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Abstract 
In both Britain and France, the international impact of the Spanish civil war 
and the history of intellectuals during the 1930s have excited considerable academic 
and popular interest. Yet surprisingly few works have looked beyond their own 
country's historiography to examine in detail the experiences of others during the 
period. A conscious comparison between events in Britain and in France sheds new 
light on the reactions in both countries to the Spanish civil war, questioning the 
assumptions of existing histories which see the war as an international conflict 
between anti-fascist and anti-communist coalitions. This thesis is also a social 
history of intellectuals, treating their politics not as the pronouncements of 
independent individuals, but as formulated within distinct professional and 
personal milieus, political organisations and university institutions. Academics and 
students in Britain approached politics in a different way to their French peers, and 
these differences significantly shaped their reactions to the Spanish civil war. This 
thesis therefore compares the repertoires of political organisation and political 
activity which developed within British and French universities, and then examines 
how these effected particular reactions to the civil war in Spain; from volunteering 
to fight, appeals for humanitarian aid and refugee relief, to debates over non- 
intervention and domestic politics. Within each of these reactions political 
commitments combined with other motives. What has been lost within the political 
rhetoric over the civil war, which has continued long after 1939, is the extent to 
which reactions to the conflict were always changing with the fortunes of battle in 
Spain, and the variety of perceptions which co-existed within political coalitions 
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Preface 
Before beginning my postgraduate studies, I had lived all my life outside of 
Europe. This background made me strongly aware that I was studying not only a 
particular country, but also an intensely diverse continent. It was the desire to 
balance both local idiosyncrasies and national currents within a wider context 
which has fuelled this study. I am particularly grateful to the friends from Britain, 
Italy, Norway, Switzerland and France whom I have been fortunate enough to 
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and local identities of the continent. Their hospitality and their friendship, not only 
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Trythall, who not only constantly raised the intellectual content of this thesis, but 
also always encouraged a wider and more nuanced view of politics. Earlier drafts of 
this work benefited from the insightful criticisms of Geoff Cubitt, Alan Forrest, and 
David Howell. I am also grateful to Tom Buchanan for generously discussing his 
own work on British reactions to the Spanish civil war with me. Thanks also go to 
Keith Gildart, John Langdon and Matt Shaw, who each took time away from their 
own research to read final drafts. 
Another academic and personal debt is to Robert Aldrich, who always 
managed to combine the role of friend and mentor, be it in Paris, London or 
Sydney. Equally, Allen Warren, the Provost of Vanbrugh College, provided timely 
assistance and advice throughout my residence in York. I would also like to thank 
the University of York for awarding me a College Research Studentship and to the 
Overseas Research Students Scheme, whose financial support made this research 
possible. 
Richard Symonds, Rachel Makinson, Allison Duke, Michael Thwaites and 
Lord Healey graciously agreed to be interviewed and each provided me with a 
stimulating vision of student life in the 1930s. I would also like to thank Eric 
Hobsbawm, John Saville, and Francoise Basch for their informative letters. 
Finally, this work would neither have been started nor completed without 
the ever-present support and encouragement of my family. 
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Initially, perhaps rightly, the gallant figure becomes a symbol, which the 
man of flesh and blood might hardly recognise, or, if he did so, might 
contemplate with healthy derision. Yet this is not an illusion to be 
dispelled... The praise should be no less, but greater, if anyone could unravel 
the tangle of weakness not wholly overcome, of conflict not wholly resolved, 
that lay behind. 
Cambridge Professor of Philosophy, Francis Cornford, 
on the death of his son in the Spanish civil war, 1937. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 1930s have long been mythologised as a unique decade of politicisation in 
Western Europe, as an age when ideological divisions and mass politics cut across the 
continent. Implicit in this view is the reductionist assumption that certain political 
activity was the inevitable result of the global economic crisis of 1929 and the rise of a 
European-wide fascism. This explanation proffered by political activists at the time has 
formed the framework for historians wanting to link the political changes which were 
occurring throughout the continent. For both contemporaries and historians, the nodal 
point for these transnational currents between 1936 and 1939 was the civil war in 
Spain. The Spanish civil war has commonly been seen as a confrontation between the 
international forces of anti-fascism and anti-communism, or as part of the developing 
conflict between the emerging fascist regimes of Central Europe, Communist Russia 
and the stagnant liberal democracies of Western Europe. 1 Despite the shared intensity 
with which many non-Spaniards viewed Iberian events, the civil war itself stirred very 
different reactions in countries such as Britain and France. These national differences 
reveal that to the extent to which there was a distinct spirit of the 1930s, it was made 
by people within and against their existing political environments, not imposed from 
outside by the logic of events. 
The Spanish civil war occupies very different positions in the historiography of 
Britain and France during the 1930s, due to both their divergent domestic politics at 
the time and the differing concerns of their historians afterwards. In Britain, where 
parliamentary politics was overwhelmingly dominated by Conservative rule 
throughout the decade, histories of the left have argued for the importance of the 
popular campaigns in support of the Spanish Republic. Appeals for humanitarian aid 
and opposition to non-intervention have been seen as fuelling a broad coalition 
outside the established Labour Party, and against the Chamberlain Government's 
policy of appeasement? Interestingly, humanitarian aid for Spain in France has excited 
little academic interest. While historians have recognised that the Front Populaire 
possessed a triple character as a government, political coalition and mass movement, 
rarely has French historiography examined the impact of the Spanish civil war on 
1 While recent historiography has stressed the indigenious origins of the civil war, the two 
most common explanations for the Republic's defeat focus on foreign intervention, either by 
Italy and Germany in supplying miltary material and men to Franco, or by the USSR for its 
manipulation of Spanish domestic politics - see George Esenwein & Adrian Shubert, Spain at 
War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931-1939, Longman, London, 1995, pp 3-4. 
2 Jim Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain: The Spanish Aid Movement in Britain 1936-39, Lawrence & 
Wishart, London, 1986. 
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these three levels, focusing instead on domestic political conflicts and industrial 
militancy 3 Rather than marking the birth of a broad reaching coalition, the Spanish 
civil war is seen as causing the first significant ruptures within the government of the 
Front Populaire over non-intervention, while there has been little exploration of the 
war's broader impact after 1936. Despite the large number of works on the effects of 
Spanish refugees on France and a number of studies on the civil war's effects on 
individual parties, unions, or regions, there have been few attempts at a national 
history of French reactions to the Spanish civil war apart from David W. Pike's 
examination of public opinion through the press. 4 Significantly, there is no French 
parallel to Tom Buchanan's recent work Britain and the Spanish Civil War which 
surveys the differing reactions of various political, humanitarian, intellectual and 
religious groups to the war. 5 
Perhaps the only area where historical accounts of British and French reactions 
to the Spanish civil war have come together is in study of the respective foreign 
policies of their governments during the 1930s. The international interaction between 
politicians, diplomats and civil servants of both countries has been well mapped, 
especially with respect to their cooperation in establishing the Non-Intervention 
Agreement over the war. 6 Pasiön y Farsa by Juan Aviles Farre is a synthesis of 
established work on the diplomatic policies of both countries, though it also examines 
some of the domestic political movements which form the focus of this thesis? This 
dissertation intends not merely to present the history of two countries side-by-side, but 
to intertwine them to the extent that the reader 'lives' in both countries at once. This 
conception of a comparative approach is more than merely a literary device, for it 
seeks to use comparison between the two countries to redirect our attention to the 
precise historical context and conditions in which politics was being acted out, thought 
through and lived. 
3 Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy 1934-1938 Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. xii. 
4 David W. Pike, Les Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1975. 
5Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1997; 
The only equivalent survey is the unpublished thesis of Richard Alan Gordon, "France & the 
Spanish Civil War', PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1971. 
6 Alpert's work despite its title seems to generalise British attitues onto other countries, 
especially in assuming French distance and ignorance of Spanish events - Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1994, pp. 1& 13. 7 Juan Aviles Farre, Pasiön y Farsa: Franceses y Britänicos ante la Guerra Civil Espanola, 
Eudema, Madrid, 1994; 
Reviewed by Jacques Maurice in Mouvement Social, 181, Oct. -Dec. 1998, p. 135. 
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Approaches to Comparative History 
A comparative history of interwar Europe is particularly appropriate for it was 
during these years that French historian Marc Bloch championed the use of 
comparative methodology in history. In January 1934, at the same time as Paris 
simmered with anti-parliamentary demonstrations, Bloch unsuccessfully sought 
appointment to the College de France, the pinnacle of French higher education, as 
Professor of the Comparative History of European Societies. 8 Bloch's commitment to 
comparative history has excited very few followers, despite the international prestige 
which his pioneering use of the social sciences attracted after his tragic death in 1944. 
While comparative research has become well established in economics, political 
science, anthropology, and sociology, it has been far less accepted in history .9 Perhaps 
this is because historians have sought to differentiate their concern for specific events 
and particularities from the general hypotheses and models of social scientists. 
Bloch argued that comparison was a valuable tool for the historian. 10 His 
conception of comparative history as a scientific methodology has lost much of its 
force today when the nation-orientated, high-politics histories he was attacking no 
longer dominate the field. Still, Bloch's underlying ambition of extending the 
boundaries of historiography by using comparison as a way of seeking new evidence, 
questioning existing assumptions and attempting new explanations remains strikingly 
powerful 11 Perhaps the true value of comparing the histories of two countries is that 
the comfortable assumptions of national histories lose their explanatory power when 
applied to another country. Comparative history fuels a reconsideration of the Spanish 
conflict by concentrating on the complex differences between the political climates and 
cultures of Britain and France. 
In the essay "The Peculiarities of the English", E. P. Thompson delivered a 
devastating critique of the assumption that the British and French shared the same 
8 Carole Fink, Marc Bloch: A Life in History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 
177-182, 
9 Charles Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, Russell Sage, New York, 
1984, p. 84; 
Raymond Grew argues that historians already use comparison in their work subconsciously - 
Raymond Grew, "The Case for Comparing Histories", American Historical Review, 85,1980, 
p768,776-777. 
10 Marc Bloch, Land and Work in Medieval Europe, trans. J. E. Anderson, Routledge, London, 
1967, p. 44. 
11 Ibid., p. 48; 
George M. Fredrickson, "From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in Cross- 
National Comparative History", Journal of American History, 82, Sept. 1995, p. 587; 
Moore, Barrington, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Allen Lane, London, 
1967, p. xii. 
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political culture or experience. 12 He argued that it was futile to look at one country as a 
model for the other as politics had developed one way in France and another way in 
Britain. Underlying this seemingly simple statement was the recognition of the 
complex differences in forms of political organisation, types of activity, social 
membership, and collective mentalites between the two countries. Rather than 
assuming a single model of political participation, Thompson argued, 
So let us look at history as history - men placed in actual contexts which they 
have not chosen, and confronted by indivertible forces, with an overwhelming 
immediacy of relations and duties and only a scant opportunity for inserting 
their own agency - and not as a text for hectoring might-have-beens. 13 
Contrasting the political life of the two countries, therefore, provides a valuable way of 
marking out the differing opportunities and constraints which faced activists in Britain 
and France. Rather than generating general models, this thesis adopts a comparative 
approach to more precisely define the nuances of national contexts, and the political 
activity and participation which was formed within them. 
One basis for comparison between the two countries is the concept of a political 
repertoire, which was defined by Charles Tilly as the accepted forms of public activity 
and organisation in his comparative examination of political struggle over different 
periods of French history. 14 The significant advantage of this comparison of political 
repertoires is that it does not assume that the existing political parties of Britain and 
France are the primary point of comparison between the two countries. Though there 
were strong similarities between the major parties of the left in the two countries - 
between the Labour Party and the Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere 
(SFIO), as well as between the British Communist Party (CPGB) and the Parti 
Communiste Francais (PCF) - which were reinforced by their international 
connections, they assumed different forms due to their national setting. 15 The 
parliamentary supremacy of the National Government in Britain after 1931 
encouraged extra-parliamentary politics which drew on the participation of new 
groups alongside the established parties. 16 In contrast, French parliamentary politics 
was far more fluid and evenly contested, with parties of both the left and the right 
12 EP Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English", Socialist Register, 1965, p. 333. 
13 Ibid. p. 342. 
14 Charles Tilly, The Contentious French: Four Centuries of Popular Struggle, Havard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 4. 
15 Fundamental to the difference between the two countries was the respective relationships 
between the industrial and political wings of their labour movements. The close collaboration 
of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour Party, contrasts to the syndicalist 
independence of French trade unions - John N. Home, Labour at War: France and Britain 1914- 
1918, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 21. 
16 Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 38. 
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gaining increasing support during the mid 1930s. Equally the relationship between 
conservatism and the extreme right differed markedly between the two countries, and 
there was no British equivalent to the anti-parliamentary politics in the streets of the 
nationalist leagues. Perhaps the greatest advantage to not focusing specifically on 
comparing the reactions of the parties themselves has been to avoid the partisanship 
with which the historiography of the civil war has been repeatedly refought by the left 
and right. A study of political repertoires enables us to gauge the different support, 
activities and aims of the established political parties and other groups which chose to 
align themselves with political debates. This foundation should be flexible enough to 
allow for meaningful comparison between the forms of political activity and 
organisation which had developed within British and French universities, and how 
these shaped their members' reactions to the war in Spain. 
The first three chapters of the thesis concentrate on mapping the character of 
the national political repertoires as they developed during the early 1930s within 
particular university structures, claiming differing traditions and forms of expression, 
and being shaped by nationally distinct political campaigns and coalitions. The 
opening chapter examines how the institutional structure of universities in the two 
countries could encourage different reactions to the same event, such as the crisis of 
German academic refugees in 1933. The reaction in British and French universities to 
the Nazification of German education provides a revealing contrast between the two 
countries, as the problems of German academic refugees were a specifically university- 
based issue. The success of a non-partisan coalition of professional relief for their 
German peers by British academics and students was an influential predecessor for the 
later humanitarian campaigns over Spain and other international events. Equally the 
limitations of university-based relief efforts in France, reflected not only institutional 
restrictions, but also the differing conception of politics held by French academics and 
students which was centred on public engagement rather than campus-centred 
activity. 
The historical development of the distinctive national approaches to politics in 
British and French universities is discussed in Chapter Two, which traces the 
respective national traditions and political repertoires which were claimed by 
university members in Paris and London. The Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the century 
established accepted forms of political activity in France for both academics and 
students, and for the left as well as the right. There was no British equivalent to the 
Dreyfus Affair as a reference point which could legitimise particular forms of politics 
for those in universities. Rather, students and academics in London found that their 
escalating political activity during the early 1930s led to conflict with university 
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authorities, who successfully sought to confine student activity within campus 
boundaries, while academics focused their political energies through established 
political parties, professional or social groups. 
Chapter Three considers how these national repertoires were put into action 
during the mid 1930s, and particularly how they were affected by the contrasting 
coalitions on the left which developed within the two countries. The differing political 
landscapes of Britain and France before 1936 are crucial to understanding their later 
reaction to the civil war in Spain, as almost from its outset, the war was fitted into pre- 
existing domestic perceptions, debates, campaigns and coalitions. 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into chapters which each compare a 
specific reaction to the war in the two countries. From volunteering to fight, the 
collection and shipping of humanitarian aid, debates over non-intervention, to the 
provision of refugee relief, these reactions each assumed their own nationally distinct 
character and forms. Despite its thematic focus, the thesis also seeks to stress the extent 
to which particular reactions or forms of politics were interconnected with others, and 
the extent to which they all changed over the course of the war. Chapter Four 
examines why British students were more prominent in volunteering for the 
International Brigades than their French counterparts, and how this has been treated 
by later historiography. The volunteers 'internationalised' the civil war in a profoundly 
personal as well as political sense, especially for the communities they left behind. 
Chapter Five focuses on the organisations, coalitions and campaigns which 
developed to send humanitarian aid to Spain during war's first ten months. In Britain, 
humanitarian aid was able to mobilise a broad range of supporters, although co- 
existing within the various coalitions and the separate aid appeals were a variety of 
perceptions of the war and its politics. Given that there has been relatively little work 
on French humanitarian aid, the dual focus on both countries breaks new ground by 
highlighting the extent to which aid efforts in France were far more party-focused than 
its neighbour's. As reflected in the way aid was organised in the two countries, the 
Spanish civil war was a much more politicised issue in France than in Britain, partly 
because of the extreme polarisation of French politics which preceded 1936. 
Overlapping and reinforcing the appeals for humanitarian aid for Spain were 
political critiques of the non-intervention policy initiated by the French and British 
governments, which are considered in Chapter Six. While pro-Republican 
historiography has overwhelmingly portrayed non-intervention as hypocritical and 
illegitimate from its birth, this ignores the strong support for the policy amongst 
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committed Republican supporters in both countries, including those in the forefront of 
organising humanitarian aid for the Republic. The role of students and academics in 
the national debates over non-intervention, reveals both the importance of domestic 
politics in shaping the tone of those debates and the growing support for the 
Communists' absolute rejection of the policy. 
The Nationalist offensive in the Basque country marked a new phase of the civil 
war, in creating the conflict's first mass refugee crisis which touched Britain and 
France differently. As refugee relief was organised along similar lines to humanitarian 
aid, Chapter Seven contrasts the more politicised relief efforts in France with the broad 
support which refugees received in Britain. 
Equally, the Northern offensive intensified appeals for aid, revealing the 
growing tensions between the parties of the Front Populaire and the success of non- 
partisan campus coalitions in British universities. Chapter Eight also stresses the 
importance of the connection between the concerted campaigns for humanitarian aid 
and the muted reaction to the May Days conflict in Barcelona. Aid efforts for Spain 
were linked to different issues in both countries; to non-partisan relief for Chinese 
universities in Britain and to the changing face of French domestic politics. 
Chapters Nine and Ten consider the debates and divisions which developed on 
the left and right in both countries during 1938. While German expansion into first 
Austria and then Czechoslovakia was a major factor in fuelling changes in the political 
landscape, these shifts were first expressed over Spain. In Britain, the emergence of a 
more defined pacifism and the debate over Air Raid Precautions, though motivated by 
events in Central Europe, focused on events in Spain as embodying the horrors of war. 
While 1936 and 1937 had largely been dominated in both countries by the left's 
campaigns in support of the Spanish Republic, the right had been fairly inactive in the 
face of the civil war. This contrast between left and right politics was partly due to 
dissolution of the leagues in France and to the rejection of activism by British 
Conservatives. In late 1938, the shifts in national debates encouraged a more active 
engagement for the students of the right, and some in Britain found themselves 
sharing common political positions as well as activism with the left. 
In both countries the last months of 1938 and the first months of 1939 marked 
the culmination of political campaigning over the civil war. The severe food shortage 
in Eastern Spain, the Republic's increasingly fragile military position after April 1938, 
and finally the massive flood of refugees from Catalonia in late January 1939 all 
evoked major relief campaigns in both Britain and France. Significantly, the 
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unavoidable involvement of the French State in providing for refugees in 1939, 
encouraged in France a university-based aid campaign to parallel those that had 
developed throughout the war in Britain. 
A Social History of Intellectuals 
Western intellectuals were central figures in the Spanish civil war and in its 
history. 17 Most work has focused on the experiences of well-known writers and poets 
such as Hemingway, Orwell, Malraux, Auden, Spender and Bernanos, and on their 
novels, plays, poems or paintings which were inspired by the war. Such studies have 
often assumed a particular definition of the intellectual, as an independent individual, 
a creator of culture choosing between their disinterested art and political engagement. 
These themes have been central to several major studies on Communist intellectuals in 
Britain and France, which have argued there is a fundamental contradiction between 
an intellectual's independent identity and their membership of a Stalinist party. 18 With 
the recent collapse of the Soviet Communism, these arguments were restated by Tony 
Judt and Francois Furet who have attacked the moral blindness of French intellectuals 
whose public commitment to the PCF and the USSR was unaffected by Communist 
repression in Eastern Europe 19 However, while assumptions of independence and 
detachment are central to so many theoretical definitions and justifications of 
intellectual identity, this distance was rarely part of real experience. 
Recent French historiography has reversed this definition of the intellectual, 
from an identity rooted in the individual to that of a collective group, which has 
encouraged a rapid growth in the social history of intellectuals 20 As Christophe 
Prochasson has argued, 
A history of intellectuals cannot be written if it excludes either an element of 
social history (the history of individuals located within a particular social 
17 Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier Julian Bell and John Cornford 
- their lives and the 1930s. Constable, London, 1966; 
Stanley Weintraub, The Last Great Cause: The Intellectuals and the Spanish Civil War, W. H. 
Allen, London, 1968. _ 18 David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960. Andre Deutsch, London, 
1964, pp. 34-48; 
Neal. Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, Victor Gollancz, London, 1959, pp. 17 & 30. 19 Jeremy Jennings, "Of Treason, Blindness and Silence: Dilemmas of the Intellectual in Modem 
France" in Jeremy Jennings & Anthony Kemp-Welch, Intellectuals in Politics: From the Dreyfus 
Affair to Salman Rushdie. Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 67-68. 20 Jeremy Jennings, "Introduction: Mandarins and Samurais" in Jeremy Jennings, ed., 
Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century France: Mandarins and Samurais St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 1993, pp. 8-11. 
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environment, the history of their practices and... the history of their behaviour) 
or a history of their ideas. 21 
At the forefront of this new approach has been the work of Christophe Charle, who 
has argued that the image of the intellectual as a detached individual, which has been 
derived from writers or artists, obscures the extent to which other intellectuals, such as 
those in universities, intervened collectively in French politics drawing on shared 
backgrounds of social, professional, religious, personal and other networks22 Charle 
has sketched this social framework of family, career and politics in his series of 
collected biographies for Paris academics during the Third Republic, covering the 
College de France and Sorbonne23 By shifting the focus away from independent 
intellectuals, social history offers a more nuanced understanding of the relationships 
between intellectuals and established political parties, and a broader vision of politics. 
Tony Judt at his more tendentious describes the Communist Party intellectual 
as an oxymoron? 4 The assumed contradiction between intellectual integrity and party 
discipline also underlines the work of David Caute 25 Intellectuals often acted as 
outside supporters for established parties, yet it is to miscast their collective history to 
see them as either hypocritical fellow-travellers or naively manipulated? 6 The focus on 
Communist intellectuals from the 1930s onwards, ignores the actual circumstances of 
the Dreyfusard crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century which is seen as giving 
birth to intellectuals as an independent force in French political life. In fact, many 
Dreyfusard intellectuals were from the first closely aligned with French socialists, and 
either became members of the party or committed supporters during the crisis. It was 
not independence, but rather their relationship to existing parties which differentiated 
intellectuals in Britain and France. Either as experts within the party or outside patrons 
who gave it committed support, intellectuals maintained a distinct political identity, 
21 Christope Prochasson, "Intellectuals as Actors: Image and Reality" in Jeremy Jennings, ed., 
Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century France: Mandarins and Samurais, p. 59. 
22 Christophe Charle, Les Naissance des "Intellectuels", 1880-1900, Minuit, Paris, 1990, p. 7; 
Jennings argues that this sociological definition of intellectuals developed at a time of debate 
over the disappearance of intellectuals in France - Jennings, "Of Treason, Blindness and Silence: 
Dilemmas of the Intellectual in Modern France", p. 73. 
23 Christophe Charle & Eva Telkes, Les Professeurs de la Faculte des Sciences de Paris: 
Dictionnaire Biographique 1901-1939, INRP/CNRS, Paris, 1989. 
Christophe Charle & Eva Telkes, Les Professeurs du College de France: Dictionnaire 
Biographique 1901-1939, INRP/ CNRS, Paris, 1988. 
Christophe Charle, Les Professurs de la Facult6 des Lettres de Paris, Dictionnaire Biographique 
1909-1939, Vol 2., INRP/ CNRS, Paris, 1986. 
24 Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1992, p. 118. 
25 Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960, passim; 
David Cauth, The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London, 1973, passim. 
26 Michel Winock, Le Sipcle des Intellectuels, Seuil, Paris, 1997, p. 229. 
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which self-consciously claimed legitimacy for political engagement by reference to 
their occupational role as society's 'thinkers'. Academics and students in Britain and 
France saw themselves as a distinct social and occupational group, yet while they 
largely engaged in politics with distinct organisations, forms and objectives, these 
were rarely intended as absolutely separate from the party politics of the 1930s? ' 
A second valuable element of social history's conception of the intellectual is 
that it also allows for the recognition that political engagement developed within a 
personal, social and professional matrix which included many non-political factors 
such as personality, religion, social milieu and career. Gary Werskey, in his study of 
the British scientists who most prominently committed themselves to the left during 
the 1930s, stresses the extent to which their professional and political lives 
interconnected as marxist materialism seemed to offer a scientific understanding of 
politics consistent with their own academic research. 28 Equally, Jean-Francois Sirinelli 
in his study of French academic elites has stressed the importance of sociability and 
the connections of friendship, in shaping small political groups29 The importance of 
these non-political factors within the university environment in shaping opportunities 
for political activity by academics and students forms the focus for the first third of the 
thesis. Politics developed within the university as a structural and social phenomenon 
that was formulated and expressed within the limits of immediate environments. 
Differences between institutions in political organisation, activity and consciousness 
were encouraged by divergences in the ways universities taught and organised. 
However, politics was also a social phenomenon - individually expressed, often 
reacting to mentors, peers, current concerns or traditional assumptions. The place of 
religion, gender and class in shaping the social milieu of institutions also encouraged, 
or reinforced, political differences. The university was both a structural institution and 
a social milieu, and these two elements powerfully effected the place of intellectual 
politics during the 1930s. 
27 Despite the growing youth movements of the 1930s, especially in France, students 
maintained their own distinct identies and organisations - Remi Fabre, "Les Mouvements de 
Jeunesse dans la France de 1'Entre-Deux-Guerres", Mouvement Social, 168, July-Sept 1984, pp. 
9-30. 
28 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists 
of the 1930s , 2nd ed., Free Association Books, London, 1988. 29 Jean-Francois Sirinelli, 'The Concept of an Intellectual Generation" in Jeremy Jennings, ed., 
Intellectuals in Twentieth-Century France: Mandarins and Samurais St. Martin's Press, New 
York, 1993, p. 90. 
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Universities in the 1930s 
To the outsider, the intellectual, social and political life of a university seems to 
constitute a unified community distinct from its surroundings, yet from within, 
university life often seems comprised of a diffuse milieu of sub-cultures, groups and 
individuals 30 Equally the insider is highly sensitive to the distinctive identities and 
characters of the various institutions, be they residential colleges, faculties, or 
departments, which those outside the university see as merely common components of 
the whole. To survey the different character of universities within each country, seven 
British and eight French institutions were selected to be studied. In Britain these were 
the universities of Cambridge, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Oxford, as well as the 
London School of Economics and University College London which were both part of 
the federal University of London. In France, research was focused on the universities 
of Bordeaux, Lille, Marseille, Montpellier, Toulouse and Paris as well as two French 
institutions with no British parallel, the $cole Normale Superteure and the College de 
France. 
Perhaps the most significant contrast between the system of higher education in 
the two counties was that in France, universities were state institutions whereas in 
Britain, despite their reliance on government funding following the First World War, 
they remained largely independent. As a result, there was a stronger interconnection 
between French universities and the other levels of state education than in Britain 
where the university tended to stand as largely distinct. The head of each French 
university, the Rector, exemplified this integration of the state system, for he was 
responsible to the Minister of National Education for primary, secondary and higher 
education in his region. Equally the words etudiant and professeur covered both those in 
universities and those in secondary schools and lycees, as compared to the far more 
distinct meanings of undergraduate, don, lecturer and professor in Britain. The career 
paths of many French academics often began at a lycee and could extend to university 
appointments across the country. Despite this contrast between a highly centralised 
state system in France and the independent universities of Britain, there were many 
similarities between their institutional structure and social milieu. 
University students in both countries were almost definitionally part of their 
society's upper ranks, although as Zeldin notes "the relation of class and education was 
complex and not automatic" 31 In both countries the expansion of higher education at 
30 Raymond Williams, What I Came Lo Sav, Hutchinson, Radius, London, 1989, p. 4. 
31 Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945, Vol 1: Ambition, Love and Politics, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1973, p. 18. 
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the turn of the nineteenth century, had increased student numbers and accessibility-32 
Still universities remained institutions for a privileged minority, and perhaps more 
significantly, the massive growth of higher education produced a fragmented 
structure, which entrenched a bifurcation between 'elite' institutions and their 'civic' 
counterparts, who differed significantly in resources, student composition, teaching 
and prestige. 
In both countries the apex of higher education, was occupied by elite-forming 
institutions which largely controlled access to the higher professions and public office. 
With the expansion and reform of the universities these had "moved from monopoly 
to pre-eminence", largely maintaining their prestigious status 33 Institutions such as 
the Ecole Normale Superieure and the specialised grandes ecoles in France as well as the 
universities of Oxford and Cambridge in Britain, were "at the head of the academic 
hierarchy of prestige, achievement, and reputation known to every academic, 
professional, and businessmen"34 Significantly, the College de France, the $cole 
Normale Superieure and the Brandes ecoles formed a distinct and largely autonomous 
sector outside the state system of universities 35 Unlike Britain, the highest levels of 
research, as well as technical and professional teaching often lay outside the French 
universities, which "never became the true apex of the educational system" though this 
separation was lessened by the personal interaction between the different 
institutions 36 Universities in Britain and France developed along divergent lines, 
though they were both components of a highly stratified education system. 
32 In 18% the existing regional Faculties in France were amalgamated into 15 universities, 
while the number of French students rose throughout the Third Republic, from 11,200 in 1876 
to 81,000 by 1935. In Britain, 6 new universities were built from metropolitan technical colleges 
at the turn of the century which allowed the student population to increase from 16,735 
students in 1899 to 50,000 students during the second half of 1930s - Joseph K. Moody, French 
Education Since Napoleon, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1978, pp. 113 & 143; 
Harold Perkin, Key Profession: The History of the Association of University Teachers, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1969, pp. 23 & 57; 
Fritz K. Ringer, Education and Society in Modern Europe, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington, 1979, p. 229. 
George Weisz, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France 1863-1914, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1983, pp. 225 & 242. 
33 A. H. Halsey, Decline of Donnish Dominion: The British Academic Profession in the 
Twentieth Century, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 60. 
34 Harold J. Perkin, 'The Academic Profession in the United Kingdom" in Burton R. Clark, ed., 
The Academic Profession: National, Disciplinary & Institutional Settings, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1987, p. 21. 
35 Erhard Friedberg & Christine Musselin, "The Academic Profession in France" in Burton R. 
Clark, ed., TheAcademic Profession: National, Disciplinary & Institutional Settings, p. 93. 
36 Theodore Zeldin, "Higher Education in France 1848-1940", Journal of Contemporary History, 
2,3, July 1%7, p. 69. 
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The unique character of the Brandes ecoles and Oxbridge was reinforced by their 
selective admission of students, their closely supervised teaching environment, and for 
the latter, its residential nature. Selective admission was based on a combination of 
financial and academic constraints, such as the requirement of an entrance exam in 
classics, which privileged students from the lycees and the public schools 37 Admission 
automatically made the student part of a well defined elite, physically as well as 
intellectually. The Ecole Normale Superteure took in only fifty students a year, while at 
Oxford and Cambridge students joined a similarly small cadre through their 
membership of a residential college. Within Oxford, 
The tightness of the college community owed much to a shared educational 
and social background. Inter-war Oxford was overwhelmingly middle-class in 
its composition. Oxford undergraduates were instantly recognisable by their 
gowns, accents and clothing: grey flannel trousers, tweed jacket, collar and tie 
for ordinary occasions, white flannels and blazer for sporting functions. Yet 
within this middle-class collegiate world there were many gradations of status 
and marked contrasts in income 38 
In both countries class and gender were powerful markers of the separation between 
'elite' and 'civic' universities. 
For those who went up to Oxford or Cambridge from working class 
backgrounds, there was a feeling of incredible distance from the upper class public 
school culture which set the dominant tone 39 In France, the Republican concept of 
meritocratic opportunity was partly undermined by the education system's reliance on 
rigorous exams which made a student's cultural capital crucial to their chances of 
success. Family background therefore played a large role in preparing students for the 
arduous concours of the Ecole Normale Superteure, or the entrance exams for the 
grandes ecoles or Faculties of Law and Medicine. 
Like class, gender differentiated elite institutions from the civic universities in 
both Britain and France. Throughout the inter-war period, women were not only a 
small minority of the university population of Oxford and Cambridge, but they were 
formally "half-in and half-out of the university' . 40 These restrictions encouraged the 
37 Daniel I. Greenstein, 'The Junior Members, 1900-1990: A Profile" in Brian Harrison, ed., The 
History of Oxford, Vol III: The Twentieth Century, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 47; 
T. E. B. Howarth, Cambridge Between Two Wars, Collins, London, p. 65. 
38 Brian Harrison, "College Life, 1918-1939" in Harrison, ed., The History of Oxford. Vol III: The 
Twentieth Century, p. 94 
39 Raymond Williams, Politics and Letters. New Left Books, London, 1979, p. 39. 
40 Rita McWilliams-Tullberg, Women at Cambridge: A Men's University -Though of a Mixed 





women to work to a higher academic standard than their male peers and perhaps also 
increased their willingness to engage in political activity. 41 The male residential 
colleges dictated the dominant ethos of Oxbridge, for as Margaret Cole remembered of 
her exclusion from the college Senior Common Room enjoyed by her husband, "later 
generations can have little idea how male was the adult life of intellectual Oxford". 42 
Equally, the most prestigious French grandes ecoles remained all-male » By 1935 there 
were over 20,000 women studying at French universities, representing a quarter of the 
total student population. However, most of this number were concentrated in 
studying for lower level degrees and located in particular faculties. 44 Perhaps most 
significantly, their restricted access to elite institutions meant that there was a dearth of 
female academics, especially in France. It was their professional exclusion from the 
higher ranks of learning and teaching rather than their political disenfranchisement 
which was the main factor responsible for making intellectual a male identity. 45 
Reinforcing these social differences between the universities, were structural 
differences which affected how teaching and campus life were organised. Teaching 
was predominantly on a smaller scale in the 'elite' institutions, allowing for more 
personal supervision. While the students of the $cole Normale Superieure and 
Oxbridge attended lectures within their respective universities, the primary form of 
teaching was through individual tutorials or in small group seminarsffi This intimate 
style of teaching encouraged a unique ethos, an emphasis on discussion and much 
closer relations between students and academics. These close contacts were reinforced 
in Oxbridge, though not in France, by the collegiate residence of students and 
academics together. The collegiate environment was an influential frame in which 
Oxford had admitted female students as full members of the university following the First 
World War, but had imposed a quota on their numbers in 1927, while Cambridge refused to 
grant them full membership of the university - Janet Howarth, "Women" in Harrison, ed., The 
History of Oxford, Vol III: The Twentieth Century. pp 349-350. 
41 Ibid p. 366; 
Gary Wersky describes the numerically small contingent of female students and academics in 
the science labs of Cambridge as by almost be definition a "gifted and suppressed minority" - 
Werskey, The Visible College, p. 221. 
42 Margaret Cole, The Life of G. D. H. Cole. Macmillan, London, 1971, p. 145. 
43 Weisz, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France 1863-1914, p. 243. 
44 In 1935,46% of French students in the Faculty of Letters and 43% of those studying 
Pharmacy were women, while they were only 15% of the student population in the Faculty of 
Law and 23% of those in the Faculties of Medicine and Science - Ibid., p. 246. 45 Christophe Charle, La Republique des Universitaires 1870-1940. Seuil, Paris, 1994, pp. 217- 
222. 
46 Robert J. Smith, L'Lcole Normale Superieure and the Third Republic State University of 
New York Press, Albany, 1982, pp. 18 & 74. 
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undergraduates experienced university, and while they never dictated the attitudes of 
their diverse membership, they provided opportunities for organisation and contact 47 
In both countries civic universities followed a different educational model that 
reflected their expansionist backgrounds. This allowed them to admit more students, 
as did the lecture structure of their courses. Their largely local student intake and the 
more applied nature of their courses, gave them a more regional nature than their 
'elite' peers 48 The non-residential character of British civic universities was perhaps 
the most significant factor that made separated them from their elite counterparts. Not 
living on campus removed a potential focus for group activity or identity, while it 
meant students and academics were automatically more involved in activities outside 
the university. As the student magazine of the University of Edinburgh recorded, 
A large number of students have lived in Edinburgh all their lives, and to them 
the University with its three classes a day is only an incident.. The average Arts 
Class is not conducive to the evocation of that shy spirit called corporate. A 
few score of mildly bored and harassed people walk in, write hard for an hour, 
snap their books shut, and hurry on to do it all again round the corner... There 
are, of course, the Athletic Club and some seventy societies... Society meetings 
are generally rather like Tutorials, but they last longer and fewer people are 
present49 
University life was not only organised on a different basis at civic institutions, but it 
was also seen as a less overwhelming experience. 
Interestingly, in British 'civic' universities there was still an emphasis on 
campus clubs and societies on an Oxbridge model, whereas in France these internal 
organisations were largely non-existent. As a visiting commission of British academics 
representing the Association of University Teachers reported in 1930 that at French 
universities, 
Instruction is largely on formal lines and there is little intimate contact and 
certainly no continuous contact between professor and student.... Corporate 
student life is self-organised and self-governed, and has grown up alongside of, 
rather than within, the universities 50 
47 Another difference between the two countries was the professional specialisation of French 
studies, while at Oxbridge notions of a balanced general 'gentleman's education' strongly 
persisted. Significantly the study of economics and politics developed within the Ecole Libre 
des Sciences Politiques in Paris and the Faculties of Law which were seen as largely 
conservative institutions, while at Oxbridge they were taught as "Modern Greats" or PPE 
(Philosophy, Politics and Economics) which meant they developed next to the humanities. 48 Halsey, Decline of Donnish Dominion. p. 61. 49 The Student, Jan. 1936, p. 159. 
50 The Universities Review. 3,1, Oct. 1930, p. 52; 
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University life was therefore more self-contained and campus-focused in Britain while 
in France, politics for academics and students was centred on public activity and 
organisation rather than within the university. To an extent, this distinction was 
encouraged by the way the historical record has been preserved, for British 
universities have devoted considerable resources to recording their own internal 
activities. For French education, the historian is frequently reliant on other sources, 
particularly the press and police, which give an external view and emphasis to 
university activities. 
This contrast in sources has significant consequences in the way university 
politics are recorded. They are described as part of a milieu of campus social, cultural, 
sporting and political activities in Britain, whereas in France they are seen as occurring 
outside the university. Charle writes that the two main sources for the political 
attitudes of students are the press, which is frequently unreliable and imprecise, or 
police reports, which are often biased and contain significant gaps 51 Perhaps more 
importantly than these criticisms, this focus on activity daps la rue ignores the stratum 
of sub-political informal meetings, discussions and activities which are visible in 
British student publications. For example, the dissolution of the nationalist leagues in 
1936 means that French students of the extreme right largely disappear from the 
historical record. While it is harder to find evidence for their politics during the second 
half of the 1930s, it is fairly certain that dissolution had also produced a transformation 
of their activities for despite increased police scrutiny they no longer had a public face. 
The contrast in sources available in Britain and France reinforces, rather than 
undermines this dissertation's central contention that political activity developed 
within British universities during the 1930s in a more broad-reaching and non-partisan 
way, facilitated by its enclosed environment, whereas in France, students and 
academics remained more strongly divided by party politics. Consciously comparing 
the different character of archival material which has been preserved in the two 
countries, gives the historian a wider awareness of what may have been left 
unrecorded, of where there may be silences or gaps in the sources. 
Weisz, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France 1863-1914, p. 303. 
51 Charle, Les Naissance des "Intellectuels". p. 62. 
David Berry is equally critical of police reports as sources, which he argues miss the nuances of 
labour movement and confuse subtle differences and tendencies, however these are defended 
as a source for political history by Robert Soucy - David Berry, 'The Response of the French 
Anarchist Movement to the Russian Revolution (1917-24) and to the Spanish Revolution and 
Civil War (1936-39)", D. Phil, Sussex, 1988, p. 15; 
Robert Soucy, French Fascism: The Second Wave 1933-1939. Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1995, pp. 323-324. 
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This thesis seeks to use comparative history and social history to give a deeper 
and more nuanced understanding of interwar politics. By examining the political 
repertoires adopted by different groups at different times, we obtain a clearer image of 
how forms of activity and organisation shaped their reactions to specific events. 
Equally, social history offers an understanding of how politics was influenced by other 
factors, including personal and professional concerns. Adopting both these approaches 
demystifies and contextualises the political engagement of British and French 
intellectuals during the 1930s. Both academics and students reacted to the civil war in 
Spain through diverse organisations with a variety of means and motives. In 
examining how they approached politics through the 1930s it becomes clear that not 
only were the university members of France and Britain participating in different 
political climates, but that the nature of political activity itself was very different 
'between the two countries. 
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Chapter 1 
'A Crisis in the University World': German Academic Refugees 
The Nazification of German Universities 
The birth of the Nazi Reich in 1933 directly touched the international 
university community. As part of the new government's policy to racially and 
politically 'purify' all state institutions over a thousand German academics were 
dismissed or forced out of their university positions. 1 The exodus of these academic 
refugees overseas evoked significantly different responses from Britain and France 
due to their distinctive university systems. The campaigns to aid German academics 
which developed within British and French universities registered the differing 
political opportunities and limitations in the two countries. These diverging 
reactions to the same event also established campaigns, coalitions and perceptions 
which shaped the responses of academics and students to other international events 
later in the decade. 
In mid-March 1933, the Director of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE), William Beveridge, received a letter from his university 
contacts in Vienna detailing the establishment of a committee to aid the refugees 
from German universities by Paris academics. Given Beveridge's leadership role in 
similar relief efforts in Britain, it suggested "that it would be of great importance if a 
contact between English and French personalities could be established before a 
definite scheme will be adopted by the French Committee"? Beveridge therefore 
wrote to Sylvain Levi of the College de France, who had been identified as the 
"'spiritus rector' of the whole work", including details of his School's relief fund and 
the national appeal launched by the newly-formed Academic Assistance Council 
(AAC). 3 Yet despite this early contact between academics in the two countries, 
British and French responses to events in Germany followed distinct paths. In 
Britain, the AAC, supported by a broad coalition of professional and political 
groups, successfully coordinated a national campaign that funded positions for the 
refugees at universities across the country. The state structure of French universities 
militated against such a campaign, as did the character of the refugee influx from 
1 Academics were only one group amongst the mass exodus from Nazi Germany, which 
between 1933 and 1941 totalled an estimated 300,000 refugees - Gerhard Hirschfeld, 
"Introduction" in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., Exile in Great Britain: Refugees from Hitler's 
Germany. Berg Publishers, Leamington Spa, 1984, p. 2. 2 Letter of 17/3/ 1933, Mss SPSL 144, Bodleian Library. 
3 Letter of 22/ 5/ 1933, Ibid. 
31 
Germany which made refugee relief a more politicised issue in France. In both 
countries, academics and students found their efforts shaped by the opportunities 
afforded by their own universities and the contours of national politics. 
By early May 1933, all non-Aryans and political opponents of the Nazi 
regime had been excluded by law from the civil service, including the state 
universities 4 Legislation was also enacted which limited the number of Jewish 
students to 1.5% of the total student body in German higher education. These 
accumulating legal restrictions were parallelled by widespread intimidation and 
anti-semitic violence on the streets and within universities 5 Amongst the books 
burnt on 10 May 1933 were those of some current German academics 6 Within a 
year of the Nazis coming to power, an estimated 1,100 German university 
academics were forced out of their positions, representing 15% of the nation's 
teaching body? Many of these "displaced scholars" were senior figures with 
international reputations; the average period of teaching for the refugees was 22 
years and a quarter were full professors. This radical transformation of German 
universities by the Nazi state aroused international concern, especially amongst 
academics who had known as colleagues and friends those who were being forced 
to the margins of the new Reich. 
'Contre l'Antisemitisme: A Parisian Protest 
On 22 and 27 April 1933, Le Temps carried a petition against the growth of 
anti-semitism in Germany signed by almost 200 Paris academics .8 The petition was 
sponsored by the newly formed Comit6 d'Accueil et d'Aide aux Victimes de 
1'Antisemitisme Allemand, led by a former Prime Minister (Paul Painleve) and a 
former Minister of Public Instruction (Senator Andre Honnorat). 9 Significantly the 
wording of the petition treated German anti-semitism as a moral issue, and 
explicitly claimed its signatories to be representatives of the national conscience. 
Such a role harked back to that which French academics had most publicly claimed 
4 Michael Burleigh & Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, p. 78. 
5 Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship: The Origins. Structure and Consequences 
of National Socialism. Penguin, London, 1970, pp. 335-339 
6 Burleigh & Wippermann, The Racial State, p. 80. 
7AAC Annual Report .1/5/ 1934, p. 12 in Mss SPSL 1, Bodleian Library; SPSL Annual Report, 22/ 7/ 1937, p. 6 in Mss SPSL 1. 
8 Newspaper clippings of 22/ 4/ 1933 & 27/4/1933 in BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de 
Police, Paris. 
9 The committee also included Senator Justin Godart, Edmond de Rothschild and the Grand 
Rabbi of France. 
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as intellectuels engages during the Dreyfusard crisis of 1898.10 Though the signatories 
of the Le Temps petition had been overwhelmingly drawn from the academic 
institutions of Paris, their conception of intellectual identity meant that they had 
acted in the name of general principles rather than over the specific repression of 
the German universities. This stance contrasts to that adopted during the following 
month by British academics, who choose to deliberately down-play the impact of 
anti-semitism on events in Germany and focused instead on academic refugees as a 
professional issue when they formed the AAC. 11 
It was not only the sheer number of signatories to the Le Temps petition that 
was impressive, but also the professional titles that accompanied these leading 
names. Of the 60 signatories of the first instalment of the petition, two thirds were 
members of the Institute, 16 belonged to the Academie de Medecine, and two to the 
Academie Francaise. Their prestige probably facilitated the second list of signatories 
five days later, which was drawn almost exclusively from within the University of 
Paris. The petition was so successful in mobilising the elite of French academia that 
it reached across political, religious and institutional boundaries 12 Jews and 
Catholics, partisans of the left and the right, and many who abstained from public 
politics all came together in a petition which explicitly described itself as above 
considerations of politics. Amongst the signatories were several academics who 
would later find themselves on opposing sides over the Spanish civil war. 13 
The elite support and the breadth of the non-partisan appeal of the Le 
Temps petition represented the high watermark of its genre during the 1930S. 14 
Given the emphasis in French historiography on the structural divisions between 
10 The Dreyfus Affair and the political traditions it defined will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
Sudhir Hazareesingh argues that the politics of French intellectuals have traditionally 
focused on universalist arguments of abstrach truth, moral justice and universal reason - 
Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modem France Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1994, p. 52. 
11 Beveridge had been discouraged by the Royal Society from seeking a Jewish Hononorary 
Secretary in the formation of the AAC, and ultimately only one British academic of Jewish 
faith was included amongst the 43 signatories to its initial appeal - William Beveridge, A 
Defence of Free Learning, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 3. 
12 The personal, professional and political biographies of many of the signatories are 
detailed in the following works - Charle & Telkes, Les Professeurs du College de France, 
passim.; 
Charle & Telkes, Les Professeurs de la Faculte des Sciences de Paris, passim; 
Charle, Les Professeurs de la Faculte des Lettres de Paris. passim. 13 In 1936, germanist Victor Basch & physicist Paul Langevin emerged as two key figures 
championing the cause of the Spanish Republic while in the Faculty of Law, Louis Le Fur 
played a similar role for the Nationalists. 
14 Bertrand Laguerre, "Les Petitionnaires du Front Populaire 1934-1939", Revue d'Histoire 
Moderne et Contemporaine, 37,1990, p. 506. 
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Faculties and the centralisation of higher education around Paris, it is not surprising 
that over half of the petition's signatories were concentrated within the politically 
prominent College de France and the Sorbonne. Yet the support from the Faculties 
of Medicine and Law was also significant, given the less prominent role their 
members played in later, more political, petitions in the 1930s. 
TABLE 1.1 ACADEMIC SIGNATORIES OF THE LE TEMPS PETTTION15 
Institution 22/4/33 27/4/33 Total 
College de France 14 21 35 
(16.2%) 
Sorbonne 21 52 73 
Sorbonne (non-professorial) - 5 5 
(36.1%) 
Faculty of Medicine 4 5 9 
Faculty of Medicine (non-professorial) - 15 15 
(11.1%) 
Faculty of Pharmacy - 4 4 
(19%) 
Faculty of Law 2 19 21 
(9.7%) 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes 2 26 28 
(13.0%) 
Other 17 9 26 
(12.0%) 
Total 60 156 216 
Perhaps what is most striking about the 216 names is the extent to which this 
mobilisation of France's university elite was exclusively Parisian. A handful of 
academics in provincial universities did take public positions against German anti- 
semitism, but they did so within their local communities rather than on the national 
stage. 16 At the University of Bordeaux, mass meetings against fascism were 
15 Newspaper clippings of 22/4/1933 & 27/4/1933 in BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de 
Police, Paris; 
In 1936-37 the professorial staff of each institution numbered: 42 at the College de France, 
139 at the Sorbonne, 50 in the Faculty of Medicine, and 44 inthe Faculty of Law - Ministere 
de 1'Education Nationale: Tableau de Classement du Personnel Enseienant 1/ 111937- 2T 
665, AD Nord. 
16 In late April 1933, Rector Chatelet of the University of Lille was invited by the Ligue 
Internationale Contre le Racisme at 1Anti-Semitism to support a local meeting which was 
attended by 1,200 people - Letter of 21 / 4/ 1933,2 T 747, AD Nord; 
Report of 28/4/1933, M155-38, AD Nord. 
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organised by the left-wing students' group the Ligue d'Action Universitaire 
Republicaine et Socialiste (LAURS) in early April and mid-May 1933.17 Rather than 
motivated by events in Germany these were directed against their fellow students 
of the extreme right, who violently interrupted the second meeting, causing several 
injuries. On 24 May 1933, LAURS organised a meeting in Bordeaux on "Le Fascisme 
en Allemagne" which attracted an audience of around 600 people, whom police 
identified as mostly students. 18 Following the main speaker from Germany, 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bordeaux', Henri Daudin, appealed to 
the meeting to establish a local section of the Comite d'Aide aux Victimes du 
Fascisme Hitlerien. Given Daudin's pro-communist political commitments, it is 
probable that the committee to which he referred was an offshoot of the PCF. 19 
Strikingly, unlike the campaigns within British universities to aid German refugee 
scholars, it was political parties and not professional groups which were able to 
establish in France the organisations which most successfully mobilised academics 
and students on a national basis. 
British Refugee Relief and the Academic Assistance Council 
Though there was no British petition which parallelled that in Le Temps, a 
similar array of leading academics came together to organise relief funds and 
university positions for their German counterparts 20 Beveridge was on a visit to 
Vienna in late March 1933 when he first heard of the dismissal of leading German 
academics on racial and political grounds by the new Nazi regime21 Responding to 
the fears of continental colleagues, he returned to Britain committed to organising 
assistance. By mid-May 1933, his initiatives within the London School of Economics 
had established an Academic Freedom Committee which sought to fund research 
and teaching positions at the LSE for the German refugees through staff 
17 Report of 7/4/1933,1 M 525, AD Gironde; 
Report of 17/5/1933, Ibid. 
18 Report of 24/ 5/ 1933, Ibid. 
19 Daudin's political position is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3; 
The British parrallel of this committee, the Relief Committee for the Victims of German 
Fascism was seen by the Labour Party as a Communist front organisation - see footnote 44. 20 The Times. 26/ 4/ 1933, contained a letter to the Editor from 18 academics at Cambridge, 
Oxford, Edinbrugh and Bangor protesting the dismissal of Dr Bernhardt Zondek from his 
position in Germany. 
21 Beveridge, A Defence of Free Learning, p. 1; 
Ralph Dahrendorf, LSE: A History of the London School of Economics & Political Science 
1895-1995 Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 287; 
R. M. Cooper, ed., Refugee Scholars: Conversations with Tess Simpson, Moorland Books, 
Leeds, 1992, p. 31. 
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donations22 Professor of Economics Lionel Robbins had recommended a scaled 
voluntary contribution scheme for staff (ranging from 3% of professors' salaries to 
1% for lecturers) to raise 1,000 pounds a year for three years 23 This provided the 
basis for an initial appeal at the LSE which raised 1,100 pounds, with a further 600 
pounds conditionally promised for the following two years. 24 LSE's commitment to 
the social sciences may have encouraged these efforts to welcome refugee 
academics, as the School was more suited than other British institutions to the 
theoretical nature of German scholarship. 25 Over the next six years LSE's Academic 
Assistance Account raised 3,141 pounds which provided grants to 26 academic 
refugees. 26 
At the same time as initiating the development of LSE's Academic Freedom 
Committee, Beveridge was also active in the formation of a national Academic 
Assistance Council to organise a similar provision of professional aid across British 
universities. The first public appeal of the AAC on 24 May 1933 was in Beveridge's 
words "as impressive as any such list could be" 27 Besides Beveridge, the AAC's 
sponsors included the Provost of University College London (Dr Mawer), the Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of Oxford (A. D. Lindsay who was also Master of 
Balliol College) and prominent professors from Cambridge and Oxford (such as 
F. G. Hopkins and physicist Lord Rutherford). 28 Like the signatories of the Le 
Temps petition, these names were not only leaders in their academic fields but 
drawn from a variety of institutions and political groups. 29 Unlike their Paris 
counterparts, the academics of the AAC focused specifically on actions against 
German universities, thereby seeking to avoid any wider debate over the legitimacy 
or merits of the Nazi government. The AAC's initial appeal argued that the crisis 
22 The Committee included the Director, Dr Dalton and Professors Laski, Parry, Power, 
Robbins and Webster - Statement, Coll Misc 22/ 10, LSE Archives. 23 Minutes of Professorial Council 17/5/1933, Coll Misc 349/A, LSE Archives. 
24 The efforts by their teachers, were parralleled by LSE students whose Union established a 
German Refugees Scholarship Fund which quickly raised 160 pounds - Clare Market 
Review, Spring Term 1934, p. 3. 
25 Paul Hoch argues that the secondary migration of German academic refugees from 
Britain to the US was fuelled by the intellectual differences between scholarship in the two 
countries, which ignores the powerful financial constrains which faced British universities - 
Paul K. Hoch, "No Utopia: Refugee Scholars in Britain", History Today, 35, Nov. 1983, pp. 
54-55. 
26 Report of 7/ 6/ 1939, Coll Misc 349/B, LSE Archives. 
27 Beveridge, A Defence of Free Learning, p. 3. 28 Ibid., p. 5. 
List cMay 1933, Mss SPSL 1, Bodleian Library. 
29 Hopkins and Rutherford were active adherents of the Labour Party and the Conservative 
Party respectively, while Beveridge was a supporter of the Liberal Party - Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and Socialists of the 1930s 
2nd ed., Free Association Books, London, 1988, p. 222. 
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was not merely a Jewish issue or a German one, but a matter of academic 
freedom. 30 Distinctively, the AAC saw itself as a national organisation to coordinate 
support from institutions and individuals across the country for the provision of 
academic positions for the German refugees. 
Within a matter of weeks the AAC's first appeal had raised 10,000 pounds 31 
Only a quarter of this total had come from large donations. 32 Though Beveridge 
sought funds from private foundations and other charitable institutions, he noted 
that British universities were the strongest financial supporters of the AAC's 
efforts 33 Part of this success was due to large donations from the residential 
colleges of Oxford and Cambridge which were institutions with their own financial 
resources and administration. The individual colleges within the University of 
Cambridge contributed 1,025 pounds to the first appeal. Parallelling this effort was 
the support of the Association of University Teachers (AUT) whose membership 
was largely drawn from universities outside Oxbridge. In the spring term of 1935, 
an appeal was made directly to the 1,500 members of the AUT which raised 1,481 
pounds 34 
Though the leaderships of both the AAC and the AUT disavowed political 
positions (defined in their minds by party or ideology), their professional concerns 
forced them to take public positions over events in Germany. As the AUT's journal, 
The Universities Review stated over recent Nazi policy, "the Association of 
University Teachers has always stood aloof from party politics, but the present 
persecution of the Jews is something more than party, something more than a 
difference of political opinion": 35 After receiving resolutions from its Leeds branch, 
from Beveridge and from the Association of Science Workers over the issue of 
German refugees, the AUT Central Council released a public statement stressing 
"its continued adherence to the fundamental principle of freedom of opinion and 
teaching in academic life" 3' The AUT Executive established an Academic 
Hospitality Committee to provide aid for German refugees and to co-operate with 
other groups, such as the AAC. 37 The head of Academic Hospitality Committee 
30 Beveridge, A Defence of Free Learning, pp. 4-5. 
Cooper, ed., op. cit., p. 37. 
31 Beveridge, A Defence of Free Learning, p. 6. 
32 A donation of 2,500 pounds had come from Central British Fund for German Jewry - 
AAC Annual Report. 1/ 5/1934, p. 3, Mss SPSL 1, Bodleian Library. 
33 Beveridge, A Defence of Free Learning, p. 17. 
34 AAC Second Annual Report, 20/7/1935, p. 5, Mss SPSL 1. 
35 The Universities Review. 5,2, April 1933, p. 91. 
36 Minutes of 26/ 5/ 1933, Mss 27/ 1/1/5, AUT Collection, Modem Records Centre. 
37 Minutes of 14/12/1933, Ibid. 
37 
(who also sat on the AAC) was keen that the AUT should encourage local 
fundraising committees to provide positions at their own universities. 
One such local committee to aid displaced scholars was established at the 
University of Leeds following a meeting sponsored by the university's Vice- 
Chancellor on 27 June 1933.38 Though the Vice-Chancellor refused to join the 
academics who formed the local committee of the AAC, the branch was able to gain 
the patronage of the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Ripon. By the opening of 
the academic year in October 1933, they had collected 30 subscriptions totalling 107 
pounds 39 During the following month this total increased to 192 pounds. In March 
1934 the Leeds AAC launched a public appeal to 2,000 leading local citizens, 
including 400 senior members of the university and 240 members of the Jewish 
community. `° Its aim was to raise 2,000 pounds to support three German academics 
at the University of Leeds over a two year period. In fact, the appeal only raised a 
quarter of the total which organisers had hoped for; receiving 119 pounds from 
university donations, 242 pounds from the Jewish community and 184 pounds from 
the general public. While the funds were much less than those raised at the 
resource-rich universities of Oxford and Cambridge, they did provide temporary 
funding for three academic refugees at the University of Leeds. 
In mid-1935 the AUT's review carried an article which recorded that 4,000 
pounds had been raised by the local AAC committees in Manchester and Leeds 41 
The same article recorded that 650 academics had been forced to leave Germany 
since 1933. Its writer noted that "nearly one third of the scholars in emigration have 
found hospitality in British Universities while seeking positions elsewhere"42 
Nonetheless, he argued (appropriately for a trade union paper), that the work of the 
AAC had not injured the professional interests of British teachers. 
Another'non-political' body which joined the AUT in the relief efforts for 
German refugees was the Royal Society, whose early support was instrumental in 
the AACs foundation 43 The AAC, AUT and Royal Society each claimed to be non- 
partisan organisations and justified their activism in solely professional terms. Their 
combined efforts were therefore qualitatively different from politicised left-wing 
38 Letter of 5/ 7/ 1933, Ms 415 LAAC, Special Collections, Brotherton Library. 
39 Note, Ibid. 
40 Note of 13/3/ 1934, Ibid. 
41 The Universities Review_ 7,2, April 1935, p. 130. 42 Ibid., p 128. 
43 Beveridge, A Defence of Free Learning, p. 3. 
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organisations such as the Relief Committee for Victims of German Fascism. 44 
Academic refugees from the Nazis' new Germany made anti-fascism a professional 
cause as much as an ideological one. The AAC's widening base of support was 
encouraged by a'softening' of the political issues involved. Engagement was fuelled 
and facilitated by the mixing of political considerations with moral, humanitarian 
and professional motives. The AAC was therefore based on the extension of the 
boundaries of political involvement to previously non-political groups and 
individuals. 
The Comite des Savants 
The closest French counterpart to the humanitarian fundraising efforts of the 
AAC to aid German refugee scholars was the Paris-based Comite des Savants. This 
committee, which was formed at a meeting in the Sorbonne on 13 May 1933, 
paralleled the British efforts in its elite support and its ambition of providing 
professional aid for academic refugees . 
45 Despite the early contact between 
Beveridge and his French peers over the organisation of British aid, academic 
assistance in France was shaped by a different set of indigenous imperatives. The 
structure of French universities, the restricted resources available and 
considerations of national politics limited the relief that the committee could 
provide. 
The president of the Comite des Savants was Andre Honnorat, who was one 
of the patrons of the Le Temps petition as well as president of the newly-built 
student housing project in Paris, the Cite Universitaire. He was joined on the 
committee by several other signatories to the Le Temps petition including Sylvain 
Levi and physicists Paul Langevin and Jean Perrin. The Comite des Savants drew 
far less support from academics in the Faculties of Medicine and Law than the 
earlier petition, perhaps because of the controversy created in France by the arrival 
of high numbers of refugee doctors and lawyers. The Comite des Savants, like the 
petition which preceded it, drew exclusively from a Paris academic milieu. While 
44 The Leeds AAC declined to particpate in a joint meeting with the Relief Committee for 
Victims of German Fascism as the Leeds academics felt that the latter "was definately 
associated with certain political interests" - Minutes of 2/ 5/ 1934, Ms 446 LAAC. 
In Cambridge Professor Francis Cornford noted of a petition by the Relief Committee for 
Victims of German Fascism for the release of Comintern delegate Dimitrov held by the 
Nazis that "others might sign if the Communist origins of the movement was sufficiently 
suppressed" - Letter of 6/ 12/ 1933, K 71, Needham Papers, University Library, Cambridge. 45 Report, Ms SPSL 145, Bodleian Library; 
Report of 19/5/ 1934, BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
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the AAC had sought to coordinate university efforts across the country, the Comite 
des Savants was the creation of a Parisian elite. 
In one respect, at least, it was impossible for Comite des Savants to pursue a 
campaign similar to the Academic Assistance Council in seeking permanent and 
temporary positions for German academics, as French law imposed strict 
nationality requirements on university employment. Levi wrote to his AAC 
colleagues across the Channel, "I hope that through our cooperation it will be 
possible to secure for them positions which they cannot, unfortunately find in this 
country": 46 This legal barrier powerfully shaped French academics' conceptions of 
their efforts. As Canadian scientist Louis Rapkine noted of the French relief efforts 
of 1933, 
before the hopelessness of not being able to find permanent positions for the 
foreign scholars and scientists in State universities (where one must be 
French) nothing serious was undertaken even in the way of helping these 
foreign savants 47 
Rapkine's judgement was overly harsh given that the Comite des Savants was able 
to temporarily place 23 refugee academics in Paris institutions 48 
The legal constraints faced by the Comite des Savants were reinforced by the 
increasing financial pressures on French universities during the early 1930s. Facing 
an international financial crisis and a stagnant domestic economy, the French 
government focused its financial policy on drastically reducing state expenditure 
including that on higher education 49 These cuts forced many universities into a 
significant reduction of their teaching staff. Even at the pinnacle of the state 
education system, the College de France was reduced from 47 professorial chairs in 
1930 to 42 chairs in 1936. -'50 With such pressure on teaching and research 
opportunities for French academics, even temporary places for the German refugees 
required substantial external funding. 
`K' Letter of 9/ 2/ 1935, Mss SPSL 145, Bodleian Library. 
47 Letter of 8/ 7/ 1936, Ibid. 
48 Of these half were concentrated in the laboratories of Perrin, Langevin, and Mayer - 
Letter of 15/4/1934, bid. 
49 Julian Jackson, The Politics of Depression in France 1932-1936. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 54-58 & 220. 
This contrasted to Britain where there was a gradual expansion of government expenditure 
on higher education during the interwar period, as state funding rose by over 90% between 
1924 and 1937 to 9.8 million pounds - John Stevenson, British Society 1914-45. Penguin 
Books, London, 1984, p. 252. 
50 Theodore Zeldin, "Higher Education in France", p. 77; 
Jacques Cavalier, "L'Organisation de 1'Enseignement Superieur en France" in L'Organisation 
de l'Enseignement Superieur, Institut International de Cooperation Intellectuelle, Societe des 
Nations, Paris, 1936, p. 140. 
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The difference between France's highly centralised, state system of education 
and Britain's independent, self-regulating universities was not only in terms of 
financial resources, but how these were sought. Mass fundraising for the AAC had 
been a vital tool in generating interest and support amongst British academics and 
students. The structure of the French system, where there remained strong divisions 
between the Faculties, grandes ecoles and research institutions seemed to discourage 
such a national campaign. Despite public appeals for support, the Paris Comite des 
Savants did not adopt the mass fundraising employed by the AAC either on a 
national or local basis. Its original funds of 640,000 francs were primarily based on 
large bloc donations, and for the academic year of 1934-35 it sought a League of 
Nations grant. 51 The contrast in fundraising not only stemmed from different 
university structures, but perhaps also from the different attitudes they 
encouraged. 52 As an AUT delegation to France in 1930 commented, 
We received the impression of a slight stiffness of outlook regarding the 
work of the regular Facultes, as distinct from the Instituts, and we may 
permit ourselves a doubt as to whether the system proves as readily 
comfortable at heart to changing demands as our own less highly-organized 
one 53 
Perhaps some of these structural and financial limitations on French relief efforts 
might have been overcome if German physicist Albert Einstein had accepted the 
offer of a chair at the College de France in mid-1933.54 Such a public success might 
have freed resources and encouraged more pro-active efforts for other refugees. 
Significantly, it was not until the reforms of the Front Populaire government in 1936 
which reorganised academic research in France and increased its state funding, that 
French aid for refugee academics became more like its British counterpart. 
51 Report of 19/5/ 1934, BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
52 There were some British complaints that the French Comite des Savants did not do 
enough of its own fundraising - Letter of 8/ 10/ 1934, Ms SPSL 145, Bodleian Library. 53 "e French University System, Report of the AUT Commission of Investigation, 1930", 
The Universities Review, 3,1, Oct. 1930, p. 40. 
Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years: France in the 1930s, W. W. Norton, New York, 1994, p. 
283; 
Andre Langevin, Paul Langvin, Mon Pere: L'Homme et 1'Oeuvre, Francais Reunis, Paris, 
1971, p. 146. 
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Relief Campaigns in British and French Universities 
The publication in 1935 of the pamphlet A Crisis in the University World 
provided a basis on which to assess the international impact of the German 
academic refugees. 55 The pamphlet estimated that 252,605 pounds had been raised 
worldwide to assist the refugees. This included 69,672 pounds donated by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, which was larger than any national total. Britain emerged 
as the leading country in fundraising to assist academic refugees, narrowly 
followed by the USA. Its total of 68,903 pounds, which included 28,142 pounds 
collected directly by the Academic Assistance Council, represented 27.3% of the 
funds collected internationally. The amount raised in France was 14,384 pounds, or 
only 5.6% of the international total. 
A comparison of the temporary and permanent positions found for the 
refugee academics reinforces this contrast between Britain and France. 
TABLE 1.2: INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENTS FOR ACADEMIC REFUGEES, 1934- 
193756 
Country 1934 1935 1937 
UK (Permanent) - 57 101 
UK (Temporary) 178 155 127 
(48.5%) (31.0%) (29.0%) 
France (Permanent) - 11 16 
France (Temporary) 41 35 27 
(10.5%) (7.4%) (5.5%) 
USA (Permanent) - 76 117 
USA (Temporary) 58 68 76 
(14.9%) (215%) (24.6%) 
International Total 389 623 785 
In terms of fundraising and the provision of positions for refugee academics 
during the mid-1930s, Britain emerged as the leading nation, especially due to the 
AAC's early efforts. Aware of its own success, the Academic Assistance Council 
consciously took the lead in internationally co-ordinating and organising 
55 A Crisis in the University World. Office of the }sigh Commisioner for Refugees, 1935 - his 
LAAC 415, Brotherton Library. 
5' AAC Annual Report. 1/5/ 1934, p. 13; 
AAC Second Annual Report. 20/7/ 1935, pp. 10-13; 
SPSL Annual Report. 22/ 7/ 1937, pp. 16-18. 
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humanitarian aid for academic refugees. 57 Despite the increasing importance of the 
USA in providing permanent academic positions, it was Britain which remained at 
the forefront in providing relief. By comparison, the numbers of refugee academics 
able to secure positions in France remained remarkably low. This was even more 
striking, given that the exodus of German refugees impacted upon France with a far 
greater magnitude than the rest of the world. 
TABLE 13: ESTIMATED INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF GERMAN 
REFUGEES, 1933-193958 

























International Total 59,300, 80,500, 154,000, 400,000 
There were two key factors which encouraged different reactions over the 
new Nazi state and the persecution of German academics within French universities 
compared to those in Britain. Firstly, the structure of the British university system 
encouraged a broad non-political campaign of professional relief for the refugees 
within the universities. In France, financial and legal restrictions on university 
employment limited the opportunities for professional relief similar to that in 
Britain. Secondly, reactions within the universities were also shaped by national 
politics. The 1936 debate over the 550th anniversary of the University of Heidelberg 
revealed some of the political tensions which the refugee relief efforts by British 
academics had successfully by-passed in 1933. In contrast, the character and 
magnitude of the refugee influx into France made it a more controversial issue than 
in Britain, both in national politics and within the universities. 
The 550th Anniversary of the University of Heidelberg 
The political currents underlying the various British relief efforts for German 
academic refugees were most clearly exposed in early 1936 over the celebration of 
57AAC Second Annual Report. 20/ 7/ 1935, p. 4. 58 Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe: The Emergence of a Regime, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 50. 
43 
the University of Heidelberg's 550th anniversary. Representatives of universities 
from around the world had been invited to the elaborate celebrations in Germany. 
Yet for some, participation in such an event raised the wider considerations of the 
changes in German universities and of Nazi policy generally. Though British 
academics had publicly united to aid their German colleagues, they adopted 
disparate positions over the more controversial issue of whether official recognition 
of Heidelberg's long history would legitimate recent Nazi policy. 
The debate over the Heidelberg celebrations revealed the limitations in the 
Academic Assistance Council's ability to publicly engage in political controversy. 
The AAC was divided over whether delegates should be sent to Heidelberg, 
however it was not this split that kept most of the leading names of the AAC out of 
the public debate on the issue, but rather their personal conceptions of professional 
responsibility. 59 Oxford scientist A. V. Hill, who was one of leading figures on the 
AAC, felt unable to publicly commit himself against the recognition of Heidelberg, 
in spite of his strong distaste for Nazi Germany, because of his position in the Royal 
Society 60 The sense of professional duty which had encouraged many leading 
academics to support the relief efforts of the AAC, encouraged them to shy away 
from public controversy over Heidelberg. This tension was perhaps strongest in 
historian Walter Adams, who was unable to allow the Heidelberg celebrations pass 
unchallenged, yet felt constrained by his position as the AAC's Secretary. 
In his private correspondence, Adams opposed the Heidelberg anniversary, 
because "the real truth being that the German Universities are, at present, the 
negation of all that a University ought to be , '. 61 In early February 1936, Adams 
made several efforts to solicit letters to continue a public debate in The Times over 
the celebrations 62 Adams, with Hill, wrote to several prominent academics, such as 
Oxford classicist Gilbert Murray, "suggesting that he might take up the cudgels" 63 
Initially, Adams felt that "the Heidelberg discussion is going extremely badly'; and 
hoped that the AACs list of 44 refugee scholars dismissed from Heidelberg could 
be used to encourage the boycott of the celebrations 64 
By the end of March 1936 public pressure had led the University of Oxford 
to reject sending a delegation which caused the German authorities to withdraw its 
59 Letter of 12/ 2/ 1936, Mss SPSL 53, Bodleian Library. 
60 Letter of 10/ 2/ 1936, Ibid. 
61 Letter of 12/ 2/ 1936, Ibid. 
62 Letter of 8/2/1936, Ibid. 
63 Letter of 10/ 2/ 1936, Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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invitations to British universities. Adams had played a key role in keeping the 
debate going and hailed the decision as an "immense success" . 
65 For some, the 
existence of the debate itself was probably a strong enough disincentive to sending 
representatives. Herbert Loewe declined Adams' suggestion that he canvass the 
Council of the University of Cambridge against supporting the Heidelberg 
celebration, noting that because it was divided on the issue, the Council was 
unlikely to take any action. 66 Adams also had more practical objectives in 
championing the debate over the University of Heidelberg, for he hoped that it 
would raise public awareness of the issue of German academic refugees which 
could be channelled into future AAC fundraising. 67 
The Heidelberg celebrations also generated heated controversy within the 
Association of University Teachers, as the clear professional concern which had 
fuelled refugee relief in 1933 was invoked by both sides of the debate over 
Heidelberg. The AUT found itself in a highly uncomfortable position when the 1936 
Third International Conference of Universities was scheduled for Heidelberg to 
coincide with the anniversary celebrations. The British union had been the driving 
force and first host of the International Conference of Universities in 1934, so that 
given its commitment to fostering international connections between universities, 
the AUT's executive committee was unwilling to support a boycott to prove a 
political point 68 Still, within local branches of the union there was committed 
opposition to sending an official delegation to Heidelberg. An AUT representative 
at University College London complained that one of his local members was "after 
my blood" because of the decision to send an official delegation to Germany, but he 
had managed to quieten things by saying "we had to go" 69 At the LSE, after a "very 
animated discussion" the local branch sent a resolution to the AUT executive 
disapproving of the delegation and requesting an official statement dissociating the 
trade union from the Heidelberg celebrations 70 For LSE's Professor of Political 
Science Harold Laski, this dissent did not go far enough, and he resigned from the 
branch. 71 There was enough pressure from its membership that the AUT was keen 
65 Letter of 24/ 3/ 1936, Ibid. 
66 Letter of 6/2/1936, Ibid. 
67 Letter of 24/ 3/ 1936, Ibid. 
68 The Universities Review, 8,2, April 1936, p. 100. 
Similar considerations may have played a role in the discussion of Academic Freedom being 
dropped from the schedule of the 1934 Conference in Britain - A14.3 Box 1, Mss. 27, AUT 
Collection, Modern Records Centre. 
69 Letter of 30/6/ 1936, Ibid. 
70 Letter of 24/ 5/ 1936, Ibid. 
71 Michael Newman, Harold Laski: A Political Biography. Macmillan Press, Bassingstoke, 
1993, p. 154. 
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to publicise that its delegation had only attended the international conference and 
had left before the anniversary celebrations 72 At the same time, perhaps to placate 
opponents of the delegation, the AUT's journal carried a forceful article by the 
Academic Assistance Council's A. V. Hill, F. Gowland Hopkins and F. G. Kenyon 
detailing the scale of persecution at German universities 73 
The debate over the University of Heidelberg's anniversary celebrations did 
not generate the same intensity in France, partly because the decision to attend was 
left to individual faculties, rather than to the universities as a whole. 74 Efforts by the 
Communist groups to stir a nation-wide debate to parallel that which had occurred 
in Britain seem to have been largely unsuccessful, although they did secure the 
personal condemnation of the anniversary by several leading academics75 More 
importantly, while British academics were protesting against the persecution of 
their German colleagues, the members of French universities had other concerns, as 
students were demonstrating over the influx of refugees from Germany into their 
courses. 
LTnvasion des Etrangers 
Academic relief campaigns in France were partly stifled by the magnitude of 
the refugee influx across the border and the heated political debate this stirred. 
During 1933, approximately 25,000 German refugees rushed into France. 76 Of these, 
probably at least half were concentrated in and around Paris?? Amongst this 
overwhelming deluge, the specific problems of German academics and students 
were largely lost on the periphery of such immense numbers78 Significantly, in 
Laski's brother, Neville Laski, was one of leaders of British Jewish community and involved 
in organising an international conference on refugee aid in London in October 1937- Report 
of 29/ 11/ 37, BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris; 
Isaac Kramnick & Barry Sheerman, Harold Laski: A Life on the Left, Hamish Hamilton, 
London, 1993, pp. 15 & 317. 
72 The Universities Review 9,1, Nov. 1936, p. 101. 
73 The Universities Review, 8,2, April 1936, p 103. 
74 Letter of 20/4/ 1936,2 T 752, AD Nord. 
75 The included Professors Zoretti (Caen), Guignbert (Paris) and Chapelon (Lille) - La Voix 
des 1~tudiants, June 1936, p. 5 in Collection: Rassemblement Mondial des )tudiants, 5, 
International Institute of Social History. 
76 Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe, p. 50; 
Weber, The Hollow Years, p. 104. 
77 Paris police noted 10,000 declared refugees from Germany within the Department of the 
Seine - Report of 30/10/33, BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 78 For example, amongst the 2,647 German refugees in Paris known to police in mid-June 
1933, only 169 were students, while academics were included amongst the 96 refugees from 
liberal professions - Report n. d., BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
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France the magnitude of the refugee problem made the issue far more politicised 
than it was in Britain. 
Drawing on its traditional anti-German rhetoric, the press of the French 
extreme right labelled the foreigners as '1'invasion'. Richard Millman has argued 
that the massive influx of German Jews in 1933 fuelled a marked increase in anti- 
semitism which had previously been a secondary consideration in the rhetoric of 
the nationalist leagues79 However, as Eugen Weber points out, it was not merely 
the numbers of refugees in 1933 that generated the controversy, but rather their 
visibility which made them the scapegoats for both France's domestic ills and the 
international economic and political crises of the 1930s. 80 Against this background 
of xenophobic nationalism and anti-semitism, the Le Temps petition by French 
academics was as much for local consumption as it was directed at Germany. 
The German refugees largely felt shut off from Paris society. Writer Arthur 
Koestler noted that in spite of the provision of aid, the French largely kept their 
distance from the newcomers 81 These experiences seem to have been shared by the 
groups of refugee German students who gathered in the cafes of Montmartre and 
St-Germain. As a police report noted of the refugees in the Dome cafe, 
L'attitude de ces etudiants est tres reservee en ce moment; ils ne conversent 
en general qu'avec des amis sürs et seule est ä craindre la proximite de 
groupes d'etudiants francais appartenant aux partis de droite ou la presence 
de quelques etudiants hitleriens frequentant nos Facultes 82 
Given the strong appeal of the nationalist leagues amongst university students, the 
Germans had reason to be wary. 
Unlike the relief efforts by British universities for German academics and 
students, the larger influx of refugees into France and the strength of the nationalist 
leagues fuelled a more antagonistic response amongst French students. 83 In January 
79 Richard Millman, La Question Tuivre entre les Deux Guerres: Ligues de Droite et 
Antisemitisme en France, Armand Colin, Paris, 1992, p. 125; 
Robert Soucy, French Fascism. p. 26. 
80 Weber, The Hollow Years. pp. 104 & 106 
81 Herbert R. Lottman, The Left Bank: Writers. Artists & Politics from the Popular Front to 
the Cold War, Heinemann, London, 1982, p. 40. 
82'The attitude of these students is very reserved at the moment; they generally only 
converse with their trusted friends and if alone fear contact with groups of French students 
belonging to the parties of the right or the presence of some pro-Nazi German students who 
attend our Faculties" - Report of 24/10/ 33, BA 1814, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, 
Paris. 
83 An example of British student efforts took place at UCL, were the College and Hospital 
Music Association and the Jewish Students' Society co-operated in organising a concert to 
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1935, the student sections of the nationalist leagues and 'non-political' corporate 
groups joined together in protests against the arrival of German refugees on their 
courses which combined xenophobic nationalism with claims of students' rights . 
84 
Their fundamental grievance was the preferential treatment given to the German 
students - the waiving of course requirements and tuition fees as well as the 
provision of scholarships - which they feared would ultimately allow the Germans 
to practice professionally in France. 85 To maintain a strict enforcement of 
nationality restrictions on the medical profession, French universities had 
historically awarded two types of medical degrees, the Diplome d'Etat for French 
students and the Diplome d'Universitaire for foreign students. With growing 
numbers of German students on their courses, French medical students mounted an 
active campaign against any lessening of the nationality bar, culminating with their 
called for a national strike in early 1935. 
The hostility of French students to the newcomers was partly because of the 
strained resources which already existed in the universities. Government cuts 
meant that students competed with each other for space in libraries, laboratories 
and lecture theatres 86 The journal of the extreme right group Etudiants d'Action 
Francaise, recounted to its readers how fifth year medical students were unable to 
find seats in the over-crowded amphitheatre for their lectures. "N'y a-t-il donc plus de 
place ici pour les Francois? ", it asked. 87 While conditions within the university did 
play an important part in the strike, socialists, communists and other students of the 
left criticised their opponents of the extreme right as motivated more by xenophobic 
nationalism than corporate concerns 88 Statistically, the number of foreign students 
studying in French universities had peaked in 1930 before the crisis in Germany, 
but as the following table shows, foreign students had always been concentrated in 
particular institutions. 89 By examining the demographics of several Faculties of 
Medicine for the following academic year, we see the importance of the corporate 
benefit the International Student Service Fund for German refugee students - Universi 
College Annual Report 1936-1937, London, 1937, p. 88. 
84 The two leagues with the largest student followings were the Action Francaise and the 
Jeunesses Patriotes (whose student section was called the Phalange Universitaire). The 
political organisations adopted by French students will be considered in detail in Chapter 2. 
85 L'Echo des l; tudiants de Toulouse, Jan. 1935, pp. 5-6; 
L'Echo des Etudiants de Toulouse. Feb. 1935, p. 3. 
8' This strain on resources was spread across the French Faculties, as in 1930 the law library 
in Paris had only 765 seats for 19,000 registered students - Zeldin, "Higher Education in 
France 1848-1940", p. 64. 
87 L'Etudiant Francais, 10/ 1/ 1935, p. 1. 
88 L'Etudiant Socialiste, March 1935, p. 15; 
L'Universite Republicaine, March 1935, p. 4. 
89 George Weisz, The Emergence of Modem Universities in France 1863-1914, p. 258. 
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Union Nationale des $tudiants (UNE) in nationalising grievances that were felt 
more strongly in some Faculties than others. 
TABLE 1.4: STUDENT REGISTRATION IN FRENCH FACULTIES OF MEDICINE, 
1936-193790 
University Diplome d'Etat 
(for French students) 
Diplome d'Universitaire 
(for foreign students) 
Bordeaux 616 40 
Lille 266 - 
Montpellier 301 145 
(+35 foreign students) 
Paris 2,219 778 
(+376 foreign students) 
Toulouse 309 - , 
The strike on 31 January 1935 was most energetically pursued in those 
universities where the leagues' student sections were strongest, such as Montpellier, 
Bordeaux and Paris. The call to strike was issued across the nation by Montpellier 
students through the columns of Action Francaise. 91 The day before, 400 students 
attended an afternoon meeting in Bordeaux at which the strike motion from 
Montpellier was read out 92 It was passed unanimously and sent to the Prefect and 
Dean. Later in the day, sixty students assembled outside the Prefecture chanting the 
nationalist rallying call "La France aux Francois". On 31 January 1935, a meeting at 
Bordeaux's Athenee Municipal was estimated by police as numbering 800 
students 93 Supporting the protests of their peers in Montpellier and Grenoble, the 
students demanded the strict enforcement of nationality bars on professional 
employment. 
The Rector of the University of Lille informed the Minister of Education that 
were it not for the position of the UNE over the strike, medical students in his 
university would probably abstain 94 On 31 January 1935, pickets were established 
at different hospitals in Lille though there were few confrontations 95 The President 
of the local medical students' group noted that, 
90 "Statistique des $tudiants 1936-37", AJ63-135, Archives Nationales; 
The category of foreign students includes other not only Germans, but large numers of 
students from Eastern Europe and other nationalities. 
91 Action Francaise, 31/1/1935, p. 2. 
92 Report of 31/1/1935,1 M 605, AD Gironde. 
93 Letter of 31/l/1935,1 M 605, AD Gironde. 
94 Letter of 23/ 1/ 1935,2 T 1116, AD Nord. 
95 L'Echo du Nord, 1/2/1935, p. 4. 
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A Lille la greve s'est passee dans le calme et la dignite. Aucun chahut nest 
venu troubler les abords de notre faculte 96 
In Toulouse, on the same day, the strike stopped four courses in the Faculty, with 
only two others taking place; one course was attended by 25 out of its 70 students, 
and the other by 30 out of 80 students. `n In both Toulouse and Lille the strike 
reflected the strong solidarity of corporate groups, yet it also had a far less 
confrontational face than the demonstrations in Montpellier or Bordeaux, perhaps 
because of the relative absence of foreign students in the local Faculty and the 
strength of local left-wing students' groups. 
The day after the strike had spread through France's provincial universities, 
it reached the nation's capital 98 In Paris, the strike in the Faculty of Medicine was 
launched on 1 February 1935 under Action Frangaise's banner of "Contre l'invasion 
des meteques" . 99 That afternoon the strikers formed pickets and engaged in recurrent 
clashes with left-wing students groups and the police. After a series of speeches by 
student leaders of the leagues and corporate groups, the strikers marched along the 
Boulevard St-Michel where they were eventually dispersed by police. The following 
day, the strikers returned to the streets where they were joined by students from the 
Faculties of Law and Science numbering by their own estimates between three to 
four thousand. However, after negotiations with the government, the Union 
Nationale des Etudiants called an end to the strikes. 
The strike revived two months later, but with a stronger political face. In 
Lille, a meeting of the Phalange Universitaires on 18 March 1935 discussed the 
possibility of another strike. The 100 students present were mostly drawn from the 
private Catholic Faculties in the town (rather than the state university) and speeches 
supported the recent strike by the Phalange in Paris' Medical Faculty. 100 At the end 
of the month, 200 students from the Catholic Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy 
held a strike against "1'invasion des etrangers". 101 An afternoon march numbering 
between 60 to 100, carried both a tricolour and the sign "La France aux Francais" 
through the streets. At the same time in Marseille, 100 medical students met outside 
their Faculty to vote a motion protesting against the intrusion of foreign students in 
96 Lille-Universite, Feb. 1937, p 7. 
97 Report of 3/ 2/ 1935,1303 W 13, AD Haute-Garonne. 
98 Strikes occured on 31 January 1935 in Montpellier, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Lille 
and ten other universities. Students of Aix/Marseille, and Lyon voted motions of solidarity 
to the Paris strikers - L'Echo des l4tudiants de Toulouse. Feb. 1935, p. 4. 99 L'Etudiant Francais, 10/2/1935, p. 1. 
100 Report of 19/3/1935, M154/244, AD Nord. 
101 Report of 29/3/1935, M154/ 120, AD Nord. 
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their courses. 102 This was followed by a march to the Faculty of Science. The 
demonstration was enough to provoke a counter-demonstration on the 1 April 1935 
by workers of the Syndicat Regional des Metaux (CGTU) which led to the arrest of 
several unionists 103 The union justified its actions as seeking to protect foreign 
students from the fascists of the extreme right who sought to interrupt their studies. 
Conclusion 
The 1933 wave of German refugees was the first of four mass movements of 
population spurred by the initiatives of the Nazi state. The Nuremberg Laws of 
September 1935 which made Jews non-citizens forced more refugees out of 
Germany, as did the occupation and rushed Nazification of Austria in early 1938 
and the anti-semitic riots of Kristallnacht in November 1938.104 The rallying to aid 
academic refugees in 1933 through the AAC and ISS is fundamental to 
understanding the development of politics within British universities in the late 
1930s. The continuing campaigns to provide relief for German academic and 
student refugees had a three-fold significance which shaped later political 
campaigns within British universities. Firstly, they legitimised and were the 
predecessors of later relief and humanitarian campaigns both for universities in 
China and Czechoslovakia, or over the civil war in Spain. More broadly, they 
represented a softening of politics in Britain and the acceptance of non-party and 
non-partisan forms of campaigning and coalitions. Thirdly, they gave British 
universities a distinctive perspective on fascism as a direct threat to intellectual 
freedom internationally. Of primary significance for some British academics, anti- 
fascism was as much a professional issue as a political one. The early protests 
against the racial cleansing of German academia established the key elements that 
were the basis for the increasing activism of the mid-1930s. 
In France, reactions to the events in German universities took different 
forms, sparking a petition on general principle by Paris intellectuals and a national 
strike by medical students over corporate rights. Though the former was able to 
claim non-partisan support, the latter fitted easily into a polarised political arena, 
despite its corporate rhetoric. The 1935 strike provides one of the keys as to why 
there was never any French equivalent to the AAC's national humanitarian 
fundraising. Refugees had a far greater impact in French politics, which combined 
102 Report of 30/ 3/1935, M6 8294, AD Bouches-du-Rhone. 
103 Letter of 5/4/ 1935, M6 8294, AD Bouches-du-Rhone. 
104 Skran, Refugees in Inter-war Europe, p. 49. 
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with legal and financial restrictions on academic employment severely curtailed 
French opportunities for a non-partisan, humanitarian response. Together, the 
structural differences between university systems and the impact of the refugees 
themselves meant that, despite efforts to co-ordinate British and French responses, 
this international crisis stirred distinctively national political campaigns. 
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Chapter 2 
National Traditions & Political Repertoires: 
The Universities of Paris & London 
Political activity and organisation within the university developed very 
differently between Britain and France. Within each country students and 
academics approached politics from their own nationally-distinct mentalites, 
traditions and histories. These national repertoires of political action were fuelled 
by common experiences and shared perceptions as well as shaped by institutional 
constraints and wider political currents. 1 This fundamental contrast between the 
ways in which those at university conceived of, and acted in politics, was best 
embodied by the capitals of the two countries, Paris and London. 
The Universities of Paris and London occupied very different positions in 
national life during the 1930s and its subsequent historiography. Not only did 
almost half of France's university students study in Paris, but the capital also 
claimed the country's leading elite-forming institutions, including the College de 
France, Ecole Normale Superteure and other grandes ecoles. 2 The prestige and 
resources of Parisian institutions were reinforced by their centrality in the national 
education system 3 In contrast, though the University of London, was larger than 
those of Oxford and Cambridge combined, its federation of academic colleges 
which included the LSE and UCL, lacked the elite standing of the 'ancient' 
universities .4 In both capitals, the proximity of the national political stage 
encouraged academics and students to fashion their own repertoires of 
participation. These evolved at different times, so that while in 1930s France certain 
forms of political activity and organisation had become accepted as long standing 
traditions, in Britain these were still being developed and contested. 
The Mixed Legacy of the Dreyfus Affair 
The Dreyfus Affair which dominated French political life at the turn of the 
twentieth century, established a legacy which fundamentally shaped the ways 
1 Tilly, The Contentious French, p. 4. 
2 Lottman, The Left Bank, p. 9. 
3Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945. Vol. 2 Intellect, Taste & Anxiety, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1977, p. 332. 
4 Bruce Truscot, Red Brick University. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1951, p. 28; 
Halsey, Decline of Donnish Dominion p. 61. 
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French academics and students approached politics in the twentieth century. 
Obviously there were deeper origins for such a political culture, yet the Affair of 
1898 marked for contemporaries and historians the birth of a distinctive approach to 
politics, that of the intellectuel. Academics and students were at the forefront of the 
violent controversy over Dreyfus's guilt or innocence, and these experiences later 
became the commonly invoked source for a political repertoire of familiar forms of 
organisation, activity and perceptions .5 
In late 1894 artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus had been arrested and 
condemned to deportation for life for passing French military secrets to the 
Germans .6 Just over three years later, the acquittal of another officer and probable 
culprit of similar charges, provoked a storm of protest from those who felt Dreyfus 
had been wrongly convicted. It was the violent eruption of this controversy in 
January 1898 that turned the legal case for revision into an affair which dominated 
French political life.? 
The Dreyfusard Intellectuels 
On 13 January 1898, the journal L'Aurore printed novelist Emile Zola 's 
polemical open letter "J'Accuse! ", in which he accused the government and military 
of conspiring against the innocent Dreyfus. A day later, the same newspaper 
printed a petition calling for a legal revision of the two trials in the Dreyfus case. 
The petition has become known as the "Manifeste des Intellectuels" for it is widely 
seen as marking the involvement of a new group in the politics of the trial. 8 The 
petition was headed by writers Zola and Anatole France, but its main body of 
supporters were concentrated within certain sections of the University of Paris .9 Of 
the 1,482 names who eventually signed the petition, 22% were academics or 
teachers while 18% were students 10 
Christophe Charle's detailed demographic study of the Affair argues that the 
Dreyfusard cause found some of its most committed advocates amongst younger 
5 Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France, P. 38. 
6 For a comprehensive survey of the Affair see Eric Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair in French 
Society and Politics, Longman, London, 1996. 
7 Eugen Weber, Action Francaise: Royalism & Reaction in Twentieth Century France. 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, p. 4. 
8 Jean-Francois Sirinelli, Intellectuels et Passions Francaises: Manifestes et Petitions au XXe 
SiPcle, Fayard, Paris, 1990, pp. 25-26. 
9 Cahm, The Dreyfus Affair in French Society & Politics pp. 68-69. 10 Christophe Charle, Naissance des "Intellectuels". p. 242. 
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academics. 11 The violent crisis of 1898-1899 was a profoundly personal, and 
formative experience for a generation who were just beginning their teaching 
careers at the turn of the century. For those who came of age politically in the 
Affair, they retained not only a lasting loyalty to republicanism but a certain 
conception of political participation 12 Significantly, many of these Dreyfusards 
such as physicists Jean Perrin and Paul Langevin, psychologist Henri Wallon and 
historian Lucien Febvre, would continue their political engagement throughout the 
interwar period. 13 Dreyfus was therefore much more than an idealised tradition, 
but represented a very real reference point as the Third Republic seemed to be 
entering a new period of crisis in the mid-1930s 14 
In late 1899, as the revisionist cause gradually gained momentum and 
thereby provoked more intransigent opposition, both Wallon and Febvre 
commenced their studies at France's elite teaching institution, the Ecole Normale 
Superieure. 15 The school focused on intensive preparation for the agregation, which 
was the qualification required for teaching positions at universities and lycees. Once 
admitted, normaliens entered a unique teaching environment, which placed an 
emphasis on discussion and on much closer relations between students and 
academics. 16 Its elite ethos meant "that graduates of ENS seemed a race apart", not 
only academically, but also politically 17 During the Dreyfus Affair, the school's 
librarian Lucien Herr was one of the earliest activists in the cause for revision, 
becoming a leader for both past and present students of the school. The school 
became a head-quarters for Dreyfusard campaigns and half of its students signed 
the petition of early 1898.18 
As Dreyfus shaped the lives of individual normaliens, it also shaped the $cole 
Normale Superieure's conception of itself as an institution. The Affair legitimised a 
political role for the fcole on the national stage, both through the petitions of 
teachers and the street fighting of students. The acceptance of this distinctive 
11 Ikid., p. 194. 
12 Tony Judt, Past Imperfect, p. 23. 
13 Charle, Naissance des "Intellectuels", p. 222. 
14 Nicole Racine, "References Dreyfusiennes dans la Gauche Francaise de 1'Entre-Deux- 
Guerres" in Michel Leymarie, ed., A Posterit@ de Affaire Dreyfus, Presses Universitaires du 
Septentrion, Paris, 1998. 
15 Cahn, The Dreyfus Affair in French Society and Politics. pp. 120 & 132. 16 Jean-Francois Sirinelli, Generation Intellectuelle: Khägneux et Normaliens dans I'Entre- 
Deux-Geurres. Quadrige, Paris, 1988, pp. 41-66; 
Smith, The Ecole Normale Superteure & the Third Republic pp. 18 & 74. 17 Lottman, The Left Bank p. 14. 
18 Robert J. Smith, "L'Atmosphere Politique a l'Ecole Normale Superteure a la fin du XIXe 
Siecle", Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 20,1973, p. 255. 
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political role was reflected in a 1929 controversy over military service. When a 
normalien petition drew official reprimands from the school's authorities the 
incident produced expressions of concern in the Chamber of Deputies. 19 The 
Director of the ENS replied that: 
La liberte des eleves de 1'Ecole Normale Superieure d'exprimer 
publiquement leur opinion est limitee, - comme 1'exercise general de la 
liberte dont ils jouissent dans I'Ecole, et hors de 1'Ecole -, par la reserve que 
leurs devoirs d'eleves de 1'Ecole doivent leur imposer. 20 
There were limits on the public commitments normaliens could make, though the 
authorities seemed rather more concerned with those that were close to the parties 
of the left than those that were independently assumed. 21 Despite these limitations, 
the Director's defence of his actions reveals the extent to which the rights of 
normaliens to a political voice were accepted, not only by the administrators of the 
school but even by the politicians of the Third Republic. 
Perhaps the most profound legacy of the Dreyfus tradition was the 
conception of the politically engaged intellectual as an individual distinct from 
established political parties. This independent identity was embodied in the 
formation of a separate organisation for intellectuals of the left, the Ligue des Droits 
de l'Homme, in February 1898.22 Parallelling the political intensity of their peers in 
Paris, young academics like Victor Basch in Rennes and sociologist Celestin Bougle 
in Montpellier established local sections of the Ligue. 23 By the 1930s, the Ligue des 
Droits de 1'Homme provided the exemplar for those who sought to establish new 
intellectual groups, especially as these efforts were led by the politicians, writers 
and academics who had joined the league during the Affair. The Affair was not 
simply a party contest between the left and right, but was fought in general terms 
between ideals of justice and patriotism24 Part of the legacy of the Affair was 
therefore in the political language of intellectuals, as academics and others gained a 
special confidence to invoke general values and abstract ideals over political 
19 Sirinelli, Generation Intellectuelle, p. 533. 
20 'The liberty of students of the Ecole Normale Superieure to publicly express their opinion 
is limited - that is the general freedom which they enjoy within the school and outside the 
school - by the reserve which their duties as students of the school impose" - Director's 
Report, p. 8. in AJ16-2895, Archives Nationales. 
21 Police seemed particularly concerned about any pro-Communist activities by normaliens - 
Letter of 14/3/1935, AJ16-2895, Archives Nationales. 
22 Weber, Action Francaise, p. 5. 
23 Francoise Basch, Victor Basch: La Passion de la Tustice, Plon, Paris, 1994, pp 30-54. 
24 Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower. A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890- 
1914, Macmillan, New York, 1966, p. 198. 
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issues. 25 More specifically, Dreyfusard revisionists cast themselves as defenders of 
the young Third Republic from the nationalist, clerical, and military forces of 
reaction. It was a language which was to be echoed by the left in mid-1930s. 
The Nationalist Reaction 
As Michel Winock has written, the Dreyfus Affair not only gave a particular 
meaning to the word intellectuel but also to the nationalisme of their opponents as 
well? 6 As the campaign for the revision of Dreyfus's conviction gained strength, a 
second campaign developed to combat revision by all possible means. In reaction to 
the public commitment of academics at the forefront of the Dreyfusard cause, large 
numbers of students took to the streets or signed petitions against revision. 27 It is 
significant that both academics as independent intellectuals and students in 
nationalist (or anti-nationalist) groups were inaugurated as major participants on 
the national political stage at the same time and on opposing sides of the same 
political contest. 28 
In reaction to Zola 's "J'Accuse! " the committee of the Association Generale 
des Etudiants (AG) in Paris published an attack on the author for undermining the 
Army and national honour29 Though corporate groups formally denied their 
political motivations in opposing the left, their defence of student conditions and 
welfare possessed a far more ambiguous political identity. This ambivalence was 
reinforced as student corporate groups became dependent on state recognition and 
financial support, which involved their registration by the police and therefore 
formally depoliticised their identity30 Yet, the Dreyfus Affair marked an early 
alliance between corporate students groups and the nationalist right, which also 
formed their own separate student sections. Both groups shared memberships and 
the claim to defend the nation and the university from the politics of the left 31 
25 Pascal Ory & Jean-Francois Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France: De l'Affaire Dreyfus a nos 
Tours, Armand Colin, Paris, 1986, pp. 9-10; 
Judt, Past Imperfect p. 252. 
26 Michel Winock, La Fievre Hexagonale: Les Grandes Crises Politiques 1871-1968, Seuil, 
Paris, 1987, pp. 158 & 166. 
27 A. Belden Fields, Student Politics in France: A Study of the Union Nationale des Etudiants 
de France, Basic Books, New York, 1970, p. 17. 
28 Claude Singer, Vichy, l'Universite et les Tuifs: Les Silences et la Memoire. Les Belles 
Lettres, Paris, 1992, p. 23. 
29 Fields, Student Politics in France. p. 18. 
30 The national federation of corporate groups, l'Union Nationale des Etudiants (UNE), was 
founded in 1907 and recognised by law in 1929. 
31 Action Francaise recruited from corporate groups in the early 1900s, and corporate rights 
formed an important part of the rhetoric of students in the league. For example a flyer in 
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Central to both the repertoire of leagues and of corporate groups was the chahut, the 
deliberate disruption of lectures or classes which blurred a rejection of their 
teacher's politics with 'non-political' corporate claims. 
At the forefront of the reaction to the Dreyfusards' campaigns for revision 
was the league Action Francaise which was formed in 1899.32 From an early stage, 
the league found its purpose, support and publicity through attacks on those public 
figures who were active in the revisionist cause. Given the prominence of academics 
in the Dreyfusard campaign, the university became a frequent battleground for the 
nationalists. A standard pattern of chahuts and challenges by students of the 
extreme right against academics of the left developed at universities across France. 
These clashes encouraged state authorities to formally ban politics from the inside 
of the university, though disorder would sporadically reappear inside the Faculties 
fuelled by corporate or political motives. 
In 1905 the league organised its students support into a distinct section, 
Etudiants d'Action Francaise 33 More significantly for the politics of Action 
Francaise was its establishment of a newspaper in 1908, which soon became the 
dominant focus of its activity 34 As Rend Remond has written, 
This nationalism had no theory, scarcely a program. It had powerful 
antipathies, vigorous aspirations; it was instinctive, passionate, shaken with 
furious gestures... 
Words divided, action united, force brought together. This anti- 
parliamentism [sic] had two outlets: street demonstrations and polemics by a 
newspaper press lying in wait for scandals, prompt to exploit them, and 
ready if necessary to invent them 35 
The hawking of the league's newspaper by students and its supporters was partly 
about public propaganda and partly about asserting physical control of the streets. 
Vendors were accompanied by escorts, which frequently led to violence between 
the Action Francaise and its opponents of the left and the right. 
1935 proclaimed "Etudiants! Soucieux de saurvegarder vos droits les plus elementaires. Lisez claque 
jour l'Action Francaise' - M154/241(A), AD Nord; 
Nicolas Portier, "LAction Francaise ä 1'Assaut de l'Universit6 Republicaine", La Revue 
Universelle. 163-164, July-Oct 1991, p. 84. 
32 Weber, Action Francaise, p. 25. 
33 Ibid., pp. 38 & 64. 
34 Ibid. p. 50. 
35 Remond, Rene, The Right Wing in France: From 1815 to de Gaulle. 2nd ed., trans. Jones 
Laux, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1969, p. 215. 
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The opening editions of Action Francaise denounced Sorbonne professor 
Charles Andler, marking the first of many attacks on academics for their pro- 
Dreyfusard or left-wing politics 36 These polemics could also spark physical battles 
for control over university space. In March 1925 the Faculty of Law in Paris was 
disrupted by clashes between Action Francaise students and police which were so 
severe they caused the temporary closure of the faculty. The violence had been 
triggered by the appointment of Georges Scelle to teach international law. Scelle 
was an adviser to the Cartel des Gauches government, so his selection was seen by 
those in the league to be a case of left-wing political favouritism. 37 The students 
downplayed their political motivations, arguing that they were defending 
university traditions from a political appointment. The real spur to violence was the 
existence of the Cartel des Gauches itself, as the extreme right were quick to seize 
on the opportunity to attack the government and its supporters. 
Yet despite its success in disrupting Scelle's course which was suspended 
after a month, 1925 also represented the peak of Action Francaise's influence. By the 
early 1930s, it is generally argued that the leagues' membership and readership 
were marked by declining support 38 This decay was partly due to the league's loss 
of official Catholic support and the challenge of other groups from the right. One of 
its strongest competitors was the Jeunesses Patriotes which was founded in 
December 1924 in reaction to the national election of the Cartel des Gauches 39 
Robert Soucy has argued that the new league "was fascist in its anti-liberalism and 
anti-socialism, in its cult of the leader, paramilitary organisation, and political 
authoritarianism' . 40 Soucy's label would have been rejected by the student section 
of the Jeunesses Patriotes, the Phalange Universitaire which mixed corporate and 
political rhetoric. The Phalange described their objective as "de defendre le interets 
corporatifs de leurs membres, d'intervenir dans les conflits purement universitaires et de 
propager dans les milieux etudiants les idees du programme des Jeunesses Patriotes". 41 
36 Weber, Action Francaise. p. 52 
37 Jean-Francois Sirinelli, "Action Francaise: Main Basse sur le Quartier Latin! ", L'Histoire, 
51, Dec. 1982, pp. 8-9. 
38 Weber, Action Francaise. pp. 260 & 365-366. 
Serge Berstein "La Ligue" in Jean-Francois Sirinelli, ed., Histoire des Droites en France. Vol 2: 
Cultures, Gallimard, Paris, 1992, p. 91. 
39 Report of Jan. 1929, F7/ 13232, Archives Nationales. 
40 Robert Soucy, "Centrist Fascism: The Jeunesses Patriotes", Journal of Contemporary 
History. 16, April 1981, p. 350. 
41 'To defend the corporate interests of their members, to intervene in purely univeristy 
conflicts and to propagate in the student milieu the programme of the Jeunesses Patriotes" - 
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By 1929, the Jeunesses Patriotes had become the first league to claim a 
membership of over 100,000 nationally. ` At that time, the Phalange Universitaire 
had an estimated 4,000 members nationally, of which 800 were university students 
in Paris 43 According to police reports, the Phalange had 250 members amongst 
students in the Paris Faculty of Law, of whom 50 were very active. The new league 
drew support from a Catholic constituency which had been distanced from Action 
Francaise after its condemnation by the Vatican in December 1926. In Lille the 
massive decline of the Action Francaise's student section and the subsequent 
increase in strength of the Phalange in the local Catholic faculties suggests the 
importance of the papal condemnation in shifting support on the right. 44 Such a 
hypothesis reveals the extent to which French students, by choosing to organise as 
sections of nationalist leagues, submerged themselves within political currents 
outside the university. Despite the rivalry between the leagues, students of both 
often engaged in common action against those of the left who were becoming 
increasingly more organised, if not numerous, during the late 1920s. 45 
Students and the French Left 
Also originating in the violence of the Scelle chahut of 1925, students 
opposed to the nationalism of the leagues began to create their own political 
organisations. The extreme right's physical dominance of the streets, profoundly 
shaped the tone, style and political repertoire adopted by their opponents. ` 
Significantly, it was within the Ecole Normale Superteure that the left-wing 
opposition to the leagues first emerged, encouraged by the school's elitism, 
Dreyfusard heritage and intimate environment. 47 Normasiens formed the core of a 
small group of left students who established their own league, the Ligue d'Action 
Universitaire Republicaine et Socialiste. 
The birth of LAURS within such a small institution as the Ecole Normale 
Superieure allowed for a mixture of left-wing political positions within the new 
42 Millman, La Question luive entre les Deux Guerres, p. 116. 
43 Another 1,400 members where in Paris's lycees orcolleges. - Report of Jan. 1929, F7/ 13232, 
Archives Nationales. 
44 Weber, Action Francais p. 201. 
45 Millman, La Question iuive entre les Deux Guerres, pp. 129-130. 
46 Emmanuel Naquet, "Un Mouvement Typique de la France de 1'Entre-Deux-Guerres: La 
LAURS (Ligue d'Action Universitaire Republicaine et Socialiste)", Memoire de Maitrise, 
Univerite de Paris X, Nanterre, 1987, p. 226. 
47 The formation of LAURS drew on the atmosphere of strong general sympathy for Scelle 
within the ENS, as 113 out of the 150 current normaliens signed a petition against the riots of 
the extreme right - Ibid., p. 69. 
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group, independent of party considerations. The early unity of student 
organisations of the left reflected the physical dominance of the nationalist leagues 
and corporate groups of university space. 48 As the French student left developed its 
own strength in the early 1930s, these coalitions and alignments became 
increasingly concerned to establish their own separate identities. Communist 
students in Paris formed their own organisation in 1926, the Union Federale des 
Etudiants (UFE). The UFE like the corporate groups controlled by the right, claimed 
a political neutrality through a corporate and syndical identity. 49 Despite this 
neutrality, the UFE's syndical character allowed it a definite political agenda. The 
year after the formation of UFE, the Etudiants Socialistes (FNES) created their own 
Federation within the SFIO's youth organisation. 50 LAURS and the FNES shared 
memberships until the early 1930s when the growing membership of the latter 
allowed it to break ties with its predecessor. 51 
The Dreyfus Affair created political repertoires for academics and students, 
for the left and the right, for those in Paris and for those at universities across the 
country. The politics of confrontation persisted in French universities long after the 
heated conflicts of 1890s, as there remained a fundamental polarisation over the 
legitimacy of the Republic itself. 
Defining Political Space at the University of London 
The long history of public confrontation in national affairs which gave 
French academics and students their political identities, was largely absent from 
Britain. Certainly there were moments when British universities were drawn into 
wider political events such as during the General Strike of 1926 when a large 
number of Oxbridge students volunteered for essential service work to help break 
the strike, while a small core of left-wing academics and students supported the 
TUC. Despite these events, there was no British parallel to the Dreyfusard and anti- 
Dreyfusard collective commitment to national politics. In the early 1930s, when 
British students self-consciously sought to create new political movements there 
were no predecessors they could directly claim. The extent to which the 
48 As one English student commented when he joined a left-wing student group in Nancy: 
"Most of our meetings were broken up by fascists and royalists, and there were many fights 
across the cafe floors with flying glasses and tables. It was an intensely happy and flowering 
period for me" - Philip Toynbee, Friends Apart: A Memoir of Esmond Romilly & Jasper 
Ridley in the Thirties. Macgibbon & Kee, London, 1954, p. 35. 
49 Naquet, "Un Mouvement Typique de la France de 1'Entre-Deux-Guerres", p. 87. 
50 Ibid., pp. 69 & 130. 
51 Dzid., pp. 390-391. 
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organisations and activities they developed were unprecedented in Britain was 
reflected in the conflicts they generated with university authorities. In another 
sense, this was also true for British academics, who during the 1930s created a 
variety of new professional and political organisations. For many of the most 
prominent academics, their political commitments extended back well before the 
1930s, yet this did not prevent debates on the legitimacy of that activity. 
Throughout the first half of the 1930s both British academics and students found 
their university identities could be invoked as much to restrict as to legitimise 
political participation. 
London's Student Vanguard 
The academics and students of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science lived close to the political currents of the metropolis, not simply 
due to their geographic location on the Strand. For its inhabitants, the LSE 
possessed a distinctive ethos arising from its origins, location, student composition 
and teaching staff. Harold Laski described the LSE as located near the heart of 
events in the capital, unlike the universities of Oxbridge which were cloistered off 
from the "real world" 52 The School's founding father in the 1890s was leading 
Fabian Sidney Webb, and as its student magazine proclaimed, "we do not want to 
forget that the school was founded by a socialist in a slum'. 53 Amongst British 
universities in the early 1930s, the LSE "enjoyed an undisputed reputation as the 
centre of the student movement on the left, in London certainly, and in the country 
at large"54 Yet despite its proximity to the politics of the capital and its radical 
heritage, after 1934 political life within the school had been largely stifled by the 
overwhelming paternalism of the School's authorities. 
There was no constitution for the LSE, resulting in administrative power 
being largely concentrated in the position of Director. 55 Since 1918, LSE's Director 
had been William Beveridge, whose vision of the school was centred on protecting 
and entrenching the academic prestige vital for its continued financial existence. 
This fundamental focus was expressed in two objectives; the notion of a pure and 
scientific social science, and an "almost total political abstemiousness . 56 Beveridge's 
52 Kramnick & Sheerman, Harold Laski, p. 246; 
This opinion was shared by a later Director, Ralf Dahrendorf - Dahrendorf, LSE, p. 300. 53 The Clare Market Review. Michaelmas Term 1933, p. 4. 
54 Stansky & Abrahams, Journey to the Frontier, p. 189. 55 Dahrendorf, . SE, p. 179. 56 Ibid., p. 269. 
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dual aims, which helped the School to establish itself and expand in the 1920s, led 
to increasing problems during the 1930s as he clashed with students and senior 
staff. 57 The LSE had been popularly labelled Red Houghton Street due to the 
prominence in the Labour movement of its founders and several members of the 
academic staff. It was a label Beveridge sought to absolutely reject as a threat to the 
School's funding and legitimacy. Ironically, at the same time that Beveridge was 
heading the AAC's campaign for academic freedom abroad, he found himself under 
attack in Britain over his attempts to regulate the political activity of the students 
and academics of the LSE. 
In his diary of 1933 Beveridge expressed his desire, "to be a personal 
influence on generations of students" 58 It was an aspiration that the structure of the 
LSE permitted and perhaps encouraged, but one which his students were to resist. 
Such paternalism was ill-suited to LSE's distinctive student body which contained 
high numbers of part-time, graduate and overseas students 59 Compared to other 
British universities, the student body of the LSE was older as there had been a 
massive growth in the number of graduate students during the interwar years 60 
This community, representing a tenth of LSE's students, often played a key role in 
the student political groups which would clash with the administration in 1934. 
Despite expansion and building efforts at the school during the interwar 
period, it still remained a cramped enclave in inner London. Questions of political 
space were therefore physical as well as ideological. Students required permission 
to use the school's facilities which had to be negotiated directly with the 
administration. As political activism increased in the mid 1930s, this relationship 
became gradually strained and antagonistic. The expansion of left-wing student 
activities within the school, created growing pressure on the existing regulation of 
political groups. In early 1934, the LSE Marxist Society sought to hold a series of 
lectures on Marxism in rebuttal to those by the school's academics, which it felt to 
be too bourgeois and reformist. It was denied facilities 61 
The LSE Union was the focus for social, athletic, political and cultural 
activities of students within the School. At its political debates the Union usually 
averaged a weekly attendance of 100 to 150, though for special debates it could 
57 Ibid., p. 192. 
58 Diary entry of 6/ 8/1933, Ic50, LSE Archives. 
59 Dahrendorf, LSE, p. 173; 
Kramnick & Sheerman, Harold Laski p. 245. 
60 Graduate students increased from 47 in 1920 to 293 by 1937 - Dahrendorf, LSE p. 173. 61 The Clare Market Review, Lent Term 1934, p. 35. 
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draw up to 500 students such as when Kerensky visited the school in late April 
1937.62 The largest meetings of the Socialist Society could sometimes outdraw the 
Union, thanks to the prominence of such celebrity speakers as Hugh Gaitskell, Sir 
Stafford Cripps, Leonard Woolf, R. H. Tawney, and G. D. H. Cole. Tensions were 
increased between students and the Director when an American Communist, Frank 
Meyer, was elected Union President. Meyer had come to the LSE from Oxford 
where he had held a Rhodes Scholarship and led the formation in 1932 of a pro- 
Communist student group, the October Club 63 Faced with increasing student 
activism within the school, 
The Director proceeded to devise a Code for the Union and a Memorandum 
for student societies establishing clearly that he was the only authority when 
it came to notices, meetings, and the allocation of rooms. All the time he 
dealt with Mr Meyer in a notably hostile manner, until in the end the Union 
rallied to the defence of its President 64 
Beveridge's draft regulations held that the name of the School could not be used or 
published by students without his permission; equally his permission was required 
to sell literature on campus which would only be granted when its distribution was 
incidental and confined to a specific meeting (only in exceptional cases would 
general distribution be allowed); collections for charity within the LSE were also to 
be authorised by the Director. 
Beveridge was committed to the position that any publication sold in the 
School require his sanction as Director. In early March 1933, he banned an issue of 
the left-wing journal Student Vanguard which accused an LSE academic of spying 
on colonial students for the Foreign Office. The allegation was libellous, and was 
ultimately retracted with an apology by the paper. However, the incident produced 
the explosion of the accumulated tensions between the School's Director and the 
Union President. Meyer reacted to Beveridge's censorship by leading five other left- 
wing students to sell the paper at the School, which resulted in all six students 
being suspended by the Director 65 Those suspended were aged between 27 and 21, 
and four were postgraduates. Meyer and the Chair of the Marxist Society were 
expelled from the school on 5 March 1934, although the latter was allowed to 
62 For Union Debates see Minutes in C oll Misc, 649 2/5, LSE Archives. 
63 Brian Harrison, "Oxford and the Labour Movement", Twentieth Century British History, 
2,3,1991, pp. 252-253; 
Two Cambridge Communist students who also attended the LSE in the early 1930s were 
John Cornford and Michael Straight. 
64 Dahrendorf, LSE, p. 274. 
65 Report to Emergency Committee, 22/ 3/1934, p. 2 in 67/ 11 /A, LSE Archives. 
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ultimately return to the school to finish his degree. Amidst public criticism of his 
actions, Beveridge encouraged the Home Office to force Meyer out of the country. 66 
Michael Straight, a newcomer to the school and its Socialist Club remembers 
the Union at the time as "a battlefield, and on every bulletin board, notices were , 
posted, summoning all students to an emergency meeting". 67 Meyer's deliberate act 
of defiance had been committed without consulting the Union executive 8 When 
the Union was faced with a motion of censure against Meyer and another of 
confidence in him, it chose the latter perhaps because it was vaguely worded 69 
Within a week 400 LSE students had signed a petition against Meyer's expulsion? ° 
Protesting the expulsions, Straight marched in the ragged ranks of students outside 
the School. However, he noted that "the week of examinations was approaching; the 
time for agitation had passed". 71 
New Rules, New Restrictions 
In the wake of Meyer's expulsion and the public criticism it generated, 
Beveridge introduced a gamut of rules. 2 These regulations were described in detail 
in the Students Union Handbook 1934-35.73 Student societies were to be registered 
at the discretion of the Director subject to the general conditions that their 
membership was confined to the school, that they nominated two responsible 
student representatives, and that their purpose was "consistent with the welfare of 
the school, and appropriate to the school as a University institution". 74 General 
conditions were also imposed on student meetings, so that their attendance was 
limited to school members only. Meetings were only to be advertised in the general 
press with specific permission and the school's notice boards could not be used for 
posters or propaganda. 75 It was stated that "all students are bound to obey all rules 
made and instructions given by the Director of the school or under his authority, 
and to refrain from any conduct derogatory to the character or welfare of the 
66 Ibid., p. 4. 
67 Michael Straight, After Long Silence Collins, London, 1983, p. 49. 
68 The Clare Market Review. Lent Term 1934, p. 5. 
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school' : 76 As one student complained, "We are told that it is our job to study in an 
atmosphere of academic detachment, that time spent in political activity is wasted 
and that older people know better than we do what is best for us" 77 
Over the following two years there was a general solidification of the 
restrictions which had been fully enunciated due to the Meyer case. Against this 
background, student groups mobilised into a coalition over civil liberties, and 
implicitly over student rights. The LSE Council for Peace and Civil Liberties was 
chaired by W. A. Lewis of the Student Christian Movement (SCM), and included 
representatives from the League of Nations Union, Socialist, Conservative, Marxist 
and Liberal Clubs. This coalition sought to stage W. H. Auden's politically 
controversial play The Dog Beneath the Skin, but was refused permission by the 
school's authorities. Equally an address by two Hunger marchers to a joint meeting 
of the SCM, Liberal and Socialist societies was prevented as it involved 
organisations outside the School 78 The joint meeting reveals how university 
regulations designed to isolate the students' groups from external political 
organisations facilitated coalitions and cooperation within campus. 
A significant concern of the new regulations was whether LSE students 
could identify themselves as members of the school in political activity outside its 
walls. This was a confrontation over whether the students could legitimise their 
political position in public by their membership of the LSE, a connection which 
Beveridge fundamentally opposed. In February 1935, Beveridge refused to allow an 
"LSE Socialist Society" banner in the London demonstrations against the 
Unemployment Assistance Act, a restriction strongly criticised by the student's 
Union. 79 
In this contest for identity, Beveridge sought advice from his London 
neighbour the Provost of University College, who replied that, 
The issue has never been the subject of any College regulation or edict, but 
the matter has come up in this way. All political societies, before receiving 
recognition by the College, have to give, at the beginning of each session, a 
pledge that they will not engage in propaganda work inside or outside the 
College. We have always interpreted that pledge in as generous a way as 
possible, but when a year or two ago there was some doubt as to its exact 
76 Letter of 25/ 5/ 1936, LSE 67-H, LSE Archives. 
77 The Clare Market Review, Dec. 1936, p. 6. 
78 The Clare Market Review. Oct. 1934, p. 5. 
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significance, I held a general meeting of the students and made it quite clear 
to them that, so far as propaganda outside the college was concerned, the 
one form which could not be allowed was taking part as College students 
under some College banner in this or that political demonstration. On 
investigation it seemed to me that their doing so was due to a genuine 
misunderstanding, into the details of which I need not enter. I explained to 
them that though I did not intend to take any action in regard to the past, 
when they were asked to renew their pledge at the beginning of the next 
session they must understand that it did cover this situation. When the time 
came they were unwilling to give the pledge, so no application was made, 
and the Society automatically came to an end. That is the only occasion on 
which this matter has been raised. Fortunately it settled itself without any 
need for any formal edict on the part of the College, and I sincerely trust that 
the matter will continue here in the same clear, if informal, 
understanding. 
Perhaps, it was this informality which allowed Provost Mawer more flexibility in 
adapting to the various calls within UCL for political and humanitarian action over 
international events that would intensify during the mid 1930s. Unlike Mawer, 
Beveridge tried to draw a strict division between his school and outside political 
events, which generated considerable animosity within the LSE. 
Mawer's account downplayed the extent to which students at UCL sought to 
extend the boundaries of political action within and outside their Gower Street 
campus in 1934. The incident to which his letter referred occurred at the beginning 
of that year's summer term, when UCL authorities required a pledge from the 
Socialist Society that its activities would be restricted to discussion. However, the 
students of the Socialist Society argued that since they were affiliated to a national 
body, the radical Federation of Student Societies (FSS), they were obligated to 
follow its requirements of "participation in and support of all working class 
activities"81 The same argument was used to justify off-campus political action in 
other universities by socialist students groups affiliated to the FSS, such as the 
October Club in Oxford. After joining demonstrations against the Unemployment 
Assistance Act, the UCL Socialist Society was deregistered by the College. 82 
80 Letter of 21 / 2/ 1935, LSE 67-G, LSE Archives. 
81 University College Magazine, June 1934, p. 245; 
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Deregistration channelled the Socialist Society's membership and their 
collective concerns into new organisations, a Social Problems Group, and a War and 
Peace Society. Both had to adopt forms that could be approved by the College 
authorities 83 The Provost in a letter to the founders of the Social Problems Group 
set out the UCL authorities' conception of what aims and activities were acceptable 
for student societies. He wrote, 
In order to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, I would stress the 
importance of observing the distinction between a discussion club and a 
political society, and point out that whatever the ultimate complexion of the 
opinion of the majority of the members of your club may be, it must not 
become a political society for the advocacy of these views. In particular there 
are two forms of activity upon which the Club must not embark. The first is, 
it must not appear at any meeting or demonstration outside the college in 
the name of the College; and the second is, that the Club must not engage in 
the distribution of literature supporting this or that point of view within the 
precincts of the College. 84 
Both new clubs formally complied with the authorities' view that they should 
provide for discussion amongst students on a broad basis, rather than act as a focus 
for campaigning or agitation. 85 Though these limits would segregate British 
students into distinct campus-orientated groups, their broad and non-aligned 
character provided the basis for alliances amongst UCL's student societies over 
more political issues later in the decade. 
At a meeting in mid May 1936 the Social Problems Club decided by 49 votes 
to 1 to seek approval from the College authorities to change itself into a new 
Socialist Society. Its justification was the need for a UCL student society to lead and 
be the focus of progressive opinion. 86 The reformation of the Socialist Society and 
its acceptance by UCL authorities reflected the growing tolerance of student 
political activity by the latter during the second half of the 1930s. Perhaps more 
significantly, it also reflects the extent to which students had accepted the 
boundaries against involvement with non-university groups. UCL's new Socialist 
Society was formed within the framework which its predecessor had refused to 
accept. Official restrictions kept the increasing political activities of student groups 
83 Universes College Magazine, March 1935, p. 164. 
84 Minutes of 6/11/1934, p. 8 in "Minutes of College Committee, 1934-1935", UCL Archives, 
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within British campuses, fundamentally maintaining their distant relationship with 
external political bodies. 
The efforts by the authorities of UCL and LSE to circumscribe collective 
political activity by students were largely successful. Politics was a matter to be 
discussed by distinct students' groups, which consciously limited their activities 
and membership outside university. Alliances on campus were far easier than with 
non-university bodies because religious, academic, political and other student 
societies shared memberships, facilities, as well as concerns. Thg close and 
continued interaction between various student groups, partially explains why 
coalition, and not polarisation, was the dominant characteristic of British 
universities, unlike their French counterparts. Student independence from external 
organisations, and interdependence on each other, promoted and then preserved 
the coalitions which after 1936 would take as their main focus the civil war in Spain. 
The Laski Controversy 
When the British Union of Fascists labelled the LSE as "that alien-infested 
college of subversion" in 1936, they were referring not so much to its student 
activists as to the public prominence of several of its academics, particularly Harold 
Laski 87 At the same time as the regulation of student political activities was 
stirring debate at LSE, there developed within the School a debate over political 
action by academics. The controversy centred on which forms of political activity, 
and public visibility, were permissible for British academics. For Beveridge, 
overridingly concerned with the school's public image and its external sources of 
funding, any political commitment by staff should be subordinated to the interests 
of the school. Others, such as Laski, saw these interests as complementary rather 
than conflicting. In 1926, the year before he was appointed Professor of Political 
Science, Laski had stated his belief that "active participation in public affairs was an 
essential prerequisite for effective political analysis" S8 However, his prominence in 
national politics put him under increasing pressure from those who were opposed 
to his connection of political activity and teaching. At the time, the LSE had around 
eighty teachers but Laski was a defining presence, both for the way the outside 
world saw the LSE, and for how the school perceived itself. 89 
87 clipping of Blackshirt, 14/ 2/ 1936 in LSE 26/ 1/ 10, LSE Archives. 
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In late May 1934, Laski had travelled to Moscow to deliver three lectures in 
which he criticised both British capitalism and the communist alternatives. 90 This 
provided a pretext for an attack by the London press, led by The Daily Telegraph 
and taken up by The Morning Post and The Evening Standard 91 More significant 
than the press vitriol was the public statement by the Vice-Chancellor and Principal 
of University of London that Laski would be held answerable for his comments 
before the appropriate inquiry. The strongest attacks on Laski and the LSE, 
ironically came from the MP for University of London, Sir Ernest Graham Little, 
who called for disciplinary action and reduced funding to the LSE. Little's actions 
were motivated by his personal animosity against Laski, which was probably only 
surpassed by his hatred of Beveridge 92 These public attacks provoked strong 
defences of Laski by his colleagues. The Times carried a joint letter by Professors 
Chorley, Gregory, Power, Tawney and Webster of the LSE, and Cambridge 
economist John Maynard Keynes wrote to the New Statesman protesting the 
controversy 93 Despite these efforts, Laski felt that he had largely been let down by 
the British academic community on the issue of academic freedom. 94 
For Beveridge, it was the public nature of such a debate, rather than the 
debate itself, which threatened the ISE's reputation and funding. Through the 
school's governing committee, Beveridge was able to have Laski's frequent writings 
for the national press declared a breach of its rules on professorial employment and 
the public controversy over his Moscow lectures declared "against the best interests 
of the school": 95 Laski agreed to end his regular articles for the Labour Party's Daily 
Herald and to limit his extra-curricular political activities but, embittered, he pulled 
back to focus on teaching. `X' 
The confrontation over Laski's political activities occurred at the same time 
as the crisis over students politics within the school, which left Beveridge 
beleaguered, depressed and seeking career alternatives outside the LSE. `n It took 
two more academic years before Beveridge finally decided on returning to Oxford. 
On the other hand, Laski maintained his impressive public energy in 1934, for he 
was elected alderman on Fulham Council and was one of the founders of the 
90 Kramnick & Sheerman, Harold Laski, p. 326. 
91 Dahrendorf, LSE, p. 280. 
92 Kramnick & Sheerman, Harold Laski, p. 329. 
93 press cuttings, LSE 26/ 1/ 10, LSE Archives. 
94 Newman, Harold Laski, p. 173. 
95 n, id., p. 172. 
`X' Kramnick & Sheerman, Harold Laski, p. 331. 
97 Dahrendorf, LSE, p. 283. 
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National Council of Civil Liberties 98 In the same year he was also forced to resign 
from the Relief Committee for the Victims of German and Austrian Fascism after 
the Labour Conference in Southport had declared the committee to be a Communist 
front organisation. 99 Laski, despite his deeply felt opposition to Nazism, bowed to 
the constraints of the Labour Party just as he had accepted those of the School. 
British Academics and the Labour Party 
Laski's willingness to work within the Labour Party, even where he disagreed 
with party policy, was strikingly characteristic of British academics during the 
1930s. Rather than the independent stance of their French peers, British academics 
on the left enthusiastically submerged themselves within a party organisation. 
Academics were encouraged to channel their political energies through Labour by 
their desire to claim a distinctive role within the party based on their scholarly 
expertise, and the possibility after Labour's electoral disaster in 1931 of remaking 
the party along more radical lines. 100 These two factors meant that their 
commitment to the Labour Party was increasing at the very time when'intellectuals' 
were being increasingly marginalised within the party, especially its decision- 
making. 101 Though Laski and other party members were to disagree strongly with 
elements of the party's international policy, especially over the Spanish civil war, 
they were not prepared to break with the party through which they had defined 
their political identity. 
Nineteen thirty-one was a year of crisis and change for the British Labour 
Party. From holding office as a minority government, the party had been shaken by 
the defection of its most prominent leaders to a Conservative-dominated National 
Government which had been followed by a massive electoral defeat in which it had 
lost 230 seats102 This collapse and the loss of the party's first generation of leaders 
98 mid., pp. 338-339. 
99 Iid., p. 316. 
100 Equally significant was the collapse of the Cambridge Labour Club in the wake of 1931 
disaster which was later reformed as the Cambridge University Socialist Society. Labour's 
weak position in the early 1930s made it easier for students to commit themselves to a more 
radical socialist alternative, rather than the party itself - Patrick Seale & Maureen 
McConville, Philby: The Long Road to Moscow, Hamist Hamilton, London, 1973, p. 29. 
101 Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People: Leaders & Lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock 2nd ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, pp. 9-10; 
Robert Dare, "Instinct & Organization: Intellectuals & British Labour after 1931", Historical 
Journal 26,3,1983, p. 695. 
102 David Howell, British Social Democracy: A Study in Development and Decay, 2nd ed., 
Croom Helm, London, 1980, pp. 10-11. 
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provoked a re-evaluation of party policy by many of its members. Whether the 
party had collapsed or been betrayed, the fall of the Labour government 
encouraged a more radical vision of politics for academics such as G. D. H. Cole and 
Laski. The defeats of 1931 also reinforced their commitment to the Labour Party as 
both Laski and Cole felt there was as an opportunity to remake the party and to 
increase its radical commitment. With the parliamentary wing of the party severely 
weakened, Laski was a much-needed public figure for the party, 
When Labour was out of office, his importance in the labour movement was 
at its greatest. His ideological passion found strong support in sections of the 
party and his constant willingness to work, write and speak for the party 
gave him visibility and importance second to some of the party's 
parliamentary leaders. 103 
Alongside his increasing activities for the party, Laski's political analysis became 
more sympathetic to Marxism as he questioned the gradualism of democratic 
socialism. 
For G. D. H. Cole, the crisis of 1931 reinforced his conception of the role of 
intellectuals inside the Labour Party which stemmed from his earlier experiences of 
Fabianism. Cole believed that academics had a distinct purpose within the Labour 
Party of thinking out party policy and principles, based on their intellectual 
expertise 104 This drew on the Fabian emphasis on the role of the expert in 
preparing and advising the Labour Party on how best to manage the neutral British 
state 105 Despite Cole's commitment to working within the Party, he was largely 
viewed by its leadership as not quite "sound"; a "permanent undergraduate". 106 
Despite this distance, the leadership of the Labour Party was willing to use and 
cooperate with the various academic 'think-tanks' which Cole established in the 
early 1930s. Perhaps the most significant of these was the New Fabian Research 
Bureau, founded in early 1931 with support from Party leaders Attlee, Dalton and 
Henderson. 107 Cole also founded the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, 
however this organisation quickly changed its character into the Socialist League, 
which was intended as an activist lobby group for radical policies. Cole broke with 
the new League to focus on more moderate research and propaganda work for the 
party. 
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Through regular social discussions held at home or in his college rooms in 
Oxford, Cole encouraged a group of young students and dons who shared his 
commitment to left-wing politics. Economists Evan Durbin and Hugh Gaitskell 
were part of this 'Cole Group' when they studied together in Oxford during the late 
1920s, and they had been profoundly influenced by Cole's conception of intellectual 
engagement 108 Taking up lectureships at the LSE and UCL respectively, Durbin 
and Gaitskell acted as Cole's assistants on the New Fabian Research Bureau, which 
perhaps best encapsulated their desire to work inside the Labour Party. Together 
they exemplify the web of political sociability upon which such commitments to the 
Labour Party were built. Across London there were a variety of other forums for 
political activity, such as the multitude of social and political clubs or the 
Bloomsbury homes of other academics. 109 Professional and personal networks often 
overlapped to provide the opportunities for academics to discuss and debate 
contemporary politics and economics. 110 
This political milieu provided the basis for the reviving of the dormant 
University of London Labour Party. Distinct electorates existed for the graduates of 
London, Cambridge and Oxford, the Scottish universities and the new English 
universities, which encouraged the establishment of university Labour parties. 111 
Voting in university constituencies was overwhelmingly conservative during the 
1930s, and such university Labour parties were more significant for providing a 
focus for Labour support than for mounting an effective electoral challenge. 112 By 
the end of 1934, in the space of two years, the University of London Labour Party 
had risen from nothing to a constituency party numbering 73 members. 113 The 
group was open to graduates and teaching staff of the University of London, 
though it drew its most prominent members from the LSE and UCL. Despite its 
membership, the University of London Labour Party always acted as a local 
constituency party rather than a distinct grouping of intellectuals. Its acceptance of 
108 Ibid. p. 94. 
109 Residence in Bloomsbury gave left-wing academics a proximity not only to their 
universities but to the resident literary intelligentsia, encouraging social contact and 
common political activity between the two groups. 
110 Elizabeth Durbin, New Terusalems, p. 115. 
111 An effort to co-ordinate members of various 'redbrick' English universities into a single 
constituency organisation failed - Executive Committee Minutes, 23/2/1937, London 
University Labour Party Collection, University of London Archives, London. 
112 For example, after the 1935 election the Cambridge University Labour Party had 
increased its official membership to 139, yet its poll of only 3,500 votes had been doubled by 
both of its two Conservative opponents - Minutes of 1/ 6/ 1936, Add. 881 / 1, University 
Library, Cambridge. 
113 Minutes of General Meetings, London University Labour Party Collection University of 
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a Labour ethos was a powerful contrast with the independence from the party line 
of London's socialist students. 
Academic Freedom 
In early August 1934, H. D. Dickinson, a lecturer in Economics at University 
of Leeds made a controversial anti-war speech on a visit to Auckland, New 
Zealand. Dickinson was quoted as saying that he would rather be shot by his own 
government than in a war, and that the only good thing to come out of the First 
World War had been the Bolshevik Revolution. 114 Following an outcry in the 
British press over the lecture, Dickinson was censured by the Vice-Chancellor of 
Leeds. The attacks sparked a joint-letter by Cambridge and London academics, who 
on 11 October 1934 wrote, 
This case raises in the clearest way the issue of free speech, and, taken in 
conjunction with recent events in England such as the campaign against 
Professor Laski as well as political developments abroad, shows that there is 
an urgent necessity to affirm the rights and duties of University teachers and 
research workers in this matter. 115 
The letter was signed by a group of leading left-wing scientists - Lascelles 
Abercrombie, J. D. Bernal, P. S. M. Blackett, J. B. S. Haldane, G. H. Hardy, L. Hogben, 
F. G. Hopkins, R. Marrack, J. Needham - who arranged for a meeting at the 
University of London Club, on 21 October 1934. The Academic Freedom Committee 
which was established at the meeting was largely drawn from prominent academics 
in the Cambridge-London-Oxford triangle. I 
Given the support the AUT had given to the AAC in its efforts to care for 
German academic refugees, its reaction to the new Academic Freedom Committee 
showed that the domestic campaign had a far more politicised character. The AUT 
did send a delegate to the London meeting, who was not impressed by the 
proceedings and felt that the new committee was badly organised. The delegate 
reported that 
I do not imagine however that this movement is going to do very much... It 
struck me that there was an undercurrent of political feeling - it showed 
itself in some of the speakers - and that there might be quite a real danger of 
114 Letter of 11 / 10/ 1934, K318, Needham Papers, University Library, Cambridge. 
115 Ibid. 
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this new body being used for the interests of one particular party, namely, 
the Socialist and Labour Party. 1 
The Academic Freedom Committee attempted to link the cases of Laski and 
Dickinson with the attacks on academics in Germany, yet such an international 
phenomenon was explicitly denied by the AUT. 2 The tension between the 
Academic Freedom Committee and the AUT reveals the different political 
mentalities of their separate constituencies. The Academic Freedom Committee 
comprised prominent academics from London and Oxbridge (the latter where the 
AUT was particularly weak) .3 On the other 
hand the AUT circulated its local 
branches in Britain's 'redbrick' universities, thirteen of which replied that they felt 
there had been no infringement of academic freedom at their institution and neither 
was one likely to occur in the immediate future .4 Against the abstract principle of 
academic political engagement, the AUT was far more concerned with pragmatic 
professional measures. 
In August 1935 the Academic Freedom Committee organised a Conference 
at Oxford 5 One of its speakers was a representative of the French organisation, the 
Comite de Vigilance des Intellecutels et Antifascistes (CVIA), who called for the 
establishment of a similarly broad organisation of British intellectuals independent 
of party politics. Though the Academic Freedom Committee saw itself as appealing 
to intellectuals both inside and outside the university, it was never able to achieve 
the large national membership of CVIA as British academics largely remained 
organised in their own distinct political and professional groups 6 
1 Letter of 30/4/1935, "File: Academic Freedom Committee", Mss 27, Modern Records 
Centre. 
2The Universities Review, Oct. 1935, pp. 1-3; 
The Universities Review. April 1936, pp. 101 & 140. 
3 It was not until June 1935 that a Cambridge branch of the AUT was formed; significantly it 
was only launched with the support of politically prominent senior academics such as 
Pascal, Dobb, Elwin and Cornford - Letter of 5/ 6/ 1935, Mss 27/ 3/ 186, Modem Records 
Centre. 
4 "File: Academic Freedom, Position of Junior Staff", Mss 27, Modern Records Centre. 
5'Report of the Conference on Academic Freedom", pp. 18-21, K319, Needham Papers, 
University Library, Cambridge. 




Just as events in Paris at the beginning of the twentieth century marked a 
national tradition of political participation by French intellectuals, so those in 
London during the early 1930s symbolised the limits in the development of a 
similar tradition in Britain. Politics for the students and academics at the University 
of London was not about a public commitment to parallel their French peers. The 
strength of restrictions by university authorities and the mentalites of the activists 
themselves made political activity a matter centred within the university. Unlike 
Paris, there was no long history of polarised struggles for public space by both left 
and right. Rather, British students and academics built alignments and coalitions 
within campuses or professional groups. This difference between the political 
activity in the universities of the two capitals, symbolises the gap between 
intellectual politics in the two countries. 
These two national political traditions were significantly different in four 
key (and inter-connected) areas: 
(i) Histories of political participation 
(ii) Political arenas 
(iii) Forms of organisation and activity 
(iv) Alignments and coalitions 
Traditional national differences in political participation were preserved in the 
distinct political arenas and forms of organisation which focused political activity 
outside the university in France and concentrated them within the university in 
Britain. Within the national contrasts students and academics followed separate 
conceptions of political organisation, most clearly over whether they independently 
aligned themselves with larger political parties or national organisations, worked 
within party organisations or followed a separate course. These national differences 
in political forms, spaces and traditions shaped not only political activity but also 
the creation of coalitions, alignments and movements in the two countries. 
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(i) Histories of political participation 
The Dreyfus Affair of the late 
1890s established French academics 
and students as political actors on the 
national stage, fitting both with 
particular political repertoires. The 
familiar forms of organisation and 
activity established in the Affair were 
overwhelmingly focused on 
intervention in public debates and 
public spaces. The Dreyfusard 
experience became a powerful 
reference point which was 
consciously and continually invoked 
by academics and students of all 
political hues throughout the interwar 
period. 
In Britain, there was no 
parallel singular reference point to 
justify participation in public politics. 
As a result, the birth of new political 
groups for both academics and 
students during the early 1930s was 
far more idiosyncratic - marked both 
by their confrontations with their own 
university authorities and diverging 
local concerns. The focus of these 
groups on politics within the 
university, was partly a product of 
these conflicts, but was also largely 
derived from their own strong 
traditions of campus-based 
organisation and activity. 
(ii) Political arenas 
Political participation by 
French students and academics had 
developed out of a long history of 
confrontation in public debates and 
public spaces. This focus on politics 
outside the university in France was 
reinforced by the legal 
depoliticisation of the university 
itself. Compared to their British peers, 
French academics and students 
enjoyed a greater degree of freedom 
outside university walls. One 
significant consequence of this public- 
orientation was the importance of 
confrontation for university members 
in the symbolic and physical claiming 
of space in the public arena. 
For most members of British 
universities, the central focus of their 
political (and other) activities was the 
university itself. During the mid 1930s 
there were campaigns by students for 
greater political participation in 
public debates, yet their politics 
remained overwhelmingly campus- 
centred. This campus-focus was 
strongly felt even at non-residential 
British universities where there was a 
strong commitment by the 
institutions themselves and their 
members to campus-life. 
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(iii) Forms of organisation and activity 
The Dreyfus Affair had been 
fought by French academics as 
political independents. This formal 
independence from parties and 
parliament not only legitimised 
political engagement, but was part of 
their political capital. In petitions and 
public meetings senior academics 
preserved an identity as independent 
individuals (although this image was 
less true of junior academics who 
were more likely to be involved in 
party politics). Significantly, the inter- 
linked structure of the state education 
system reinforced the broader, non- 
professional conception of intellectuel 
in France, placing academics beside 
other public figures in heavily mixed 
milieus. 
In contrast to their seniors, 
French students developed their own 
distinct organisations as part of 
existing nationalist leagues or parties 
of the left. Significantly, this form of 
organisation made students not only 
subject to external discipline and 
policies, but also drew them into 
national political confrontations and 
developments. Parallelling these 
groups which existed and acted 
outside the university, were student 
corporate organisations which were 
formally defined as 'non-political'. 
Unlike their French peers, 
British academics were far more likely 
to justify their engagement in political 
activity by their professional skills 
rather than abstract values. Union 
and party organisations reached 
across campuses, as did the 
connections of academic disciplines or 
shared educational backgrounds 
(both of which were also strong in 
France). During the 1930s they sought 
a role on the inside of the Labour 
Party due to the dual considerations 
of legitimising political participation 
through their professional expertise 
and seeking to remain distant from 
public controversy. The failure of the 
campaign for "Academic Freedom" to 
mobilise broad support outside the 
university reflected the extent to 
which British academics maintained 
their own distinctive identities. 
The campus-focus of British 
students was most powerfully 
expressed in their forms of 
organisation. Almost all student 
political activity was channelled 
through university clubs and 
societies. Though these were 
frequently aligned to national parties 
or wider movements, they remained 
firmly autonomous and locally 
idiosyncratic. They were also subject 
to university regulations, which were 
primarily concerned with keeping 
students away from the controversy 
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Nevertheless, the polarisation of the 
1930s, the willingness of such groups 
to engage in public space (reinforced 
by their lack of broad roots within the 
university itself) and their 
overlapping memberships with 
leagues and parties, gave corporate 
student groups a far more ambivalent 
political identity. 
of the public arena. These restrictions 
were reinforced by the perspectives of 
the participants themselves, and their 
opportunities and resources within 
their institutions. 
(iv) Alignments and coalitions 
The extreme polarisation of 
the Dreyfus Affair became a lasting 
characteristic of politics in French 
universities. Conflict and 
confrontation defined not only the 
organisations of the 1920s and 1930s 
but also their activities which were 
focused on clashes over public spaces 
or in public debates. These traditions 
and tendencies shaped the later 
coalitions amongst academic and 
student groups. 
The university-orientated 
mentalities of British academics and 
students facilitated broad coalitions 
amongst university groups which 
shared campus space. These 
alignments were encouraged during 
the early 1930s when university 
restrictions united disparate groups in 
coalitions to claim common 'rights' to 
participate in public politics. Such 
coalitions were sometimes 
intermeshed with the broad-reaching 
movements that developed around 




Campaigns & Coalitions, 1934-1936 
Political histories of the thirties have stressed the extent to which the slogan 
"against war and fascism" rallied support from a variety of groups and coalitions in 
both Britain and France. 1 "Against war and fascism" is seen as covering a multitude 
of campaigns, from those against militarism to support for League of Nations, as 
well as opposition to the extreme right in domestic or international politics. 
Underlying the shared political rhetoric, there were significant differences between 
the two countries in the slogan's meaning, resonance and tone. This gap was best 
expressed by two symbolic dates -6 February in France and 11 November in 
Britain. The former marked the riots of the extreme right in 1934 which had 
increased the polarisation of French politics, focusing the left on the domestic threat 
of fascism and the right on the growing unity of the left. It was Armistice Day 
which created controversy within British universities as activists became 
increasingly concerned about international politics and clashed with university 
regulations. Embodied in these two key dates was a profound contrast between the 
national political cultures of the two countries which were focused on the domestic 
instability in France and overseas events in Britain. 
This political mobilisation of the mid 1930s drew heavily on the traditions 
and perceptions discussed in the previous chapter. In French universities between 
1934 and 1936 there was a reshaping and transformation of an already polarised 
and highly politically active population. In British universities, the same years were 
dominated by political movements over international events which overlapped 
with confrontations over university restrictions, producing far more campus- 
specific campaigns and coalitions. While Paris would remain the focus of French 
national (and university) politics, by the mid-1930s London had been replaced as 
the leading political campus by Oxford and Cambridge due to their resources and 
elite ethos. 
At the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, students and academics faced 
limitations on their political activities which were similar to their London 
counterparts. In Oxford, Armistice Day 1933 became the focus for confrontation 
1 Kevin Morgan, Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British 
Communist Politics, 1935-1941, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989. 
Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Shorth Twentieth Century 1914-1991 Abacus, London, 
1994, pp. 143-150. 
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between students and university authorities. By 1936, the tone of this debate had 
changed and there was widespread national criticism of the unreasonable proctorial 
regulation of student political activity. During the mid 1930s, there were therefore 
significant developments in political campaigns by students within the university. 
In Cambridge Armistice Day 1933 was marked not by proctorial regulation, but by 
the clashes between students of the left and right. This confrontation came to 
symbolise the growing coalition between political, religious and other students 
groups against war. This coalition was encouraged by leading academics, 
particularly those close to the Communist Party. The CPGB's activist approach to 
politics had a strong appeal for those at Oxbridge who saw'real politics' as 
occurring outside the university. Class was a powerful influence in shaping this 
conception of politics, which transcended the changing policy of the Communists 
during the first half of the 1930s. 
Armistice Day: Oxford 
I propose to adhere to the rule not to give any undergraduate political club 
leave for a public meeting. 
Vice-Chancellor of Oxford to University Proctors, 1933.2 
In February 1933, the Oxford Union became the focus of the national press 
when it passed the motion that "this House will not fight for King and Country" by 
a substantial majority 3 The Oxford Union (and its sister institution at Cambridge) 
embodied the ambiguous position of the ancient universities in British political life. 
The Union mixed prominent statesmen, politicians and public figures with students 
in debates on the leading issues of the day. However amidst this playing at 
parliament, the Union and its members saw themselves as operating outside of 
narrow party or political considerations. Voting at the debates was on the speakers' 
ability as much as the motion itself. 4 Union debates, as T. E. B. Howarth has argued, 
constitute a very erratic barometer of political and social opinion amongst 
2 Letter of 3/ 5/ 1933, PR 3/ 2/ 339, Proctors' Records, Bodleian Library. 
3 Martin Ceadel, 'The'King and Country' Debate, 1933: Student Politics, Pacifism and the 
Dictators", Historical Journal. 22,2,1979, pp. 397-422. 
4 Brian Harrison, "Politics" in Harrison, ed., The History of the University of Oxford. Vol III 
The Twentieth Century, p. 406. 
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undergraduates. But attendances in the inter-war years relative to the 
student body, were often surprisingly high and the choice of motions and of 
distinguished visitors invited is frequently indicative of preoccupations and 
social trends .5 
Given the heated public controversy which had been stirred by the "King 
and Country" motion it was not surprising that university authorities were 
unwilling for such a spotlight to return to their institution later in the same year. 
The university's Proctors who were responsible for regulating student activities 
outside of their residential colleges sought to prevent a potentially controversial 
meeting of the growing student anti-war movement. As the left-leaning journal The 
New Oxford Outlook wrote, 
an Anti-War Committee, on which the October Club was represented 
together with the Labour Club and the Oxford Peace Groups, applied for 
permission to hold a meeting criticising the work of the University Officer 
Training Corps. This permission was refused, and the same organisations 
then combined with representatives of the Liberal Club and the League of 
Nations Union to form a Free Speech Committee, to hold a meeting 
protesting against restrictions of this kind. Permission for this meeting also 
was refused .6 
Like in London, restrictions against student political activity could encourage 
further political action and broaden campaigns across different campus groups. Of 
all the aforementioned students groups, it was the radical October Club which in 
defiance of university authorities arranged a meeting over Free Speech at Ruskin 
College for 1 November 1933.7 Over 400 students attended the meeting, which the 
university was unable to prevent as it was convened at a college on the periphery of 
the university both administratively and geographically 8 Still, Proctors waited 
outside the meeting to collect names of students attending, and after its close they 
were roughly interfered with by the students of Ruskin College. This challenge to 
university authority, and the fear of public disturbance on Armistice Day during 
the following week, resulted in the October Club being suspended on 7 November 
1933.9 
5T. E. B. Howarth, Cambridge between Two Wars, Collins, London, 1978, p. 22. 6The New Oxford Outlook. 1,2, Nov. 1933, p. 133. 
7 The meeting was formally convened by the Federation of Student Societies of which the 
October Club was a member. 
8 Ruskin College was unique within Oxford as it had been created as an independent 
institution for students from the organised labour movement - Harold Pollins, The History 
of Ruskin College, Ruskin College Library, Oxford, 1984. 
9 Letter of 2/ 11/ 1933, PR 3/ 2/ 339, Proctor's Records, Bodleian Library. 
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Within its brief two year existence, the October Club claimed 300 student 
members. 10 Few of these formally belonged to the Communist Party, and despite its 
radical marxism there was considerable overlap between its membership and the 
Labour Club. As one commentator wrote of the October Club, 
inside the club there is a fairly small but very active group, but the larger 
part of its membership, like that of every other political club in the 
University, only attend the weekly meetings when a speaker comes down to 
address them. Its numerical success has been due in no small degree to the 
calibre of these weekly speakers, who have included Bernard Shaw and HG 
Wells besides a number of other well-known people. ll 
The most significant consequence of the suspension of the October Club, was not 
the end of its radical politics, but that it merged its membership with that of the 
Labour Club. This coalition of the left would probably have occurred anyway given 
the appeal of Popular Front coalitions amongst left students in the mid-1930s. Yet 
the early end of the October Club, partly explains why students of the left did not 
have to face the party divisions of their seniors but co-existed within the Labour 
Club. 
Though the Oxford University Labour Club was affiliated to the Oxford City 
Labour Party, the Club had always followed its own independent line, as members 
of the Club were not required to be members of the Party. 12 Despite the support of 
senior university figures such as G. D. H. Cole and A. D. Lindsay, the Club suffered 
through a difficult early existence before the 1930s as its meetings were frequently 
interrupted by conservative students 13 Rather than paralleling the French pattern 
of regular political violence, these clashes were often merely the boisterous rejection 
of left-wing politics. 
Oxford students of the political left were at the forefront of criticism of 
university regulations on student life. In February 1934 they called for the end of 
proctorial discretion, with the formulation of enumerated rules for student societies 
and proctorial registration of a club being reduced to a formality. 14 They also 
demanded freedom of publication, and abolition of restrictions on social activities 
between male and female students. Given the large number of women students in 
10 The New Oxford Outlook. 1,2, Nov. 1933, p. 169. 
11 Ibid. 
12 M. P. Ashley & CT. Saunders, Red Oxford: A History of the Growth of Socialism in the 
University of Oxford, 2nd. ed., Oxford University Labour Club, Oxford, 1933, p. 40. 13 Rid.. p. 17. 
14 Part of those rules specified that all student dubs had to register a list of members and 
senior members with the Proctors, and that they were limited to only one public meeting a 
term - The New Oxford Outlook, 1,3, Feb. 1934, pp. 259-260. 
83 
the Oxford Labour Club, calls for sexual equality were not merely matters of 
principle, but pragmatically related to the running of the club. 15 In June 1934 the 
Labour Club applied to the university authorities for a mixed club room. Despite 
the fears of Oxford's Proctors the proposal was supported by the Principals of the 
women's colleges. 16 The establishment of facilities such as regular dub rooms, and 
the attraction of social intercourse with the opposite sex, did much to increase the 
appeal of political activity to the students of Oxford. 17 
The development of political opinion and organisation amongst Oxford 
undergraduates during the early 1930s was revealed by the controversy that 
erupted over Armistice Day 1936. Fearing a public outcry if students staged an anti- 
war demonstration during the town's memorial service, Oxford Proctors banned a 
planned wreath-laying march by anti-war students. 18 Once again, restriction 
fuelled a broad coalition amongst student groups of all political colours. Eleven 
Oxford student societies signed a joint letter of protest, including the Conservative 
Association, Liberal Club, Labour Club, League of Nations Union and Pacifist 
Society 19 A protest meeting supported by the same organisations and the SCM was 
also organised, chaired by the President of the Oxford Union. The Proctors' actions 
were publicly criticised by Oxford academics in the Labour Party (G. D. H. Cole, 
Richard Crossman and Patrick Gordon Walker), as well as writer H. G. Wells, the 
National Council for Civil Liberties and a group of Liberal and Labour MPs 20 The 
reaction to the Proctors' restrictions on students demonstrations over Armistice Day 
reveals the degree to which the concept of acceptable student political activity had 
shifted, both inside and outside of Oxford. Politics had become a deep-rooted 
activity within Oxford by 1936, even if it remained largely focused on campus 
activities and organisations. 
15 Ashley & Saunders, Red Oxford, p. 31-32. 
16 Letter of 30/ 10/ 1934, PR 3/ 2/ 339, Proctors Records, Bodleian Library. 
17 "A fair number joined the Labour Club as a way of meeting women. The Club had the 
reputation, not unfounded, of having the best women in Oxford as members. It also held 
good 'socials"' - Leo Pliatzky in Brian Harrison, ed., Corpuscles: A History of Corpus Christi 
College. Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1994, p. 125. 
18 At the same time, Proctors had prevented a delegation of students from welcoming 
Hunger Marchers. The Labour Club protested, Philip Toynbee decrying the infringement on 
rights of students to express their opinion in public. He wrote that "the former right of clubs 
to demonstrate and of students to carry banners have already been withdrawn" - Letter 3/11/36, PR 3/2/339, Proctor's Records, Bodleian Library. 
19 The Granata, 20/ 11/ 1936, p. 126. 
20 The Oxford Magazine, 19/ 11/1936, pp. 175 & 184; 
The Cherwell, 21/11/1936, p. 123. 
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British Fascism and British Anti-Fascism 
Political coalitions amongst Oxford students developed out of their anti-war 
campaigns focused on Armistice Day, rather than in opposing the British Union of 
Fascists (BUF). David Renton has argued that the confrontations with the newly 
formed fascist group represented the first stage of politicisation and coalition- 
building within the University of Oxford in the early 1930s. 21 Perhaps this was true 
for a vanguard of students on the far left, but the most successful coalitions in 
Oxbridge before 1936 were mobilised against international war (and the subsequent 
confrontations with university authorities), not British fascism. 
From their birth in October 1932, the British Union of Fascists were a 
marginal force in British politics22 Their paramilitary style, corporatist ideology 
and anti-semitism seemed to many alien in a British context 23 In July 1934, the BUF 
claimed 50,000 members but by October 1935 this had collapsed to 5,0004 Though 
membership slowly increased during the second half of the 1930s, it remained 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the East End of London. 25 The BUF were never a 
national presence, especially within British universities, despite the Communist 
Party's efforts to rally support by leading the physical and political challenge to the 
fascists26 The weakness of British fascism was reflected in the extent to which 
political alignments both nationally and locally were unaffected by the rapid rise 
and collapse of the BUF. Compared to France where domestic fascism was seen as 
the central issue of national politics in the mid-1930s, the BUF had only a transitory 
and peripheral impact on British politics. Those student activists who enjoyed the 
physical confrontations of the BUF remained a minority; for most in British 
universities the threat of domestic fascism in the mid 1930s was not serious enough 
to force them into political action 27 
21 Dave Renton, Red Shirts & Black: Fascists & Anti-Fascists in Oxford in the 1930s, Ruskin 
College Library, Oxford, 1996. 
22 Richard Thurlow, Fascism in Britain: A History. 1918-1985, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1987, pp. 23,107 & 117. 
23 Richard Thurlow, "The Failure of British Fascism 1932-40" in Andrew Thorpe, ed., The 
Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-war Britain, University of Exeter, Exeter, 1989, p. 74. 
24 John Stevenson & Chris Cook, Britain in the Depression: Society & Politics 1929-1939 2nd 
ed., Longman, Harlow, 1994, p. 234. 
25 Thurlow, Fascism in Britain, p. 126. 
26 Morgan, Against Fascism & War, p. 27. 
27 Toynbee, Friends Apart, pp. 21-23. 
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Oxbridge, Politics and the'Real World' 
The confrontations between Oxford students and university authorities over 
public engagement in politics outside the university arose in an environment very 
different to than of their peers in London. The complaint of one Oxford student 
that, "wherever he may turn he will find University rules defending his position as 
an undergraduate and a gentleman rather than a student and a citizen" reveals the 
significant class differences which distinguished the universities of Oxford and 
Cambridge 28 Their elite mentalite, residential nature and regulation of daily life, 
gave rise at both universities to a powerful motivation to become active in politics 
outside university. 29 The quads of the ancient universities were not merely part of 
its distinctive architecture but felt by some of its members to represent a sense of 
enclosure and isolation 30 During the 1930s, left-wing politics was therefore seen as 
a way of getting involved in the 'real world'. The same enclosure that focused the 
aspirations of activists outside college walls, generated an intense communal life 
within the colleges, which encouraged and provided more opportunities for 
political groups than at non-residential universities. 
The desire for a politics outside of campus was most clearly articulated by 
those who aligned themselves in the early 1930s with the Communist Party. In 1931 
the first Communist cells were formed within the Universities of London, 
Cambridge, and Oxford 31 In London, student communists were encouraged by 
their proximity to other radical organisations, including such left-wing landmarks 
as the bookshop at Red Lion Square 32 However, in Cambridge and Oxford, it was 
university life itself rather than its surrounding milieu which encouraged activism 
in 'town . The first communist efforts by the Oxford and 
Cambridge cells were 
directed outside the university to involvement in'real' issues in the surrounding 
community like rent disputes and strike&33 Activity off-campus was what mattered 
and what appealed about party politics. Margot Heinemann described becoming a 
28 The New Oxford Outlook 1,3, Feb. 1934, p. 269. 
29 Restrictions included college curfews at midnight and the compulsory wearing of 
academic gowns when outside college at night. 
30 Poet Stephen Spender wrote of being a student in the early 1930s, "Oxford was in some 
ways for me a period of my life having little connection with what went before or after it. 
There was a sense of unreality, of living in a vacuum" - Stephen Spender, World within 
World Readers Union, London, 1953, p. 34. 
31 Wood, Communism & British Intellectuals, p. 51; 
Seale & McConville, Philbv, p. 31. 
32 Toynbee, Friends Apart, pp. 17-18. 
33 Maurice Cornforth, "Recollections of Cambridge Contemporaries" in Carmel Haden 
Guest, ed., David Guest: A Scientist Fights for Freedom (1911-1938), Lawrence & Wishart, 
London, 1939, p. 98. 
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communist as a student in October 1934 out of her interest in the party's practical 
work, despite being put off by its theory 34 As a Party member she was expected to 
do work in town, and after three weeks she helped to organise a rent strike. Equally 
for historian Roy Pascal, 
It was a principle whenever a Communist group was formed that it should 
undertake work in the working class, distributing party literature, carrying 
on party propaganda of various kinds, helping in industrial struggles and so 
on. [Therefore] the first thing that the group in Cambridge thought of was 
what could be done... We proceeded to create tasks... and to carry them out, 
working among railway workers, the bus workers and taking every 
opportunity to help... I think it must be said that people tended to join the 
Communist Party and leave the Labour Party because of this sort of 
requirement. You felt that something was being done, that you weren't just 
sitting up in a study and thinking about the political situation. 35 
Public politics gave purpose to communist students and academics, making their 
clashes with university authorities in the early 1930s almost inevitable. 
Underlying the tension for university activists between campus restriction 
and politics in the 'real world' were perceptions of class and class identity. 
Nineteen-thirties Britain was a intensely class-stratified society, and these divisions 
were powerfully expressed in both politics and education. Both the Communist 
Party and the Labour Party identified their politics in specifically class terms; they 
were of and for the working class. Student activists such as Heinemann did not 
share this background, nor would they have had much contact with those the 
labour movement represented, until they joined its ranks. Class provided not only 
the symbols and rhetoric of politics on the left, but also the motive for engagement. 
During the early 1930s, the Communist Party had emphasised its working class 
identity, as part of a'class against class' strategy of absolute sectarian distance from 
other socialist groups. The line of "class against class" had a strong personal appeal 
for students such as John Cornford, especially in its call for a purist campaign 
amongst the working class towards revolution. 
Comford's attitude to the English middle class was described by a 
Cambridge contemporary as based on a "sense of absolute separation from the 
'enemy', of irreconcilable antagonism and difference". 36 It was an ideology which 
34 Recorded Interview with Margot Heinemann, Reel 1, Side 2,9239/ 5, Imperial War 
Museum. 
35 Pascal quoted in Gary Werskey, The Visible College, pp. 216-217. 36 Victor Kiernan, "John Cornford: A Memoir", pp 5 &. 9 in John Cornford Collection, Trinity 
College Archives. 
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coloured Cornford's appearance so that he became famed around the university for 
wearing stained trousers, black shirt, ragged raincoat, 'dirty sweaters' and a tattered 
academic gown 37 On meeting Cornford in 1934, Margot Heinemann was struck by 
the way he looked and acted like a worker 38 To her, Cornford was striking for 
cutting his bourgeois connections and his stance of accepting nothing short of 
revolution. 
Cornford's connection of politics and class exemplified the appeal of the left 
to student activists at Cambridge and Oxford, of a 'real world' removed from upper 
class privilege. Significantly, these motives for political action remained unchanged 
even with the reversal of Comintern strategy in mid 1935 to the call for a cross-party 
and cross-class coalition against fascism. 39 This tournant had been anticipated in 
some respects for Cambridge students when they were told in 1934 by Communist 
MP William Gallacher that "the party needed good scientists, historians and 
teachers, and that they should study and become good students, not run away to 
factories". Though Communist campaigns for a Popular Front produced greater 
efforts at proselytising and organising within the university, the 'real' political 
struggle was still seen as occurring off campus 41 
Significantly, this physical and mental crossing of class boundaries was not 
faced by Conservative students within Oxbridge. Tory students in the early 1930s 
constructed their political identities through the sociability of dining or social clubs, 
rather than through activism amongst the working class. There was a profound 
difference in political mentalite between the left and right amongst British students, 
explaining why there are fewer records for right-wing politics despite its numerical 
strength. Their politics was not centred on notions of public engagement or 
expressions of class allegiance, but rather consisted of merely living the status quo. 
These contrasting conceptions of politics within Britain's elite universities also 
37 Stansky, & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier. pp. 206-207. 
38 Recorded Interview with Margot Heinemann, Reel 1, Side 2,9239/ 5. 
39 Even during the late 1930s, some Oxford students affected a'proletarian' accent in 
speaking of politics - Denis Healey, The Time of my Life, Michael Joseph, London, 1989, p. 
35; 
For a balanced account of the international and internal pressures which shaped the new 
strategy see E. H. Carr, The Twilight of Comintern 1930-1935. Macmillan Press, London, 
1982. 
41) Margot Heinemann, 'The People's Front & the Intellectuals" in Jim Fryth, ed., Britain, 
Fascism & the Popular Front, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1985, p. 161. 
41 "Left-wing students saw themselves as joining in a struggle already being carried on by 
the working class, or finding a useful role in the wider peace movement, rather than as a 
separate estate with wholly distinct problems and attitudes, or even a new revolutionary 
leadership" - Noreen Branson & Margot Heinemann, Britain in the Nineteen Thirties, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1971, pp. 258-259. 
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partly explains why there were so few clashes between left and right as compared 
to France during the 1930s. 
Left-wing Politics at 'Elite' and 'Civic' Universities 
In late 1935, Cambridge's Socialist Society and Labour Club merged to form 
the Cambridge University Socialist Club. On a national level, the Federation of 
Student Societies dissolved itself and merged with the University Labour 
Federation in January 1936.42 This amalgamation of left-wing students, was largely 
based on the increasing activism and broadening student coalitions against war and 
university regulations within London, Oxford and Cambridge. Interestingly, 
members of the Socialist Society at the University of Leeds took a very different 
view of calls for coalition, and of student politics itself. This dissent crystallised the 
different attitudes and opportunities for political activity between British elite and 
civic universities. 
In its report on the ULF Conference in Cardiff during January 1936, the 
Leeds' Socialist Society described itself as "probably unique among University 
Labour and Socialist groups in that it has persistently held fast to a strictly Fabian 
attitude". 43 The resolution from Leeds "protesting against the united front with 
Communism" was outvoted, and the efforts of its delegates seem confined to the 
role of marginal dissent. Unable to accept the majority's orientation in the ULF, 
Leeds' delegates consoled themselves with the argument that their moderate 
approach was more likely to deliver practical results than Marxist and communist 
extremism. 44 Though unsuccessful in resisting the merger with the FSS, Leeds 
Socialist students saw their efforts as loyally in line with the policies of the official 
Labour movement. 
At the ULF Conference in Manchester the following year, the Leeds 
delegates attacked not only the policy direction of the ULF, but also its conception 
of its purpose 45 Reporting after the Conference, they noted that, 
Our opposition to the ULF policy was concentrated by our delegates on two 
42 Stanksy & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier. , pp. 228 & 247. 43 The Gryphon, Feb. 1936, p. 206. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Six of the leading members of Leeds' Socialist Society rejected the ULFs policy of a 
'united front' which they felt would increase Communist influence in univeristy groups and 
the Labour movement. Interestingly, they were "willing to support wholeheartedly a Popular 
Front, that is, a union of Radical, Liberal, and Democratic forces against Fascism and War" 
over which they did not share the same fears - The Gryphon Feb. 1937, p. 176. 
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points, namely the proposal for a 'United Front' between Socialists and 
communists in all its forms, and the conception of the ULF as a separate 
political organisation with an independent policy of its own. 
Positively, the delegates urged that the function of University Socialist 
Societies was to provide a forum for discussion and organisational 
experience for Socialists of all shades of opinion. The appropriate political 
parties were the correct media for political activities and student unions for 
student grievances. Finally, we urged that direct Socialist propaganda and 
education should be the main purpose of the ULF and its affiliated clubs to 
which objective all other activities should be subordinated 46 
This emphasis on education and discussion within the university provided a 
conception of student activism that rejected the role of the student groups in anti- 
war and anti-fascist agitation. Leeds' officials stated their belief "that for effective 
politics on a national or international scale students will have to go outside the 
University and become active members of the appropriate political party, which in 
their view is the Labour Party" 47 It was loyalty to the party rather than campus 
coalitions and activism which mattered most to Leeds left-wing students, partly 
because they shared neither the same intense focus on university life or the self- 
conscious leadership mentalite as their peers at Oxbridge. 
Armistice Day: Cambridge 
The official commemorations of Armistice Day 1933 in Cambridge were 
overshadowed by street fighting amongst undergraduates in what seemed like a 
full-scale political war. Brawling erupted outside Peterhouse when socialist and 
pacifist students sought to march to the town's war memorial 48 The marchers 
intended to lay a wreath at the memorial which read "To the Victims of a War They 
Did Not Make, from Those Who are Determined to Prevent All Similar Crimes of 
Imperialism". The march had been organised by the Cambridge University Socialist 
Society in co-operation with the Student Christian Movement. The wording of the 
wreath, which echoed the CPGB's stand against imperialist war, had been too 
provocative to win support from the students of the League of Nations Union. In 
response, Cambridge's Tory students and others, described by Heinemann as boat 
toughs, met the demonstration with flour, feathers, eggs and tomatoes 49 
46 The Gryphon, Feb. 1937, p. 201. 
47 The Gryphon, March 1937, p. 238. 
48 Stansky & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier. p. 212. 
49 Recorded Interview with Margot Heinemann, Reel 1, Side 1,9239/ 5, Imperial War 
Museum. 
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In his study of the politics of scientists in Cambridge, Gary Werskey argues 
that the Armistice Day clash "marked the beginning of Cambridge's left-wing 
renaissance", in that it politicised religious pacifists and others who previously saw 
their anti-war commitments as 'non-political . 50 Certainly Armistice Day 1933 has 
been preserved in the popular memory of the university as the birth of a coalition 
between socialists and pacifists against war and fascism. However, the alliance that 
Werskey sees as sealed in 1933 was constantly changing through the decade as 
international events gave rise to a variety of campaigns. The real significance of 
Armistice Day 1933, rather than marking the birth of a single political movement 
within Cambridge, was the absence of further clashes between students of the left 
and right over political space. The lack of physical confrontations is especially 
striking when compared to the frequent conflicts within and around French 
universities at the same time. 
Part of the reason for resistance to anti-war activism in Cambridge during 
the early 1930s lay in the prominent role of the Communist Party in organising such 
movements 51 Physicist J. D. Bernal was one of the key figures behind organising a 
Cambridge Anti-War Council which in the week of the 1933 clash had organised a 
public meeting addressed by German novelist Ernst Toller as well as an Anti-war 
Exhibition. 52 In the same year Bernal had stopped being an official member of the 
Communist Party. His independent position left untouched his strong commitment 
to communism and close contact with the Party. 53 
The Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group (CSAWG) 
Another organisation which drew strongly on Bernal's initiative was the 
Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group (CSAWG). Like the town's Anti-War 
50 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 218; 
Stansky & Abrahams, tourney to the Frontier, p. 212. 
51 Martin Ceadel, "The First Communist 'Peace Society': The British Anti-War Movement 
1932-1935", Twentieth Century British Histoly 1,1,1990, pp. 58-86. 
52 The meeting was organised by the Relief Committee for Victims of German Fascism to 
raise funds for working class German refugees - flyer, K 70, Needham Papers, University 
Library, Cambridge; 
The 1933 Anti-War Exhibition attracted an estimated 2,000 people - Pamphlete, "What is the Cambridge Anti-War Council", p. 3,416/ 0.16, Cambridge Trades Council & Division Labour 
Party, Cambridgeshire County Record Office. 
53 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 166; 
This was one of the few examples of a deliberate 'independent' stance adopted by a British 
Communist academic fitting the image of fellow-traveller describe by David Caute - David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript tothe Enlightenment Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
London, 1973, p. 7. 
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Council, the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group was formed in 1932. The group 
was "originally formed by a left-wing coterie", or in the words of C. H. Waddington, 
"a really coherent group of friends" . 
54 Marriage made academic and political 
partnerships common amongst the leaders of the CSAWG, such as the Needhams, 
the Piries and the Woosters. 55 Given their very low numbers within the university 
itself (less than 10% of total population), women were strikingly over-represented 
in the CSAWG ranks. The CSAWG drew its strongest support from amongst post- 
doctoral researchers and postgraduates especially within the two largest 
laboratories of Cambridge, the Dunn Biochemical Institute and Cavendish 
Laboratory for experimental physics 56 One of the keys to the Group securing such 
diverse political and religious support was the compatibility, for some, of academic 
and political commitments. 
In his study of left-wing British scientists, Gary Werskey correctly 
recognised the extent to which CSAWG was formed within the framework 
established by their academic work in science. Some quickly accepted that 
"Marxism in its widest implications is the essence of the modem scientific 
outlook" 57 Socialism was the political correlative to advances in physics and 
biology and science was the cornerstone of socialism. Strengthening this appeal of 
Marxist theory was the special recognition which the USSR seemed to accord to 
science in practice through extensive funding and cooperative, state-directed 
research 58 As Joseph Needham wrote for the Cambridge Review in 1935, the 
Soviets were building a new society based on scientific principles and advances 
which gave the scientist an essential social function. 59 The conjunction of scientific 
theory and marxist philosophy is not so surprising, given the emphasis on pure 
science within these elite institutions. 
Scientific socialism, like other intellectual traditions, justified a distinctive 
political voice for those with particular forms of knowledge. Unlike the French 
Dreyfusards, the scientists of CSWAG did not claim to speak for universal values, 
but rather to apply their professional expertise to certain related political areas. 
Given the personal experiences of scientists in military research during the First 
World War, military technology provided a central motive for the Cambridge 
54 Werskey, The Visible College, pp. 221 & 223. 
55 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Cornforth, "Recollections of Cambridge Contemporaries", pp. 92-93. 58 Werskey, The Visible College, pp. 142-146; 
Seale & McConville, Philby, p. 50. 
59 The Cambridge Review, 15/11/1935, pp. 136-137. 
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Scientists' Anti-War Group 60 In petitioning against the extension of military 
regulation over scientific research in June 1934, the members of CSAWG were 
explicitly combining political and professional concerns 61 This membership was 
concentrated in certain pockets of the university, for out of the 423 staff and 
graduate students engaged in scientific research, there were only 79 signatories to 
the petition, and by the beginning of the following academic year the group could 
only claim 88 members. 62 
Colleges, like the laboratory, offered a physical focus for political 
organisation and activity. The residential colleges that formed the foundation of 
Oxford and Cambridge gave the elite universities a structure and ethos unique in 
Britain. The Oxbridge colleges expressed an overwhelmingly public-school culture, 
because of the shared educational and social background of their middle class 
members 63 This common ethos did not prevent its members from seeing each 
college as architecturally, socially and intellectually individual 64 The intimacy of 
the college environment was an influential frame in which undergraduates and 
academics lived, studied and engaged in politics. 
After his experiences of the political conflicts at the LSE, Michael Straight 
moved in late 1935 into the largest college in Cambridge, the prestigious Trinity 
College. As an 19 year old, Michael Straight remembered, 
Living in college, I found myself at the centre of the political life of the 
university. I was well enough ahead in my studies to be able to coast and so, 
for the first time, I took on a political role. I worked with Dobb on his Anti- 
Fascist Exhibition. I helped to plan demonstrations and parades. I canvassed 
for the Labour Party. I made speeches demanding sanctions against Italy in 
response to Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia . 65 
Maurice Dobb was not only Straight's economics tutor, but one of the few British 
academics who was openly a member of the Communist Party 66 His role as 
adviser, tutor, father-confessor, and friend to the young radicals, while important 
60 In October 1935, Bernal, Needham, Pirie and Wooster signed a protest against the 
University of Cambridge receiving a grant for aeronautical military research -K 28, 
Needham Papers., University Library, Cambridge 
61 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 220. 
62 "Origin and Development of the Cambridge Scientists' Anti-War Group", K 22, Needham 
Papers, University Library, Cambridge; 
Werskey, The Visible College, pp. 339-342. 
63 Harrison, "College Life, 1918-1939", p. 94 
64Ibid. 
, p. 105. 65 Straight, After Long Silence, p. 65. 
66 Pamphlete, "What is the Cambridge Anti-War Council", p. 4 
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for some students has been overstated 67 While Dobb was a frequent presence at the 
early morning discussion meetings held by some of Trinity College's left-wing 
students, most of his political activities, such as his role as the secretary of the 
town's Anti-War Council, were largely outside the ken of undergraduates 68 
The Cambridge Anti-war Exhibition, which Dobb and Bernal prominently 
supported, provides a profound register of how the relationship between anti-war 
and anti-fascist currents changed in Britain during the mid-1930s. By 1935 the 
exhibition had developed a harder edge over anti-fascism with sections devoted to 
Austria and the proto-fascist movements of France and Spain 69 Ironically this 
concern with international fascism occurred at just the same time that the British 
variant was becoming increasingly marginal to political life. 
6 Fevrier: Paris 
L'Heure de la Jeunesse, 
Etudiants, 
En face de la situation exterieure: crise economique et desequilibre budgetaire 
qui nous regnent, en face de la guerre qui nous menace, que font les 
gouvernements? Ils se succedent. 
La Patrie est en Danger!... 
La Revolution Nationale est urgente. 
Les Etudiants en tete! " 
Poster of Jeunesses Patriotes70 
67 Neal Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, p. 86; 
Trinity's Communist cell attracted a large following because of the recruiting efforts of 
leading students John Cornford and James Klugmann, rather than the presence of Dobb. In 
focusing on the influence of academics as political mentors, what has been missed is the 
influence of students on each other, and how often political allegiance and friendship 
overlapped. Perhaps most importantly many students who were Communists at university 
had become political radicals whilst still at public school. 
68 Interview with Alison Duke, Cambridge, March 1996. 
69 Byer, K 40, Needham Papers University Library, Cambridge; 
The Cambridge Review, 1/ 11 / 1935, p. 63; 
The Cambridge Review, 8/11/1935, p. 96. 
70 "The Hour of Youth, Students, In front of the international situation: economic crisis and 
budgetary disequilibrium which reigns over us, in front of the war which menaces us, what 
do the goverments do? They replace each other. The Country is in Danger!... The National 
Revolution is urgent. The Students at the head! "- Report of 13/ 1/ 34, M6 8289, AD Bouches- 
du-Rhone. 
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The long-rehearsed rhetoric of the French extreme right culminated in the 
first weeks of 1934. A financial scandal became a political crisis, as police and 
parliamentarians were implicated in protecting a known embezzler. 71 The 
resignation of the government did nothing to still the vociferous and vehement 
attacks of the right-wing press. These were matched by a series of violent 
demonstrations and confrontations between the extreme right and police in the 
streets of Paris and large towns across the country. The most polemical and public 
leader of the demonstrations was Action Francaise, who rallied support with the 
call "contre les voleurs". 72 Throughout France, students of nationalist leagues formed 
the vanguard of the campaigns over the scandal, hawking the newspapers of the 
leagues and protesting on the streets. 73 Resignations from cabinet were not enough 
to stop the controversy, as the attacks escalated from the corruption of politicians to 
an attack on the legitimacy of the Republic itself. 
The crisis culminated when the Prefect of Police in Paris was dismissed by 
the new Prime Minister Daladier, partly for his passivity and sympathy for the 
extreme right's demonstrations. Various veterans' groups and nationalist leagues 
organised demonstrations for 6 February 1934 in the streets of Paris against the new 
government. It was a reflection of the divisions amongst these various groups that 
they intended to converge on the Chamber in separate columns, as each sought to 
keep their own forces separate from their rivals on the right 74 Nationalist students 
were in some ways an exception to this sectarianism, as they grouped together in a 
body titled the Front Universitaire. They arranged to meet before most of their 
seniors at 6: 30 pm on the Boulevard St Michel, though they seem to have mixed 
with elements of Action Francaise in approaching the Chamber. By that evening a 
pitched battle had broke out in Place de la Concorde as police and the marchers 
faced off until midnight. The scale of violence as the rioters fought to cross the Seine 
had been unknown in Paris since the Commune of 1871 and left 15 dead and 1,435 
wounded. 75 
71 Serge Berstein, Le 6 F6vrier 1934, Gallimard, Paris, 1975. 
72 Eugen Weber, Action Francaise, pp. 321-323 
73 During January 1934 there were intensifying demonstrations in Paris by the leagues over 
the scandal. On the first two days of February, several hundred students of Action Francaise 
and Jeunesses Patriotes in Bordeaux marched to Place Gambetta in the town's center. - 
Report of 2/ 2/34,1M 561, AD Gironde. 
74 To some on the left, the separate columns reflected not the factionalism of the right but a 
coordinated conspiracy - Max Beloff, 'The Sixth of February" in James Joll, ed., The Decline 
of the Third Republic: St. Antony's Papers, No. 5. Chatto & Windus, London, 1959, pp 23 & 
25. 
75 Charles Tilly, The Contenious French. Havard University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 324. 
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In the shock of the following day, Daladier resigned, becoming the fifth 
government to fall in under two years. The new cabinet was a coalition of the right 
and centre; however, far more significant than events within the parliament was the 
transformation of French political life sparked by the clashes. The 6 Fevrier became 
the symbolic date which defined the political identity for both the left and the right. 
The French left saw the riots in Paris as an attempted coup, while for the anti- 
parliamentary leagues the bloodshed of the night confirmed the illegitimacy of the 
Republic. Both extremes of the political spectrum sought to build coalitions in 
reaction to the threat of the other. Political mobilisation and political polarisation 
fed off each other. 
6 Fevrier. Reactions in the Provinces 
As during the Dreyfus Affair, academics and students were prominent actors 
on both sides of the crisis in 1934, partly because they had maintained the same 
approach to politics as 1898. They were in the forefront of the left's championing of 
coalitions and the right's reaction to it. The events in Paris had a far deeper impact 
outside Paris than the Affair of 1898-99, sparking immediate counter 
demonstrations on 8 February 1934 in 30 different towns, the largest of which were 
held in Lyon, Nantes, Brest and Toulouse. 76 Two days after the riots, 5,000 people 
gathered in Toulouse to hear speeches in defence of the Republic by the local 
representatives of the SFIO and CGT. 7 Amongst the speakers was the secretary of 
the local group of Etudiants Socialistes, Descours. 78 The rally took place in the 
central square of Toulouse, the Place du Capitole, which was bordered by cafes, 
including that which housed the local Association Generale des Etudiants (AG). 
Following the meeting some members of the Jeunesses Socialistes tried to storm the 
nearby site of AG revealing the close connection between corporate students groups 
and the extreme right, at least in the eyes of their opponents. Police tried to protect 
the students of the AG, though they reported that in the confusion some members 
of the Etudiants Socialistes were assaulted by the Jeunesses Socialistes "par erreur 
sans doute". 79 This case of mistaken identity suggests the class differences between 
the student and youth sections of the SFIO which also underpinned the sporadic 
76 There were also protests in Lille, Bordeaux, Valence, Cherbourg, and Rennes amongst 
others - Antoine Prost, "Les Manifestations du 12 Fevrier 1934 en Province", Mouvement 
Social. 54,1966, p 14. 
77 Report of 9/2/1934,130 W 13, AD Haute Garonne. 
78 A socialist student, A. Auban, also spoke at the demonstration during the general strike 
of 12 February 1934 - La Depeche, 13/ 2/ 1934, p. 2. 79 Report of 9/ 2/ 1934,130 W 13, AD Haute Garonne. 
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clashes between students of the leagues and working class activists. Following the 
attack, the AG published a letter in Le Midi Socialiste which stressed its strictly 
neutral and non-political character 80 Despite its claimed limited role in defending 
student corporate and material interests, the political identity of the AG was far 
more ambivalent, which surfaced in later confrontations between the left and right. 
These reactions in Toulouse to national politics had their own local character, 
which was further developed in the general strike of 12 February 1934 called by the 
CGT. 81 The show of strength by the organised labour movement in Toulouse was a 
reaction far more to Paris events than to the relatively marginal right-wing forces 
locally. Equally, the strength of the SFIO and CGT within Lille and Toulouse 
distanced them from the PCF. In Bordeaux, Montepellier and Marseille, reactions to 
the 6 Fevrier were as much about local balance of power as national events 82 Within 
this interaction between national and local politics, academics and students 
emerged as key actors at both these levels. 
In reaction to the Front National Universitaire which grouped together 
students from the Action Francaise and the Jeunesses Patriotes, the left-wing 
students of Toulouse formed a Front Universitaire Antifasciste (led by socialist 
students), which held a meeting on 1 March 1934 to assert the university's rejection 
of the riots of 6 Fevrier. 83 The meeting was chaired by Professor Soula of the Faculty 
of Medicine and also a member of the SFIO. Soula opened proceedings in front of 
the 400 strong audience by criticising the "mentalite ancien combattant" dominant in 
French politics as a pretext for war. Soula was followed by Professor Fourgeaud 
from the Faculty of Law who called for a union of workers and intellectuals to 
defend the fundamental principles of the Republic and democracy. Given the 
political atmosphere, Fourgeaud's words were enough to provoke the right. The 
following morning, a group of students marched from the Faculty of Law to the AG 
in the Place du Capitole, chanting insults against Fourgeaud and singing the 
Marseillaise M The drive to confrontation was so strong that the march triggered an 
immediate counter-demonstration by the Etudiants Socialistes and workers in the 
square. 
The chahut began on 2 March 1934 when Fourgeaud's course on political 
economy was suspended when it was filled by 400 students which was double the 
8OLe Midi Socialiste, 12/2/34, p. 3. 
81 Antoine Prost, "Les Manifestations du 12 Fevrier 1934 en Province", pp. 26-27. 82 Ligue des Droits de I'Homme et du Citoyen Jan-Apr 1934, p. 1. 83 Report of 2/3/1934,130 W 13, AD Haute Garonne. 
84 Report of 15/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
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normal attendance. Fourgeaud wrote to the local right-wing newspaper, L'Express 
du Midi, criticising those students who led the strike, citing in his own defence his 
service record from 1914-1918 and the accepted right of academics to adopt political 
positions S5 The Front National Universitaire replied in the same journal that while 
it accepted the political engagement of their teachers, the meeting by the Front 
Universitaire Antifasciste had described itself as "une reunion de combat pour lutter 
contre les 'methodesfascistes de 1'Universite'(? )". 86 Citing the attacks by the Jeunesses 
Socialistes, they accused Fourgeaud of being an accomplice to the assaults on 
students. Against those on the left who labelled the leagues as 'fascist', the FNU 
sought to reverse the label; 
Les etudiants se trouvent ä 1'heure actuelle devant des gens, qui sous pretexte 
de combattre un fascisme inexistant, instaurent ä Toulouse un fascisme 
veritable, et qu'ils pretendent nous imposer, sous pretexte qu'il est rouge 87 
The letter by the Front National Universitaire closed noting that the decision by 
Dean Abelous of the Faculty of Medicine to suspend Professor Soula's course for 
fear of trouble, was "accueillie avec joie par 1'unanimite des etudiants en medecine". 88 
In response to the suspension of Soula's course, the youth groups of the SFIO 
and PCF marched from the Faculty of Medicine to the Place du Capitole on 6 March 
1934.89 Police identified few students amongst the initiators of the march whose 
chants accused Dean Abelous of being motivated by his Action Francaise 
sympathies 90 The march ended outside the AG which was seen as favouring the 
Front National Universitaire, an impression confirmed by an open letter from the 
AG's President, Pierre Nielsen, to the Prime Minister Doumergue defending the 
chahut as inspired by the attacks on students 91 - 
A week after the anti-fascist meeting which had triggered the trouble, the 
university and civic authorities made a concerted commitment to restore order in 
the Faculties. A detachment of a dozen police prevented any groups from forming 
at the entrance to the Faculty of Law and admission to Fourgeaud's course was 
85 Clipping of 7/ 3/1934, Ibid. 
86 Clipping of 8/ 7/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
87'The students one finds at this moment in front of the people, who under the pretext of 
combatting a fascism which doesn't exist, institute in Toulouse a real fascism, that they 
pretend we impose, under which pretext lies red" - Ibid. 88 Ibid. 
89 Report of 9/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
`0 Ibid. 
Report of 7/3/1934, Ibid. 
91 Neilsen had been personally attacked during the confrontations, for which four students 
and three workers would later be charged for assault. Two of the students received 
suspended prison sentences including Communist activist jean Marcenac - Report n. d., Ibid. 
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strictly controlled 92 Inside, 150 students of the course listened to the Rector of the 
University call for calm. He was accompanied by the Dean of the Faculty of Law. 
When Fourgeaud started to speak, 80 students walked out of the room leaving stink 
bombs in their wake. The course was cancelled again, though Fourgeaud was 
cheered by a counter-demonstration of 200 members of the $tudiants Socialistes 
and Jeunesses Socialistes as he left the building. 93 A strong police presence and 
expulsions by the Dean finally produced quiet in the Faculty of Law, though 
demonstrations and counter-demonstrations continued in the streets 94 Still the 
FNU continued to lead sporadic opposition to Fourgeaud, calling for a boycott of 
his course, and attempting to resume the chahut the following term 95 
Occurring during the middle of the unrest against Fourgeaud, the Front 
National Universitaire mobilised around another rallying point. It sponsored a 
mass for the victims of 6 Fevrier at the Cathedral of St Etienne, on the 11 March 
1934.96 The service was lead by the Archbishop of Toulouse and attended by Dean 
Abelous and Professor Thomas (later Dean of the Faculty of Law). `n Also attending 
the mass were Nielsen and six other members of the AG committee. Amongst the 
student ranks were delegates from the Association des $tudiants Catholiques, the 
Phalange Universitaire, Etudiants d'Action Francaise and the Comite du Front 
National Universitaire. The latter acted as a service d'ordre at mass, and police 
reported that they were hoping for trouble 98 Outside the cathedral, sixty PCF 
members staged a counter-protest, during which two Communists were arrested 
for carrying fire-arms. Significantly, due to the threat of violence, the students of the 
Front Universitaire Antifasciste, which numbered 100 members, had declined to 
participate in the protest. `9 
In reaction to the role of the local AG in the chahut of Fourgeaud and the 
demonstrations of the nationalist leagues during March 1934, left-wing students in 
Toulouse formed their own corporate group, the Union Syndiale des Etudiants 
(USE)10° Their efforts were supported by sympathetic academics in the Faculties of 
Medicine (Professors Ducing, Soula, Brustier, Vallois), Law (Fourgeaud) and Letters 
92 Report of 9/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
93 Report of 9/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
94 Report 15/3/34, Ibid. 
95 Report 17/3/34, Ibid. 
96 A similar mass on 6 February 1935 attracted 700 people in Bordeaux - Report of 6/2/1935, 1M 443, AD Gironde. 
97 Report of 2/3/1934,130 W 13, AD Haute Garonne. 
98 Report of 10/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
99 Report of 12/ 3/ 1934, Ibid. 
10OLMC 14902, L'Union Sydnicale des Etudiants (1934-1940), Toulouse, n. d, p. 3. in 
Library Municipale, Toulouse. 
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(Faucher) and perhaps more importantly by three grants of 2,000 francs each in 1934 
and early 1935 from the SFIO-dominated municipal government 101 While existing 
student corporate groups were largely defenders of the professions, the new USE 
claimed a more radical face by committing itself to the CGTs Federation des 
Fonctionnaires. Initially the group used the union offices as its base before moving 
to a cafe in the Place du Capitole. Drawing on the strength of the local Socialist 
student's group, within a month of its foundation the USE claimed 300 members. 102 
Its membership strength, and its close contact with local trade unions and 
the SFIO made the USE reluctant to participate in Communist calls for united 
action. In mid-January 1936, at that same time that British Communist and Socialist 
students were merging in the University Labour Federation, a meeting was held in 
Toulouse to discuss a similar measure. An estimated 70 students attended the 
meeting which was addressed by a delegate from the Union Federale des Etudiants 
in Bordeaux, who called for common action between the UFE and USE. 103 In 
Bordeaux, local Communists and Socialists had come together in the UFE during 
the previous month, and their group now numbered 120 students. 104 In Toulouse, 
where the USE was triple the size, the motion for fusion of Communist and Socialist 
students was overwhelmingly rejected. While the 6 Fevrier created coalitions 
amongst French students on both the left and right, because they were organised 
through national parties and leagues, these coalitions rarely became the mergers 
which occurred in Britain. 
In the wake of the 6 Fevrier confrontations of varying levels of violence 
occurred at universities across France. The chahut of Fourgeaud was paralleled by 
others of left-wing academics in Grenoble and Paris. In the former, Professor 
Esmonin of Grenoble's Faculty of Letters faced a chahut of his course on art history. 
The students argued that Esmonin had marched with the left during the general 
strike of 12 February 1934, "ä la We d'un cortege revolutionnaire qui, en passant devant 
la Faculte a ose crier: 'ä bas les etudiants! "'. 105 At the Sorbonne, biologist Marcel 
Prenant faced a vigorous chahut by $tudiants d'Action Francaise for his communist 
politics. 106 Prenant described the experience in which his lecture was interrupted, 
par un jeune garcon qui me reprocha violemment ma complicite avec la greve. 
A ce signal, ses comparses disperses dans la Salle, effectuerent une charge 
101 mid., p. 6. 
102 Itid., p. 4. 
103 Report of 15/ 1/ 1936,1303 W 13, AD Haute-Garonne. 
104 Report of 17/12/1935,1 M 605, AD Gironde. 
105 L'Etudiant Francais. 25/ 3/ 1934, p. 6. 
10' L'Etudiant Francais. 10/5/1934, p. 1. 
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contre mes auditeurs qu'i1s frapperent ä coups de poings et de matraques 
redoublant de brutalite s ils tentaient de se relever. L'appariteur et le garde de 
la Sorbonne, retraite d'äge certain, ne pouvant s'opposer aux aggresseurs, me 
firent signe de sortir et fermerent la porte ä clef derriere moi laissant les 
fascistes maltres du terrain. 107 
Even with restricted entry to Prenant's course and with around hundred students of 
the left to oppose trouble, several hundred nationalist students gathered in the 
courtyard of the Sorbonne until they were dispersed by police. Echoing the Dreyfus 
Affair, the leagues sought to meet every challenge of the left following the 6 Fevrier 
and it was academics who were often prominent targets. 
Patrons of Unity: the Comite de Vigilance des Intellectuels Antifascistes 
Le rassemblement anti-fasciste de 1934 n'en representes pas moins pour le 
monde intellectuel francais un changement non seulement d'echelle mais de 
nature. 108 
Despite the spontaneous reaction to the sixth of February of unity in the 
streets by the various organisations of the French left, the leaderships of both the 
PCF and SFIO maintained their distance from each other. 109 Only in mid-1934 did 
the PCF reverse its historic sectarianism following policy debates within the 
Comintern 110 From attacking the SFIO as "social-fascists", the PCF became the 
champions of unity of action against domestic and international fascism at all costs. 
Ultimately, the PCF and the SFIO agreed to a pacte d'unite d'action on 27 July 1934, 
however the months in which it took both parties to overcome their mutual 
antipathy, opened opportunities for other groups to seek to organise an energetic 
opposition to the leagues. 
107 "By a young man who violently reproached me for my support of the strike. At this 
signal, his dispersed stooges in the room, launched an attack against my students who they 
hit with fists and bludgeons, increasing their brutality if they tried to resist. The porter and 
guard of the Sorbonne, of retirement age, not being able to oppose the attackers, signalled 
for me to leave and locked the door behind me leaving the fascists masters of the terrain" - 
Prenant, Toute Une Vie N Gauche. Encre, Paris, 1980, pp. 94-95. 108 Ory & Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France. p. 94. 109 Nathanael Greene, Crisis & Decline: The French Socialist Party in the Popular Front Era, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1969, p. 9. 
Julian Jackson, The Popular Front in France, p. 42. 110 E. H. Carr, The Twilight of Comintern 1930-1935, Macmillan Press, London, 1982. 
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Predating the major changes in party policy and alignments which 
developed after mid-1934, was the creation of a new political organisation that drew 
heavily from the universities. Following the success of the general strike of 12 
February 1934, Francois Walter and other activists of the Syndicat National des 
Instituteurs sought to maintain the spontaneous coalition against the leagues. 111 
Over the course of meetings on 17 February 1934 at Maison de Mutualite and then 
on 5 March 1934 at Musee Social they were able to rally support for a broad-ranging 
anti-fascist coalition of intellectuals, a Comite de Vigilance. 112 
The new organisation was publicly launched by a manifesto in the press 
titled "Aux Travailleurs" dated 15 March 1934. Its opening and closing lines defined 
the concern of the new group: 
Unis, par-dessus toute divergence, devant le spectacle des erneutes fascistes 
de Paris et de la resistance populaire qui, Beule, leur a fait face, nous venons 
declarer ä tous les travailleurs, nos camarades, notre resolution de lutter 
avec eux pour sauver contre une dictature fasciste ce que le peuple a conquis 
de droits et de libertes publiques... 
... Notre premier aste a ete de former un Comite de Vigilance qui se tient ä la 
disposition d'Organisations ouvrii res. 113 
The declaration was signed by a trio of prominent intellectuals, representing the 
three parties of the French left - physicist Paul Langevin (PCF), ethnographer Paul 
Rivet (SFIO) and philosopher Alain (Radicals). 114 Together they called for those 
inside and outside the existing parties of the left to form a united defence of the 
parliamentary Republic. In its early life the organisation adopted the name Comite 
d'Action Antifasciste et de Vigilance; however as the push for coalition between the 
parties spawned other local Comites d'Action across France, it eventually claimed 
its own distinct identity as the Comite de Vigilance des Intellectuels et Antifascistes 
(CVIA). 
111 Ory & Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France, pp. 97-98. 
112 prenant, Toute Une Vie a Gauche, pp. 96-96. 
113 "United, above all divisions, in front of the spectacle of the fascist riots in Paris and of the 
popular resistance which, alone, faced events, we have come to declare to all the workers, 
our comrades, our resolution to fight with them to save from a fascist dictatorship those 
rights and public liberties which the people have conquered... Our first act is to form a 
Comite de Vigilance which places itself at the disposal of the Labour movement - Dossier: "France - CVIA", Bibliotheque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine. 114 Nicole Racine-Furland, "Antifascistes et Pacifistes: Le Comite de Vigilance des 
Intellectuels Antifascistes" in Anne Roche & Christain Tarting, eds., Des Annees Trente: 
Groupes et Ruptures. CNRS, Paris, 1985, p. 57. 
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In its name, its birth in a petition, and directly through its Parisian 
leadership, the Comite de Vigilance drew strongly on a Dreyfusard heritage. 115 The 
elections of CVIA's first national committee on 8 May 1934 reveal the extent to 
which its national leadership was concentrated in particular sections of the 
university. The seven academics elected represented the largest occupational group 
on the committee, compared to five writers and five teachers 116 Those from higher 
education were Paris academics, Langevin, Basch, Bayet, F Dominois, G Fournier, 
Prenant and Wallon. These names represent a Parisian elite drawn from College de 
France, Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the Sorbonne, who would reappear in political 
movements throughout the 1930s. Mobilised together, almost all of them had long 
histories of political activism, while Langevin, Basch and Wallon were veterans of 
the Dreyfus campaigns. 117 
The deep roots of CVIA's leadership within the University of Paris were 
revealed by a number of the organisation's interventions in public life during the 
mid-1930s. Soon after its formation the organisation held a large meeting on 30 May 
1934 in the Latin Quarter titled "La Jeunesse Devant le Fascisme". 118 Two thousand 
attended the meeting, and it was estimated that the great majority of these were 
students 119 The speakers included academics Perrin, Rivet, Langevin, Levy-Bruhl, 
Prenant, and Bayet; along with writers Benda, Cassou, Fernandez, and Guehenno. 
There were also anti-fascist speeches by a normalien and a female student. The 
prominence of women on the platform during the campaigns of the Rassemblement 
Populaire is significant, given their formal exclusion from politics in the Third 
Republic. The pluralist style of Popular Front politics stressed the inclusion and 
representation of different groups including not only intellectuals and students, but 
also different classes, religions, sexes and even nationalities. At a time when politics 
was defined in gender terms, the prominence of women on the platform symbolised 
the expansion of political life beyond its ordinary concern. 
Equally it was the concerns of CVIA's leading academics that saw it later 
champion both the call from female students of the ENS Sevres for equality of 
treatment and the petition by male normaliens against war. 120 The connection 
115 Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower, p. 212; 
Pascal Ory, La Belle Illusion: Culture et Politgue sous le signe du Front Populaire 1935-1938, 
Plon, Paris, 1994, p. 93. 
116 Vigilance. 18/5/1934, p. 4. 
117 Racine, "References Dreyfusiennes dann la Gauche Francaise de 1'Entre-Deux-Guerres", 
pp117-119. 
118 Dossier. "France - CVIA", Bibliotheque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine. 119 Vigilance. 10/6/1934, p. 6. 
120 ViSilance, 10/5/1935, p. 4. 
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between CVIA's strength within the University of Paris and national politics was 
perhaps most clearly symbolised in early May 1935, during the municipal election 
for Paris's fifth arrondissement. These elections saw the tentative beginnings of co- 
operation by parties of the left, but it was the campaign by CVIA's President, Paul 
Rivet, on the Left Bank which received national attention as a microcosm for the 
polarisation of French political life. 121 In the first round of voting the sitting 
candidate Georges Lebecq, who was also leader of an ex-servicemen's group which 
had marched in the riots of 6 February 1934, had narrowly missed an outright 
majority against the four candidates of the PCF, Radicals and SFIO. 111 Faced with 
the prospect of Lebecq's re-election, Paul Rivet, a prominent ethnographer and 
member of the SFIO, announced his candidature as a non-party representative 
behind whom all parties of the left could rally. His opponent was labelled a "symbole 
du 6 fevrier" by CVIA. 123 
With under a fortnight to campaign before the second round of voting on 3 
May 1935, Rivet was supported by a published appeal by ten savants, including 
Paris academics Irene and Frederic Joliot-Curie, Louis Lapiacque, Paul Langevin, 
Jacques Hadamard, jean Perrin, and Georges Urbain. 124 Socialist students and 
Communist students were also involved in the intense campaigning, though some 
were roughed-up by students of the leagues as they put up posters supporting 
Rivet 125 With the withdrawal of the other candidates of the left, Rivet achieved a 
spectacular victory on the second round of voting by 2445 votes to 2292.126 His 
election was seen by CVIA's activists and later historians as one of the first to be 
marked by the shift from sectarianism to co-operation that ultimately produced the 
national election of the Front Populaire. 
As in the Affair of 1898, the Ecole Normale Superteure provided a network 
of support which was central to the mobilisation in defence of the Republic. 
Normalien support was fundamental to CVIA's founding declaration cum petition, 
"Aux Travailleurs". The manifesto was signed by over 110 past and 90 present 
students of the school, making them a key group in the organisation's 
121 Ory & Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France, p. 101-103. 
122 Proces-verbal, D2 M2/ 106, AD Seine. 
123Vigilance 25/5/1935, p. 2. 
124bid. 
, pp. 1 & 6. For Joliot and Perrin support for Rivet's campaign was also financial as both contributed 100 
francs to his election fund - Ibid. p. 14. 125 Henri Nogueres, La Vie Quotidienne en France au Temps du Front Populaire, 1935-1938, 
Hachette, Paris, 1987, p. 82. 
126 proces-verbal, D2 M2/ 108, AD Seine. 
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development. 127 Most visibly, past and present students in Paris formed the 
frontline leadership for the Comite de Vigilance in national politics. On a second 
level, the position of the Ecole Normale Superteure as the national entrance into the 
teaching ranks of academia, gave common experiences and friendships to a small 
distinct group of academics. Regardless of the wide range of positions and locations 
they later occupied as teachers, the strong personal connections between normaliens 
shaped and facilitated professional and political contacts. The Paris-focus of the 
historiography of French universities has to a large extent missed the importance of 
these personal networks between universities, which extended into national and 
local politics 128 Classmates from 1899, Wallon in Paris and Daudin in Bordeaux - 
played similar roles in CVIA's campaign. As national or local patrons, the 
academics in the Comite de Vigilance provided a non-partisan rallying point for the 
movements to anti-fascist coalition inspired by 6 Fevrier. 
The Comite de Vigilance may have been a Paris creation, but it extended 
across France. By the end of April 1934, the organisation claimed nearly 2,000 
members nationally, which had increased to a membership of approximately five 
thousand by mid November 1934.129 At the height of the movement in late 1935, it 
claimed two hundred local committees. 130 CVIA's local committees were largely 
comprised of fonctionnaires or teachers, revealing the extent to which professional 
boundaries were blurred in the broad conception of intellectuel in France. 131 Within 
these mixed local committees it was frequently academics who played the most 
prominent role, serving as the presidents of the local committees of Algiers, 
127 Alain Baudant, "L'Ecole Normale Superteure: Donnees sur la Participation de 
l'Universite de Paris ä la Vie Politique Francaise", Memoire de Maitrise, Universit6 de Paris 
I, 1972, p. 63. 
128 Terry Nichols Clark argues that French academics were divided into professional 
clusters which cut across universities and were centred on the patronage of a senior 
Professor in Paris. Christophe Charle has criticised this concept as too static and extreme, 
but it does show the professional interaction between different universities within the state 
system - Terry Nichols Clark, Prophets and Patrons: The French University and the 
Emergence of the Social Sciences, Havard University Press, Cambridge, 1973, pp. 10 & 67-69; 
Charle, La Republique des Universitaires 1870-1940, p. 201. 
129 At the end of 1934, CVIA stated that of its 5,241 members, 3,700 were outside Paris - 
Vigilance, 5/12/1934, p. 3. 
CVIA's membership in the capital was estimated at 2,037 at the end of October 1935 and as 
3,300 in May 1936 -Vigilance, 28/4/1936, Supplement, p. 2. 
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incomplete. While it was impossible to know the exact number of members, the peak of 
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represented 2.2% of population) including 186,000 teachers in state education and not 
counting 73,850 university students - Claude Willard, "Les Intellectuels Francais et le Front 
Populaire", 3-4,1966-67, Cahiers de 1'Institut Maurice Thorez. p. 116. 
105 
Bordeaux, Dijon, Lille and Montpellier. 132 Their political authority within the towns 
where they taught reveals the extent to which their social status within the 
community could encourage certain forms of politics. 
Significantly the strongest public support for CVIA's petitions from France's 
provincial universities seems to have been in the same locations dominated by the 
nationalist leagues. A survey of several of the Comite's petitions and public appeals 
reveals that its support within French universities was shaped by both personal 
connections and local politics. While academics in Paris consciously saw themselves 
on the national political stage, the public stances of their peers in Bordeaux and 
Montpellier suggest that these were in part in a reaction to the particular militancy 
and strength of nationalist students within their own institutions. 133 As in the 
Dreyfus affair, the interaction within the university between students and 
academics shaped the stances they adopted in national politics. 
TABLE 3.1: UNIVERSITY SUPPORTERS FOR THE COMITE DE VIGILANCE DES 
INTELLECTUELS Er ANTI-FASCISTES134 
Paris No. Provincial Universities No. 
College de France 7 Aix-Marseille 1 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes 9 Algiers 8 












I Total 64 Total 72 
132 Vigilance, Jan. 1935, p. 3. 
133 For nationalist student activity in Bordeaux and Montpellier, see the earlier discussions 
of the 1935 strike in the Faculties of Medicine against "1'invasion des etrangers" and the 1936 
chahuts over the Jeze Affair. 
134 Vigilance, Jan. 1935, pp. 2-3; 
Vigilance, 15/9/ 1935, p. 4. 
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The Comite de Vigilance's success in acting as a non-partisan sponsor of a 
broader anti-fascist coalition at both a national and local level was partly due to its 
origins as a deliberately non-communist initiative. As Claude Willard recognises, 
CVIA differed in both its successful recruitment from universities and its focus on 
domestic politics from the two Communist-initiated campaigns to form a common 
front against fascism, the Mouvement Amsterdam-Pleyel and the Association des 
Ecrivains et Artistes Revolutionnaires. 135 The Comite de Vigilance represented a 
transformation of politics in that Dreyfusard independence was used to legitimise 
the call for unity amongst the parties of the left against the threat of domestic 
fascism. The non-partisan identity of French intellectuals was crucial to their role as 
a rallying focus for the parties that eventually formed the Front Populaire, 
symbolised by their prominence in the mass demonstrations of 14 July 1935 which 
marked the coalition between the SFIO, PCF and Radical Party. 136 Significantly the 
very success of the Popular Front, weakened the impetus that fuelled CVIA and the 
organisation was increasingly fragmented in its reactions to international events. 
The Jeze Affair 
Sur le front de defense de la liberte, les educateurs occupent un sector 
particulierement expose. 
The journal of the Ligue des Droits de 1'Hommei37 
Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935, and the League of Nations 
attempts to restrict the conflict, created far more controversy in France than in 
Britain. Across British politics, conservatives, liberals and socialists were largely 
united in calling for sanctions against Italy. 138 In France, the left's advocacy of 
sanctions was seen by the extreme right as unjustifiably risking war. This 
isolationist nationalism drew on earlier reactions to the non-aggression pact 
concluded between France and Russia in May 1935. Though the pact itself had been 
the initiative of a government of the right, the leagues feared that the international 
135 Willard, "Les Intellectuels Francais et le Front Populaire", p. 120. 
Both Amsterdam-Pleyel and the AEAR developed before the PCFs tournant to seek 
coalitions against the threat of domestic fascism, and so were not the pregenators of a 
Popular Front, but camoflaged bids to win supporters away from other parties, especially 
the Socialists - Tony Judt, "Une historiographie pas comme les autres: The French 
Communists & their History", European Studies Review, 12,4, Oct. 1982, p. 454. 136 Racine-Furland, "Antifascistes et Pacifistes", p. 88. 137Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen 10/2/1936, p. 87 138 Taylor, English History 1914-1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 384-385. 
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politics of the left would betray France into war and cause the country's 
destruction. 139 
Such an isolationist anti-war stance was encapsulated by a petition which 
appeared in October 1935 during the intensifying debate over Italy, Ethiopia and 
the League. The petition "Pour la Defense de l'Occident et pour la Paix en Europe", 
stressed that the imposition of League sanctions on Italy risked dragging France 
into war over Ethiopia. 140 As its dual title implied, conflict against Italy was beyond 
the pale, at least in terms of skin colour, for those who felt that latin solidarity and 
Mediterranean identity gave the two countries a shared Western superiority. The 
petition was signed by a number of leading members of the Academie Francaise 
and prominent writers of the right including Robert Brasillach, Charles Maurras, 
and Pierre Drieu la Rochelle. Over twenty academics also signed the petition, 
though apart from Bernard Fay of the College de France and two Professors of the 
Faculty of Law in Paris, most names were from provincial universities. Equally 
significant, was the reaction of CVIA to the petition which revealed the polarised 
nature of French politics by labelling the petition, "Le Manifeste des Intellectuels 
Fascistes". 141 
The hostility of the nationalist right against the League of Nations over 
sanctions against Italy was soon focused on Gaston Jeze, Professor of International 
Law at the Faculty of Law in Paris. Jeze had served as a delegate for the Ethiopian 
Negus to the League of Nations and with his left-wing sympathies was a tailor- 
made symbol for those who opposed sanctions and France's role in the League. 142 
With the intensification of political polarisation following 6 February 1934, the 
chahut of Jeze's courses at the Faculty of Law in Paris was of a striking intensity. The 
chahut began in November 1935, which resulted in the suspension of J6ze's course as 
the leagues alternatively occupied or stormed the lecture hall. The demonstrations 
brought together the various factions of the extreme right, including students of the 
Croix de Feu which had largely stood apart from the activities of the Phalangeards 
and Etudiants d'Action Francais 143 Between January and March 1936, the riots 
intensified within the Faculty of Law as they became linked to other political events 
in the capital. The Jeze chahut reveals the vigour of which the students of the 
nationalist leagues were capable. Acting together they were able to maintain 
139 Report of 23/ 10/ 1935, M154 246, AD Nord. 
140 Ory & Sirinelli, op. cit.. p. 111. 
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sustained resistance to both university and police authorities, despite the counter- 
demonstrations of the left. 
With the renewal of the chahut in early January 1936, both academics and 
students of the left appealed to the government for stronger action. On 14 January 
1936, CVIA protested to the Minister of Education over the invasion of academic 
freedom, while a day later the Minister received a petition from fifty students of the 
Ecole Normale Superieure against the campaign by their "camarades du Droit" 
against Jeze 14The petition described the demonstrations as against the interests 
and reputation of both the University of Paris and the French state itself. It 
continued that, "Aujourd'hui, le probleme pose pas celui de la liberte d'opinion mais celui 
de la liberte d'action". 145 The Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme also publicly protested the 
chahut to the government, 
qui assurent ä tous les maitres des Universites, sans distinction d'opinion, la 
pleine liberte de pensee, qui garantissent le droit des vrais etudiants ä 
travailler paisiblement, et qui arretent toute tentative de guerre civile. 146 
Part of the left's attack on the Jeze demonstrators was to portray them as 
unrepresentative of the university itself. The pro-communist students of the UFE 
described the Jeze chahut as the work of minority students. 147 CVIA published the 
arrest figures from the 11 February 1936, stressing that of the 105 protesters 
detained by police at Faculty of Law, only 25 were identified as law students. 148 
Still, another 20 of those detained were students from Ecole Libre des Sciences 
Politiques (a grande ecole known as Sciences Po), 14 were students at the Faculty of 
Medicine, 11 from the Faculty of Letters, and 3 were studying pharmacy and 
science. Even if the majority of protesters for leagues came from outside the Faculty 
of Law, it seems that at least two thirds were students. The police figures undercut 
efforts at a strictly institutional reading of the political geography of the University 
of Paris. Though students of the Faculties of Law and Medicine, and those of 
Sciences Po, seem to have been the leading contingents for the leagues, a 
considerable amount of support came from outside of these 'bastions' of the right. 
144Vigilance, 15/1/1936, p. 5; 
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It was not only activists and organisations of the left which were touched by 
the confrontation over Jeze, other groups within the university felt it necessary to 
publicly take a position outside the polarisation. One of these was the Federation 
Francaise des Etudiants Catholiques, whose president, Roger Millot, publicly stated 
that, 
La Federation francaise des Etudiants catholiques, fidele ä poursuivre une 
action strictement corporative en dehors de toute politique, ne veut pas 
s'associer ä des manifestations d'un caractere plus politique que 
corporatif. 149 
He went on to criticise those leading the Jeze chahut as prejudicing the image of the 
university and as a danger to free opinion. Given the French right's emphasis on its 
close relationship with the Catholic Church, this non-political position adopted by 
the leading Catholic student group was a political victory for the left. 
Regional Reactions to the Jeze Chahut 
Paris events, often quite self-consciously, set the national agenda. Their 
campaigns and counter-protests were echoed throughout provincial universities. 
This nationalisation of events was encouraged by the local press (particularly that of 
the extreme right) which looked to Paris in an effort to stir domestic action 150 In 
Toulouse the USE passed on 15 January 1936 a unanimous motion against the Jeze 
riots, specifically criticising the Paris AG for its role in supporting the leagues' 
protests. Four days later, the USE with the UFE formed a Comite d'Entente to 
support those in Paris who were standing for freedom of opinion over the Jeze 
affair 151 This mobilisation of the Toulouse left preceded that of their local 
opponents, who marked the rentree in the Faculty of Law with what police 
described as a spontaneous chahut in the first year course taught by the Dean of the 
Faculty, Professor Thomas. 152 When Thomas arrived for his course, some of the 
students chanted "A bas Jeze! Jeze demission", and sang the Marseillaise. They also 
shouted "Vive le Doyen" to show that their protest was one of solidarity with the 
Paris demonstrators, rather than aimed at the Dean himself. On 24 January 1936 
another first year law course was interrupted by calls against Jeze, though these 
were quickly quietened by the appeal of the professor. It is significant that the 
149 L'$tudiant Catholigue, l Trimestre 1936, p. 47 
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agitation was only amongst first years, and that second and third years remained 
aloof from any attempt at chahut. The chahut in Toulouse was therefore a symbolic 
effort to nationalise the Paris protest, but as events of 1934 had shown, any serious 
campaigns in the town were likely to be limited by the hostility of local authorities 
and a strong student left. 
The polarised atmosphere of the Jeze debates fundamentally shaped other 
activities within French universities during the first months of 1936. The proposed 
increase in students fees by the Laval government created a national issue which 
affected students of all political creeds. Yet the continuing protests over Jeze and the 
deeply-felt symbolism of the 6 Fevrier politicised, polarised and undercut any 
efforts towards a wide-ranging coalition over the problem. 
At the same time as the leagues were seeking to extend the Jeze chahut, the 
corporate Association Generale within each university, and their national 
federation, the Union Nationale des Etudiants, were calling for a national corporate 
strike against fee increases in early February 1936. However, given the close 
relationship between the corporate associations and the leagues, left-wing students 
reacted ambivalently to such proposals of 'non-political' action. The feared 
nationalist motives underlying the proposed strike were reinforced by its proximity 
to the symbolic date of 6 Fevrier. On 5 February 1936, both the Union Syndiale des 
Etudiants and Union Federale des Etudiants in Toulouse agreed to join a corporate 
strike if it remained strictly 'non-political' though they publicly reserved the right to 
help with courses in the Faculty of Law if the strike turned political by joining the 
continuing demonstrations against Jeze. 153 These concerns were parallelled in Paris, 
where Socialist and Communist students were able to secure the support of the 
national federation of Catholic students, to form their own Groupement Corporatif 
Interfederal des Etudiants. 154 Just before the national strike was to take place on 11 
and 12 February 1936, it was called off by the UNE which had managed to secure 
the government's agreement to maintaining fees at their previous level. 155 A tract 
by the Toulouse AG praised the UNE 's role in maintaining the old registration fees 
and attacked the Groupement Corpartif Interfederal des $tudiants formed by the 
left for confusing a corporate issue with politics. 156 
153 Report of 5/ 2/1936, bid. 
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The situation within the University of Montpellier contrasts strongly with 
that in Toulouse. Leagues like Action Francaise and the Croix de Feu drew strong 
support amongst students, and these had increasingly drawn into coalition and co- 
operation with each as part of the Front National. 157 This strength of the extreme 
right gave the local Association Generale the support to carry out the strike against 
fees in Montpellier even though it had been nationally suspended by the UNE. 158 
The AG was far from united in such actions; the existing committee received a vote 
of confidence of only 80 votes to 57, despite the AG having over several hundred 
members. 159 The strength of the extreme right within the AG of Montpellier was 
revealed by the telegram supporting the Jeze chahut sent by the association to the 
law students of Paris, at the same time as the corporate strike was being debated. 160 
Montpellier was in the forefront of a group of Associations Gengrales, including 
those of Bordeaux and Marseille, which dissented from the UNE's moderate line 
which had sought to avoid confrontation. 161 
Blum's March 
The atmosphere of polarisation and confrontation fuelled by the on-going 
agitation over Jeze, the debate over a national corporate strike on fees, and the 
agitation surrounding the symbolic date of 6 Fevrier, culminated in a national cause 
celebre. On 13 February 1936, the funeral cortege of nationalist historian Jacques 
Bainville provided an opportunity for Action Francaise to stage a large 
demonstration of strength on the Boulevard St-Germain. By chance, SFIO leader 
Leon Blum crossed the cortege's path as he was returning home by car, and was 
seriously assaulted by members of the league. The shock of such street violence 
being directed against a national figure spurred the Chamber of Deputies to decree 
the immediate dissolution of the league Action Francaise, and its component 
sections the Camelots du Roi and the Federation des Etudiants d'Action Francaise. 
The reaction amongst the parties of the Popular Front to the assault was as 
swift as that within the parliament. A counter-demonstration was immediately 
called for 16 February 1936 by the SFIO, PCF and other groups composing the 
157 Despite the efforts of the Croix de Feu's national leadership to maintain its distance from 
its competitors on the right, local groups such as that in Montpellier readily cooperated with 
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Rassemblement Populaire. The march was planned through the heart of the Latin 
Quarter, and represented a defining moment for politics in French universities 
during the 1930s. The demonstration of the Rassemblement Populaire marked the 
end of the previous absolute dominance of the extreme right in the streets around 
the University of Paris, and their ability to meet with violence any newspaper 
hawker, public meeting or even lecture of their opponents. Without a campus to 
parallel those that existed in Britain, the physical and symbolic claiming of political 
space had been the leagues' raison d'etre. The assault on Blum ended one of few 
public preserves left to the leagues in front of the growing momentum of the 
Rassemblement Populaire, their dominance of the streets of the Latin Quarter. Not 
only had Action Francaise been dissolved by the force of law, but the right had lost 
control of the streets to the marchers of the Rassemblement Populaire. 
The march of the 16 February 1936 began in the early afternoon as 
approximately a thousand demonstrators formed columns around the Pantheon. 
Facing the Pantheon, the Faculty of Law was a prominent target for the marchers. 
As they passed down the rue St Jacques next to the Faculty, police reported that the 
demonstrators had repeatedly chanted "fascistes assassins". 162 There were some 
verbal exchanges between law students in the windows of the Faculty and the 
passing protesters in the street, which culminated after fifteen minutes when one 
student gave a fascist salute. 163 From rue St. Jacques, the marchers passed along the 
Boulevard St Germain to Place de la Nation which they reached at 5: 00 pm. In Place 
de la Nation the demonstration was estimated as numbering two thousand by 
police? M 
The marchers carried tricolours and sang the Marseillaise, both of which had 
been nationalist symbols until reclaimed by the left republicanism of the 
Rassemblement Populaire. But it was the chant of "la Police avec nous", which most 
strongly captured just how far the balance of power on the streets had been 
transformed from early 1934, when the Prefect of Police had been dismissed for his 
sympathetic treatment of the leagues. 165 Much of the police efforts were directed at 
keeping small groups from the leagues away from the mass of marchers. Pro-active 
policing lead to the arrest of six students of Action Francaise and the Croix de 
Feu. 166 An attempted counter-demonstration by the extreme right numbering 
around 250 was dispersed on the Boulevard St Germain with more arrests. 
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Significantly, one of the few physical clashes between left and right that did take 
during the march was between students. Around 4: 30 pm, on the corner of the 
Boulevard St Michel and the rue des Ecoles, police reported a brawl between two 
groups of students in which there were numerous injuries, including to three police 
officers who tried to intervene. 167 
The Dissolution of the Leagues 
The leading historian of the Action Francaise, Eugen Weber, has largely 
down-played the effects of legal dissolution on the league and its student section 
arguing that, 
[Dissolution] came when all these bodies were losing ground. It may even 
have permitted them to end with a flourish careers that otherwise would 
have dragged on in a slow, gradual decline. 168 
From its peak in the mid 1920s, the league was faced with a declining readership for 
its press, splits within its membership, and the increasing competition from 1934 of 
the Croix de Feu. Dissolution seemed only a partial measure anyway, as it did not 
affect the league's vitriolic newspaper, allowing it to maintain its prominent 
presence in French public life. The legal measures were minimised by the league's 
leaders, so that "the Action Francaise always spoke of 'dissolved' Camelots and 
'dissolved' Leaguers, ironically implying that the decree had not actually done 
anything to prevent their existence-. 169 Equally Action Francaise's opponents feared 
that dissolution had merely driven the organisation underground. 170 
For the students who supported Action Francaise, legal dissolution meant that 
their striking victory in the chahut against Jeze had been unexpectedly reversed into 
an almost total defeat. The league was far from a declining force within French 
universities during the mid-1930s. Police estimates of its membership and the 
increased rythmn of confrontation after 6 February 1934 show that the league was 
gaining strength in the atmosphere of polarised conflict. 171 The chahuts of 
academics sympathetic to the left, the national strike by medical students "contre 
l'invasion des meteques" in early 1935, and their victory against Jeze (paralleled by 
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almost another national strike) made the league a dominant presence throughout 
France's universities. However, dissolution denied the league its repertoire of 
political action which it had derived from the Dreyfus Affair, of physical clashes 
and the claiming of public space. The confrontations with which the league had 
defined its presence on the streets, in lecture-halls and in police reports were 
strikingly absent as the Front Populaire came to power in mid 1936. 
Like its senior counterpart, L'$tudiant Francais was allowed to continue 
despite dissolution, though it dropped the title "Organe des Etudiants d'Action 
Francaise". Denying its death L'Etudiant Francais claimed, 
On a voulu frapper des organisations. On n'atteindra pas notre 
propagande. 172 
Though students still gathered to sell nationalist newspapers, they were restrained 
in reacting to challenges from the left 173 There was also a noticeable change in 
content of the journal from February 1936 which had previously devoted so much 
of its print to organising, mobilising and glorifying the league's public clashes. 
Equally, the attempt by the dissolved league to give students an organisational 
focus through the Institut d'Action Francaise was quickly limited by the authorities. 
The Institute had previously periodically arranged courses and lectures for the 
league, and after the dissolution of the Federation National des Etudiants d'Action 
Francais, their headquarters at 33 rue St Andre was taken over by the Institute. 174 
Still when the Institute attempted to rally broader support from students with a 
mass meeting to be addressed by nationalist leaders Maurras, Daudet, Brasillach, 
Moulnier, Pujo and Fay on 18 May 1936, it was prohibited by the police. 175 Though 
in Paris, 33 rue St-Andre was still used as a base from which to sell L'Action 
Francaise, student support declined after dissolution 176 
For some students the dissolution of Action Francaise led them to channel 
their energies into the other student groups of the remaining leagues. The leading 
beneficiary of this constituency was the Croix de Feu. Police reported that its 
student section, the Volontaires Nationaux, were drawing increasing support 
amongst students in Paris, while the Phalange faced a decline in its own 
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membership. 177 The dissolution of Action Frangaise marked the turning of the tide 
for all groups of the nationalist right, and with the election of the Front Populaire in 
June 1936, the Croix de Feu, Jeunesses Patriotes, Solidarite Frangaise were all 
dissolved. Immediately following the dissolution of the Croix de Feu, its militants 
in Paris engaged in a series of cat-and-mouse incidents with police at the train 
station of Gare Saint Lazare. Groups would arrive at the station, to cry "Vive de la 
Roque" or to wear the league insignia on their clothes 178 Within a week, 54 people 
had been detained by police, of whom seventeen were students. The latter included 
a 17 year old female student, who was wearing a cocarde. 179 These confrontations 
were shorted-lived as the Croix de Feu changed itself into a political party, the Parti 
Social Francais, which established its own student section as a corporate association. 
Dissolution meant war by other means for the extreme right, although they 
had lost the organisational forms which had made them the pre-eminent forces dans 
la rue. Action Francaise and the Croix de Feu were affected by dissolution in 
different ways. The organisation of the former was largely driven underground, its 
supporters surfacing in private meetings or dinners, or much more rarely in 
violence on the streets. Still, Action Francaise maintained its newspaper, and this 
kept its politics in public view, if not its membership. The Croix de Feu was able to 
avoid these consequences of legal dissolution by changing its form into a political 
party. As will be examined later this change in form affected the political repertoire 
which could be used by its student supporters. Nineteen-thirty-six saw a 
fundamental transformation of the French political landscape, as the extreme right 
not only lost control of the streets to Rassemblement Populaire, but were also 
denied the political repertoire of confrontation which had made them such a 
presence within French universities. 
The Dissolution of CVIA 
The legal dissolution of the leagues was parallelled by the political 
dissolution of CVIA. With the electoral victory of the Front Populaire and the 
subsequent marginalisation of the extreme right, the Comite de Vigilance had lost 
part of the impetus behind its birth. More significantly, as CVIA moved its focus 
away from domestic politics to take a position in relation to international events the 
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divisions within the organisation became increasingly apparent. 180 The divisions 
which had been expressed at the November 1935 Congress over the Franco-Soviet 
Pact of May 1935 became irreconcilable at the Congress of June 1936, following 
Hitler's remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Finding that motions supporting anti- 
militarism conflicted with his call for hard-line resistance to the Fascist powers, Paul 
Langevin headed a group who resigned from the national committee of the Comite 
de Vigilance following the June 1936 Congress. 181 Joining Langevin were fellow 
academics Frederic Joliot, Albert Bayet, Lucien Febvre, Francis Perrin, Henri 
Wallon, Marcel Prenant, Jeanne and Georges Fournier. Wallon, Prenant and the 
Fourniers were strongly pro-Communist. 
Most studies of this split within CVIA stress the extent to which the division 
was over the conflicting imperatives of pacifism and anti-fascism - whether the 
organisation was 'against war' or'against fascism . 
182 This interpretation is mirrored 
in many other areas of the historiography of the 1930s, polarising the forces of 
pacifism/ appeasement on one hand and the forces of committed anti-fascism on the 
other 183 The supposed inherent contradiction or'schizophreniä between the 
demands of anti-war and anti-fascist politics, has partly been the creation of 
historians who seek to fix the historical experience of diverse groups on the 
simplicity of a four-word slogan. "Against war and fascism" was a phrase that 
provided a clear symbol of political aspirations for a variety of parties and groups, 
yet it certainly did not encapsulate a single fixed meaning throughout decade. As a 
rallying point, it was approached from different directions, even within the same 
organisation such as CVIA, at different times, in reaction to different events and 
contexts. 
The Comite de Vigilance's success in rallying support against what it 
perceived to be an indigenous fascist threat was striking. As Nicole Racine-Furland 
argues, "L'antifascisme du Comite de vigilance, reponse au 6 fevrier, est donc, avant tout 
une reaction ä une menace interieure". 184 However, as this anti-fascism was redefined 
in relation to international affairs, the Langevin tendance found their own activism 
conflicting with the majority position within CVIA. The resulting split was not 
merely between pacifists and communists, but also over the policy and purpose of 
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the organisation. A subsidiary conflict was certainly the role of PCF in CVIA, as 
Communist members and sympathisers had aroused hostility by regularly holding 
separate meetings to discuss party strategy. 185 The split is a reminder that the 
communist definition of the anti-war and anti-fascist alliance was not the only one 
at the time, in fact the creation of CVIA had pre-dated the official Comintern 
formulation of the new line. Given the leading role of Langevin in the anti-fascist 
movement, it was also true that as some of the organisation's rank-and-file stated, 
"Vigilance sans Iangevin nest plus vigilance"186 
The Oxford Congress, July 1936 
The fifth International Congress of Socialist students opened in Oxford on 17 
July 1936. The congress was dominated by debate over whether the national 
coalitions between socialist and communist students should be extended to a 
merging of their separate groups worldwide. The morning before the Congress 
opened, a delegation of Communist students met with Socialist representatives to 
discuss whether'unity of action' could become 'unity of organisation'. On 18 July 
1936, Communist John Cornford in his capacity as a delegate for the University 
Labour Federation moved a motion that the Communist delegation be invited to 
attend the Congress. 187 He was supported by the delegates from Spain, where 
Socialist and Communist students had already united in one organisation. 
Expressing strong reservations over any shift from coalition to merger were 
members of the French delegation. They felt that their national membership had not 
been allowed to consider such a question of organisation. As one French delegate 
argued, the Socialists had already achieved "une unite avec les communistes, et sur 
d'autre point avant trouae que la mauvaise foi des communistes empechaient la vraie 
unite. "188 This distance between the French Socialist students and their peers in 
Britain, Spain and Belgium was revealed in the debate over USSR189 The British 
delegates unanimously supported allying with a USSR pact for peace, whereas 
almost all the French delegation voted against this proposal. 190 Cornford's praise 
for the USSR was questioned by Dourioux and Rabaud of the French delegation 
who argued that the USSR had changed dramatically since 1917. 
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The pivotal motion for unity of organisation between Socialist and 
Communist student movements was moved by Boutbien of the French delegation 
and seconded by Cornford. 191 While the motion received the unanimous support of 
the British delegation, their French counterparts were strongly divided 192 Rabaud 
claimed that the French delegation possessed no mandate to support such a merger, 
and threatened the secession of the French Federation from the international 
organisation. 193 Though the motion was comfortably passed by the Congress, and 
Boutbien elected president of the new International, later debates would reveal that 
it was Rabaud's dissent which most clearly reflected the position of the French 
Socialists. 194 
Despite the deep divisions between the British and French Federations over 
the call for merger between the socialist and communists, the Congress still ended 
with a powerful image of unity. After three days of debates, the Congress was 
brought to an emotional close when it addressed by a representative of the Spanish 
delegation. On the opening day of the congress in Oxford, a military revolt had 
erupted in Spanish Morocco. By 20 July 1936 this had spread to become a civil war 
throughout Spain. After the Spanish student's speech, the congress unanimously 
voted a motion of fraternal salute to the Frente Popular, and closed as the delegates 
sang the International. 195 
191 bid., p. 9b. 
192L'Etudiant Socialiste, Oct. 1936, p. 19. 
193 paid. p. 10. 
194 Pi., d p. 20. 
195 mid p. 12. 
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Chapter 4 
Volunteers & Witnesses 
In July 1936, twenty year old Cambridge chemistry student, Hugh Gordon, 
headed to Barcelona for his summer holiday. 1 He had visited Spain the previous 
summer with Trinity College friends and fellow Communists, James Klugmann and 
Phillip Cell. Rather than walking across the Pyrenees as he had in 1935, Gordon 
returned to Barcelona by train with another Cambridge friend. They awoke on their 
first morning in Spain to find that the streets of the city had been transformed by a 
military rebellion. On 19 July 1936, troops had attempted to march to the Plaza de 
Cataluna in support of the pronunciamiento which had occurred two days earlier in 
Morocco? They were opposed in bloody clashes by the ad hoc militias of left-wing 
political groups as well as the Republican government's assault guards and police. 
By the following day, the revolt by the army and rightist groups had been defeated 
in Barcelona and Madrid, but had succeeded in claiming power in towns across 
Northern and Western Spain. 3 
Touring the freshly-improvised barricades that dotted the streets, the 
Cambridge students found that their Communist Party cards were more useful than 
their British passports in gaining a friendly reception from the various checkpoints. 
Gordon was struck by the sporadic columns of smoke from burning churches across 
the city. Remembering the events almost sixty years afterwards, he stated that, 
One got the impression that this was the people having a go at last after 
being suppressed for ever so long, and it was impossible for a couple of 
English students really to do anything except observe it. 4 
Some foreigners though chose not merely to observe, but to participate in the 
fighting. Amongst those Gordon encountered on the streets was Felicia Brown, an 
English painter and Communist who would be killed a month later fighting in 
Aragon with the militia. 5 
I "Recollections of a Younger World", pp. 374-376, in CP/ Ind/ Kett/ 1, National Museum of 
Labour History. 
2 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 3rd ed., Penguin Books, London, 1986, pp. 232-236. 
Casualties over the two days of fighting in Barcelona were estimated at 500 killed and 3,000 
wounded - Ibid., p. 248. 3 These included Burgos, Saragossa, Huesca, Teruel, Pamplona, Seville and Valladolid. 
4'Recollections of a Younger World", p. 374. 
5 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 367. 
A member of Somerville College, Audrey Beecham, who was also in Barcelona for her 
summer holidays, participated in the street fighting - Pauline Adams, Somerville for Women 
1879-1993, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 233. 
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Despite the action and atmosphere on the streets, the students had to face 
more practical concerns, for "our time in Barcelona had to come to an end, because 
the banks were all closed and we had run out of money" .6 With train services shut 
down, the students contacted the British Consulate which arranged for them to be 
evacuated on a Royal Navy destroyer to Marseille. Once back in England, Gordon 
was quickly speaking at street meetings for the Communist Party on what he had 
seen in Spain. 
The handful of students and academics from British and French universities 
who actually experienced the fighting in Spain at first-hand have a two-fold 
significance for this study. They were the people most directly touched by the war, 
revealing the mixed backgrounds from which outsiders viewed Spain. Secondly, 
the ways in which their experiences were interpreted by others in their own 
countries became important markers in framing understandings of the civil war. In 
reaction to the prominence accorded to intellectuals at the time and afterwards, 
historians have sought to show that these were only a statistically small fraction of 
combatants in Spain.? Yet, the few university students and academics who went to 
Spain exercised a disproportionate influence on their peers' perceptions of the war 
and its later history. 
The First Volunteers 
Perhaps the most prominent university figure to fight in the war was 
Cambridge student John Comford. In the days immediately preceding the 
rebellion's outbreak, Cornford was lobbying at the Oxford Congress of Socialist 
students for the international merger of Socialist and Communist student 
organisations. Cornford had just graduated from Cambridge with a first class 
honours degree in history with distinction. Only 20 years old, he was unsure of his 
immediate future .8 Though 
he wanted to work in politics, he ultimately decided to 
stay at Cambridge as a research student in history. Before returning to university, 
Cornford and his girlfriend, Margot Heinemann, planned a trip to the continent 
combining politics and holidaying. They intended to relax in the south of France 
6 "Recollections of a Younger World", p. 377. 
7Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 126. 
Judith Cook, Apprentices of Freedom, Quartet Books, London, pp. ix & 2. 
R6mi Skoutelsky, "Les Volontaires Francais en Espagne Republicaine 1936-1939", These, 
Universit6 de Paris I, 1996, p. 218. 
8 Stansky & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier, p. 244. 
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before attending the World Peace Conference in Brussels Y Such travels to Europe 
were common for Oxford and Cambridge students during their summer holidays, 
shaping their understanding of international politics. 
It was in the same spirit that Cornford decided to include Spain on his 
travels after hearing of the military rebellion. He began his trip early, and intended 
to join Heinemann in the south of France after he had seen for himself what was 
being described as a workers' revolution against a military revolt 10 Cornford 
arranged press credentials with the Daily Herald, and also carried a letter of 
introduction from the pro-Communist student organisation. the Rassemblement 
Mondial des Ptudiants pour la Paix, la Liberte et la Culture. 11 With fellow Trinity 
Communist Richard Bennett, he arrived in Spain a fortnight after the fighting had 
broken out. 12 While Bennett joined the PSUC radio station in Barcelona, Comford's 
time as journalist did not last long, as on a tour of the Huesca front with Franz 
Borkenau, he volunteered for the POUM militia. 13 
As Heinemann remembered, "I was at Nimes, waiting to hear from him, 
when I got a letter saying that he'd joined up and was going to stay there, which he 
certainly hadn't intended to do when he went out' . 14 In late July 1936, anarchist, 
POUM and PSUC militia columns had rapidly advanced out from Barcelona 
through Aragon to within reach of Saragossa and Huesca. Like many others, 
Cornford felt that the fighting would be over very quickly and so he wanted to 
participate before it ended. 15 The impulsiveness of Cornford's action was reflected 
in his choice of the closest militia units, for otherwise he probably would have 
joined a Communist unit. Significantly, despite the later conflict during the war 
between POUM and the PSUC, and the more recent historical debates over the 
clash, there seems to have been little ideological antagonism between the young 
committed Communist and his more revolutionary comrades, who included several 
German ex-Communists. 16 It was not ideology, but the long periods of inactivity on 
9Ibid pp. 323-4. 
10 Recorded interview with Margot Heinemann, Side 3,9239/ 5, Imperial War Museum. 
11 The letter stated that Cornford "est mandate par nous pour enqueter sur la situation en Espagne 
et porter aux courageux etudiants Espagnols eta tons les defenseurs de la Repubique 1'expression de 
la solidarite agissante des etudiants du monde entier, pour la cause de 1'Espagne libre" - Letter of 
7/8/ 1936, John Cornford Papers, Trinity College Archives. 
12 Bill Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty: Spain 1936-1939, Lawrence & Wishart, 
London, 1982, pp. 41 & 222. 
13 Stansky & Abrahams, journey to the Frontier, p. 314 
14 'The Spanish Civil War", p. 1, CP/ Ind/ Kett/ 1, National Museum of Labour History. 
15 As Cornford later wrote to his father "I expected at that time that the fighting would be 
over very soon" - Letter of 15/ 9/ 1936, John Cornford Papers, Trinity College Archives. 16 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 123-124; 
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a quiet front and the militia's disorganisation which increasingly frustrated 
Cornford. 17 Joining up to directly participate in the struggle against international 
fascism, he found himself feeling useless, lonely and bored far away from home. 18 
Cornford's experience typified the ad hoc arrival of volunteers during the 
initial stages of the war. The first large groups of volunteers who crossed the 
Pyrenees to join the fighting seem to have been Spaniards returning home from 
France 19 These were quickly joined by other groups - political refugees from 
Central Europe, French anarchists, and other committed activists such as 21 year 
old Trotskyist Maurice Loeuillet, a law student at Aix who left for Spain in August 
1936.20 As the fighting continued these early volunteers, who had arrived in small 
groups or individually to join the nearest militia units, were obscured by the arrival 
of a far larger, more organised, Communist-inspired effort, the International 
Brigades. 21 
In mid-September 1936, Cornford returned to England, partly on sick-leave, 
but also with the purpose of organising a small disciplined group of comrades to 
fight in Spain. As he told a close friend, he wanted a special band to act as an 
example to the militias, people who would shave every morning and act as a 
disciplined formation. 22 In the words of Heinemann, he was, "looking for people 
really with a bit of expertise, something to contribute": 23 Two of the staples of 
English public school education - classical languages and the military experience of 
the Officer Training Corps - provided some of these skills. 24 Cornford turned to his 
contemporaries from the anti-war and anti-fascist campaigns within universities 
Valentine Cunningham has implied that the CPGB distrusted Cornford after his experiences 
with the POUM, obscuring Harry Pollitt's direct assistance in recruiting and transporting 
Cornford's group - Valentine Cunningham, ' Saville's Row with The Penguin Book of 
Spanish Civil War Verse", Socialist Register. 1982, p. 279 
For a rebutal of Cunningham's charges see John Saville, "Valentine Cunningham and the 
Poetry of the Spanish Civil War", Socialist Register, 1981, p. 275. 
17 George Orwell was to share such experiences on the same front half a year later - George 
Orwell, Homage to Catalonia. Penguin Books, London, 1986, pp. 22-32 
18Stansky & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier, P. 331. 
19 David Wingeate Pike, "France" in James W. Cortada, ed., Historical Dictionary of the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939 Greenwood Press, Westport, 1982, p. 217. 
2 Skoutelsky, "Les Volontaires Francais en Espagne Republicaine 1936-1939", p. 119. 21 David Berry, "French Anarchists in Spain, 1936-1939", French History, 3,1989, p. 427. 
22 Straight, After Long Silence, p. 87. 
23 Recorded interview with Margot Heinemann, Reel 2, Side 3,9239/5, Imperial War 
Museum. 
24 While many of the working class volunteers from Britain, France and other countries had 
done military service or experienced battle in 1914-1918, the anti-militarism of the student 
left meant that former public school students such as Cornford and Esmond Romilly had 
refused to join their school's OTC - Stansky & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier, p. 155; 
Esmond Romilly, adill Macdonald, London, 1971, pp. 26 & 29. 
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between 1933 and 1936. Perhaps more important than their skills were the resources 
which students had to make their political commitment meaningful: passports, 
money and travel experience. 25 Some of them had finished their studies in the 
month before the war and were without steady jobs. Like the large numbers of 
unemployed and refugees who later joined the International Brigades, those who 
most readily volunteered to fight in Spain often had weak personal commitments 
and a strong political consciousness. 
Cornford's group of seven students included John Sommerville and Bernard 
Knox from Cambridge, and Mannassa (Sam) Lesser, who had just finished a 
diploma in Egyptology at UCL. 26 Growing up in a family of Jewish Poles in 
London's East End had given Lesser direct contact with the anti-semitism that 
Mosley's British Union of Fascists was attempting to organise in the mid-1930s. It 
was a background that provided powerful reasons to join the actively anti-fascist 
Communist Party, which he did in his first year of university in 1934. Unusually, 
given the strong anti-militarism of the left, Lesser also joined the university's OTC, 
citing Lenin to justify learning the weapons of revolution. It was this military 
training which Jack Cohen, a CPGB organiser, appealed to, arguing that the 
Republic needed those with military training and expertise 27 Lesser disagreed with 
Cohen, for he felt that what was necessary for the defence of Republican Spain was 
arms not more men. However, he became absolutely convinced that volunteers 
with military experience were vitally needed in Spain after talking with both the 
head of the CPGB, Harry Pollitt, and Cornford. Carrying his University of London 
OTC uniform and a gas mask which had been a farewell present from his college 
friends, Lesser left for Spain just as the new academic year was opening. 
Cornford's group of volunteers has been portrayed as solely a personal 
initiative, conceived and executed in ignorance of the Comintern's official formation 
25 Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, p. 36. 
The experience of 24 year old Oxford student Jim Brewer contrasted to that of Cornford's 
group. Brewer had been born into a family of South Wales miners, and had worked for two 
years in the mines before winning a WEA scholarship to Ruskin College. In the summer 
holidays of 1936, he decided to go to Spain, though it took him several months before he 
was able to join a group of volunteers being organised by the CPGB in January 1937. 
Brewer's difficulties in getting to Spain reveal the importance of the Communist Party in 
organising passports, day tickets, accomodation and transport necessary for working-class 
volunteers to travel to Spain. The familiarity of middle class students with international 
travel meant that they were over-represented amongst the first volunteers - Recorded Interview with Jim Brewer, Reels 1-3,9963/ 10, Imperial War Museum. 
26 Lesser changed his name to Sam Russell during the civil war, when he worked on 




of the International Brigades in late September 1936.28 Margot Heinemann describes 
him recruiting a small group of friends in a "free-lance" fashion, which the 
Communist Party then aided in transporting to Spain. 29 Lesser's experience 
suggests that the CPGB's role extended to informally recruiting the first volunteers, 
before it became officially committed to the International Brigades. Another 
member of Cornford's group, the New Zealander George McLaurin, who was a 
former Cambridge student, had also been asked to volunteer by Pollitt 30 Despite 
the accounts of participants and historians, few works have positioned Cornford's 
efforts within the Party organisation or recognised that these were largely 
dependent on Pollitt's pro-active support. Personal initiative and party mobilisation 
ran together, as each drew on the other. 
Cornford's role in organising a group of volunteers for Spain raises one of 
the recent methodological debates over the historiography on the Communist Party. 
In America, Theodore Draper has polemically attacked the growth of social 
histories focused on the Communist Party as producing a profound mis-reading of 
the party's organisation, membership and history. 31 To Draper, any attempt to write 
a history of the Communist Party'from the bottom up' ignores its monolithic and 
totalitarian nature. He criticises those who put forward the interpretation that 
national Communist Parties enjoyed a measure of autonomy from Moscow 
leadership, as based on a distorting emphasis on isolated incidents and individual 
biography. These histories, he concludes, "depoliticise the most political of all 
political movements . 32 For Draper, any attempt at social history must be 
incorporated within a consideration of the Communist Party's political organisation 
and institutional structures. 
Yet Draper's model of the Communist Party as a monolithic organisation 
gives it a coherence and unity that it lacked in reality. Cornford's recruiting efforts 
in England between 15 September and 5 October 1936 were too early to be part of 
the co-ordinated international effort that was still developing 33 According to Paris 
28 Stansky, & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier, pp. 360-361. 
29 Recorded interview with Margot Heinemann, Side 3,9239/5.. 
30 Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, p. 34. 
31 Theodore Draper, "American Communism revisited", New York Review of Books. 9 May 
1985, p. 37. 
For arguments supporting a social history of the Communist Party see Kevin Morgan, 
"Introduction" in Geoff Andrews, Nina Fishman & Kevin Morgan, eds., Opening the Books: 
Essays on the Social & Cultural History of British Communism, Pluto Press, London, 1995, 
pp. 2-3- 
32 Theodore Draper, 'The Popular Front revisited", New York Review of Books, 30 May 
1985, p. 46. 
33 Saville, "Valentine Cunningham and the Poetry of the Spanish Civil War", p. 273. 
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police, the PCF had begun recruiting French and Spanish volunteers to fight for the 
Republic as early as August 1936.34 The fall of Irün in early September 1936, which 
sent large numbers of Republican refugees into France, produced an intensification 
of such activity by the French left as the Republic's position seemed more 
perilous. 35 The French Communists were at the forefront of organising military aid 
to Republican Spain, and it seems that Thorez s suggestion in September 1936 for a 
Comintern army coincided with Moscow's own decision to commit itself to supply 
armaments to the Republic. 36 Given the official birth of the International Brigades in 
the following month, the speed of their creation indicated that the Comintern was 
co-ordinating national efforts which had already been developing. Since British 
efforts were slightly behind those of the French Communists, it is not surprising 
that Cornford's group only realised the extent to which they were part of a much 
larger effort when they arrived in France 37 Though the group was eager to join the 
fighting, their transportation through Paris and then Marseille was delayed as they 
were joined by much bigger contingents of volunteers headed for Spain. 36 
France was the focus for the organisation of the International Brigades 39 
This was partly due to its geographical proximity, which made it an important 
route to Spain. It was also partly due to the domestic strength of the PCF, which 
created networks for the recruitment and transportation of volunteers in certain 
regions of communist dominance, such as the Nord, the Bouches-du-Rhone and the 
Seine. The PCF started mass recruiting for the Brigades in September 1936.41 Not 
only were the French the largest national contingent within the Brigades, but many 
volunteers were refugees from Central and Eastern Europe resident in France. 
Jacques Delperrie de Bayac has estimated that the Brigades were drawn from 53 
countries, and ultimately totalled 35,000 volunteers, of whom almost half went to 
Spain between October and December 1936.42 
34 Carlos Serrano, L'Enjeu Espagnol: PCF et Guerre d'Espagne, Messidor, Paris, 1987, p. 50. 35 Ibid., p. 54. 
36 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War. p. 440 & 452; 
E. H. Carr, The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War. Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p. 24. 37 John Sommerfield, Volunteer in Spain, Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1937, pp. 11 & 20; 38 Ibid., p. 13. 
39 Farre, Pasiön y Farsa, p. 39; 
Jacques Delperrie de Bayac, Les Brigades Internationales, Fayard, Paris, 1968, p. 85; 
Pike, Les Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne p. 163. 
40 Skoutelsky, "Les Volontaires Francais en Espagne Republicaine 1936-1939", p. 247. 41 Delperrie de Bayac, Les Brigades Internationales, p. 78. 42 Ibid., pp. 9& 90. 
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TABLE 4.1: NATIONAL ESTIMATES OF BRIGADES43 
Country No. of Volunteers Volunteers (%) 
France 9,000 25.7 
Germany & Austria 5,000 14.3 
Poland 4,000 11.4 
Balkans 4,000 11.4 
Italy 3,000 8.6 
Britain 2,000 5.7 
Other 8,000 22.9 
Total 35,000 
Despite their numerical prominence in the Brigades, the French volunteers 
have been relatively neglected by historical accounts compared to their English or 
American peers. This is partly due to the shortage of memoirs and biographical 
accounts in French relative to those in English, Italian, and German. 44 Remi 
Skoutelsky has provided the most comprehensive investigation into the 
demographic composition of the French contingent. Of 3910 French volunteers, he 
identified 19 students 45 Of these 8 were students from the Ile-de-France (Paris), and 
3 were from Aquitaine and the Midi-Pyrenees. 46 The average age of these student 
volunteers was twenty-three 47 Some had been very active in student politics, such 
as Henri Chretien who had led the UFE in 1933 before becoming a medecin-chef in 
the Brigades. Thirteen of the students were members of either the PCF or JC. 48 
The French student volunteers described by Skoutelsky are demographically 
similar to the Cornford group in at least three regards. Firstly, the greatest number 
of volunteers amongst students in both countries were drawn from the largest, and 
most prestigious universities - Paris, Cambridge and Oxford. They were more likely 
to be older and finishing their degrees than starting their studies. They were 
frequently members of the Communist Party, or at least politically active before the 
43 Ibid., p. 386. 
The figures are based on the 1938 Commission of the League of Nations are generally 
accepted, though estimates of 10,000 French volunteers are supported by Skoutelsky and 
Thomas - Skoutelsky, "Les Volontaires Francais en Espagne Republicaine 1936-1939". p. 471; 
Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 982-983. 
44 Michael Jackson, Fallen Sparrows: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, 
American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1994, p. 17. 45 Skoutelsky, "Les Volontaires Francais en Espagne Republicaine 1936-1939", p. 217. 
`K' lbid., p. 266. 
47 lbid., pp. 220 & 222. 
48 Ibid., p. 283. 
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war. In fact, they were more likely to be Communists than their fellow volunteers 49 
However, a significant difference between the two countries is the attention which 
British students have received compared to the relative silence surrounding their 
French peers. This contrast is partly numerical, as British students were part of a 
much smaller national contingent which meant they were relatively more 
prominent. Their prominence has also been exaggerated by the way intellectual 
engagement in Spain has been memorialised in British historiography 50 It is this 
contrast between students which underlies the generalisation that British 
intellectuals outnumbered their French counterparts in the Brigades 51 
After arriving in Alicante, Cornford's group were moved to Albacete for 
training where their contingent joined 500 earlier volunteers, who were mostly 
French. 52 Combining with another British group, they made up a twenty-strong 
half-section in the French Commune de Paris Battalion, which Lesser described as a 
"collection of odds and sods" 53 Their training was quickly cut short and the newly- 
formed units were rushed to the collapsing front around Madrid . 
54 In contrast to 
Cornford's first visit to Spain when the revolt seemed as if it would be over in a 
matter of weeks, the Republic was now directly threatened by Franco 's drive north. 
In two months, the Army of Africa had spearheaded the Nationalist push through 
the provinces of Andalusia, Extremadura and New Castile, reaching the outskirts of 
Madrid by the first week of November 1936. 
The Nationalist attack on Madrid was launched on 8 November 1936, 
through the large park on the city's west, the Casa de Campo. The attack was met 
49 Skoutelsky estimates that 56.4% of his total sample were members of the PCF (with 
another 7.9% beloning to Communist front organisations), compared to 70% for French 
students - Ibid., pp. 277 & 283; 
It seems likely that all seven students in Cornford's group were Communist, while Cook 
and Thomas estimates that over 60% of the British contingent were Party members - Cook, 
Apprentices of Freedom. p. 2; 
Thomas, The Spanish Civil War. p. 455. 
50 Stansky & Abraham's biography of Cambridge students Cornford and Julian Bell drew 
the following review: 
"Why is there such a compulsive desire, not just to recall the 1930s, but to recall it in this 
particular way: to locate all the debates about commitment, actions, intellectuals in that 
particular moment?... But no one has yet managed to explain satisfactorily why we need 
what we need out of the 30s, why we read it in the way we do" - Alexander Cockburn, "To 
and From the Frontier", The Review. Oct 1986, p. 11. 
51 Delperrie de Bayac, Les Brigades Internationales, p. 98. 
David Winegate Pike, "Review: Juan Aviles Farre, Pasiön y Farsa: Franceses y Britänicos", 
American Historical Review. 100,4,1995, p. 1242. 
52 Stansky & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier., p. 366. 53 Recorded interview with Sam Russell, Reel 1, Side 2,9484/6, Imperial War Museum; 
Sommerfield, Volunteer in Spain, p. 35. 
54 Sommerfield, Volunteer in Spain, pp. 49 & 90. 
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by desperate Republican resistance and made little progress. That evening, the 1,900 
strong 11th International Brigade was rushed into the front. 55 Over the following 
two days, a third of the Brigade were killed in action but their line held. In the 
intense fighting that took place around the Casa de Campo and then University 
City throughout November 1936 the casualties were extremely high. George 
Maclaurin was killed on their third day at the front, while Cornford received a head 
wound from an artillery shell After a month in the front-line the original British 
group had been reduced to almost half with only 12 members remaining in the 
field. The enormous casualties that the Brigades received in their first few days of 
action would continue throughout the war, as their role increasingly became that of 
reliable shock troops, used at the heaviest point of attack. 57 
Amongst the terrible human cost, there was an optimism that the arrival of 
the volunteers had marked a change in the course of the war. One of the British 
students, Bernard Knox, wrote of 
the unique atmosphere of Madrid in November: the pervasive, blind fear of 
what Franco 's troops would do if they won, a fierce pride in the fact that for 
the first time the apparently irresistible advance of European Fascism had 
been stopped, and stopped by a miracle of military improvisation, the 
exhilarating feeling that if we could do this we could do anything 58 
The failure of the Nationalist attack on Madrid fundamentally redefined the nature 
of the civil war, extending it indefinitely. 
The International Brigades and Domestic Politics 
Though the role of the International Brigades in battle has been 
comprehensively covered, far less research has examined their effects on the distant 
social milieus from which the volunteers were drawn. 59 As Tom Buchanan has 
argued, the Brigades 'internationalised' the Spanish conflict by making the civil war 
a direct and personal experience for the family, friends and communities which 
they left behind 60 As Oxford Communist Philip Toynbee remembered, it was 
55 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 480. 
56 Ibid., pp. 111 & 121. 
57 Cook, Apprentices of Freedom, p. 13. 
58 Knox, "Remembering Madrid", New York Review of Books. 27,17,6/ 1/ 1988, p. 37. 
59 The personal and family trauma which volunteering caused is considered in Hywel 
Francis, "'Say Nothing & Leave in the Middle of the Night': The Spanish Civil War 
Revisited", History Workshop, 32, Autumn 1991, p. 71. 
60 Tom Buchanan, 'The International Brigades", unpublished paper at Conference on the 
Spanish Civil War, University of Oxford, Oxford, 1 Feb 1997. 
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upon hearing the news that his friend Esmond Romilly had volunteered in late 
August 1936, 'That the war became, for the first time, personally and immediately 
disturbing". 61 At the University of Edinburgh, medical student David Pritt recalled 
that, 
Some of the chaps with whom I was friendly joined the International 
Brigade and therefore I was involved personally in that direction. One 
actually died 62 
Those volunteers who returned from Spain, and perhaps more powerfully those 
who did not return, made the distant fighting of intense local concern throughout 
Britain and France. 
For UCL Professor of Genetics, J. B. S. Haldane, his personal sympathies with 
the Republic were reinforced by the political commitments of his family. When his 
stepson volunteered for the International Brigades, his wife became Honorary 
Secretary of the Brigade's Dependants Aid Committee 63 From March to May 1937 
Charlotte Haldane worked in Paris as a translator assisting in the covert 
transportation of volunteers. Her son, Ronald Burghes, was eventually invalided 
back to Britain in autumn 1937M Haldane himself went to Spain soon after his 
stepson. Haldane's research on gas warfare during the First World War made him a 
leading expert in the field, and he was invited to Madrid in December 1936 to 
devise possible means of civilian defence from such attacks for the Republican 
Government 65 The war of 1914-1918 made gas warfare seem the greatest danger to 
soldiers and civilians alike, yet Haldane's work in Madrid, during which he gave 
lectures to the British volunteers on gas and grenade warfare, convinced him that 
the nature of modern warfare had changed from gas to aerial bombardment . 
66 The 
political and professional effects of this change were most strongly felt in 1938, as 
Haldane's experiences in Spain made him one of the leading scientific experts and 
For example, Cambridge students knitted sweaters for the Brigade volunteers - Recorded 
interview with Sarah Henriques Harris, Reel 1, Side 1,12533/4, Imperial War Museum. 
61 Philip Toynbee, Friends Apart 
, p. 
86. 
62 "Ibe Spanish War", p. 12 in CP/ Ind/ Kett/ 1, National Museum of Labour History. 
63 Charlotte Haldane, Truth Will Out, George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1949, pp. 92 
& 98. 
64 Ibid., p. 123. 
65 Knox, "Remembering Madrid", p. 36. 
66 Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, p. 75; 
A number of volunteers left for Spain carrying gas masks including Lesser and Haldane's 
stepson. On 4 December 1936, there was a gas scare in Madrid as ten men were reported 
affected by gas from shells. A delegation of British MPs who were visiting the city around 
the same time called for British Foreign Office to make gas masks available to Republican 
Government as gas shells had already been used and civilians were so close to the front- 
lines that they were bound to be affected - Report of the Visit by an All Party Group of 
Members of Parliament to Spain, Spanish Embassy, London, pp. 15-16; 
Madrid: The'Military' Atrocities of the Rebels Labour Party, London, 1937, p. 14. 
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political activists on aerial warfare in Britain. At the same time, Haldane was 
writing letters to the News Chronicle in which he emphasised the strong morale 
and maintenance of order in Madrid despite the constant bombardment and high 
civilian casualties 67 He also found time to share a bottle of scotch behind the lines 
in Madrid with student Bernard Knox when the latter was wounded 68 
In early March 1937, news reached University College London that Sam 
Lesser had been badly wounded in leg and back during "the engagement in which 
Ralph Fox and John Cornford lost their lives" 69 A committee led by his friend and 
fellow Communist Brian Pearce was organised to send letters and magazines to his 
hospital in Ciudad Real. After a week, it was announced that Lesser was returning 
to London for treatment and would hopefully visit University College 7° 
When members of the International Brigades returned to their own 
countries, they often emerged at the forefront of domestic political conflicts. Some 
such as Edinburgh student and volunteer, David Mackenzie, took to the platform in 
mass meetings to aid Republican Spain and oppose non-intervention. 71 As a 
witness who had experienced the fighting at first hand, his testimony had the 
weight to rebut anti-Republican reports in the British press and newsreels. 
Equally, Paris science student, Maurice Laban, twice wounded during the 
war, returned from Spain to campaign for the Republican cause. He vividly 
remembered the emotional farewell from his unit's political commissar in Spain, 
who had said, 
Vous qui partez en France parce que vous ne pouvez plus lutter ici, il vous 
reste une autre arme, peut-eire plus puissante que celles que vous avez eues 
entre les mains: la propagande. Ambassadeurs du peuple d'Espagne aupres 
des autres peuples, dites-leur bien ce que vous avez vu. Dites-leur la verite, 
rien que la verite, sans exagerer. 72 
67 Madrid: The 'Military' Atrocities of the Rebels, p. 15. 
68 Knox, "Remembering Madrid", p. 35. 
69 Phineas, 2/3/1937, p. 1. 
70 Phineas, 9/ 3/ 1937, p. 1. 
71 See Chapter Seven. 
72 "You who depart for France because you can no longer fight here, you remain with 
another weapon, maybe more powerful than that which you have had in your hands: 
propaganda. Ambassadors of the people of Spain to other peoples, tell them what you have 
seen. Tell the truth, nothing but the truth, without exaggeration" - Les Cahiers de la 
Jeunesse 15/1/1939, p. 27. 
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It was often students who emerged as the most articulate ambassadors for the 
Republican cause, sharing the platform with politicians, intellectuals and other 
public figures. 
The Death of John Cornford 
In late December 1936, Cornford and the remaining four members of the 
British sub-section were transferred south to participate in a Republican counter- 
offensive. On the 27 December 1936, John Cornford celebrated his twenty-first 
birthday on the Cordoba front, as head of a machine gun unit in a battalion of 
French volunteers. That night, or the following day, he was killed in action near the 
small village of Lopera, although the exact circumstances of his death remain 
uncertain 73 
For those who were closest to his life, his family, close friends and 
Cambridge peers, Cornford's death was a deeply-felt tragedy. It was partly the 
strength of these personal feeling which meant that reactions to his death 
transcended party political boundaries within Cambridge culminating in a 
memorial appeal in his honour. Cornford's image also became a significant 
reference point for many at universities across Britain, and even internationally. At 
the same time, the way Cornford's life was memorialised and the efforts of others to 
give meaning to Cornford's death registered a particular view of the Spanish 
conflict and of intellectuals. 
The confusion of battle meant that details were slow in arriving back to 
England. 74 As one of Cornford's closest friends and a comrade in the Communist 
Party, Michael Straight was one of the first in Cambridge to learn of events in mid- 
January 1937.75 Straight was so shaken by the news of Cornford's death that in early 
1937 he agreed to leave the university to work as a spy for the USSR. 76 After 
informing Cornford's family and Heinemann, Straight wrote an obituary which was 
73 Stansky, & Abrahams, journey to the Frontier, pp. 388-390. 
74 Saville, "Valentine Cunningham and the Poetry of the Spanish Civil War", p. 276. 75 Straight, After Long Silence, pp. 96-97. 
76 Iid., pp. 102-105; 
The spy scandal surrounding the Cambridge quartet of Blunt, Burgess, Philby and Maclean 
created a stereotype of Cambridge Communists in the 1930s which had little to do with the 
university experiences of the vast majority of left-wing students - Stephen R. Parsons, "Communism in the Professions: The Organisation of the British Communist Party among 
Professional Workers, 1933-1956", PhD, University of Warwick, 1990, p. 13. 
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printed by The Cambridge Review in early February 1937.77 The obituary 
described Cornford as Cambridge-born and educated. He had come from a 
prominent family in the university; he was a great grandson of Charles Darwin, 
both his grandfathers had attended Trinity College, as had his father who was 
Professor of Philosophy at the university. Even amongst those who did not meet 
him directly, his name was known across the campus, explaining the unique 
obituaries of The Cambridge Review and The Granta. 78 The profound resonance of 
Cornford's image around Cambridge was reflected in the widespread distribution 
of a photograph of him and the launching of a memorial appeal in his name (with 
that of George Maclaurin)79 
The news of his death moved even those who were far from close to 
Cornford. A year behind Comford at Stowe school, Jon Vickers had then followed 
him to Cambridge to read Modern History. Yet Vickers was initially apathetic to 
politics, and had a fairly disparaging view of his senior. As he remembered, 
I was very affected by John Cornford being killed, but not in the way that 
you might think perhaps - rather in the way that Yeats' poem Easter 1916 
describes, in that I thought he was a bit of an ass, a bit of an eccentric, and 
here he was going out and doing something that was really rather fine. That 
made me think rather hard about myself. It wasn't so much someone I'd 
admired, it was rather the other way round. 
I knew him personally. We were at school together, although he was two 
years older. 
His death made me ask some questions. What made him do it? I then came 
to the conclusion that this had been quite a sensible thing - in fact a very 
sensible thing - to do. That made me think that other things which I hadn't 
thought of as sensible were perhaps more sensible than they had seemed. 
I'm sure that was the thing that got me thinking. 80 
Cornford's death at the beginning of 1937 encouraged Vickers into political 
activism, and he joined the CUSC, eventually becoming its secretary. 
Cornford's image was a powerful symbol of political engagement for others 
in universities outside Cambridge. James Klugmann, who had shared the 
77 The Cambridge Review, 5/2/1937, p. 228; 
Stansky & Abrahams, Journey to the Frontier, p. 390. 
78 Two former Cambridge students, George Maclaurin and Lorrimer Birch, had been killed 
in the International Brigades before Cornford, however there was almost no organised 
publicity over their deaths within the university. 79 Recorded interview with Sarah Henriques Harris, Reel 1, Side 1,12533/4, Imperial War 
Museum. 
80 "Recollections of a Younger World", pp. 390-391. 
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leadership of Cambridge Communist students with Cornford, was probably 
responsible for the obituary which was printed in Paris, by La Voix des Etudiants. 81 
Though Cornford's photo was confused with that of Belgian student Pierre Bruchet, 
it reveals the far greater prominence of British student volunteers, even in France S2 
Interestingly in Oxford, there was less coverage of Cornford's death than in Paris, 
The Cherwell seemed more concerned to claim volunteer Giles Romilly as Oxford's 
own 83 The LSE Union unanimously voted its condolences over the death of John 
Cornford at a meeting on 10 February 1937, where 120 students were present 84 
At University College London in March 1937, a short story in the student 
magazine described the death of a 21 year-old English student in the fighting 
around Madrid. 85 The age of the hero, its setting and the timing of the story's 
publication suggest it was modelled on Cornford whose death had been announced 
the previous month. The short story also reveals the origins of some of the images 
used in the following pacifist article in the same issue: 
For many months now in Spain there has been raging a war terrible to think 
of. Civil war is always ghastly. This war touches students in particular, 
because it is a war between two forces of political opinion. Students have felt 
their cause to be right, and have gone out to fight for it. This is commendable 
only in that these young men - and women too - have believed in their cause 
utterly, willing to die for it. From all other viewpoints it is a pitiful thing that 
these young people, in the prime of life, destined for great things, some of 
them, should go out to Spain and throw their lives away in a fight for justice. 
I need mention no names, all will know of someone who has gone and will 
never return, leaving the world a poorer place by his loss. Was it worth it? 
Have they thrown away their lives in vain? No, they died supporting the 
best possible cause - freedom and justice. But how much more they could 
have done if they had lived 8' 
The rhetorical scope of the article seems out of key, given that only four UCL 
students volunteered to fight in Spain and the first death from this group was 
recorded in the following issue. Even that death conflicts with the image of the 
article for it was that of a 40 year old mature-aged student, who had studied 
81 La Voix des Etudiants, Feb 1937, pp. 12-13. 
82 For Belgian reactions to the death of Bruchet, who was killed on 11 November 1936 in 
Madrid see Georgette Smolski, "L'ULB devant la Guerre d'Espagne", Revue Beige d'Histoire 
Contemporaine, 18,1-2,1987, p. 421. 
83 The Cherwell 6/ 2/ 1937, p. 50 
84 Minutes of 10/ 2/ 1937, Coll Misc 649 2/4, LSE Archives. 
85 University College Magazine, March 1937, pp. 162-3. 
86 bid., pp. 109-110. 
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engineering at UCL from 1932 to 1934 and had previously worked on London's 
docks and fought in the First World War. As his obituary noted, 
He went out to Spain, not as a young idealist, but as a man who knew what 
war is like and who knew why he wanted to fight 87 
Clearly Cornford's image had a powerful national appeal almost immediately. To 
the extent that there was a direct student presence in Spain, it was mythologised 
around him. 
In death, John Cornford also became a political symbol for the defenders of 
the Spanish Republic. An open letter from the leaders of Cambridge University 
Socialist Club used his death to attack the conservatism and anti-communism of the 
Labour party leadership. They wrote that, 
The whole of John Comford's great work was directed towards the creation 
of unity. He fought while he lived for the unity of the working-class in this 
country, he died fighting in the united working-class of Spain 88 
This description of Cornford as the embodiment of the Communist Party's Popular 
Front strategy was in many ways a misrepresentation of his politics. Despite 
Cornford's work from 1935 in campaigning for the merger of Socialist and 
Communist students groups within Cambridge, Britain and then internationally, 
this amounted to a re-writing of the sectarianism which had first attracted him to 
politics and had characterised most of his political life. Cornford was one of those 
who in the words of another Cambridge communist, Eric Hobsbawm, "joined the 
party in the stalinist period and largely because of its stalinism, i. e. because they 
welcomed the construction of a totally devoted, disciplined, realistic, anti-romantic 
army of revolution" 89 Rather than the image of the young student, poet or 
intellectual which quickly became enshrined in popular memory, Cornford's 
foremost identity was his exceptional political commitment. In the words of another 
volunteer who met him in Spain, he was a "Real Communist" 90 
Cornford's death reveals how the volunteers of the International Brigades 
made Spain a direct and tangible concern for those they left behind. Politics and 
personal emotion mixed, facilitating new campaigns such as that for humanitarian 
aid which was launched in Cornford's name in February 1937. 
87Phineas, 27/4/1937, p. 1. 
88 Letter signed by G. P. Croasdell, J. P. Astbury, M. J. C. Hodgart & Michael Straight, p. 2, 
"File: Notes for an Obituary" in John Cornford Collection, Trinity College Archives. 
89 E. J. Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries: Contemporary Essays, Phoneix, London, 1973, p. 27. 
90 Romilly, Boadilla, p. 183. 
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Chapter 5 
Humanitarian Aid: July 1936-April 1937 
Developing at the same time as the International Brigades and arms 
shipments to Spain were a multiplicity of humanitarian aid efforts for those affected 
by the war which were undertaken by a variety of groups outside Spain. The 
collection of medicine, money, food, clothing and other material for the combatants 
and non-combatants in Republican Spain, and far less frequently for Nationalist 
Spain, was perhaps one of the most prevalent forms of international activity over 
the civil war. While the historiography of the civil war has largely focused on 
military and political events, the importance of the international relief efforts it 
generated has been rightly recognised by several recent histories on British 
reactions to the conflict. 1 Significantly, such campaigns are almost totally absent 
from French historiography. This contrast between how the histories of the two 
countries have been written, suggests a deeper contrast between British and French 
aid efforts during the war, the ways in which such campaigns developed, and the 
different contours which this one form of political activity had in the two countries. 
This chapter has two concerns: firstly to trace chronologically the 
development of various aid organisations and appeals during the civil war's first 
nine months (from July 1936 until April 1937), examining how in responding to 
particular events in Spain, such campaigns were also shaped by their own 
individual environments, concerns, and domestic political alignments. Secondly, 
the dominant characteristics of aid campaigns are contrasted between the two 
countries both in national politics and within the universities. Spanish relief 
developed in France through established political parties and trade unions, which 
gave it a far more 'politicised' character than in Britain where these organisations 
mixed with an array of 'non-political' groups in ad hoc coalitions for aid. For 
academics and students, the differences between national campaigns and coalitions 
in the two countries were fundamental in shaping their own aid efforts and 
whether these were organised outside or within the university. 
1 Jim Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain, passim. 
Tom Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 
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The Politics of Humanitarian Aid 
In British historiography, humanitarian aid for Spain was first recognised as 
representing a broader definition of politics, which reflected popular concern with 
the civil war. Michael Alpert has rightly argued that part of the reason that 
campaigns for Spanish relief touched so many participants was that they 
encapsulated both political and non-political motives. The success of such 
campaigns was that they "allowed the participation of people who would perhaps 
have striven to avoid association with any politically identified group". 2 Alpert 
seems to imply that political motives and concerns were simply diametrically 
opposed to non-political ones, instead of seeing them as overlapping and 
interacting. 3 The term 'humanitarian can be used to escape such a definitional 
dichotomy by combining political and non-political motives, for they co-existed, 
intertwined and were often blurred together in the various campaigns. 
An exact definition of the political character of specific aid campaigns in 
either country is particularly difficult. Common to the propaganda and publicity of 
almost all relief work were appeals for'non-partisan' or'non-political' support, 
above mere party politics. Yet, when such claims were made by the established 
parties themselves or their committed activists they obviously had a political 
resonance. The key is to balance the broad language of the appeals with the political 
contexts in which they were formulated. The intentions of the organisations which 
sponsored them, the perceptions of their supporters and how they developed over 
time, are all crucial factors which gave meaning to the appeals. 
The majority of relief efforts during the civil war was either explicitly or 
implicitly pro-Republican, as the Republican Government was seen on the left as 
representing 'the Spanish people', 'the Spanish workers' or more simply the 'true 
Spain'. Within pro-Republican relief, there were varying levels and motives of 
support, which are not reducible to merely party terms, though in both countries 
the tensions between Communists and Socialists were a major factor in shaping 
how aid developed. Differences and divisions between campaigns were broader 
2 Michael Alpert, "Humanitarianism and Politics in the British Response to the Spanish Civil 
War, 1936-9", European History Quarterly. 14,4, Oct 1984, p. 433. 
3 Buchanan strongly argues that the leadership of the British Labour movement mobilised 
humanitarian campaigns for the Spanish Republic to depoliticise its ranks - Buchanan, The 
Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement. p. 118-119. 
Conversely, the CPGB campaigned on humanitarian issues in an attempt to gain a broader 
political base. The tactics cut both ways, suggesting that humanitarian efforts have no 
implict political or'non-political' character but depended on individual circumstances. 
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than strict definitions of 'politics', but were often centred on the very purpose and 
methods of aid in the war. 
Despite appreciating how the broad appeal of humanitarian aid 
quantitatively expanded political participation, Alpert did not examine how the 
same campaigns qualitatively changed the political arena. The 'soft' politics of relief 
also had a significant impact on the 'hard' politics of other aspects of the war, such 
as reactions to non-intervention and perceptions of the Republic. Equally, these 
other issues, as well as the changing positions of the established parties and unions, 
formed the political background against which relief, promoted as 'non-political', 
developed. What is needed is a broader conception of the 'political' which 
recognises the different motives, aims and levels of commitment that distinguished 
the various aid campaigns and coalitions from each other. 
The political meaning of humanitarian relief was the central point of 
contention between the first two studies of British aid efforts during the Spanish 
civil war. Jim Fyrth's The Signal Was Spain: The Spanish Aid Movement in Britain 
1936-39 argued that humanitarian efforts during the war fuelled a popular 
movement which drew together a range of political, religious and other groups in a 
dozen major relief campaigns and over a thousand local committees .4 The scale of 
the campaigns which Fyrth describes, their number of participants and the funds 
they collected, suggest that the war in Spain was far more than merely "a question 
for the few". 5 Central to The Signal Was Spain is the argument that the wide- 
ranging ad hoc coalition of support for relief campaigns represented a Popular 
Front extending across political parties, religion and class .6 For Fyrth, this coalition 
was always a political one, committed to anti-fascism and to supporting the Spanish 
Republic, through the political act of providing aid. 7 
Fyrth's conception of a British Popular Front united to aid Spain has been 
challenged by the work of Tom Buchanan who has rightly stressed how such a 
reading marginalises not only the substantial relief efforts of the organised labour 
4 Jim Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain, p. 21. 
Fyrth also stresses the common political culture which developed around these campaigns 
of meetings, leaflets, films, concerts and collections - Jim Fyrth, 'The Aid Spain Movement in 
Britain, 1939-39", History Workshop, 35, Spring 1993, pp. 155-156. 
5A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945, p. 398; 
Fyrth estimates around a dozen major national campaigns in Britain which raised two 
million pounds and material for 29 foodships during the course of the war - Fyrth, 'The Aid Spain Movement in Britain, 1939-39", p. 155; 
Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain, p. 21. 
6 Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain, p. 22. 
7 Fyrth, "The Aid Spain Movement in Britain, 1939-39", p. 162. 
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movement but also the reactions of those who were not politically committed to the 
Republic. 8 While Buchanan recognises that local coalitions between diverse groups 
were formed across the country to send humanitarian aid to Spain, he argues that 
these never became a coherent mass movement .9 Buchanan's primary objection to 
Fyrth's work is the unitary political character which is implied in his conception of 
an Aid Spain movement. Buchanan argues, 
... it must be borne in mind that the idea of an'Aid Spain Movement' is one 
imposed with hindsight. No such body existed at the time. Moreover, the 
term clearly has a political connotation. It was first coined by the Communist 
Daily Worker (which listed 'Aid Spain' donations) and cannot be isolated 
from the broader Communist project of seeking to establish a position of 
leadership in solidarity with the Spanish Republic. The myth has persisted 
that 'Aid Spain', however defined, was the only legitimate avenue for 
supporting the Spanish Republicans: in practice there were myriad avenues, 
all equally legitimate. All of the various institutions involved in helping the 
Spanish republic - political, religious, and humanitarian - had their own 
interests and objectives. 10 
Buchanan is right to stress the differences between, and within, the various aid 
campaigns. Relief efforts were separated not merely by politics, but by their 
conceptions of aid itself - whether it was for combatants as well as non-combatants, 
whether it was for Republicans, Nationalists, or both. 
There are no French parallels to the work of Fyrth and Buchanan on 
humanitarian aid during the Spanish civil war. Given the detailed histories of 
popular pressures in the formation of Rassemblement Populaire and the greves sur le 
tas of June 1936, the absence of any major study on French relief efforts for Spain is 
a surprising silence 11 Despite the CGT's major role in organising humanitarian aid 
during the war, authors have preferred to focus on its role in the industrial conflicts 
of June 1936 and November 1938. 
Given this gap in the historiography, before we examine how campaigns for 
humanitarian aid developed in French universities, we must first outline the 
hitherto ignored national relief efforts which developed during the 1930s. 
Fortunately, national and university campaigns in France were much more closely 
8 Tom Buchanan, "Britain's Popular Front?: Aid Spain and the British Labout Movement", 
History Workshop,. 31, Spring 1991, p. 63. 
9Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
10 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 96-97. 11 Jackson, The Popular Front in France. passim.; 
Georges Lefranc, Histoire du Front Populaire 1934-1938,2nd ed., Payot, Paris, 1974, passim. 
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inter-connected than their British counterparts, as academics played a large role as 
patrons in the former. In Britain, though the works of Fyrth and Buchanan have 
provided a comprehensive picture of the national aid campaigns, the variety of aid 
which developed within British universities and their inter-action with national 
campaigns have received far less attention. The contrast between the ways Spanish 
relief touched universities in the two countries is not merely in terms of what has 
been written by historians, but was also shaped by the distinct political space 
available in Britain and France at the time, by the organisation of aid in the two 
countries and by their existing university structures and traditions. 
Humanitarian Aid in France 
The October Revolution, the Frente Popular and France 
French reactions to the civil war which broke out in Spain in 1936 were 
fundamentally shaped by a strong concern over the preceding two years with 
Iberian politics. Two events were particularly significant for both the French left 
and the right in increasing this awareness: the October Revolution of 1934 and the 
triumph of the Frente Popular coalition in the national elections of February 1936. 
Both events created perceptions and encouraged campaigns which gave the civil 
war a powerful resonance across the border. The vigour and immediacy of French 
reactions to the pronunciamiento in July 1936 are only explicable by these earlier 
engagements and concern with Spanish politics. 
In October 1934, a cabinet crisis resulted in the entry of the Catholic party of 
the right, the Confederaciön Espafiola de Derechas Autönomas (CEDA), into a 
coalition government. 12 This sparked a revolt by the Spanish left who saw the 
CEDA as the precursor of fascism which had so recently triumphed in Germany, 
Austria, and almost France. Led by the Socialist trade union, the Union General de 
Trabajadores (UGT), and including anarchists, Communists and Catalan 
nationalists, the rising was quickly quelled in Madrid and Barcelona. In the Asturias 
the revolution held on for several weeks until the area was reconquered by the 
Foreign Legion. The fighting left between 1,500 and 2,000 dead, and this was 
followed by the imprisonment of thousands (including the leadership of the 
Spanish left), as well as further killings and torture. 13 The severity of the repression 
12 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 133. 
13 1bid., p. 143-144. 
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by the Spanish military and the judiciary roused a strong reaction from the left in 
France, partly because of the close personal connections between activists in the two 
countries 14 In late November 1934, CVIA's national committee sent a telegram to 
the Spanish government objecting to the brutal treatment of the defeated rebels 15 
Events in 1934 generated a strong sense of solidarity between the left of the two 
countries, particularly as both saw themselves trying to combat a domestic 'fascism' 
which had tried to take power that year, from the streets in France in February, and 
through the state in Spain in October. 
For CVIA, as well as for many party militants, political protests also found 
material expression in the activities of the Comite d'Aide aux Victimes du Fascisme 
Espagnol. 16 The president of the Comite d'Aide was Henri Wallon, lecturer at the 
Sorbonne on child psychology, and also a member of the CVIA bureau. 17 Wallon, 
though not a member of the PCF, had strong communist sympathies after visiting 
the USSR in the early 1930s, which was reflected in his support for the Cercle de la 
Russie Neuve. 18 For Wallon and other academics of the left, their interest in the 
Spanish political battleground predated the war by almost two years. 
Outside of Paris, reactions to the repression of the Spanish left reinforced the 
currents of co-operation and united action amongst local parties of the 
Rassemblement Populaire. In Toulouse, the SF1O and PCF held a joint meeting for 
Spanish political prisoners in early November 1934.19 This co-operation became 
formalised in a Comite de Defense des Victimes de la Repression formed to protest 
events in Spain as well as the arrest of left activists in Toulouse. The Comite de 
Defense included all the parties of the local section of Rassemblement Populaire 
and the town's Socialist Mayor. 20 At the same time as local political parties were 
14 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", pp. 40-41; 
Vigilance, 5/11/1934, pp. 9-11; 
For the PCF's role as mentor to the PCE - Serrano, L'Enjeu Espagnol, p. 10. 
15 Vigilance, 20/11/1934, p. 8; 
Paul Langevin and Jean Perrin had signed telegrams to protest the repression in Spain in the 
previous issue - Vigilance, 5/11/1934, p. 11. 16 Vigilance, 5/1 / 1935, p. 12. 
The following issue contained a protest at the execution of 25 Spanish miners - Vigilance, 
20/ 1/ 1935, p. 2. 
17 Vigilance , 25/2/ 1935, p. 10. 18 Dictionnaire Biographique du Mouvement Ouvrier Francais, Vol 43. p. 336. 
19 Le Midi Socialiste, 2/11/1934, p. 3. 
This was parallelled in Bordeaux by the formation of a Comit6 d'Entr'aide aux Refugi6s 
Espagnols - Report of 28/11/1934,1 M 444, AD Gironde. 20 Reports of 6/ 12/ 1934 & 23/12/1934,1945 W 140, AD Haute-Garonne. 
One difficulty with local aid organisations at this time and during the Spanish civil war is 
that due to the variations in their titles as reported in the local press, their relationship with 
other national and local bodies is sometimes unclear. 
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engaging in closer co-operation, a Comite Populaire d'Aide aux Victimes du 
Fascisme en Espagne et Orphelins des Revolutionnaires held a gala of Spanish 
drama and music at the Foyer du Peuple. 21 This was followed by another 
performance for aid in mid-December 193422 On 10 February 1935, Wallon chaired 
a mass meeting against the repression of the Spanish left which was held in 
Toulouse with 800 national delegates drawn from the SFIO, PCF, LDH, CGT, CGTU 
and anti-fascist committees. 23 The continuing protests and the national fundraising 
efforts of the Comite d'Aide aux Victimes du Fascisme Espagnol represented in 
many ways the direct predecessor to the humanitarian aid campaigns that would 
later develop in France during the civil war. 
In February 1936, Wallon was one of the signatories to a joint telegram by 
CVIA and the Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme, enthusiastically welcoming the new 
Frente Popular government in Spain and its amnesty for prisoners from the 1934 
revolts24 The Spanish elections of that month were the second key event which 
shaped French pre-war conceptions of Spain. With their own national elections to 
be held in late April and early May 1936, both the French left and right were 
extremely sensitive to potential parallels with the politics developing across the 
Pyrenees border. 23 The success of the Spanish left was to a large degree a surprise. 
Despite the very different coalitions they represented, the Frente Popular and Front 
Populaire were seen by supporters and opponents as closely connected movements. 
For the French left the success of the Frente Popular represented the possibilities of 
left unity, whereas for the French right the increasing street violence that followed 
the Spanish elections would recur in France if the Front Populaire were elected. 
Across the political spectrum, the confrontations and coalitions which were 
developing in Spain were seen as a potential mirror for France's own domestic 
divisions. 26 
21 Report of 7/11/1935,1945 W 140, AD Haute-Garonne. 
22 Clipping of 20/11/1934,1945 W 140, AD Haute-Garonne. 
23 Vigilance, 25/2/1935, p. 10. 
24 Vigilance15/2/1936, p. 14. 
25 David W. Pike, "Reaction in France to the Frente Popular and its Victory (January-July 
1936)", unpublished paper at Conference: Spain in an International Context 1936-1959, 
University of the West of England, Bristol, 18-20 July 1996. 
26 Joel Colton, 'The Formation of the French Popular Front 1934-1936", in Martin S. 
Alexander, & Helen Graham, eds., The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative 
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Aidez 1'Espagne: The Rassemblement Populaire 
The previous concern and heightened awareness of Spanish events which 
had developed over the preceding two years, meant that when the civil war erupted 
in mid-1936, French reactions were immediate. Two days after the first military 
rising, the Front Populaire government had agreed to the Frente Popular's request 
for military supplies. Equally, for the parties and trade unions of the French left the 
commitment to provide material support for the besieged Spanish Republic 
developed within the first weeks of the war. Just as during 1934, these efforts were 
shaped by the existing coalition of the Rassemblement Populaire. On 30 July 1936 in 
the Salle Wagram, the Rassemblement Populaire organised a mass rally in support 
of the Spanish Republic which L'Humanit6 described as, "C'est le Paris du Front 
Populaire qui est venu ce soir". 27 The following day, a meeting was held to unite the 
left's aid efforts for Republican Spain which was organised by the PCF's Secours 
Rouge 28 Arising out of this meeting a Commission de Solidarit6 du Rassemblement 
Populaire pour l'Aide au Peuple Espagnol was founded, including representatives 
of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, CGT, PCF, Radicals, SFIO, Amsterdam-Pleyel, 
and Secours Rouge. 29 Victor Basch, as President of the Rassemblement Populaire, 
was named as President of the Commission de Solidarit6, while its co-Treasurers 
were elected from the CGT and Ligue des Droits de l'Homme. As with many of the 
coalitions for humanitarian aid later established in Britain, Communist activism in 
their foundation gave the Party a key administrative role. As principal initiators of 
the meeting, the pro-Communist organisation Secours Rouge provided the bulk of 
the secretariat and staff for the Commission . The Commission's tasks included 
maintaining a unified list of subscriptions and donations of aid for the Republic, 
arranging the provision of cards and stamps of solidarity, and organising national 
fundraising days of solidarity, fetes, and meetings for Spanish relief. 31 
The first public appeal of the Commission de Solidarite was launched the 
following week in the national press of the SFIO and PCF. A target of one million 
francs worth of aid to be raised before 15 August 1936 was announced, which 
would go to providing medicine and aid for the wounded as well as food for 
Republican soldiers and their families 32 The appeal reflects the blurring of 
27 L'Humanit&. 31/ 7/ 1936, p. 1. 
28Le Populaire, 5/8/1936, p. 2. 
29 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 195. 
30 Serrano, L'Enjeu Espagnol, pp 220-221. 
31 Le Populaire, 5/8/1936, p. 2. 
32 L'Humanite, 5/8/ 1936, p. 3. 
Le Populaire, 5/ 8/ 1936, p. 1. 
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humanitarian relief for combatants and non-combatants in the civil wars initial 
stages when there were few clear distinctions between the military and home front. 
On 8 August 1936, the Commission de Solidarite held its first Parisian meeting for 
Republican Spain at the Velodrome d'Hiver, which was followed a day later by the 
departure from Paris of two trucks carrying condensed milk, sugar, food and 
coffee. 33 By 16 August 1936, the Commission de Solidarite was able to publish that 
1,065,376 francs had been donated for Republican Spain. M 
While the Rassemblement Populaire symbolised the broad appeal of 
solidarity with Republican Spain across the French left, it remained merely a co- 
ordinating body. From its formal birth in July 1935, the Rassemblement Populaire 
had always represented a coalition of co-ordinated, rather than co-operative, action. 
Each of its affiliated organisations maintained their own distinct memberships, 
activities and policies 35 Revealingly, the day after the Commission de Solidarite 
published in the pages of Le Populaire that over one million francs of aid had been 
raised, the journal printed an appeal by the SFIO's Federation of the Seine which 
reminded its members of its own collections of money and goods, including 
conserves, chocolate and underwear. 3' Therefore, while humanitarian aid for 
Republican Spain became the central focus for many French parties of the left and 
trade unions, separate campaigns were directed within each organisation, rather 
than mounted across the Rassemblement Populaire. 
Within a week of the military risings in Spain, both Victor Basch as President 
of Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, and Paul Rivet for CVIA had sent telegrams of 
solidarity to the Republic's President and Prime Minister 37 CVIA's telegram read, 
"Dix mille intellectuels antifascistes expriment au governement espagnol ardente sympathie 
etfoi en victoire definitive contrefascisme arme' : 38 This sympathy had found concrete 
expression on 26 July 1936, as Paris members of CVIA had spontaneously organised 
the shipment of 12,500 francs worth of condensed milk and medical supplies to 
Barcelona by truck. 39 Within three days the Paris section of CVIA had raised 9,000 
francs towards covering the initial cost of this initial aid, and during August 1936 
33 Le Populaire. 9/8/1936, p. 3. 
34 Le Populaire. 16/8/ 1936, p. 4. 
35 The failure of CIVA's mixed membership in June 1936 is quite significant in this regard, 
for there was no other major organisation apart from the Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme 
which shared its membership with other parties. 
36 Le Populaire. 17/8/ 1936, p. 1. 
37 Les Cahiers des Droits de I'Homme. 10/8/ 1936, p. 596; 
Vigilance. 31/7/1936, p. 3. 38 Vigilance. 31/7/1936, p. 3. 
39 paid. 
144 
over 61,000 francs were contributed nationally by CVIA for further relief work. 
Amongst the donors for CVIA's Spanish aid were Sorbonne Professors Louis 
Lapicque and Victor Auger, as well as the Joliot-Curies who donated 500 francs 40 
Alongside CVIA's efforts, the Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme engaged in its 
own fundraising, which while not as quickly improvised was able to draw on a far 
more extensive national membership 41 By the end of August 1936, the Ligue des 
Droits de 1'Homme had raised 380,000 francs for Spanish relief. 42 These separate 
appeals amongst intellectual groups were parallelled by independent appeals by 
the SFIO and PCF. The newspapers of both parties sought to use the publication of 
subscription lists and publicity for their own aid efforts to mobilise their 
memberships within the party and to recruit new members. 
The fragmented character of French aid appeals marked even the efforts of 
the CGT, the newly re-unified national trade union which was responsible for the 
largest aid efforts during the civil war. Five days after the outbreak of the revolt, the 
CGTs General Secretary Leon jouhaux had sent a message to UGT leader Largo 
Caballero expressing fraternal admiration for their fight against fascism and 
assuring the Spanish proletariat of the CGT's complete solidarity. 43 On 29 July 1936 
the CGT launched its first appeal, published in L'Humanite and Le Populaire under 
the title "Au Secours du Peuple Espagnol" `4 Aimed at local, departmental and 
national sections of French union movement, the appeal read: 
La solidarite doit &tre agissante et efficace. Des fonds sont indispensables 
pour assurer le ravitaillement de la population, secourir les blesses, panser 
les plaies de la guerre civile. 45 
After a fortnight, the CGT reported regular and enthusiastic contributions. 46 By that 
time, it had already sent 250,000 francs worth of anti-gangrene and tetanus 
medicine to Spain, and another 50,000 francs to the International Solidarity Fund of 
the Labour and Socialist International for the "same object". 47 
4OVigilance. 15/9/1936, pp. 28,30 & 31. 
41 In mid-1937 the Ligue numbered approximately 140,000 members - Madeleine Reberioux, 
"Victor Basch et les Droits de l'Homme", in Michel Denis, Michel Lagree & Jean-Yves 
Willard, eds., L'Affaire Dreyfus et 1'Opinion Publique: en France et ä 1'Etranger Presses 
Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 1995, pp. 102 & 110. 
42 Serrano, L'Enjeu Espagnol, p. 224. 
43 La Voix du Peuple, July-Aug. 1936, p. 483. 
44 L'Humanite. 29/ 7/1936, p. 2. 
Le Populaire. 29/ 7/ 1936, p. 2. 
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The speed of the CGTs response to events in Spain, meant that its aid appeal 
remained distinct from the newly-created Commission de Solidarite of the 
Rassemblement Populaire. Though the latter would sometimes publicly include the 
CGTs appeal funds within its own total, the CGT raised twice as much money as 
the other organisations within the Commission de Solidarite. 48 The distinctiveness 
of the two appeals was confirmed by a report in mid-January 1937 that the CGT had 
made a contribution of 600,000 francs to the funds of Rassemblement Populaire, 
revealing the tight control the CGT exercised over the direction of its own 
fundraising 49 This financial control was true at both a national and local level, such 
as in Toulouse where union officials held the office of Treasurer in the local 
fundraising appeals. 
Aidez l'Espagne. French Academics and Students 
The extent to which existing political organisations in France swiftly reacted 
to the civil war is striking. The speed of relief appeals reflected the continuity with 
which the Rassemblement Populaire mobilised in defence of the Frente Popular. 
The academics who had become figureheads for left unity during 1934 and 1935 at 
either a national or local level, continued in these roles through meetings and 
appeals for the Spanish Republic. Yet, as will be considered later, despite the 
national prominence of academics such as Basch, Langevin, Wallon and others, the 
few aid campaigns which would develop within French universities, like the 
national aid movement itself, did so within the framework established by the major 
parties. 
Moving away from the national organisations which were largely interacting 
on the Paris stage, it is striking that regional aid efforts developed out of the local 
Rassemblement Populaire committees. In towns like Bordeaux and Toulouse from 
late July 1936 onwards, the fundraising and collections for the Spanish Republic 
reinforced the existing local coalitions between the SFIO, PCF, CGT, Secours Rouge 
and the Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme. In Bordeaux 3,500 people attended a meeting 
of the Rassemblement Populaire for Spain at which the keynote speaker was 
Communist Paul Vaillant-Courturier. -'O In Toulouse at the same time, a Comite 
d'Aide du Peuple Espagnol was formed out of the efforts of the local Secours Rouge 
48 See Appendix 3. 
49 Aidez I'Espaagnel, p. 9. 
50 Report of 31 / 7/1936,1 M 57, AD Haute-Garonne. 
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and the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme with representatives from the SFIO, PCF and 
CGT. 51 The new committee was based in the Bourse du Travail, and the local union 
secretary acted as Treasurer for relief funds. On 6 August 1936, the local SF1O and 
unions organised a soiree artistique to benefit Spanish anti-fascists through their own 
public subscription. 52 The following week, Le Midi Socialiste printed an appeal for 
relief funds to be directed to Treasurer of the SFIO Federation, revealing how each 
party sought to mobilise its own members within its distinct campaigns 53 
The importance of existing parties in organising humanitarian relief perhaps 
explains why there were so few campaigns organised around French universities. 
During the war's early stages, there were several pro-Republican meetings by 
students in Paris and Toulouse organised by LAURS, Socialist and Communist 
activists, but few details have survived . -4 Students do represent a striking absence 
from the columns of donors listed by the major party newspapers, and given the 
parties' willingness to highlight their other activities it seems probable that there 
were few distinct university campaigns or collections. Equally, it was unlikely that 
nationalist students were much involved in one of the few pro-Franco aid efforts in 
France, which was organised by the followers of Action Francaise in Toulouse. 55 
This appeal for clothes and shoes for the nationalist army, sponsored by the French 
colony in San Sebastian, seems largely a one-off attack against the efforts of the 
French left rather than a sustained campaign for the Nationalist cause. 
At the same time the Toulouse group of Secours Rouge was appealing to the 
Spanish residents of the town for moral and material aid 5' The activism of French 
communists in organising humanitarian aid, and a few months later volunteers for 
the International Brigades, often ran together. In Lille, the PCF and Secours Rouge 
were accused of recruiting volunteers by making the Bourse du Travail a base for 
collections of material and men 57 Equally in Marseille, PCF sections and the leader 
of Secours Rouge were recruiting volunteers at the same time as collecting food and 
51 Le Midi Socialiste, 5/8/1936, p. 3. 
52 La Depeche, 4/8/ 1936, p. 6; 
Le Midi Socialiste. 4/8/ 1936 p. 5. 
53 Le Midi Socialiste. 14/8/1936, p. 4. 
54 La Voix des Etudiants, Dec 1936, p. 8; 
It was reported at the LSE that "the association of the Friends of Republican Spain, 
originating with the students of Toulouse University spread rapidly throughout France" - 
The Clare Market Review, March 1937, p. 18. 
55 L'Express du Midi, 22/11/1936, p. 4. 
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clothes for Spain. 58 This mixing of military and humanitarian aid largely occurred 
in PCF strongholds, revealing the extent to which local aid campaigns for Spain, 
and the coalitions that supported them depended on the contours of the local 
community. 
Humanitarian Aid in Britain 
As in France, the first humanitarian aid campaigns which developed in 
Britain over the Spanish civil war were initiated by the organised labour movement. 
However, unlike France where the PCF were strong enough to directly challenge 
the SFIO, the strong opposition of the leadership of the Labour Party and TUC to 
collective action with the Communist Party quickly encouraged aid campaigns 
outside party frameworks. It was the proliferation of these largely ad-hoc 
campaigns and coalitions reaching across and outside established political divisions 
which formed the focus of Jim Fyrth's work, and for which there was no French 
parallel? 9 French relief campaigns were formed out of established political groups 
and coalitions, which meant that they were highly politicised, whereas in Britain, 
the organisation of aid was far less tied to the boundaries of party politics. 
The Spanish Medical Aid Committee 
With neither the mass support of the PCF, nor the existing alliance of the 
Rassemblement Populaire, British Communists channelled their activism into 
creating new coalitions for Spanish relief. The Spanish Medical Aid Committee was 
formed in early August 1936 out of such initiatives, in cooperation with the Socialist 
Medical Association which was affiliated to the Labour Party60 On 23 August 1936 
the SMAC's first British Medical Unit left London to establish a hospital for 
Republican forces on the Aragon front. The Unit numbered 21 volunteers including 
4 surgeons, 4 medical students and 6 nurses 61 
58 Report of 31/10/1936, M6 10899, AD Bouches du Rhone; 
Report of 8/2/1937 M6 10900, AD Bouches du Rhone; 
Report of 5/2/1937M610898, AD Bouches du Rhone. 
59Jim Fyrth, The Signal was Spain, passim. 
60 Letter of 8/8/1936, DSM(2)-6, University of Hull Archives. 
Draft of 26/11/1936, no 280 in Ms Addison dep c 202, Bodleian Library. 
61 Fyrth, The Signal Was Spain, p. 48. 
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While the SMAC became one of the leading British humanitarian efforts in 
the civil war, at a national level it was subject to the strong tensions between its 
committee of activists and the leadership of the Labour Party and TUC. The latter 
ultimately choose to cease funding the SMAC in November 1936 due to the 
prominence of Communists in its relief work. While these party political divisions 
have been well documented, less attention has been given to the different levels of 
politicisation within the SMAC's campaigns. Ultimately the political character of 
local relief efforts must be determined by their particular context, with reference to 
their supporters, the nature of their aims and appeals, the specific community they 
developed within, and background events in Spain. This is particularly the case 
within British universities, where relief campaigns during the civil war created new 
coalitions and fuelled a quantitative and qualitative expansion of political concern. 
Support for the SMAC extended far outside the labour movement, involving 
academics and students in campaigns within the university itself and in their 
surrounding communities. In Cambridge, the worlds of town and gown overlapped 
as revealed by a mid-October 1936 meeting for the SMAC. The meeting at the 
Guildhall for the British Medical Unit in Spain had an impressive list of sponsors 
from within the University, led by the Vice Chancellor, the President of Queens' 
College, the Mistress of Girton College, the Principal of Newnham College and 
Professors F. M. Cornford, D. Keilin, G. E. Moore, D. S. Robertson, J. A. Ryle, and J. B. 
Trend, as well as F. L. Lucas and Dr J. Needham 62 The meeting was also supported 
by the Bishop of Ely and seven other clergy, including Professor Canon Charles 
Raven who agreed to chair the meeting. 63 
Canon Raven's public support for the SMAC symbolises the extent to which 
the war in Spain had built coalitions between politically divergent groups in Britain. 
Following the outbreak of the military revolt in Spain and at the end of the 
university summer holidays, Raven had written to J. D. Bernal pointing out the 
differences between their approaches to pacifism because of their respective 
political positions 64 While Raven supported the socialist argument that social 
62 Cambridge Review, 16/10/1936, p. 28. 
63 A similar appeal for the SMAC drawing support from academics and clergy had 
appeared in Leeds, signed by Professors Harvey and Smith with four local clergymen. Their 
letter appealed for funds and volunteers for the medical unit in Spain, noting that 
"All friends of suffering humanity and of all democratic causes must feel how terrible and 
urgent is the need for this relief which the Spanish Government is itself so inadequately 
equipped to give" - Yorkshire Press, 21/9/ 1936 in Box 6, Frank Smith Collection, University 
of Leeds Archives. 
64 Letter of 14/8/1936, Box 97, Bernal Collection, University Library, Cambridge. 
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change was needed to avoid war, he disagreed with Marxist theory as neither 
profound nor consistent. He contrasted the positive, constructive, and revolutionary 
steps made by the newly formed Peace Pledge Union to the utopianism of English 
communism. Raven wrote to Bernal, 
You ask me whether we can co-operate. That is not easy to answer. We are 
agreed in our opposition to war and agreed that this involves a far-reaching 
constructive programme. But we disagree as to the basis of that programme; 
and this would, I fear, mean that as soon as we began to plead for peace we 
should find it necessary to disown one another's promises 65 
Raven suggested that pacifists and communists might find common ground if they 
looked at wider issues; however, it was the specific events of the civil war in Spain 
which after July 1936 made such a coalition possible. Raven's letter sets out some of 
the political and theoretical differences amongst British supporters of the Spanish 
Republic which were bridged by humanitarian aid. 
Raven opened the SMAC's Guildhall meeting of 18 October 1936 with a 
message of endorsement from the Archbishop of York. He then spoke of the tragic 
fighting in Spain, concluding that medical aid offered one outlet for sympathy, 
whatever the different political views of the audience. 66 Cambridge biochemist 
Professor J. R. Marrack spoke as co-Treasurer of the SMAC on the difficulties which 
were being faced by the Spanish government in improvising a medical service. He 
was followed by Communist activist Mrs Isobel Brown who, "described the heroism 
of the Spanish people as [she] had seen them marching badly armed or not armed at 
all to meet an enemy equipped with all the resources of modem warfare" 67 Her 
appeal for donations was followed by journalist J. Langdon-Davis who attacked 
non-intervention for allowing fascism in the Mediterranean to threaten European 
peace. The meeting collected 121 pounds for the SMAC, bringing the total amount 
raised in Cambridge during the civil war's first three months to 336 pounds. Despite 
the success of the meeting in appealing for broad support, there were limits to the 
'soft' politics of aid as revealed by the University's Spanish Society and 
correspondence in The Cambridge Review. 
Amongst the Guildhall meeting's sponsors had been Cambridge's Professor 
of Spanish, J. B. Trend, who because of his pro-Republican politics had also served 
on the Communist-organised Committee of Enquiry into Breaches of International 
65Ibid. 
66 Cambridge Review, 16/10/1936, p. 28. 67 Ibid. 
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Law Relating to the Intervention in Spain in the same month 68 Trend was also 
President of the Cambridge University Spanish Society, a student group devoted to 
Spanish art, drama and literature which found itself increasingly drawn into politics 
by the war. The minutes of the 19 October 1936 meeting of the Spanish Society in 
Professor Trend's rooms at Christ's College recorded that, 
The Secretary explained to those present that the resolution concerning 
support of the British Medical Aid Unit in Spain was involving the Society in 
association with other active political bodies in the University; an association 
which was giving cause for alarm to many of the members of the Society 
who took strong exception to the appearance of political partisanship which 
was being given to the Society. 69 
A resolution to discontinue subscription to Medical Aid was passed by nine votes to 
two; however, another motion to publicly dissociate the society from the Guildhall 
meeting was opposed by Professor Trend and two students. The motion was 
therefore changed to deny support for "political views which have any bearing on 
the present situation in Spain", in which form it was passed and published in The 
Cambridge Review. 70 The society's disengagement from the politics of the civil war 
was a political statement in itself. This disengagement was a common form of 
reaction to the civil war, undercutting the polarised image that reactions to Spain 
were either pro-Republican or pro-Franco 71 Within universities many groups chose 
to avoid public politics in spite of the broad appeal of humanitarian aid campaigns 
such as the Spanish Medical Aid Committee. 
A more antagonistic response to the SMAC meeting was contained in the 
letter from A. F. Wills to the Cambridge Review which opened by attacking the 
partisanship shown by leading members of the Spanish Society in the war. 72 
Though not mentioned in the letter, Professor Trend was most certainly Wills' 
target. The letter argued that democratic government in Spain had ceased to exist, 
and that the Republic was now controlled by Marxist and Anarchist trade unions. 
Turning to the Guildhall meeting Wills wrote, 
There are various ways of helping, without allowing ourselves to become 
mere - and, I regret to say, in most cases, ignorant - partisans. The 
maintenance of the 'British Medical Unit in Spain' or any other organisation, 
68 Cambridge Review, 9/ 10/ 1936, p. 3; 
Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 27. 
69 Minutes of 19/10/1936, Add 7978 Cambridge University Spanish Society, University 
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70 Ibid. 
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on whichever side, which exists to alleviate the human suffering caused by 
civil war, constitute objects fully worthy of our practical support. But that 
support should derive from motives of human brotherhood; motives 
sufficient to transcend all personal or party feeling we may have in the 
struggle. In other words, the townsfolk of Cambridge and members of 
Cambridge University must not be asked to put their hands in their pockets 
under manifestly false pretences 73 
In concluding his letter, Wills expressed his own Nationalist sympathies, with the 
hope that for the welfare of Spain, the war would be won by "the side which is the 
more truly patriotic of the two". 74 For Wills, Franco's forces represented not 
international fascism but the true Spain. His opponents shared this image of a true 
Spain, but of one which was defined by the Republic rather than Franco. 75 Wills' 
attack on the British left that "what is at stake now is of vital importance: Spain - 
Spain herself! ", was echoed by supporters of the Republic against what they felt to 
be the hostile political agendas of British conservative or Catholic groups. 76 In both 
Britain and France, Republican and Nationalist supporters saw their side as 
representing the 'true' Spain. Therefore, when they spoke of aid for Spain, it was 
frequently a politically rather than geographically defined nation to which they 
referred. This image of a'true Spain' which underlay political and humanitarian 
campaigns for both sides, was revealed by the replies to Wills' letter by two 
Cambridge communists. 
Historian Roy Pascal rebutted Wills' charges that the Frente Popular was 
illegitimate on the grounds that, despite the changing composition of government 
in the war, it was still a democratic reflection of the Spanish people?? Wills' 
imputation of bad faith to the SMACs humanitarian efforts were unwarranted, 
argued Pascal, for rather than attacking the political agenda of the British Medical 
unit, "he should not cover his partizanship [sic] over with a sugary and transparent 
coat of impartiality". 78 Student Michael Straight, who like Pascal was a Communist, 
also wrote stressing that the Republic was a democratic government which was 
both legitimate and representative. Straight employed a common Marxist 
interpretation of European fascism, when he wrote of Franco's forces, 
If we take fascism to mean the continuance, by force of the capitalist system 
in the face of an attempt by the working class to replace it by a system of 
73lbid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 33-36. 
76 Cambridge Review. 23/ 10/ 1936, p. 49. 
77 Cambridge Review. 30/ 10/ 1936, p. 68. 
78 Ibid.. p. 69. 
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socialism, then the rebellion is most certainly a fascist rebellion. 79 
Faced with the dictatorship and martial law of General Franco, Straight concluded 
that democracy would be impossible, hence the heroic unarmed resistance to 
international fascism and Franco's Moorish troops. 
Wills' reply to Pascal and Straight focused on the initial SMAC meeting 
rather than on their general arguments in favour of the Republic. He wrote, 
I do not think any member of the Cambridge Committee, present on the 
platform in the Guildhall on Sunday, October 11th will deny that that 
meeting, advertised as a non-political one, was (apart from the Chairman's 
and Dr Marrack's speeches), in effect - and more particularly after the bulk of 
the donations had been handed in - other than an anti-Fascist ramp. That is 
what I mean by 'false pretences' 80 
While the academics and clergy who were patrons of the SMAC's humanitarian 
appeal in Cambridge had often explicitly disavowed political labels, for Wills the 
appeal was still politicised by its pro-Republican character. The debate in The 
Cambridge Review and the withdrawal from politics by the Spanish Society 
revealed that opponents of the Spanish Republic questioned or at least distanced 
themselves from humanitarian relief, especially where it was strongly pro- 
Republican or linked to other political debates such as those over non-intervention. 
The Chancellor's Initiative: The Scottish Ambulance Unit 
The contrast between the Spanish Medical Aid Committee and the less 
studied Scottish Ambulance Unit highlights how different levels of politicisation 
fuelled different conceptions of humanitarian aid. Scottish efforts were initially 
intended as a northern parallel to the SI'4AC, but due to their differing conceptions 
of relief, the two organisations quickly assumed different forms. As the SMAC 
recorded, 
A few days after the formation of this Committee, Sir Daniel Stevenson, of 
Glasgow, wired to the Secretary for particulars and a representative of Sir 
Daniel interviewed members of the Committee in London in order to 
ascertain the activities that were being undertaken. It was suggested by the 
Committee that Sir Daniel and his supporters in Glasgow should work in 
close co-operation with this committee, and that for purposes of liaison Dr 
79 Ibid. 
80 Cambridge Review, 6/ 11/1936, p. 90. 
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Christopher Addison [the President of SMAC] should be accepted as the 
President of the body responsible for organising the Scottish Unit 81 
Though the Scots refused SMAC leadership, they did organise their first relief 
efforts along lines similar to the SMAC unit. At the end of August 1936, Sir Daniel 
Stevenson, Chancellor of the University of Glasgow, wrote to the Glasgow Herald 
that a Scottish relief effort had received permission from the Spanish authorities. He 
stated that, 
What is needed now is the immediate organisation of the Scottish unit more 
or less on the lines of the London one - first-class surgeons, physicians, 
experienced assistants, preferably medical students and mechanics. A 
substantial sum - at least £2,500 to begin with - will be required for transport, 
maintenance and necessary equipment - most of all for the purchase of a 
large supply of much-needed anti-tetanus, anti-typhoid, and anti-gangrene 
sera, and finally for the maintenance of the unit while in Spain... Of course, 
aid will be given equally to the sick and wounded irrespective of party. 82 
This language of non-political and non-partisan humanitarian aid was repeated 
throughout the Scottish Ambulance Unit's initial appeals 83 To some extent this 
emphasis on strictly 'non-political' aid was shared by the public appeals of both 
Scottish and English relief efforts, yet the underlying differences between the 
organisations sponsoring the appeals meant that the Scottish Ambulance Unit was 
far less politicised than the SMAC. This divergence affected not only relations 
between the two organisations, but also their conception of aid itself. 
Sir Daniel Stevenson was described by the Glasgow Herald as "one of the 
best-known men in the public life of Glasgow" 84 He had become Chancellor of the 
University of Glasgow in 1934, aged 83. Before the First World War Stevenson had 
served for twenty years on municipal government and had been Glasgows Lord 
Provost for four years, becoming well-known locally for his philanthropy and 
Liberal politics. As a "great traveller, with a gift for languages", Stevenson had a 
strong interest in international affairs, a concern which led him to endow several 
professorial chairs and student exchange scholarships 85 During the mid-1930s he 
often used his Foreword as Chancellor in Glasgow's Student Handbook to 
encourage his students to study and discuss world events. In the Student Handbook 
81 Report of SMAC, n. d., no. 299 in Ms Addison dep c207, Bodleian Library. 
82 Glasgow Herald. 31/8/1936, p. 9. 
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sick and wounded irrespective of politics or party" - Glasgow Herald, 7/9/1936, p. 9. 84 Clipping Glasgow Herald. 12/ 7/ 1944 in DC 227/ 2/ 1/ 7/ 1, University Archives, Glasgow. 
85 L. G. Wickham Legs & R. E. T. Williams, eds., The Dictionary of National Biography. 1941- 
1950. Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 836. 
154 
of 1936, Stevenson described the civil war in Spain as "the latest disgrace to 
civilisation" . 
86 He attacked the atrocity stories which had been prevalent in press 
coverage of the war and criticised the British government's policy of non- 
intervention as denying the Republic its sovereign rights. Though Stevenson sought 
to encourage in his students a greater interest in international affairs, he appears to 
have made little effort to directly mobilise them in the fundraising for the Scottish 
Ambulance Unit. Rather, as patron of the Scottish Ambulance Unit, he relied on his 
prominence in local politics and Glasgow society to appeal to the town for 
humanitarian relief in Spain. 
Besides Stevenson, who served as chairman of the Scottish Ambulance Unit, 
the committee of the Unit was of a very different political colour from the left-wing 
activists of the SMAC. The Scottish Unit's patrons included eight titled nobility, two 
professors and the Bailie of the university. They publicly stated that, 
no shade of political thought has influenced the Executive Committee of the 
unit. The one thought which has actuated the committee has been to serve 
humanity and to alleviate acute suffering by sending a medical unit to 
Spain 87 
As one Glasgow unionist reported to the TUC, Stevenson had chosen close personal 
friends for the committee rather than political allies 88 Yet despite its high brow 
character the Scottish Ambulance received strong support from local labour groups. 
The Spanish Medical Aid Committee wrote to the National Council of Labour in 
early November 1936 arguing that the Scots Unit was distrusted by the local 
Glasgow labour movement 89 In fact, the Liberal patrons of the Scots unit were far 
more acceptable to the Labour movement's leadership than the Communist 
influence on the SMAC. 
The financial importance of union support for the Scottish Ambulance Unit 
was revealed at a public meeting at the end of 1936, which Stevenson called a 
"stocktaking meeting of the executive". `O Of the 4,000 pounds raised for the Scottish 
Ambulance Unit, 1,000 pounds had come from the TUC and another 1,000 pounds 
&' Students' Handbook 1936-37. SRC, Glasgow, p. xv. 
87 Glasgow Herald, 18/9/1936, p. 7. 
88 Report of 12/11/1936, Mss 292 946/41, Modern Records Centre. 
The Scottish Ambulance Unit did make an effort in January 1937 to recruit Citrine onto its 
committee in an effort to solidfy TUC funding - Glasgow Herald. I/ 1/ 1937, p. 7. 89 Letter of 4/ 11/ 1936, Mss 292 946/ 41, Modern Records Centre; 
The Spanish Medical Aid Committee were probably also worried about a potential rival for 
Labour/TUC funding. Ultimately, their fears were justified for Labour's anti-communism 
would cause it to switch funding from the English Committee to the Scots Unit. 
90 Glasgow Herald .1/ 1/ 1937, p. 7. 
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from a single anonymous donor, who was probably Stevenson. The rest of the 
contributions had been made up by three donations of 100 pounds a few more of 
between 25 pounds and 20 pounds, and nearly 1,000 small sums. Local labour 
support for the unit was not merely motivated by parochialism, but may also have 
resulted from the tensions within Glasgow's working class Catholic community 
over the war which strengthened the attractiveness of anon-political' appeal 
outside the labour movement 91 
The Scottish Ambulance Unit contrasted with its English counterpart not 
only in its leadership but in its formulation of aid. While the first British medical 
unit established itself close to the Aragon front (and later became formally attached 
to the International Brigades), the Scottish unit was located in Madrid. In early 
November 1936 the capital was also the most contested front of the war, yet its 
location also encouraged the unit to increasing focus on providing civilian relief. `n 
Such a role had been foreshadowed by the Unit's public appeals of September 1936 
which highlighted the casualties from the aerial bombardments of Madrid and the 
potential need for evacuations as surrounding towns became part of the front 93 
This mixing of relief to both the war front and civilians created increasing tensions 
within the Unit during 1937, fuelled by political differences and fundamentally 
different conceptions of aid. 
In January 1937, the Unit was re-fitted in Glasgow and returned to Madrid. 
Stevenson announced that despite the large amount of money already spent, 
it was agreed to risk going on again in faith, notwithstanding the large 
outlay (estimated at about £1,200) for replacement of an ambulance captured 
by the rebels, another destroyed by a rebel bomb, the reconditioning of 
others much the worse for wear, and the addition of two lorries to help in 
the evacuation of British and Spanish civilians to the coast and transport of 
food supplies from the coast to Madrid 94 
Trade unionist Roderick MacFarquhar had joined the Unit's second mission to 
Spain as a driver, and was soon engaged in bringing in wounded from the fronts 
surrounding Madrid. Yet MacFarquhar was also irritated that, 
we also had the rather -I thought so anyway - unnecessary task of issuing 
91 Ian S. Wood, "Scotland and the Spanish Civil War", Cencrastus. 18,1984, pp. 14-15; 
Tom Gallagher, "Scottish Catholics and the British Left 1918-1939", The Innes Review, 34,1, 
Spring 1983, pp. 35-36. 
92 The SMAC was jealous of the publicity which the Scots unit was receiving in the besieged 
capital of Madrid- Mss 292 946/41, Modem Records Centre. 
93 Glasgow Herald, 18/9/1936, p. 7. 
94 Ibid. 
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food from our trucks to the people of various suburbs of Madrid, which I 
personally did not like because I thought it was not properly organised and 
should have been left to the Spanish authorities to do and not us 95 
While MacFarquhar was concerned that the main role of the Unit should remain 
close to the front itself, the civilian relief work of the Unit was praised by Oxford 
tutor Helen Grant. Grant was visiting Madrid as part of a delegation for the Friends 
Service Council and felt that, 
The Scottish Ambulance it appears is also doing excellent work apart from 
dealing with the wounded.... they take the ambulance round in the early 
morning and distribute cups of hot chocolate to the waiting women. 96 
MacFarquhar's uneasiness over the Unit's operations were further fuelled 
when the Unit's head, Fernanda Jacobsen, decided to use the Unit's ambulances and 
trucks to help evacuate some of the right-wing madrilenos who had been forced to 
seek political asylum in Madrid's embassies at the outbreak of the revolt 97 
Stevenson's printed appeals in Glasgow had stressed that aid would go to both 
sides within the besieged capital, however MacFarquhar felt that evacuating 
Nationalist sympathisers went against the whole raison d'etre of the Unit and the 
strongly pro-Republican politics of Stevenson himself. 98 MacFarquhar had met 
Stevenson shortly before the Unit left for Madrid and felt that, 
The primary purpose of the Scottish Ambulance Unit, as far as Sir D. M. 
Stevenson was concerned, was to supply an ambulance service on the front 
to the wounded of the Republican Army. It also had, through the generosity 
of the Scottish people several truckloads of food which it was taking out to 
supply to the people of Spain. ` 
Jacobsen's concern with civilian relief and the evacuation of Nationalist 
sympathisers had moved much of the unit's work away from the front which had 
been the spur for the initial aid efforts of the war's early stages. 
The tensions within the Scots unit finally erupted when the Nationalist 
attack at Guadalajara in early March 1937 seemed to threaten that Madrid would 
95 Ian MacDougall. ed., Voices from the Spanish Civil War: Personal Recollections of 
Scottish Volunteers in Republican Spain 1936-39, Polygon, Edinbrugh, 1986, p. 79. 
96 Diary, p. 63, Add 8251 / II, University Library, Cambridge. 
97 MacDougall. ed., Voices from the Spanish Civil War, p. 81. 
98 Stevenson launched the appeal of January 1937 with the words, "we venture to hope that 
even those who were unwilling to contribute in the past for fear of the beneficiaries being 
entirely on the government side, will surely have no hesitation in coming forward now to 
help in the relief of distress - distress which is as acute on one side as the other in Madrid" - 
Glasgow Herald, 1/ 1/ 1937, p. 7. 
MacDougall. ed., Voices from the Spanish Civil War, p. 84. 99 Ibid., p. 77. 
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finally fall. MacFarquhar advocated that the unit should retreat with the Republican 
army, a position he felt was supported by Stevenson's pro-Republican beliefs. 
Jacobsen wanted to remain in Madrid, which MacFarquhar argued against, 
She said that we were there to help both sides, which of course I 
immediately claimed was not a proper account of the view of the Scottish 
people who were contributing towards the support of a Republican 
Government and a Republican victory. 100 
After the clash MacFarquhar and two others left the unit to join the medical services 
of the International Brigades. The three dissidents produced a Memorandum in 
March 1937 which criticised Jacobsen for distributing food independently of 
Republican authorities, for making provisional plans to remain in Madrid if it was 
captured, and they also accused un-named members of the Unit of being Franco 
sympathisers. lol 
MacFarquhar's accusations were not only used by the SMAC to discredit the 
Scottish Ambulance Unit, but have been carried on in pro-Communist histories of 
the war which portray the unit as inefficient, ineffective and of dubious political 
sympathies 102 It was not until recently that this negative image of the Scots unit 
has been questioned, for as Tom Buchanan has written, 
the allegation that Jacobsen was in any sense pro-fascist is misleading. 
However, her attempt at even-handedness in such a politically charged 
situation was certainly dangerous. 103 
In a Madrid fearful of fifth columnists, non-political efforts could easily be 
misconstrued. Despite the pro-Republican position of Stevenson and some of its 
other supporters, the Scottish Ambulance Unit's conception of non-partisan civilian 
humanitarian aid created tension with those who felt such impartiality to be 
impossible. 104 The attacks on the unit reveal not its own political bias, but the 
different conceptions of relief, reinforced by different political commitments, which 
existed between aid campaigns in Britain. Despite the controversy of March 1937 
10 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 
101 Memorandum dated 30/3/ 1937 - Mss 292 946/41, Modern Records Centre; 
The first British Medical Aid Unit of the SMAC had its own problems, as in late November 
1936 its volunteer workers produced a memorandum attacking "Loutitt at the head of the 
administration has given vent to an obsession for political maneouvering and intrigue 
which is totally out of place in a unity such as ours". The unit also complained of the "secret" 
meetings organised by the Communists within the Unit - Memorandum from Unit, 
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and the increasing strain of continual funding, the Scottish Ambulance Unit 
remained in Spain until September 1938.105 During this time it largely focused on 
civilian relief in Madrid - distributing food and evacuations 106 Over the course of 
the war, the Committee spent over £20,000 on the Unit, including £3,000 from 
Stevenson personally 107 However, despite Stevenson's prominent role, the Scottish 
Ambulance Unit remained very much a local rather than university campaign. 108 
Other Relief Efforts 
A similar appeal to the Scottish Ambulance Unit, both in its focus on a 
central patron and its low level of politicisation, was the University of London 
Ambulance Unit, sponsored by Sir George Young. 109 Young was a former diplomat 
who had taught at the University of London and had been drawn into the war by 
his residency in Spain. In February 1937, Young's University Unit launched a public 
appeal signed by H. A. L. Fisher, William Beveridge and Sir Arthur Salter, all 
prominent academics and recognised public figures of Liberal politics. The Unit 
was based at Young's home in Torremolinos which had been converted into a 
hospital. Like the Scots unit, Young's appeal claimed to be non-partisan, 
The unit will serve both sides. It will be based to begin with on Malaga 
(government), where the need now is greater than at Cordova or Granada 
(Insurgent). 110 
The rationale of greatest need could be used to justify aid to the Republic, as the 
appeal noted that in the revolt most medical staff and supplies had fallen to the 
Insurgents. Another important factor which prevented relief work on both sides of 
the battlefield was the hostility of Nationalist authorities to foreign interference, 
though not foreign supplies of arms 111 On the other hand, it was in the Republic's 
interests to publicise the civilian suffering the war had caused, to strengthen its 
image as a victim of great power aggression. Though there was a real difference 
between the need for humanitarian relief in the Republican Zone compared to that 
of the Nationalists, this gap was accentuated by the politics of both sides. 
105 contra Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, p. 226. 
106 MacDougall. ed., Voices from the Spanish Civil War, p. 342. 
107 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 107. 
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The difference in politicisation of Young's Unit as compared to other efforts 
such as the SMAC was shown by the support the former received from the AUT, a 
body which explicitly sought to avoid party politics. Though the AUT did not 
engage in active fund-raising for the Spanish Republic as it had done for German 
refugee academics a few years earlier, it did make efforts to publicise to its members 
the relief appeal for Young's University Ambulance Unit. 112 According to a report 
written by Young in the AUT journal, The Universities Review, the February1937 
appeal had raised 300 pounds. 113 By mid-1937, the Unit had collected donations 
totalling 1,200 pounds and had moved to Almeria, where it had opened two 
hospitals, totalling 60 beds. It had also established a field hospital near the front. 
The Unit's personnel comprised three British doctors and six nurses, all unpaid 
volunteers. Though the AUT agreed to circulate a further appeal for the University 
Ambulance Unit on staff notice boards, the Unit never achieved the same 
prominence as the SMAC in public or within English universities. 114 
Young's Appeal does not seem to have touched the students of the 
University of London, perhaps because, in contrast to Cambridge where university 
figures led the town's aid campaigns, Spanish relief in London developed with a far 
more distinct character within the university and its authorities' regulations. Within 
the London School of Economics, the Union was one of the few available focuses for 
Republican supporters to articulate and mobilise concern amongst students over the 
Spanish civil was. Through motions at its general meetings and efforts at fund- 
raising under its auspices, the Union became the channel for pro-Republican 
activity and energy within the School. At the Union's General Meeting of 14 October 
1936, the following motion was tabled, "That this Union would welcome the 
opportunity of subscribing to the Spanish Medical Aid Fund by means of a general 
collection in LSE' : 115 Members of the Socialist Club recommended a large Union 
grant to the SMAC which was passed with only one dissent by the 100 present. Five 
days later the Executive Committee sought to implement the motion, but found that 
it was not covered by the constitution. Significantly, the Union's President G. R. 
Collins argued that support for the SMAC parallelled its earlier fund-raising efforts 
for a German Scholarship Fund 116 However, the School's authorities did not draw 
such an analogy. It was reported at the following week's general meeting that the 
112 Earlier the AUT had circulated an "Appeal for Victimised Teachers" by a Spanish 
teachers union which called for real and material support. - Minutes of 12/11/1936, Mss. 27 
A14.3 Box 2, Modern Records Centre. 
113 George Young, "The British Universities Hospital and Ambulances in Southern Spain", 
The Universities Review. 9,2, May 1936, pp. 132-134. 
114 Letter 23/3/1937, Mss. 27 A14.3 Box 2, Modern Records Centre. 
115 Minutes of 14/10/1936, Coll Misc 649 2/4, LSE Archives. 
116 Minutes of 18/10/1936, Coll Misc 649,3/4, LSE Archives. 
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Union had been unable to hold a collection for Spain because it had not yet met 
with the Director to receive his authorisation. A motion was then passed asking the 
School's authorities for permission to collect for Spain within the Union. 117 Their 
reply is not recorded, but it appears that only limited informal collections took 
place. 
Though this immediate student response to the war within the LSE was 
stifled due to the lack of official sanction, the following term at LSE a far more 
successful meeting on Spain was held. On 20 January 1937 an estimated 400 
students attended the Union General meeting, which was addressed by Lord 
Faringdon. The film "Defence of Madrid" was also shown and 30 pounds was 
collected for Spanish relief. 118 Despite Young's efforts amongst academics, 
fundraising by students in London seems to have initially focused on the Spanish 
Medical Aid Committee, probably because it was the most publicly prominent of 
Spanish relief campaigns in the first eight months of the war. Like the Scottish 
Ambulance Unit, Young's Unit found its funds increasingly strained as the war in 
Spain continued, which resulted in it eventually being absorbed into the relief 
efforts of American Quakers. 119 
The aid efforts of the British Quakers in Spain also drew heavily from British 
Universities. Over a month after the war had started, Gilbert Murray had 
encouraged Spanish academic, Professor Castillejo, to contact the Society of Friends 
about the provision of humanitarian relief, though he doubted they had an 
established organisation in Spain. 120 Following this meeting, the Friends Service 
Council established a small committee which sought to provide aid to both sides, 
and asked Murray to contact the Foreign Office on their behalf. 121 A delegation 
including Leeds Professor of Philosophy John Harvey was sent to Catalonia to 
establish relief, though they assumed that the war would shortly be over. 111 The 
Quakers were perhaps the only international group to successfully establish relief 
operations in both Nationalist and Republican zones. Yet despite the strength of this 
non-partisan commitment, the actual amount of aid was heavily weighted to the 
117 Minutes of 21/10/1936, Coll Misc649 2/4, LSE Archives. 
118 Minutes of 20/ 1/ 1937, Coll Misc 649 2/4, LSE Archives. 
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122 The volunteer worker who accompanied Harvey, Alfred Jacob, had been preparing to go 
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latter, due to the restrictions of Nationalist authorities. 123 Humanitarian relief in the 
Nationalist zone was controlled by Auxilio Social, which was part of the women's 
section of the Falange. Quaker relief workers noted that "the greatest courtesy 
prevailed but the strong nationalist trend now predominant precluded the 
possibility of foreign relief workers playing anything but a very subsidiary role". 124 
Not only were relief efforts stifled by official intervention, but it also seemed that 
the Nationalist zone could claim more productive agriculture and fewer 
refugees. 125 Though striving to avoid politics, the efforts of the Friends Service 
Council powerfully illustrate the extent to which humanitarian aid was directed to 
the Republic. 
It was not only the hostility of the Nationalists which undermined the non- 
partisan relief efforts of the Friends Service Council, but also the committed pro- 
Republicanism of the other groups with which they co-operated. While sharing 
public platforms with the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief (NJCSR) 
which was founded in November 1936, the Friends Service Council eventually 
insisted that "public meetings would be prefaced with the reading of a statement 
emphasising the strictly neutral, non-political basis of the NJC"926 Despite their 
reservations over the more political campaigns that they were associating with, 
Quaker relief efforts provided a powerful legitimising argument for supporters of 
the NJCSR. Repeatedly at universities, the aid provided by the Friends Service 
Council was cited by Republican supporters who were seeking to prove the good 
faith of their own efforts. With their relief work focused on the refugees and 
children in Catalonia, Quaker relief operations intensified over the course of the 
war as the focus of international relief gradually shifted away from Madrid during 
1937.127 
123 In 1938 it was estimated that the Friends Service Council were spending 45,000 francs 
per month in the Nationalist zone compared to 125,000 francs per month in Barcelona and 
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Humanitarian Appeals in Oxford 
Significantly, a similar debate to that which had take place in Cambridge 
over the politicised nature of pro-Republican humanitarian aid, also occurred in 
Oxford. During February 1937 there were several non-partisan appeals in Oxford, 
including a concert in the Hall of Balliol College in support of the Mayor's Spanish 
Relief Fund. 128 The Relief Fund was described as being, 
for the benefit of non-combatants suffering as a result of the Civil War in 
Spain. It appeals to human rather than party loyalty, and the need for 
support becomes increasingly acute as the war develops. 129 
A sinilar'non-political' concern for non-combatants was expressed in a meeting at 
Somerville College on 24 February 1937. The Cherwell recorded of the meeting, 
It was organised by the Labour Club, but Miss Blomfield, who took the 
chair, opened the meeting by declaring that she would dissolve it at the first 
mention of politics. Within these limits very interesting speeches were made 
by Miss Grant and Senor Moreno, leaving the College understanding and 
feeling a great deal more about Spain. People can be seen at every turn 
knitting endless scarves for the non-combatants. 130 
Even at this "most politically orientated of the women's colleges" at Oxford, the pro- 
Republican positions of Grant and Moreno were palatable as they were stated in 
humanitarian rather than party terms. 131 
Interestingly it was another Somerville don, Enid Starkie, who attacked the 
publicity of the Oxford University Spanish Democratic Defence Committee for their 
political extremism which overshadowed the humanitarian concern they purported 
to represent. 132 In replying to Starkie, Ashley Boramall, the Honorary Secretary of 
the Defence Committee, argued that, 
Her first point is that the appeal launched by us is political, and therefore 
appeals to self-interest, and not humanitarianism. This may or may not be 
deplorable, but the fact remains that last term a campaign was conducted on 
purely humanitarian grounds for the Medical Aid, and only realised £50 in 
the whole term, and that a similar campaign yielded £75 in the first six 
weeks of this term [for the Youth Foodship] whereas this campaign has in a 
week yielded £150, and we are sure there is plenty more to come. 133 
128Oxford Magazine. 18/2/1937, pp. 398-399. 
129 p3id, pp. 398. 
130 Oxford Magazine. 4/ 3/ 1937, p. 479. 
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133 Oxford Magazine, 11 / 3/ 1937, p. 504. 
163 
Boramall's argument that fundraising was more effective when it was explicitly 
pro-Republican has been repeated by historians such as Alpert and Buchanan, 
though this trend was probably more a reflection of the greater activity of political 
activists than of the donor's sentiments. However, despite this defence of politics, 
Boramall still argued that the Spanish Medical Aid Committee represented "an 
appeal for money for a purpose which cannot be considered anything but 
humanitarian". 134 
Starkie's criticism was supported by several pro-Republican academics and 
students who, while committed to humanitarian aid for Spain, disapproved of the 
Spanish Democratic Defence Committee's methods. As the student newspaper The 
Cherwell stated, "we heartily commend the object of the appeal, though we 
dissociate ourselves from the propaganda which has recently been issued for it". 135 
The university Proctors, who had received several complaints about the language in 
leaflets of Oxford University Spanish Democrats Defence Committee, wrote to 
University College Fellow E. F. Carritt who was named as a member of its 
Committee. The Proctors objected that, 
no such body has been registered with us (as a political organisation with 
undergraduate members ought to be) and of course the activities permitted 
to such undergraduate organisations do not extend to circularising the 
public in that way. 136 
Carritt replied that while he had been a member of the OUSDDC committee in the 
previous term, he had resigned in protest at the offending leaflet. He wrote to the 
Proctors, 
Would you allow me to add, in slight extenuation of a childish folly which I 
regard as very damaging to a cause I have much at heart, that the Committee 
has done some very laborious and sincere work in collecting food supplies, 
medical stores and warm clothing for Spain. 137 
Alongside the enthusiastic pro-Republicanism of the Spanish Democratic 
Defence Committee, one of the few pro-Nationalist aid campaigns in Britain was 
based in Oxford. An appeal for medical aid for the Nationalist forces was issued by 
the Catholic Weekly Universe in the first week of September 1936. Donations were 
to be sent to Oxford's Professor of International Law, Francis de Zulueta. 138 Of 
134 Ibid. 
135 Cherwell 6/3/ 1937, p. 148. 
136 Letter of 24/ 2/ 1937, PR 26/ 1/ 2, University Archives, Oxford. 
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Basque descent, Zulueta was an ardent Catholic and devoted Franco supporter. 139 
His role in the Universe campaign contrasts with the role played by another 
Spanish Catholic academic at Oxford, Enrique Moreno, who in late September 1936 
wrote to the British press supporting the Republic against accusations of religious 
atrocities. 140 Within three weeks the Universe Medical Fund had raised 3,574 
pounds. 141 Despite its pro-Nationalist commitments, the appeal later co-operated 
with various left-wing groups over Catholic Basque refugee children. Even where 
Catholics or Nationalist supporters did take positive steps over the war, these could 
still end in coalition with the left despite their divergent politics. 
The Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal 
These different conceptions of humanitarian aid came together in a 
distinctive relief campaign which developed within Cambridge. In the second week 
of February 1937, a week after obituaries were published announcing the death of 
John Cornford, subscriptions were publicly solicited for a memorial appeal in his 
name and that of George Maclaurin who had been killed in the fighting around 
Madrid. The Cornford-Madaurin Memorial Appeal was unique, not only for the 
breadth of support it received but in offering several different avenues for 
contributions. Firstly, we shall examine the coalition of groups who sponsored the 
appeal, and secondly, consider the political implications of the choices made by 
contributors to the appeal. 
The Memorial Appeal drew support from a broad range of groups within 
the university and within the town itself. The initial Memorial Appeal Committee 
included representatives from the Cambridge Trades Council and Labour Party, 
Cambridge Communist Party, University Labour Party, Socialist League, Left Book 
Club and League of Young Liberals 1` 2 One key to this wide support amongst the 
left was the leadership position of academics in Cambridge Labour, especially that 
of the appeal's Treasurer, Dr Joseph Needham. At the time, Needham was a 36 year 
old Reader in Biochemistry, and with his wife Dorothy, formed an academic and 
political partnership committed to the left of the Labour Party. He was a strong 
supporter of the left-wing dissent of the Socialist League within the Labour Party, 
while she had been a Labour candidate in the Cambridge City Council elections. 143 
139 A. L. Rowse, All Souls in my Time, Duckworth, London, 1993, pp. 96-97. 140 Catholics and the Civil War in Spain, National Council of Labour, London, 1936, p. 3. 141 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 118. 142 Cambridge Review, 12/2/1937, p. 254. 143 Werskey, The Visible College, pp. 167 & 220. 
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Together, they were vital to the willingness of the local Labour organisation to work 
with local Communists despite the considerable activity by the Labour Party 
leadership at a national level to prevent any political mobilisation across party 
lines 14In fact, despite its inclusion in the Cornford appeal, the Socialist League 
had been disaffiliated by the Labour Executive a week before the appeal after it had 
openly joined the campaign for unity on the left with the Communist Party and ILP. 
The success of aid appeals in facilitating local cross-party coalitions on the 
left was symbolised by the Memorial appeal's public meeting in Cambridge's 
Guildhall on 22 February 1937. The meeting was chaired by Professor Ernest Barker 
and 51 pounds were collected in donations. The audience were addressed by radical 
Labour MP Aneurin Bevan from South Wales, along with representatives of the 
Communist Party and the British League of Nations Union. Bevan evoked loud 
applause when he said that the sacrifices of the International Brigade in Spain 
would weld the British Labour and Communist parties into one. 145 Though 
nationally, antagonism from Labour's hierarchy stifled any official alliance between 
the parties throughout the 1930s, Bevan's speech expressed the opportunities for co- 
operation at a local level between the two camps over the civil war. 
Amongst student groups, the Comford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal drew 
an even broader backing, mobilising support from every section of the political 
spectrum. The existence of a single socialist student club meant that student 
Communists and Labour supporters did not have to face the party divisions of their 
seniors. Far more significantly, the Cornford-Madaurin Memorial Appeal was able 
to draw the backing of conservative students, as well as the left. This cross-party 
support was fuelled by the deeply personal resonance of Comford's death across 
the university. 146 Amongst student groups, a joint-letter in support of the appeal 
was signed by representatives of the Conservative Association, Liberal Club, 
Democratic Front, British League of Nations Union and the Socialist Club. 147 
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realise - and I think that in the last few days we have all realised - what a loss to life John 
Cornford's death will be, what a loss to those values and standards of life which we prize 
most highly" - notes, "Notes for an Obituary", John Cornford Papers, Trinity College. 147 Cambridge Review, 19/ 2/ 1937, p. 272. 
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As the text of the student's joint-letter reveals, unity for humanitarian relief 
was constructed through stressing the non-political character of the memorial's 
broad appeals. Donors to the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial appeal could choose 
whether their money went to assist the International Brigade, the second British 
Youth Peace Assembly Foodship to Bilbao, or the British Medical Aid Committee 
units. The joint-letter stressed the differences between the three appeals: 
We feel that some members of the University have been dissuaded from 
contributing to this and other funds for work in Spain by a certain confusion 
as to the nature of the appeals, and in particular by the apparent association 
of pure civilian relief work with support for the International Brigade. 
It should be clearly understood that the Youth Foodship and the British 
Medical Aid are entirely non-interventionist in character and are being 
supported by all parties: in order to co-ordinate such non-political relief 
work, the CU Joint Spanish Relief Committee has been formed, representing 
every shade of political opinion in the University... We have in Spain to-day 
the spectacle of hundreds of thousands of Spanish Civilians suffering 
appalling privation through no fault of their own in a particularly pitiless 
and horrible war which they did not start and over which they have no 
control. Whatever our political or religious views may be, we cannot deny 
the urgency of work to bring some of the essentials of life to these people. 148 
The letter's wording reveals the extent to which the broad sweep of the memorial 
appeal and its widening base of support were equally due to a 'softening' of 
political issues. Engagement was partly fuelled and facilitated by the mixing of 
political issues with moral and humanitarian concerns which were legitimised as 
'non-political'. Consensus over humanitarian aid for Spain did not prevent 
divergent politics, as shown in university debates over non-intervention which will 
be discussed in the following chapter. 
Joseph Needham's accounts for the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal 
provide a potentially revealing source for trying to map the variegated nature of the 
political and "non-political" support for the Spanish Republic 149 Between February 
1937 and April 1937 the Memorial Appeal raised over 1,210 pounds. There are two 
main difficulties with the accounts, in that complete collection records for all 21 
Cambridge colleges have not survived. Also significant amounts appear to have 
been donated in bloc, without specific choices being nominated or at least recorded. 
Students from the large and prestigious colleges, such as Trinity, St john's, and 
1`8 Ibid. 
149 K93 also K75-K85, Needham Papers, University Library, Cambridge. 
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Queens' raised approximately 10 pounds per College, though without collection 
sheets we lack information on who gave and for what cause. 
The individual collection sheets for the colleges that do exist provide a basic 
insight into the significant political choices being made by those who supported the 
humanitarian campaigns. The contributions to either the International Brigades, 
Spanish Medical Aid or the Youth Foodship were an expression of political 
preference, as much as any vote or survey of public opinion. The significance of 
these differences is hard to gauge, but they do provide a powerful reminder that 
there was never any single political position or ideology underlying pro-Republican 
humanitarian aid. Behind common slogans lay disparate motivations, perceptions 
and objectives, and part of the success of the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal 
was to seek to include as many of these as possible. The distinctions between 
contribution choices becomes much more meaningful when one contrasts the male 
Cambridge colleges with the two colleges for women. At Newnham especially, 
there was the strongest support for the Youth Foodship for civilian relief in Bilbao, a 
choice that contrasts with their male peers. 
TABLE 5.1: THE CORNFORD-MACLAURIN MEMORIAL APPEAL(in shillings)150 
College Students Int. Brigade SMAC Foodship Total 
Caius 308 21.0 13.0 13.5 60.0 
(35%) (22%) (23%) 
Jesus 265 16.5 8.5 2.3 27.3 
(60%) (31%) (8%) 
Peterhouse 154 16.5 13.5 11.0 41.0 
(46%) (33%) (27%) 
Selwyn 156 9.0 21 10.5 40.5 
(22%) (52%) (26%) 
Sidney 171 8.0 33.5 11.5 53.0 
Sussex (15%) (63%) (22%) 
Queens 256 - 19 11.0 180.0 
(11%) (6%) 
Girton 214 35.5 41.3 37.5 177.0 
(20%) (23%) (21%) 
Newnham 286 12.5 38.5 63.0 129.5 
(10%) (30%) (49%) 
Total of Appeal at 27 April 1937: 1210 pounds. 
150Ibid. 
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Perhaps the key to this gender difference is the identification and 
justification of some forms of relief work as 'non-political'. The label of 'non- 
political' aid was frequently invoked to legitimise and claim broader support by 
British campaigns, including the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal and the 
later efforts for Basque child refugees. Both Jim Fyrth's and Tom Buchanan's 
detailed studies of British aid recognise the large number of women who 
participated in humanitarian fundraising over Spain, but neither differentiates their 
experience from that of men 151 Still in Britain, it was women who played a leading 
role in humanitarian politics (though there were few appeals in which they were 
specifically targeted). 152 It was female MPs, Atholl, Rathbone and Wilkinson who 
formed the coalition at the head of British relief efforts. This contrasts with France, 
where women were far less prominent in national and local Spanish relief 
campaigns, because such aid was more politicised and remained the preserve of the 
parties from which they were largely excluded. 153s suggest that it was not the 
form of political activity which was gendered, the appeal for humanitarian aid, but 
rather how it was organised. Within French universities, there was an almost total 
sex segregation which prevents any real comparison between female academics in 
the two countries. 
Conclusion 
The national contrasts between humanitarian aid efforts in Britain and 
France were reflected in the International Solidarity Fund which had been created 
by the Labour and Socialist International 154 The Fund had previously provided aid 
for German and Austrian political refugees and to the Spanish left after the October 
1934 rising. It was during the Spanish civil war that the Fund received its largest 
donations, becoming one of the main international focuses for humanitarian aid to 
the Republic. Like the initial CGT aid, the LSI directed the proceeds of the 
International Solidarity Fund to the UGT, which it justified as meeting the 
151 Fyrth, The Signal was Spain, p. 22. 
uchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 65. 
152 One of the few campaigns specifically focused on women was a"Milk for Spain' appeal 
sponsored by 18 British women during the Basque offensive, pamphlet, Mss. 27 A14.3 Box 2, 
Modem Records Centre. 
153 The exception to this was itself a party organisation, the pro-Communist Comite 
Mondial des Femmes contre la Guerre et le Fascisme - Reynolds, France Between the Wafrs, 
197. 
54 The Labour Party and SFIO were affiliates to the Labour and Socialist International, 
while the TUC and CGT were members of its industrial wing, the International Federation 
of Trade Unions. 
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immediate needs of the working class. 155 In early September 1936 it was reported 
that the Fund had received contributions totalling 30,544 pounds of which 12,018 
pounds were from Britain and only 657 pounds from France. 156 The report however 
noted that close to 20,000 pounds had been raised in France by the Rassemblement 
Populaire (not appreciating the extent to which the CGT maintained control of its 
own aid funds). By mid-January 1937, the Rassemblement Populaire claimed 500 
local Commissions de Solidarite throughout France which had raised a total of three 
million francs. 157 At the same time the CGT had sent another five million francs of 
humanitarian aid to the Republic. Rather than the totals raised, it was the ways in 
which fundraising was organised which shaped the opportunities for academics 
and students. 
While British universities were the sites of a proliferation of heterogeneous 
humanitarian campaigns over the civil war in Spain, the reactions of French 
academics and students were expressed in different forms, locations and views. 
This contrast is partly due to general differences between their national political 
arenas, which meant that the war in Spain was felt as a far more direct and 
polarised issue in France as humanitarian relief was organised through established 
parties and unions. There were also the contrasting structures of the universities in 
the two countries which encouraged different forms of political participation. In 
France there could be no university-centred campaigns as the university itself was 
formally depoliticised, while Spain in 1936 was a highly controversial issue. French 
academics and students were therefore active in public aid campaigns, either as 
independents (in the case of those academics who became national and local 
figures) or through party organisations. Despite the success of the parties to which 
they belonged, it is extremely doubtful that French students were as successful at 
humanitarian fundraising as the British students of the University Labour 
Federation who raised 700 pounds in one academic term. 158 In Britain, the campus- 
focus of students' groups encouraged coalitions over Spanish relief as both 
academics and students emerged as prominent actors in a range of ad hoc aid 
groups. 
1-55 Report 4/ 9/ 1936, p. 4-5 in SAI 932/3400, International Institute of Social History. 156 Ibid., p. 3. 
157Aidez I'Espagne!: Conference International de Paris 16-17 janvier 1937, CICIAER, Paris, 
1937, pp. 23-24. 
The Rassemblement Populaire had sent 5,000 tons of food and clothing and medicine to 
Spain: 4,000 tons from Marseille via Alicante to Madrid and 900 tons from Bordeaux to 
Bilbao and Santander. 
158 Clare Market Review, March 1937, p. 19. 
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This chapter has emphasised how different aims, forms of organisation, 
support and methods of humanitarian relief existed in both countries, even though 
most aid was initially overwhelmingly directed towards the Spanish Republic. In 
France, these divisions largely followed those of party politics, and while these 
were also present in Britain, there were also more general differences caused by the 
contrasting levels of politicisation amongst British aid campaigns. Each aid 
campaign needs to be understood in its own context through recognising its 
organisers' identity, aims and their efforts in Spain, especially since most sought to 
broaden their support through 'non-political' appeals. Perhaps the key to these 
diverse relief efforts was that from October 1936 until the spring of 1937, they were 
overwhelmingly focused on Madrid, the Spanish capital which combined the war's 
primary military front with the country's most acute civilian emergencies of aerial 




Non-intervention, the international agreement to deny armaments and 
military material to both the Spanish Republicans and Nationalists, stands as one of 
the central issues in histories of the Spanish civil war. Non-intervention was seen by 
many contemporaries and historians as the most decisive factor in the Republic's 
ultimate defeat, given the covert military material and troops which Franco 's forces 
received from Germany, Italy and Portugal? The effect of these criticisms of the 
Nationalists' evasion of the Non-intervention Agreement has been to solidify the 
policy's intentions, its implementation, and its ineffectiveness into one, at the cost of 
its historical context. In the wake of the Republic's defeat, non-intervention has been 
so stereotyped as misguided and deliberately hypocritical that the politics of its 
supporters, and the complexity of the choices they faced has largely been lost. 2 
There is a strong need to re-historicise non-intervention so as to understand the 
extent to which its legitimacy and support changed over the course of the war, and 
to explain the extent to which it was supported by different groups. Outside Spain, 
Republican supporters were divided amongst themselves over the effects and 
desirability of the policy, and though many would ultimately reject non- 
intervention, they arrived at that rejection from very different motives and 
backgrounds. 
The complex motivations and perceptions underlying support for or 
opposition to non-intervention are perhaps most powerfully revealed by the 
national context in which the policy was first formulated. The English Channel 
separated two governments with fundamentally different characters, concerns and 
commitments which gave each country its own distinctive reasons for supporting 
and opposing non-intervention. Within their national borders, the debate over non- 
intervention cut across party lines, and divided pro-Republican supporters. The 
debates between academics and students over non-intervention were 
fundamentally shaped by the distinctive forums in which they were articulated. The 
commitment of French students and British academics to party politics meant that 
they saw non-intervention differently from the campus-focused politics of British 
students or the public independence of French academics. Political forms and 
1 Glyn Stone, "Britain, Non-Intervention and the Spanish Civil War", European Studies 
Review, 9,1979, p. 129. 
2 E. H. Carr describes non-intervention as "tainted with hypocrisy from the outset" - Carr, The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War p. 17. 
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organisations were powerful influences on the contours of the changing debate over 
non-intervention within and around the university. 
Domestic Politics & Foreign Policy 
Two sets of factors have been seen as causing the newly-formed Front 
Populaire government led by Leon Blum to reverse its initial decision of 19 July 
1936 to agree to the Spanish Republican government's request for armaments 
against the military coup which had broken out two days earlier. 3 One set were 
diplomatic pressures, especially those applied by the British National government, 
which British and American historians have tended to emphasise as decisive in the 
formulation of a new French policy. 4 However, as Julian Jackson writes "the 
decisive, proximate, factor in the adoption of non-intervention was the domestic 
French situation .5 Far more significant in forcing the Blum government to change 
its position over supplying military material to the Republic were internal divisions 
within the Front Populaire cabinet, the fears on both the left and right of either civil 
war in France or that the Spanish conflict would escalate into an international 
conflagration .6 The military rising in Spain 
had been seen by the French left as the 
potential predecessor of a coup against the Front Populaire, while the nationalist 
right's virulent campaigns against entanglement in an international conflict echoed 
their response to the League of Nations sanctions against Italy in 1935. The latter's 
slogan "A bas la Guerre Chile! " was intended as an indictment of the Front Populaire 
for inciting a domestic civil war through its involvement in the Spanish conflict.? 
The debates over non-intervention in France and Britain were fundamentally 
shaped by their respective domestic political landscapes. 
The governments of Britain and France had significantly different motives 
for initiating and supporting an international non-intervention agreement over the 
civil war in Spain. France's first socialist government felt a strong ideological 
solidarity with Republican Spain .8 However, this sympathy was complicated by the 
3 Lefranc, Histoire du Front Populaire (1934-1938), pp. 494-500. 
4 Stone, "Britain, Non-Intervention and the Spanish Civil War" passim; 
Pike, Les Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne, p. 105. 
5 Jackson, The Popular Front in France, p. 208. 
6Ibid. p. 207. 
Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 83. 7 Flyer, M154/299B, AD Nord; 
Unlike the student protests against League sanctions in late 1935 and early 1936, there was 
very little opposition daps la rue over Spain following the dissolution of the leagues. 8 Joel Colton, Leon Blum: Humanist in Politics MTT Press, Cambridge, 1966, p. 236. 
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Front Populaire's commitment to the nationalisation of the French armament 
industry which meant that military aid could only come from the government 
itself. 9 Therefore, the policy of non-intervention offered a justification to avoid the 
direct supply of arms to Spain by the French government which would have 
aroused strong controversy throughout France. In contrast, non-intervention in 
Britain reflected a predominantly Conservative government's detachment from 
Spanish events, and their desire to isolate a conflict which might threaten their 
diplomatic efforts towards the stabilisation and rapprochement of Western and 
Central Europe. 10 
The contrasting government motives underpinning non-intervention meant 
that attacks on the policy itself had different meaning in the two countries. In 
France, the slogans "Ouvrez les frontieres", "Blum a1 action", 'Des canons pour 
1'Espagne" symbolised the extent to which opposition to non-intervention was 
centred on calls for the government itself to directly supply arms to the Spanish 
Republic. 11 The slogan "Blum a 1'action" had actually originated in the sit down 
strikes before the Front Populaire took power, but like other slogans, its meaning 
changed over the course of the war. 12 In Britain, the policy was seen by its 
opponents as denying the Spanish Republic its legal right to purchase arms on the 
free market 13 It was the denial of arms rather than their supply which was the 
critical issue. Equally, the different political character of the respective governments 
helped to reinforce the distinctive national contours of the debates over non- 
intervention. The Front Populaire was attacked by the French left for betraying its 
sister government, the Frente Popular, while British critics of the policy saw it as 
reflecting their government's implicit sympathy for the Nationalists. The attacks in 
both countries ranged from absolute rejection of the policy on principle to the 
various calls for its reform in practice which would ensure a greater (and more 
legitimate) effectiveness. 
9The law for nationalisation was being debated at the same time as non-intervention, and 
was passed on 8 August 1936 by the Senate and on 11 August 1936 by the Chamber. 
However it was only partially implemented - Jeffrey J. Clarke, 'The Nationalization of War 
Industries in France, 1936-1937: A Case Study", Journal of Modern Histo1y, 1977, pp. 411- 
430. 
10 Buchanan, Britian and the Spanish Civil War, pp. 42-43. 
11 Report of 30/ 3/ 1938, BA 1778, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris; 
Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 107. 
12 Jackson, The Popular Front in France, p. 9. 13 -he Student. 13/11/1936, pp. 81-82. 
174 
Absolute Opponents of Non-Intervention: The PCF and the CPGB 
In both Britain and France, the Communist Party stood out in its early, 
vigorous, unified and absolute rejection of any Non-intervention Agreement which 
would compromise the defence of the Spanish Republic. Though many outside the 
party shared these views, the CPGB and PCF were at the forefront of organised 
opposition to non-intervention almost from the first formulation of the policy. Their 
rejection of non-intervention as a direct attack on Republican Spain anticipated that 
of the USSR, which was willing to formally accept the policy for almost two 
months. 14 This common opposition to the arms embargo meant that internationally 
Communists exercised a profound influence on other groups and individuals in 
shaping the contours of opposition to non-intervention, either through slogans and 
political language or through 'front' organisations and coalitions which drew 
heavily on communist activism. Communist criticism of non-intervention also 
developed nationally distinctive tones due to the differing positions of the 
Communist Party in French and British politics. 
Central to the differences between the PCF and CPGB were their respective 
sizes, both in terms of their membership and voting strengths. 15 After the 
suppression of the German Communist Party, the PCF had emerged as the leading 
national party outside the USSR. The push towards coalition which had led to the 
election of the Popular Front government in 1936 had not only marked a 
parliamentary breakthrough for the PCF but had given it a far more extensive 
political and industrial membership. In contrast, the CPGB had yet to establish 
either a popular appeal or anything greater than a marginal electoral presence. 
Though its membership was increasing throughout the 1930s, because of its overall 
numerical weakness the CPGB's greatest political success was achieved in mixed 
coalitions and campaigns with other groups. 
The differing positions of the Communist Parties in Britain and France 
fundamentally affected their relationship to the national organised labour 
movement. The interwar character of the PCF had been marked at its birth in the 
bitter schism of the SFIO in 1920. This long history of sectarian antagonism between 
the two parties, which was parallelled in industrial relations by that between the 
CGT and CGTU, was only overcome in the wake of the riots on 6 February 1934. In 
Britain, the divisions between the CPGB and the Labour Party/TUC, though 
14 Daniel R. Brower, The New lacobins: The French Communist Party and the Popular 
Front, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1968, p. 162. 15 See Appendix 2. 
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antagonistic, were never as deeply embittered as in France. The CPGB never 
represented more than a marginal threat to the leadership of the British labour 
movement, whereas in France the PCF was a direct challenger to the SFIO and 
within the newly-unified CGT. 16 These positions were reinforced in the debates 
over non-intervention, as the CPGB divided its attacks between accusations of 
Nationalist sympathies of the British government and the ineffectiveness of the 
Labour Party. In France, the old tensions which had been submerged in the 
Rassemblement Populaire threatened to be re-opened by the PCF's attacks on non- 
intervention as a'double treason' by the SFIO. The PCF accused the SFIO leadership 
of betraying Republican Spain and the anti-fascist program of the Rassemblement 
Populaire. 17 In essence this was also a double attack on the SFIO - both as the party 
of government and as a party of the left. 
In both Britain and France, Communists in their energetic championing of 
opposition to the Non-intervention Agreement were seeking to increase their own 
support, often appealing directly to the membership of the organised labour 
movement. Those within the university who shared the party's absolute rejection of 
non-intervention either formally joined its membership or, more commonly, 
independently participated in its campaigns. 18 Equally as significant, the 
Communist Party's absolute rejection of non-intervention strongly influenced the 
political language and slogans which were adopted by other groups in opposing 
the policy within both countries. 
Throughout France during mid-August 1936, the PCF held a series of 
meetings at which relief for the Spanish Republic and the absolute rejection of non- 
intervention were the dominant themes. PCF deputies such as Duclos and Marty 
toured southern towns, including Toulouse, Bordeaux and Montpellier, calling for 
solidarity, aid and opposition to non-intervention. 19 In September 1936 the PCFs 
campaign against Blum's foreign policy intensified, in newspaper attacks, mass 
meetings, and even a short strike in Paris 20 The Nationalists' capture of Irün was 
one motive for the new wave of criticism, as was perhaps the growing membership 
16 Sowerwine, Sisters or Citizens?, P. 188. 
17 Draft, "Abandon de 1'Espagne, Suicide de la France", n. d., 360 AP 28, Archives Nationales. 
18 Physicist Frederic Joliot joined the SFIO following 6 February 1934, but he started to move 
away from the party in 1936 when he strongly disagreed with the party's position of non- 
intervention - Dictionnaire Biogranhique du Mouvement Ouvrier Francais Vol. 32. p. 226. 19 L'Humanite, 15/ 8/ 1936, p. 4; 
Le Midi Socialiste, 17/ 8/ 1936, p. 4. 
20 The strike by Parisian metallurgical workers "was for 'bread and Spain' because the party 
was unsure if it could mobolize a strike around a purely political issue" - Jackson, The Popular Front in France p. 109. 
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of the PCF itself. 21 Communist calls for a reconsideration of non-intervention were 
echoed even in Socialist dominated Toulouse where 10,000 people attended a 
Rassemblement Populaire meeting which called for a new policy by the 
government and advocated action through the League of Nations instead. 22 The 
increasing tension between the leaderships of the SFIO and PCF culminated in early 
December 1936 when the latter abstained from a parliamentary vote on the Blum 
government's foreign policy 23 
Ambivalent Defenders of Non-Intervention: CVIA 
In contrast to the unity shown by communists in opposition to non- 
intervention, the Comite de Vigilance des Intellectuels Anti-fascistes reflected a far 
more divided membership over the issue than the absolute commitment of the PCF. 
The Comite de Vigilance's increasingly ambivalent position over non-intervention 
reinforces the importance of relating reactions to the policy to the evolution of the 
civil war over time and linking reactions to non-intervention to other issues. CVIA's 
national committee enthusiastically supported non-intervention in a public 
statement in December 1936 which announced, 
Le CVIA se felicite que le Gouvernement du Front Populaire, se dtgageant 
des lenteurs de procedure du Comit6 de Londres, ait pris l'initiative, 
aujourd'hui publique, de demander l'institution d'un contröle effectif de la 
non-intervention... 
... Le gouvernement francais, en acceptant un contr6le international ä sa 
propre frontiere, donne une preuve exemplaire de son attachement ä la paix, 
et de sa volonte d'action pour l'organisation de la paix 24 
The Comite de Vigilance was one of the first to welcome non-intervention, just as it 
had been one of the first French organisations to send aid to the Republican Spain. 
To support its position CVIA's Bureau conducted in November 1936 a 
survey of membership opinion through Vigilanc its journal. After two months of 
21 jid., p. 225; 
Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 182. 
22 Le Midi Socialiste. 7/9/36, p. 4. 
23 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 133. 
24'The CVIA congratulates the Government of the Front Populaire, on freeing up the slow 
procedure of the Committee of London, having retaken the initiative, publicly today, by 
demanding the institution of an effective control of non-intervention... The French 
Government, in accepting an international control at its proper frontier, has given 
exemplary proof of its attachment to the peace, and of its willingness to act for the 
organisation of the peace" - Vigilance. 16/ 12/ 1936, p. 2. 
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non-intervention, opinion was almost evenly divided over the policy, though only a 
minority favoured its immediate rejection. 
TABLE 6.1: CVIA's SURVEY OF ITS MEMBERSHIP OVER NON-INTERVENTION25 
Question yes no abstain 
(1a) Whether there should be a campaign to change 290 380 44 
the position of the French government over non- 
intervention? 
(1b) Whether there should be direct action of relief by 330 103 81 
French workers, without an official change in the 
overnment positions? 
(2) Whether they were opposed without condition to 254 421 39 
non-intervention? 
(3) Whether the lifting of non-intervention would lead 296 261 157 
to an international escalation of the war to the Spanish 
Republic's detriment? 
4) Whether France should act unilaterally in lifting the 144 492 78 
embargo? 
As questions (1a) and (1b) reveal, support for non-intervention and 
humanitarian aid to the Republic was not mutually inconsistent. While committed 
opponents of non-intervention like Paul Langevin viewed CVIA's referendum on 
Spain as unacceptable, it did reveal that for others, domestic anti-fascism and 
support for the Spanish Republic did not necessarily imply opposition to non- 
intervention. 26 
Yet if the position adopted by the Comite de Vigilance reflected the way in 
which non-intervention divided parties and other organisations, it also shows how 
the following months of warfare altered the legitimacy and the balance of support 
for non-intervention. Increasingly CVIA's bureau adopted motions critical of a 
policy which could not prevent German and Italian involvement in the war. Still, it 
was the policy's application not its objectives which caused criticism from CVIA. 
The continual breaches of non-intervention by the Nationalists did not necessitate 
its abandonment, and during the first half of 1937 CVIA appealed to the League of 
Nations and the countries involved to make the pact workable. As the table below 
25 Vigilance. 27/ 10/ 1936 p. 11. 
26 Vigilance 16/12/1936, p. 21. 
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reveals, appeals for aid and support for non-intervention could run together and 
influence each other. 
Though the Republic's victory at Guadalajara in mid March 1937 produced 
incontrovertible evidence of the scale of Italian commitment, it was probably the 
Basque campaign the following month, with its large loss of Republican territory, 
its exodus of refugees and the prominence of foreign aircraft, which spurred CVIA 
to unequivocally call for the lifting of the arms embargo. Significantly, it sought by 
its motion of early July 1937 to suspend non-intervention merely so it could be re- 
implemented more effectively. 
TABLE 6.2: RESOLUTIONS BY CVIA'S FEDERAL BUREAU ON SPAIN27 
Date Federal Bureau Resolution 
23/7/1936 Appeal for humanitarian aid 
7/ 9/ 1936 Announce support for Blum's policy of non-intervention 
20/11/1936 Appeal to English democrats for action for Spanish Republic 
10/12/1936 Call for effective non-intervention 
15/1/1937 Criticise the presence of German and Italian troops in Spain 
30/3/1937 Criticise Non-Intervention Agreement and call for action through 
League of Nations 
25/4/1937 Recognition of the failure of non-intervention 
11/5/1937 Call for aid in the evacuation of the Basques 
Appeal to the League of Nations over the failure of non- 
intervention 
6/ 7/ 1937 Call for the negotiated removal of all foreign troops, and while 
this was being implemented the lifting of the embargo on arms 
After a year of fighting in Spain, the CVIA Congress held in mid-July 1937, 
passed a resolution rejecting the policy of non-intervention by 2,026 votes to 1,250. 
The motion read, 
Le Congres du CVIA, constatant que la politique dite de non-intervention 
est, depuis un an, une duperie, demande que le gouvernement francais 
reprenne sa libert6, revienne ä la loi et retablisse le commerce des armes avec 
I'Espagne antifasciste... 
... le Congres du CVIA se prononce contre la reconnaissance de Franco 
27 Vigilance 7/ 7/ 1937, pp. 15-17; 
Vigilance 11/ 5/ 1937, p. 9; 
Vigilance, 12/8/1937, p. 7. 
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comme belligerant 28 
Though there was still considerable support for the aims of non-intervention, 
ultimately it was the PCF's view of the policy as a 'duperie' which was invoked by 
CVIA in rejecting the policy with which it had been so initially sympathetic. The 
Congress also voted (with only 2 dissenters) to seek the return of Langevin, Joliot- 
Curie and Basch. 29 Langevin declined for reasons of health, though given his 
activism in opposing non-intervention it seems more likely that the debates over the 
civil war had furthered his distance from the organisation. 30 
Ambivalent Proponents of Non-Intervention: The SFIO 
Like many other organisations, both the SFIO and Labour Party, though 
committed to supporting the Spanish Republic, were strongly divided by non- 
intervention. Within both parties, the debates over the leadership's initial support 
for non-intervention were linked to wider disputes over policy and ideology. 
Unsurprisingly for a party which in 1920 had defined itself in opposition to 
the principles of Leninist centralisation, the SFIO was a party whose organisation 
and ideology encouraged diversity. If opposition to non-intervention provided a 
rallying focus for the PCF to attract support, adherents of the SFIO reacted to events 
in Spain from a variety of perspectives 31 Nathanael Greene's study of the SFIO's 
increasing divisions over foreign affairs between 1936 and 1938, personalised these 
ideological differences by focusing on its national leadership 32 The party's centre 
was represented by the alliance between its parliamentary leader Leon Blum and 
General Secretary Paul Faure. To their left were two tendances, the Bataille Socialiste 
led by Jean Zyromski and the Gauche R6volutionnaire of Marcel Pivert. The 
tendances were parties within the party, committed to their own visions of its 
ideology and aim. Zyromski advocated closer relations with the communists, while 
the Gauche Revolutionnaire called for socialist revolution to be the SFIO's 
28 "The Congress of the CVIA, noting that the policy called non-intervention is, since one 
year ago, a deception, asks that the French Government retake its liberty, and reverse the 
law and restablish the commerce in armaments with antifascist Spain... the Congress of the 
CVIA pronounces itself against the recognition of Franco as a belligerent" - Vigilance, 
12/ 8/ 1937, p. 2. 
29 Ibid., p. 5. 
Vigilance. 2/11/1937, p. 4. 
31 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 173; 
Irvin M. Wall, "French Socialism and the Popular Front", Tournal of Contemporary History, 
5,3,1970, p. 9. 
32 Nathanael Greene, Crisis and Decline: The French Socialist Parly in the Popular Front Era 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1969, p. viii. 
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paramount commitment 33 With the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, both 
tendances saw in Iberian events justification for their own political visions, and both 
were soon opposed to the Blum-Faure formulation of non-intervention, though for 
very different reasons. 
In reaction to the government's adoption of non-intervention, Zyromski 
founded a pressure group within the SFIO to lobby against the policy 34 The Comite 
d'Action Socialiste Pour l'Espagne (CASPE) included members of both tendances, 
though Pivert initially supported non-intervention 35 Despite this early dissent over 
non-intervention within the SFIO, it was not until mid 1937 that the policy became a 
central issue of confrontation, as it became linked to the strong disillusionment 
within the party over the government 's stalled domestic reform. During the first 
months of 1937 there were increasing tensions between the Gauche Revolutionnaire 
and the SFIO leadership over the formers attacks on the Front Populaire 
government. These culminated in reaction to 16 March 1937 when police repression 
of an anti-fascist demonstration in Clichy left five dead. 36 The Gauche 
Revolutionnaire's subsequent criticism of the government led to the expulsion of 22 
members of the Jeunesses Socialistes by the party leadership 37 As a result of these 
clashes over domestic policy Pivert became increasingly critical of the operation of 
non-intervention, though his opposition to the policy was from a fundamentally 
different position from Zyromski. 
The importance of the battle between the tendances in Paris has concentrated 
historians' attention on the SFIO's ideological divisions at the expense of its regional 
differences. Geography was a major influence on the Federation National des 
Etudiants Socialistes (FNES) as it sought to position itself in relation to the debates 
within the SFIO over the policies of Blum's government. Both Zyromski and Pivert 
were Vice-Presidents of the FNES, and actively concerned to encourage the political 
development of students. Though electorally dominated by the PCF, Paris was the 
heartland for both the Bataille Socialiste and Gauche Revolutionnaire as well as the 
FNES. 38 It was Paris students who provided the leadership of the national 
33 Ibid., pp. 49 & 57. 
34 Jackson, The Popular Front in France, p. 228-227. 
35 Daniel Guerin, Front Populaire, Revolution Manquee, Francois Maspero, Paris, 1970, pp. 
151-152. 
36 The clash outside a PSF rally between anti-fascist protestors and police left 6 dead and 
hundereds wounded. In the wake of the clash, the SFIO leadership seemed to believe the 
events were a product of a conspiracy, which implied that the PCF had manipulated the 
demonstration to embarass the government - Brower, The New Jacobins, pp. 181-182. 37 Guerin, Front Populaire. Revolution Manquee, pp. 153-154. 38 Greene, Crisis and Decline, p. 181. 
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federation and controlled its journal, Essais et Combats. Their concerns dominated 
its direction and meant that the reaction of the FNES to the war in Spain was 
framed against the battle of the tendances within the party. 
For French socialist students, non-intervention was not merely a matter of 
government policy, but also of party loyalty. When in January 1937, at the first 
meeting of the Federal Bureau of the FNES, Boutbien, the Federation's 
representative to the socialist students' International, proposed a motion absolutely 
rejecting non-intervention, he received only one other supporting vote. The seven 
other members of the Federal Bureau were unanimous in declaring their agreement 
with the policy followed in Spain by the Blum government 39 After the vote, 
Boutbien, who had been active in seeking unity with Communist student groups 
during the July 1936 Oxford Conference, resigned from the party. Though the FNES 
was unwilling to directly challenge the party leadership over non-intervention, as 
the war continued a variety of dissenting perspectives over the policy developed 
within the student Federation. 
During the first three days of April 1937, the FNES held its annual Congress, 
which included student delegations from universities across France, as well as the 
leading senior figures of Pivert and Zyromski. 40 The Congress debate on non- 
intervention reveals the extent to which FNES was geographically as well as 
ideologically divided. With 175 members the student socialists of Toulouse were by 
far the largest university group outside Paris, and as such were in a strong position 
to question Parisian hegemony of the Federation 41 Before the debate over non- 
intervention, the Toulouse delegation had walked out during an earlier session of 
the Congress over the inclusion on the platform of two Paris delegates who had 
been expelled from the Jeunesses Socialistes, reflecting their lack of sympathy with 
the radical dissent of Gauche Revolutionnaire 42 
The debates over Blum's foreign policy revealed that the Congress was 
divided between those who rejected non-intervention absolutely and those who 
condemned the flawed implementation of the policy, but accepted it in principle by 
39 Essais et Combats, Feb. 1937, p. 19. 
40 The speeches of Pivert and Zyromski to the Congress symbolise their contrasting 
concerns - Pivert protested against the recent expulsion of several activists from the Youth 
section of the SFIO, while Zyromski, who made his appearance during the debate on Spain, 
encouraged the students to focus on studying international politics - Essais et Combats, 
April 1937, pp. 22-23. 
41 Essais et Combats. Feb. 1937, p. 20. 42 Essais et Combats. April 1937, pp. 19 & 23. 
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calling for its reform. This divide was regional as well as ideological as revealed by 
the following exchange. 
Raust (Toulouse) estime aussi que la non-intervention a ete jusqu'ici une 
duperie. II s'agit d'en faire une realite. Il declare d'accord avec la proposition 
de Largo Caballero qu'une delegation des Internationales exerce 
effectivement le controle aux frontieres et sur des bateaux. II indique que 
1'URSS n'a pas fourni a 1'Espagne un soutien disinteresse. II depose une 
motion dans ce sens. 
Rabaud [Paris] estime que le gouvernement a eu tort dans son action initiale 
quand il realise le blocus, et qu'en tout cas il faut se declarer pour la levee de 
1'embargo. 43 
The motion proposed by the Toulouse delegation, while condemning the existing 
operation of non-intervention, accepted it in principle by calling for a scheme which 
would make it effective on all parties. The Toulouse motion received 28 votes. 
Ultimately, the Congress followed Rabaud's absolute rejection of non-intervention, 
carrying by 41 votes the resolution which called for "la levee immediate de 1'embargo 
sur les armes et le materiel ä destination des antifascistes espagnols". 44 Given that there 
were also 15 abstentions from the vote over non-intervention, it is significant that 
this resolution did not even achieve an absolute majority from the delegates. 45 
Compared to the unanimous Congress resolution against compulsory military 
service, the divided vote over non-intervention reveals not only the different 
perceptions of the policy within the university sections of Federation Nationale des 
Etudiants Socialistes but how these were linked to internal party debates. 
The decision by the Federation Nationale des Etudiants Socialistes to start 
publishing their own journal in early 1937 reveals some of the disparate 
perspectives from which non-intervention was criticised. Until January 1937, the 
FNES had shared its journal with the far more pro-communist Belgian Federation of 
Socialist Students 46 The political differences between the two countries make it 
43 "Raust (Toulouse) also considered that non-intervention had been up until now a 
deception. He called for it to be made a reality. He declared his agreement with the 
proposition of Largo Caballero that an International delegation effectively exercise control at 
the frontier and aboard shipping. He indicated that the USSR did not furnish disinterested 
aid to Spain. He set down a motion to this effect. 
Rabaud [Paris] considered that the government were wrong in their initial action when they 
had created the blockade, and that in any case he called for the lifting of the embargo" - 
Ibid., p. 22-23. 
44 Esscis et Combats. May 1937 p. 20. 
45 48% votes for the Congress resolution, whereas the Toulouse motion had 33% support. `K' The joint publication featured an editorial by the head of Belgian socialist students 
attacking non-intervention as abandoning Spain under the pretext of pacifism - L'Etudiant Socialiste. Dec. 1936-Jan. 1936, p. 1. 
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difficult to determine early reactions in France to non-intervention, given the 
editorial dominance of the Belgians. Equally the new journal, Essais et Combats, 
was far from representative of national currents within the French Federation. Paris 
based and authored, the prominent influence of the Gauche Revolutionnaire 
emerges in several of its articles. Jean Lauriet, in a piece titled "A bas 1'embargo! ", 
rejected the view that criticism of non-intervention within the SFIO was treasonable 
to the party 47 Rather than silencing dissent, there was a need for free criticism 
within the party, which was an implicit defence of the tendances' independence. 
Lauriet argued that Spain's importance for France was that it marked the first 
serious defeat of fascism by socialism, and therefore, 
Dis le debut de la guerre civile espagnole, il etait visible qu'elle etait decisive 
pour notre sort a tous. Des le moment oü fascisme triomphait en Espagne, une 
victoire fasciste devenait fort vraisemblable en France et tous les espoirs de 
socialisme etaient perdus pour des decades. `' 
Without German and Italian aid, he believed that the rebellion would have been 
defeated in a month. Lauriet argued that the Blum's government's primary 
justification for non-intervention had been world peace, and that internal 
opposition in France to supplying arms to the Republic was only a secondary 
consideration. 49 After five months of fighting in Spain, he felt that there remained 
the risk of war, though it would now be imperialist rather than revolutionary. 
Citing the POUM's call for democracy and revolution, Lauriet called for action. 
Lauriet's argument against non-intervention was given a greater immediacy 
by a postscript added to the article by its author, calling for an international 
campaign of protest to save the comrades of the POUM. 50 The postscript concluded 
that the French abandonment of Republican Spain through non-intervention had 
given the USSR room to extend its purges against the workers' party of Spain. This 
anti-Stalinist critique of non-intervention was elaborated in a later article by J. 
Rabaud, "La Revolution espagnol en danger". 51 He argued that while Soviet aid had 
been vital for the defence of Madrid in the winter of 1936, it was now deliberately 
being used to separate the war from revolution. Stalin would not have had a free 
hand in Spain if Blum's government had actively supported the Spanish Republic. 
47 Essais et Combats, Feb. 1937, p. 10. 
48 "From the begining of the Spanish civil war, it was obvious that she was decisive for all our 
fates. From the moment when fascism triumphs in Spain, a fascist victory becomes more 
likely in France and all the hopes of socialism would be lost for decades" - 49 A reply to Lauriet the following month, argued that intervention would have lead to SFIO 
losing government as the Radicals and bourgeois held the real power in Front Populaire - 
Essais et Combats, Mar. 1937, pp. 9-10. 
50 Essais et Combats. Feb. 1937, p. 11. 
51 Essais et Combats, Mar. 1937, pp. 11. 
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Lauriet's and Rabaud's articles were striking, as one of the few critiques of non- 
intervention which were anti-communist rather than drawing on the same language 
as the PCF, as well as for their unusual sensitivity to the dynamics of domestic 
politics in Republican Spain before the dramatic confrontation of May 1937. At the 
same time as these articles, the FNES Bureau was becoming more explicit in its anti- 
communism generally, especially in relation to the second round of trials in 
Moscow. 52 This anti-communist, revolutionary critique of non-intervention within 
the Federation Nationale des Etudiants Socialistes would have found ready support 
amongst the Gauche Revolutionnaire tendance, revealing the extent to which Paris 
students, even when they dissented from SFIO leadership, did so by allying 
themselves to other currents within the party 53 
The strong divisions within the SFIO were most fully expressed in July 1937 
at the Party Congress in Marseilles which followed the shock resignation of the 
Blum government from office M The Congress debate centred on party members' 
disenchantment with the government's 'pause' in domestic economic reforms and 
its foreign policy over Spain 55 As Greene writes, "on Spain an acrimonious debate 
was followed by a unanimously voted motion which avoided the issues by, in 
effect, criticising non-intervention without calling for its end". 56 At the close of the 
Congress, Blum's motion on policy was passed with 2946 mandates, though those 
of tendances received significant support, with 1545 mandates for that of Zyromski 
and 894 for Pivert. 57 Hostility to non-intervention had not only strengthened the 
PCF's challenge to the SFIO, but had also increased the following of the dissenting 
tendances within the party. However, despite representing almost half the mandates 
at the Congress in mid-1937, the ideological differences between Zyromski and 
Pivert meant that this dissent always remained fragmented 
Ambivalent Supporters of Non-Intervention: The Labour Party 
During the Labour Party Conference held in Edinburgh in October 1936 the 
provision of humanitarian relief and non-intervention's denial of military aid were 
52 Hid., p. 17. 
53 Guerin, Front Populaire, Revolution Manquee, pp. 166-167. 
54 Greene, Crisis and Decline, pp. 141-149. 
55 Irvin M. Wall, "French Socialism and the Popular Front", journal of Contemporary 
History. 5,3,1970, p. 18. 
56 Jackson, The Popular Front in France, p. 230. 
57 Bilis, Socialistes et Pacifistes. p. 229. 58 Donald Noel Baker, 'The Politics of Socialist Protest in France: The Left Wing of the 
Socialist Party 1921-1939", Tournal of Modern History, 43,1, March 1971, p. 24. 
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linked by both defenders and opponents of the policy. The Labour Party leadership 
sought to justify its acceptance of non-intervention by reference to France, arguing 
that the policy had originated with a French Socialist government which needed 
British support 59 Yet the leadership were also under substantial pressure to 
reverse this position, especially after a Spanish Socialist delegation arrived to make 
an emotional appeal to the conference. Jimenez de Asüa opened his address with 
the words that, 
In the papers this morning you will have read that there has been a terrible 
air bombardment by heavy bombers of the villages around Madrid. We 
could not stop that bombardment. Why? Because we had not the fighting 
aircraft to do it, because the Pact of Non-intervention has prevented us from 
getting them. 60 
Jimenez de Asda then attacked non-intervention as in principle a "monstrosity" 
against international law, and in practice a complete failure as it had been broken so 
extensively by the Fascist powers. He linked humanitarian aid and opposition to 
non-intervention together when he asked, 
What are we here for? We are here to thank you for your help; to thank you 
with profound emotion for the medical supplies, for the food, for the clothes 
that you have sent, and for the other help that you have given we thank you; 
but we say that that is not enough. We ask you to help us to remove the 
obstacles that are now stopping us from getting arms. 61 
Both he and Isabel de Palencia closed by appealing for the material and arms that 
would give the Republic a quick victory, rather than the devastation of a long 
drawn-out war 62 
The Spanish delegates had a profound impact on the tone of the conference, 
providing a rallying point for opposition within the Labour Party to non- 
intervention. As Margot Kettle, a student at the University of Edinburgh who 
watched the conference remembered fifty years later, "when the Party Conference 
had received a delegation from the Spanish Republicans, headed by Madame 
Palencia, it reversed its decision, and that was a historic moment" 63 Yet, despite the 
impact of the event in Kettle's memory, the actual results of the Conference were far 
59 Buchanan, The Popular Front in France, p. 71; 
Howell, British Social Democracy, p. 101. 




Ibid. p. 4. 
62 Eid., pp. 4&7. 
63 "Recollections of a Younger World", pp. 125-126 in CP/ Ind/ Kett/ 1, National Museum of 
Labour History. 
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more ambivalent. A delegation was sent to the Prime Minister, but the Labour Party 
and the TUC did not officially reject non-intervention until June 1937.64 
Oxford academic G. D. H. Cole, committed to radicalising the Labour Party 
from within, argued that, 
Many of the delegates who attended the Edinburgh Conference of the party 
in October came away disgusted - there is no other word. They felt that they 
had been steam-rolled by the platform, and that the platform and policy was 
one of sheer evasion of the essential issues. Over Spain, on which feeling in 
the movement runs high, the Conference first accepted, by means of the 
Trade Union block vote, a resolution endorsing the policy of non- 
intervention. Then after the speeches of the Spanish delegates had made 
those present realise that non-intervention meant in fact leaving the Spanish 
people defenceless against General Franco 's plentiful supplies of German 
and Italian arms, the feeling in the Conference so mounted that the earlier 
resolution had to be set aside, and Messrs Attlee and Greenwood sent to 
London to see Mr Chamberlain in order to tell him - no one quite knew 
what, for even at this later stage there was no plain declaration in favour of 
helping the Spanish people. The Spanish business at the Conference was an 
appalling muddle, out of which the British Government was able to make 
abundant capital in favour of its 'non-intervention' policy. Nor has the 
situation improved since. Local Labour Parties have done much, but the 
Labour Party has done next to nothing, to help the Spanish cause 65 
As expressed in Cole's attack on the Labour Party's leadership, the debates 
over non-intervention must be linked to other currents in the organised labour 
movement. Ben Pimlott has described the Edinburgh Conference as a turning point 
in constitutional reform of the Labour Party, in part because the leadership's 
hijacking of the agenda had left even moderate proponents of constitutional reform 
so unsatisfied. 66 In that context, non-intervention became a symbol for those, 
especially members of constituency parties, who resented trade union domination 
of the Labour Party and saw the party's leadership as out of touch. The Home 
Countries Labour Association which was at the forefront of this push for 
constitutional reform within the party, also established in late February 1937 a 
64 Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement pp. 71 & 99. 65 Notes, "The British Labour Movement Today", n. d. in A1/55/10, Cole Papers, Nuffield 
College Archives. 
66 Ben Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1977, p. 127. 
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Labour Spain Committee to encourage opposition to non-intervention within the 
partY 67 
Yet the tensions over non-intervention between the national policy of the 
Labour Party and the views of its local activists had relatively little impact within 
British universities compared to party politics in France. The Cambridge University 
Labour Party and Cambridge University Socialist Society sent a joint-delegation of 
academics and students to meet with Attlee and Dalton in the hopes of changing 
the party's policy over non-intervention 68 That the party leadership agreed to 
receive the delegation, shows the willingness of some within the Labour Party to 
encourage activists within the universities. Unlike France where the PCF and the 
tendances inside the SFIO provided vigorous challenges to the party's leadership, 
those who favoured a stronger policy over Spain within the Labour Party faced 
fewer alternatives. Labour activists like Joseph Needham and G. D. H. Cole chose to 
remain in the party despite their divergences over policy while putting their efforts 
into independent appeals and coalitions for Spain. 
In contrast to their French peers, British socialist students were largely 
distant from the internal debates over non-intervention within the Labour Party. 
Though the University Labour Federation was affiliated to the Labour Party, the 
debates and policies of its constituent student societies tended to be largely campus- 
based. The mixed memberships of socialist societies, combining communists and 
socialists, seem to have generated far fewer tensions over non-intervention than 
within the Labour Party itself. Rather, as revealed by the Union debates in Oxford, 
Cambridge and London, there was a broad consensus on the left against non- 
intervention. 
British Student Debates Over Non-Intervention 
When the British academic year began in 1936-37, the civil war had been 
raging for several months and non-intervention had already been implemented. In 
the last days of November 1936, the Oxford Union debated the motion that "This 
House deplores the continued adherence of the British Government to the non- 
intervention agreement". 69 The motion was narrowly lost by 71 votes to 63 votes. 
67 However the leadership of the Home Counties Labour Association/ Labour Spain 
Committee were unwilling to associate themselves with the Unity campaign of the CPGB, 
ILP and Socialist League - Ibid., p. 129. 68 Minutes of 15/2/1937 & 7/5/1937, Add 881 / 1, University Library, Cambridge. 
69 Oxford Guardian. 30/ 11/ 1936, p. 8; 
188 
Given the assumed strength of Conservative opinion amongst Oxford students, it is 
surprising that the debate was not lost by a wider margin, but perhaps this was 
because of the low attendance 7O One of the students responsible for the debate was 
Union President James Brown, a member of the Liberal Club and Balliol College. In 
the preceding month, Brown had attacked support for non-intervention in a letter to 
the Liberal Club's newspaper. He wrote, "it seems to be almost universally assumed 
that this policy is intrinsically right. This is alarming"71 Even more of a concern was 
that, "as I write, the situation in Spain seems to be going from bad to worse. In all 
probability Madrid will soon fall"? 2 Brown argued that Britain needed to establish 
its legal right to supply arms to the Spanish Republic, in case there was a later 
rebellion in France (ironically, the same fear had helped to motivate Blum's decision 
not to supply arms). The opposition of Oxford Liberal students to non-intervention 
led them to seek an article from G. D. H. Cole, patron of the Labour Club, which 
attacked the government for destroying the League of Nations through its non- 
intervention policy and called for a People's Front of the left united around foreign 
policy 73 
The Union debate in Cambridge took place on a much greater scale than in 
Oxford, partly due to the unique local political atmosphere in the town in the first 
week of February 1937 after the obituaries for volunteer John Comford were 
printed. On 9 February 1937, the Cambridge Union debated the motion 'That this 
House deplores His Majesty's Government's policy of Non-intervention in Spain ". 74 
One of the key-note speakers in the debate was Harry Pollitt, Secretary of the British 
Communist Party, who was well received and delivered a speech in which he 
accused the National Government of favouring Franco. Perhaps it was Pollitt's 
charisma or the shock at the recent news of Comford's death that contributed to the 
motion being carried. The House adjourned a few minutes before midnight, and the 
motion against non-intervention received 208 votes to 166 votes. More significant 
than the vote itself, was the way the debate reveals the independence of students 
from party politics and the complex intertwining of non-intervention with other 
issues, such as the experience of volunteers or humanitarian aid. 
The Oxford Magazine. 3/ 12/ 1936, p. 244; 
The Cherwell, 5/ 12/ 1936, p. 188. 
70 The following term the Union passed by 106 votes to 91 the motion "that the British 
Government is disastorously mishandling the international situation" -The Oxford 
Magazin e. 28/1/1937, p. 307. 
71 Oxford Guardian. 19/10/1936, p. 8. 
72Ibid. 
73 Oxford Guardian, 9/11/1936, p. 5. 
74The Cambridge Review, 12/2/ 1937, pp. 261-262. 
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One of the leading speakers defending non-intervention in the Cambridge 
debate was John Churchill, like Cornford a member of Trinity College75 A few days 
after the debate Churchill signed the joint-letter endorsing the Cornford-Maclaurin 
Memorial Appeal for humanitarian relief in Spain, as representative for the 
Cambridge University Conservative Association. Though most historiography has 
ignored the point, there was no inconsistency in Churchill's position76 Not only 
was it possible to support the government's policy of non-intervention and local 
humanitarian campaigns for those suffering in Spain, but there was frequently a 
nexus between the two in which the former position was partly justified by the 
latter. " 
For other conservative students, pro-Republican sympathy could lead to 
increasing distance from the Conservative Party's foreign policy, especially the 
party's commitment to non-intervention. Another supporter of the Conservative 
Party who spoke in the Union debate was John Simonds, who defended non- 
intervention though he also desired the defeat of Franco. Simonds was one of the 
leading personalities in the Union, and his contribution at the non-intervention 
debate was described as "the best speech off the paper this term". 78 Several months 
after the Union debate, at a large fundraising meeting for a foodship to Bilbao in the 
first week of May 1937, Simonds adopted a new position. Speaking as a 
Conservative, he felt he could no longer support non-intervention, especially given 
its effects on the Spanish civilian population. 79 For Simonds, the Basque front 's 
need for humanitarian relief ultimately lead not only to sharing appeal platforms 
with the left, but also to sharing their rejection of non-intervention as deliberately 
worsening the civilian and military conditions in the Republic. 
Simonds's dissent over non-intervention was perhaps most dramatically 
symbolised with the opening of the new academic year of 1937-38 at the traditional 
Union debate of no confidence in the current government. Speaking as the Union 
Vice-President, Simonds crossed the floor to argue that, 
Non-intervention had only helped one side in Spain. He attacked the 
Cambridge Conservative Association where constipation is a representative 
75 mid., p. 262. 
76 contra Fryth who explictly links aid and opposition to non-intervention - Fryth, The 
Signal was Spain, pp. 21-22. 
77 Buchanan contrasts the SMAC where political campaigning and humanitarian fund- 
raising ran together with the Labour Party's Milk for Spain scheme which "was candidly 
presented as a means of depoliticising the campaign" - Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War 
and the British Labour Movement pp. 118-119. 78 The Cambridge Review, 12/2/1937, p. 262. 79 The Granta. 5/ 5/ 1937, p. 380. 
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condition, and, speaking as a Conservative, he stated that the Conservative 
Party was no place for any supporter of the Valencia Government or of 
collective security... John's speech was made in a tense silence, and the loud 
and prolonged applause which greeted it showed that the House too 
recognized that this was one of John's greatest speeches 8° 
The debates within Cambridge and most other British universities over non- 
intervention broadly took place between left-wing and right-wing students' groups. 
Though Conservative students like Churchill and Simonds both supported 
humanitarian aid for the victims of the civil war in Spain, Simonds' dissent in mid- 
1937 was still exceptional amongst Conservative students in Britain. 
The International Brigades and Non-Intervention 
While the battles for Madrid and the Basque country fuelled increasing 
international criticism of non-intervention, those who volunteered to fight in Spain 
frequently returned to Britain and France to emerge at the forefront of the domestic 
debates over the arms embargo. Veterans of the International Brigades represented 
powerful critics of the workings of non-intervention, not merely for their first-hand 
experiences but also for their heroic stature which transcended the party divisions 
of the left. Under-represented amongst the veterans, student volunteers were over- 
represented on the platform and in print as articulate spokesmen for the Republican 
cause. 
As one London student who served in the International Brigades would later 
write for his university magazine, 
I was bombed and strafed by Hitler's and Mussolini's avion, shelled by their 
artillery, machine-gunned by their bullets and finally captured by Italian 
tanks and a mechanised Italian column. I got the idea intervention was 
going on 81 
The author had spent almost 10 months in Spain, seven of them as a Nationalist 
prisoner. Held in a concentration camp, he claimed that his contact with other 
Spaniards and his own observations had given him an accurate idea of Nationalist 
reliance on Italian war material. While the Spanish Republican Government had 
stated that the Nationalists had received 100,000 Italian troops, he felt this estimate 
should be closer to between 200,000 and 250,000 Italian soldiers. The article closed 
80 The Granta. 20/ 10/ 1937, p. 40. 
81 The Clare Market Review, 34, Dec 1938, p. 11. 
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by calling for the confidence trick of non-intervention to be stopped S2 The LSE 
Research Students Associations was addressed by Mr Whittaker, who had been 
taken prisoner by the Nationalists, while the UCL Socialist Society also sought to 
hold a meeting with a UCL student who had been captured with the Brigades 83 
Whittaker, who was probably the author of the above article, provided in his talk to 
the research students the "most startling fact" that 250,000 Italians and 50,000 
Germans were fighting for Franco 84 These were significant over-estimates of the 
size of Italian and German forces in Nationalist Spain. At a maximum there were 
probably no more than 80,000 Italian military personnel and 10,000 Germans 
(including the 5,000 strong Condor Legion) 83 
The role of Fascist intervention in Spain was similarly overstated by 
Edinburgh medical student David Mackenzie, who had served as part of the first 
British contingent in the Brigades. After he had returned from the front, Mackenzie 
became prominent in the domestic conflict over non-intervention, speaking at 
public meetings across Scotland. In Glasgow, he addressed the University's Left 
Book Club, as well as speaking at the City Hall . 
86 Mackenzie received an 
enthusiastic reception at the latter meeting, which raised £20 for the families of 
Glasgow volunteers. Mackenzie's experiences in Spain gave his testimony a greater 
authority as he spoke of the fascist military aid which the Nationalist army relied 
upon; 
Madrid would never be surrounded by Franco's troops, and the real threat 
to the city he said, came from the German and Italian airmen, who in their 
first raid bombed 20 schools 87 
821bid. p. 12. 
83 "LSE Research Students Association Magazine", 2nd issue, n. d., p. 6 in 24/ 2, LSE 
Archives; 
Phineas, 1/11/1938, p. 5. 
84 LSE Research Students Association Magazine", 2nd issue, n. d., p. 6. 
85 Robert Whealey estimates that between 16,800-19,000 Germans served in Spain during 
the war - Robert H. Whealey, Hitler & Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War 1936- 
1939, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1989, pp. 101-102; 
John Coverdale estimates that 75,000 Italian troops were sent to Spain and another 5,700 
served with the Nationalist air force - John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish 
Civil War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1975, pp. 396 & 417; 
Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 977-979. 
8' Glasgow University Magazine 20/ 1/ 1937, p. 154; 
Glasgow Herald, 11/9/1937, p. 12; 
Andrew Ferns, "The Development of the Solidarity Movement with Republican Spain in 
Glasgow 1936-1939", BA (Hons) thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1975, p. 21. 87 Glasgow Herald, 11 / 9/ 1937, p. 12. 
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Mackenzie used similar arguments when he wrote an article for Edinburgh 
University's journal The Student on the International Brigades. 88 He firstly 
defended the Brigades, arguing that less than half the volunteers were Communists. 
He described the Brigades' purpose as providing a co-ordinated and disciplined 
unit, to improve the exceedingly brave but untrained militias. Their initial success 
had been in stopping the Nationalist drive on Madrid. Mackenzie argued that 
Franco's army relied on Moors and Nazis, and that on the front-line he had only 
once fought against Spanish soldiers 89 Around Madrid he claimed the Brigades 
were opposed by 5,000 well-equipped German regular troops, but these had been 
driven back by the bravery of the outnumbered volunteers of the Thaelmann 
Battalion. 90 Mackenzie also overestimated the role of Italy in the war, when he 
asserted that "International Fascism co-operated in Franco 's plans before the revolt 
began". 91 Finally Mackenzie closed his article by calling for the end of non- 
intervention as the policy was directed against the Spanish militia and civilians. 
The testimony of student volunteers in the Brigades was a powerful weapon 
for those who sought to argue that the non-intervention pact masked the realities of 
battle in Spain. In a November 1937 meeting at the Maison de Mutualite in Paris, 
Albert Bayet read from a letter he had received from a French student milicien who 
had been wounded three times in the fighting and was calling for the French border 
to be opened for humanitarian and military relief to Republican Spain 92 The 
emotional impact of the letter was increased by Bayet's own preface in speaking of 
his personal experience of the war of 1914-1918 and the high casualties of combat 93 
Bayet's testimony also reveals how French academics continued on public platforms 
participating in national debates over non-intervention, just as they had in reacting 
to the 6 February 1934 and in campaigns for humanitarian relief to Spain. 
88 The Student, 9/ 2/ 1937, pp. 188-189. 
89 This argument was reversed in the same issue by a letter to editor criticising Republican 
Spain as relying on the imported International Brigades -Ibid., p. 190. 90 In fact there were no German ground forces in the initial attack on Madrid, which had 
been led by the Spanish Army of Africa. 
91 Rid., p. 189. 
Mussolini had promised military aid in 1934 to Spanish monarchists, but not to the 1936 
plotters. He only decided to commit himself in the Spanish conflict after hearing of France's 
initial military aid to the Republic - Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil 
War, pp. 50-54; 
Paul Preston, Franco: A Biography, Harper Collins, London, 1993, p. 157. 92 Aider l'Espagne R6publicaine, Comite International d'Aide au Peuple Espagnol, Paris, 
c1937, p. 27. 
93 Ikid., p. 26. 
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Patrons of Opposition: French Intellectuals and Non-Intervention 
Either on the platform or through petitions, a prominent group of left-wing 
Parisian academics lobbied against the Blum government's policy of non- 
intervention. What is perhaps most significant about these political forms is that 
both were traditionally independent of party politics. The PCF's attacks on non- 
intervention had increasingly strained its alliance with the SFIO, which made the 
non-aligned identities of academics an important factor in keeping the debate over 
non-intervention from becoming merely an inter-party conflict, just as they had 
been in the formation of the Rassemblement Populaire coalition. This tension was 
reflected in the meeting of the national committee of Rasssemblement Populaire in 
mid-September 1936, after the fall of Irün to the Nationalists. The committee passed 
a motion of confidence in the Blum government but also called for a reconsideration 
of non-intervention and alternative action through the League of Nations 94 Because 
the policy of non-intervention had been born out of the strongly diverging views of 
a coalition government of Socialists, Radicals, and Communists, it gave greater 
political opportunities to Paris academics such as Victor Basch, Paul Langevin, 
Henri Wallon and Albert Bayet to act independently on the national stage. 
These four academics had been at the forefront of the developing 
Rassemblement Populaire coalition between 1934 and 1936, and they retained a 
similarly prominent position at meetings calling for the reconsideration of non- 
intervention. Combining the roles of patrons and activists they were conspicuous 
either chairing or delivering the main speeches at an array of meetings calling for 
arms for Spain. On the platform, these engaged intellectuals were the equals of the 
leading politicians of the Third Republic, forming common opposition to non- 
intervention with Zyromski, Jouhaux, Pivert, Thorez and Duclos. Yet, as the earlier 
examination of the differences between Zyromski and Pivert has shown, common 
opposition to non-intervention did not mean common politics. 
From the first fomulation of the arms embargo on Spain, Langevin and 
Wallon were committed to the PCF's absolute rejection of any betrayal' of 
Republican Spain. On 20 August 1936, their names appeared in L'Humanite 
alongide those of Andre Malraux and Jean-Richard Bloch as sponsors of an appeal 
for "Des avions pour 1'Espagne'. 95 The appeal stated, 
Offir des vivres et des medicaments pour les combattants et les blesses c'est 
bien; mais il faut, et tout de suit; des armes, et des munitions pour que les 
94 Le Midi Socialiste. 21/9/1936, p. 4. 
95 L'Humanite. 20/8/1936, p. 2. 
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republicains espganols en finissent avec les rebelles, les hitleriens, les 
legionnairs et les Marocains troupes par les generaux felons... a souscrire 
immediatement pour offrir des avions et des munition aux milices d'Espagne 
Donations were to be sent to Wallon, who later visited Spain where he denounced 
non-intervention as a double act of treason by the Blum government 97 
While Victor Basch was also absolutely committed to the Republican cause, 
his position on non-intervention was more ambivalent. A recent biography has 
emphasised how Basch's friendship with Blum meant that he did not immediately 
push the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme to oppose non-intervention in mid-August 
1936.98 Still, Basch's later place on the platform of several mass meetings against the 
policy suggests that even if his opposition was initially more qualified than 
Langevin's, it quickly hardened to put him at the forefront of the campaign. These 
ambiguities in such a prominent intellectual indicate the difficulties of pursuing the 
nuances behind the public position over non-intervention of academics from 
universities outside Paris. 99 
The independent opposition of Paris academics to non-intervention found 
collective form in the Comite International de Coordination et d'Information pour 
1'Aide ä l'Espagne Republicaine (CICIAER). The organisation was a non-party 
pressure group, led by Basch and Langevin, focused on reversing non-intervention 
through pro-Republican propaganda and information. In its meetings and 
pamphlets, academics were often the key speakers and writers. German 
Communist Willi Münzenberg has been credited as being the organising force 
behind the Comite de Coordination which was formed in mid-August 1936.100 
Though Münzenberg's role behind the scenes at the Amsterdam Anti-War Congress 
of 1932 and Pleyel Anti-Fascist Congress of 1933 has been widely recognised, there 
is far less information on his role in political campaigns for the Spanish Republic. 
96 "Offering supplies and medicine for the combatants and the wounded is good; but they 
have to have, immediately, the arms and ammunition with which the Spanish Republicans 
will finish the rebels, Nazis, legionnaires and Moroccan troops led by the traitorous 
generals... subscribe immediately to offer planes and ammunition to the militias of Spain" - 
Ibid. 
97 "Abandon de 1'Espagne, Suicide de la France", draft, n. d., 360 AP 29, Archives Nationales; 
"Culture et Revolution", Conference: Universite de Madrid, 24/ 10/ 1936,360 AP 18, 
Archives Nationales. 
98 Basch, Victor Basch, pp. 268-273. 
99 One exception to this is Henri Daudin in Bordeaux who was a strong public supporter of 
the PCF's rejection of non-intervention. In April 1937 he attacked the local committees of the 
SFIO and CVIA for supporting mediation in the civil war - La Gironde Populaire, 
16/4/1937, p. 1. 
100 Stephane Courtois & Marc Lazar, Histoire du Partie Communiste Francais, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1995, p. 152. 
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While it is true that the CICIAER shared the PCF's absolute rejection of non- 
intervention and drew strongly on the efforts of Communist activists in its ranks, it 
would be wrong to see it as merely a Communist front organisation. Far from being 
manipulated, non-Communist academics like Basch and Bayet consciously chose to 
conunit themselves to the CICIAER due to their own political perspectives and the 
difficultly of organising dissent against a Socialist-led government which they 
otherwise supported. 
Many of the key figures in the Comit6 International de Coordination et 
d'Information pour l'Aide ä 1'Espagne Republicaine were signatories to the petition 
which appeared in the December 1936 issue of the pro-Communist journal 
Commune, which was titled 'Declarations des Intellectuels Republicains au sujet 
des Evenements d'Espagne". 101 The petition opened by paying tribute to the 
magnificent resistance of the people of Madrid against the attacks of international 
fascism. It then called for the return of commercial relations with Republican Spain 
citing several delegations which had established Nationalist violations of the non- 
intervention pact. The petition claimed 1,400 signatories, who included the writers 
Rolland, Gide, Aragon, Benda and Nizan. It was also signed by 41 university 
academics and 200 agreges (the majority of whom were lycee teachers). 102 
Given that their respective governments were the first proponents and most 
enthusiastic supporters of the Non-intervention Agreement, the policy provided a 
powerful stimulus for intellectuals in Britain and France to make common cause. In 
Paris, Münzenberg pushed for an international campaign against non-intervention, 
L'action pour sauver Madrid nest pas assez developpee. En France de belles 
campagnes one ete faites. Mais c'est en Angleterre que doit porter surtout 
notre action. (Affiches, brochures). Il pense qu'une Commission du Comite 
Mondial et du Comite de Coordination pourrait aller en Angleterre et se 
mettre en rapport avec Philip Noel Baker, Norman Angell, etc., pour les 
convaincre qu'il faut faire en Angleterre une campagne dans le genre de celle 
qui a ete menge en France. 103 
101 Commune, Dec. 1936, pp. 389-191. 
102 Sirinelli, Intellectuels et Passions Francaises, pp. 103-105. 
103 'The action to save Madrid is not developed enough. In France good campaigns have 
been made. But it is in England that we particularly have to turn our action (Posters, 
pamphlets). He thought that a Commission of the Comite Mondial and of the Comite de 
Coordiation should be able to go to England and to make a report to Philip Noel Baker, 
Norman Angell, etc., to convince them that what will have to be done in England, is a 
campaign of the same kind to that which has been conducted in France" - Minutes of 3/11/1936 in "Information: Bulletin", 10/ 11 / 1936, p. 1, No. 30, Fonds Paul Langevin, ); cole 
Superteure de Physique et de Chimie Industrielles de la Ville de Paris. 
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It was significant that no British academics were amongst the prominent 
intellectuals listed by Münzenberg, yet professional connections did facilitate the 
exchange of politics across the Channel. 
In late November 1936, Langevin led a French delegation to London to 
campaign against what was feared to be the imminent recognition of Franco by the 
British government if he captured Madrid 104 The delegation included fellow 
academics Bayet and Basch, along with leading representatives of the SFIO and 
CGT. 105 The delegation met Liberal leader Sir Archibald Sinclair, Tory dissident 
Winston Churchill and several Labour MPs. 106 French pressure was important due 
to the Labour Party and National Government's initial justification of non- 
intervention as an initiative of the Front Populaire. Langevin's delegation also 
presented a petition to the House of Commons. Their petition stressed three points: 
the massacres of women and children in bombing of Madrid, that the governments 
of France and Britain should defend principles of maritime law to end Franco 's 
naval blockade of Basque ports, and that the policy of non-intervention had become 
a "duperie'. 107 
Activists in Britain and France sought to pressure their own governments to 
reverse their commitment to non-intervention, partly by seeking connections across 
the Channel. This interaction became the raison d'etre for the British group For 
Intellectual Liberty, which had originally tried to establish itself as a parallel to 
CVIA. 108 Langevin's delegation was soon followed by a reciprocal visit by a British 
delegation including fellow scientist J. D. Bernal, and the following year the French 
provided hospitality for the all-party delegation of British women MPs who visited 
Spain. Equally, Basch returned to Britain in March 1937 to see Wilkinson and 
Rathbone, though he was subject to police pressure during his visit 109 While the 
focus for both French and British intellectuals always remained on their own 
domestic politics, academics in both countries were willing to use their 
international connections, both political and professional, to try and force the 
reconsideration of non-intervention at home. 
104 Pike, Les Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne, p. 178. 
105 Notes, No. 32, Fonds Paul Langevin, Ecole Superteure de Physique et de Chimie 
Industrielles de la Ville de Paris. 
106 "Information: Bulletin", 10/ 11 / 1936, p. 5, No. 30, Fonds Paul Langevin, $cole Superieure 
de Physique et de Chimie Industrielles de la Ville de Paris. 
107 Notes, No. 32, Fonds Paul Langevin, $cole Superieure de Physique et de Chimie 
Industrielles de la Ville de Paris. 
108 Minutes of 5/ 7/ 1937, Al, Add 9369, Manuscripts, University Library, Cambridge. 
109 Basch, Victor Basch, p. 279. 
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Alongside the French academics who engaged in the debates over non- 
intervention as committed intellectuals, were others who did so as experts on 
international law. The juridical status of non-intervention was central to the 
arguments of Spanish Republicans such as Jimenez de Asüa who argued before 
Labour's Edinburgh Conference that the policy had no basis in international law, 
and therefore should be condemned in principle, regardless of its flawed practice. 
In early September 1936 the journal of the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme published 
the legal opinions on non-intervention of two left-leaning members of the Paris 
Faculty of Law, Professors Rene Cassin and Gaston Jeze 110 Both academics claimed 
that non-intervention was valid under international law, for while the Spanish 
Republican governments had a right to seek armaments from overseas, other 
governments also had the right not to supply arms. The position that non- 
intervention was valid under international law was supported by Louis Le Fur, 
Professor of International Law at the Paris Faculty of Law, who was also a strong 
supporter of Franco. In 1938 Le Fur argued that non-intervention was justified 
under the Covenant of the League of Nations, and that if France had intervened in 
Spain this would have caused a European war with Germany which is what the 
USSR desired. 111 Le Fur mixed politics and jurisprudence, arguing that the first 
large foreign intervention into the civil war had not been Italian pilots but the 
International Brigades organised by Moscow. 112 Such arguments were rejected by 
the Republican advocates such as Georges Scelle, who felt that non-intervention 
was inconsistent with both international law and the League of Nations. 113 Apart 
from the position of Le Fur, this debate over the legal validity of non-intervention 
never gained the same public prominence as the patrons of the Comite International 
de Coordination et d'Information pour l'Aide ä 1'Espagne Republicaine. 
Conclusion 
Given the extent to which reactions to non-intervention changed over time 
and the degree to which they divided groups and parties (with the exception of the 
PCF and CPGB), it is often difficult to establish exact perspectives on the policy. 
Debates over non-intervention followed the contours of the political forms 
established in British and French universities between 1934 and 1936. The views of 
110 Les Cahiers des Droits de I'Homme. 20/9/1936, pp. 636-640 111 Louis Le Fur, La Guerre d'Espagne et le Droit, Les Editions Internationales, Paris, 1938, 
pp 34-36. 
ll2Ibid. p. 37. 
113 Georges Scelle, "La Guerre Civile Espagnole et le Droit des Gens", Revue Generale de 
At International Public, 46,1939, pp. 197-228. 
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French students and British academics on non-intervention were strongly 
influenced by their commitment to party politics, not only by the constraints of 
party discipline but also by the internal debates on other matters of party policy. 
French academics and British students were far more independent from such 
concerns, though the former sought to act as public patrons for political coalitions 
outside university, whereas the latter were largely campus-focused. This difference 
between the universities of the two countries and the dynamics of their national 
politics meant that campaigns against non-intervention became a rallying point for 
broad coalitions in Britain, whereas in France they helped to widen political 
divisions amongst the left. 
Within British universities, the independence of student socialist societies 
from the Labour Party was partly derived from their campus-focus, and was 
reinforced by the way the debate over non-intervention within the party became 
linked to other issues. In France, dissent over non-intervention became part of the 
general ideological conflict between the various tendances of the SFIO, the most 
radical of which attracted a strong student following in Paris. The debate over non- 
intervention within the Labour Party was linked to wider campaigns to reform the 
constitutional structure of the party, issues with far less appeal to students. 
Not only did non-intervention change over time, and evoke reactions from a 
variety of view-points, it was also fundamentally connected to other forms of 
reaction to the war. Initial demands for humanitarian aid, refugee relief, the 
creation of the International Brigades and the growing concern with aerial 
bombardment all influenced the debate over the legitimacy of the arms embargo 
given the suffering of the Republic's civilian population. For communist activists at 
the time and some later historians, the campaign against non-intervention was only 
part of the wider campaign for aid for Republican Spain. Yet this link between 
politics and aid was far from straightforward. Within the Labour Party, SFIO and 
other groups such as CVIA, support for non-intervention was not inconsistent with 
pro-Republican humanitarian aid. As Tom Buchanan has argued, humanitarian aid 
could serve to mute the debate over non-intervention by channelling activists' 
energy into practical measures rather than general policy 114 Still, it is also true that 
the Republic's most powerful argument against non-intervention was the image of a 
suffering civilian population and therefore drew on the same motives of 
humanitarian relief. 
114 Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement, p. 118-9. 
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Most significantly, non-intervention focused pro-Republican propaganda on 
the dependence of Nationalist forces on foreign military aid, reinforcing the 
perception that the war was between a 'true Spain' and international Fascism. Thus, 
paradoxically, the very policy intended to contain the civil war in Spain, 





Just as recruitment for the International Brigades 'internationalised' the civil 
war, so did the flight of refugees from the divided country personally touch many 
outside Spain. Members of British and French universities were involved not only 
in specific efforts to help their Spanish peers, but also in more general campaigns 
for refugee relief. Care for academic refugees drew on the organisations which had 
been established for German refugees in 1933. In France these faced the same 
institutional restrictions that had constrained their earlier development, while in 
Britain the system of academic relief which had been created in 1933 was unsuited 
to the war in Spain. In the first year of the war, the specific problems of academic 
refugees were overshadowed in both countries by more general refugee campaigns, 
especially for children in the Republican zone. There were two dominant contrasts 
between British and French reactions to Spanish refugees: firstly the large sporadic 
waves of refugees from the war into France gave it a fundamentally different 
character and magnitude from the controlled evacuations to Britain; secondly, the 
organisation of refugee relief differed markedly between the two countries. In 
Britain, refugee relief literally developed out of the established broad-reaching 
coalition for humanitarian aid to Spain. In France, aid for Spain had been marked 
by the independent efforts of political parties and the union movement, and it was 
the latter which first organised care for Spanish refugees. Though this was joined by 
state, Catholic and other efforts, there remained a strong contrast between 
politicised refugee relief in France and the proclaimed non-political coalitions for 
refugee care in Britain, which provided differing opportunities for those within the 
universities of the two countries. 
Spanish Academic Refugees: British Efforts 
The exodus from German universities in 1933 created a variety of 
organisations, coalitions and campaigns in Britain and France for refugee academics 
and students. By the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, this international network of 
aid for academic refugees was firmly established, especially in Britain where the 
Academic Assistance Council's change of title in late 1935 to the Society for the 
Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL) symbolised its shift to a more permanent 
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footing. 1 The SPSL described itself as a "non-political, non-sectarian organisation" 
for the assistance of university teachers, meeting both the continuing needs of 
refugees from Germany and also new appeals from Austria, Russia, Italy and 
Portugal? 
The established strength of the SPSL meant that when the war in Spain 
erupted, British academics were ready to provide humanitarian assistance to their 
Spanish colleagues just as they had those from Germany. The SPSL's annual report 
of 1937 stated that, 
The civil war in Spain has led not only to the closing of universities and the 
cessation of most of the scientific research work that was proceeding but also 
to the flight abroad of many university teachers, research workers and 
students who were in danger from one or other or both of the main parties 
in the war. The Society has endeavoured to make contact with all these 
refugees, and has in several instances been able to give urgently needed help 
for the continuation of their research or for plans that may lead to their 
re-establishment. The existence of the Society and its accumulated 
experience has led to constructive work both for the Portuguese and for the 
Spanish refugees. It is clear that the services of the Society will be needed for 
further assistance to Spanish scholars, and that the probability of new 
demands on its resources is greater now than at the time the decision was 
taken to keep the organisation in being. 3 
Despite this concern with Iberian events, the SPSL found that it was difficult 
to provide the same assistance to Spanish academics which it had so successfully 
organised for German refugees during the previous three years. Symbolically, one 
of the first cases taken up by the SPSL was that of providing assistance to four 
German refugee academics who had taken up positions in Madrid before the war. 4 
There were very few Spanish academics who were refugees in the same permanent 
sense as the Germans, for in 1936 the war was seen as a short term affair which had 
temporarily displaced those in Spanish universities. After an extensive investigation 
for Spanish academic refugees, the SPSL concluded that, "at the moment there are 
very few and almost none in actual need' .5 That scarcely any refugee academics 
from Nationalist or Republican Spain arrived in Britain was confirmed during 
November 1936 by the SPSL's correspondence with University of Liverpool 
1 Cooper, Refugee Scholars, p. 39. 
2SPSL Third Annual Report, 22/ 7/ 1937, p. 3 in Ms SPSL 1, Bodleian Library. 
3lbid., p. 5. 
4 Letter of 28/8/1936, Ms SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
5 Letter of 21/ 10/ 1936, Ibid. 
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hispanist, Allison Peers .6 The Society was eventually able to report that the civil war 
had led to the flight of thirty Spanish academics, however the SPSL was unwilling 
to fully commit its resources until it was certain that these were unable to return to 
Spain.? 
Until 1938, the SPSL saw the war in Spain as too unsettled to make a public 
appeal for refugee academics, though in the interim it was able offer temporary 
assistance. 8 The Society reported that, 
it has assisted certain Spanish scholars to transfer from the territory of one 
side to the territory of the other according to their desire; it has given 
temporary support to some who have found refuge in this country or 
France; and has assisted by negotiations or by financial grants or loans some 
of the refugee university teachers to secure positions overseas .9 
This assistance included grants to two refugees and helping a third to visit Britain 
from France in search of a new academic post 10 Though the SPSL was a well- 
developed organisation for academic relief its conception of aid had been defined 
by its birth, and therefore it largely waited for events in Spain to emerge as a 
parallel to the German crisis of 1933. 
Spanish Academic Refugees: French Efforts 
For both the refugees from Germany in 1933 and Spain after 1936, France 
was the initial destination for the displaced. One Spanish academic visiting Britain, 
estimated that after six months of the civil war 15 Professors from the University of 
Madrid and 5 Professors from the University of Barcelona had found refuge in 
France 11 French efforts for academic refugees had been re-invigorated by the 
election of the Front Populaire which had substantially increased state funding for 
scientific research. 12 Still, as was the case for German refugees, the nationality 
restrictions on academic positions in French state universities were a heavy 
constraint on providing alternative employment for refugees from any country. 
6 Letters of 22/10/1936,9/11/1936,10/11/1936.16/11/1936,24/11/1936, Ibid. 
7 Reflecting the atrocities committed by both Nationalists and Republicans at the outbreak 
of the war it was noted that most of the academics refugees were liberals who feared both 
sides -The Universities Review. 9,2, May 1937, p 145. 8SPSL Third Annual Report. 22/ 7/ 1937, p. 7 in Ms SPSL 1, Bodleian Library. 
9SPSL Fourth Annual Report, Nov. 1938, p. 6 in Ms SPSL 1, Bodleian Library. 
10 Letter of 2/6/1937, Ms SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
11 Letter of 14/ 12/ 1936, Ibid. 
12 Pascal Ory, La Belle Illusion pp. 484-488. 
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Despite the greater contact with Spanish refugees, the political controversy 
aroused in France by the civil war and the formal depoliticisation of French 
universities, imposed substantial limits on what action could be undertaken for 
academic refugees. In April 1937, the Council of the Faculty of Letters in Paris 
debated whether to allow Bosch Gimperä, the Rector of the University of Barcelona, 
to present 12 lectures on Catalan culture and art at the Sorbonne 13 Though 
Gimperä had identified his lectures as'non-political', and had spoken at the 
University of Oxford the previous year, considerations of politics underpinned the 
Council's debate. 14 The Council identified three factors of concern, which were that 
only 5 lectures were specifically on art, that the school year was well advanced 
which create difficulties in finding students to attend, and that" 1'intention politique - 
manifestation enfaveur de 1'autonomie catalane - nest pas douteuse". 15 The Faculty was 
therefore willing to hold up to 4 lectures focusing exclusively on art, but proposed 
that any others should be postponed to the following academic year. Perhaps 
underlying this restraint was fear that Gimperä's lectures might provoke a chahut by 
nationalist students or public attacks by the nationalist press. Given the prevalence 
of lectures on the civil war in British universities by Spaniards and visitors to Spain, 
the internal and formal depoliticisation of French universities seems striking. 
In the same month as this debate the French Ambassador in Spain wrote to 
the Rector of the University of Paris to express his concern for the fate of Spanish 
intellectual refugees who may have reached Paris without resources. 16 The Rector 
replied in late April 1937, 
Nous voudrions bien pouvoir (je parle de 1'Universite de Paris) ameliorer le 
sort de collegues pour lesquelles nous ne pouvons et ne devons avoir en 
distinctement que de la sympathie. Mais vous comprenez combien nous 
sommes genes dans notre action, et pour des raisons qui ne dependent pas 
uniquement de la recherche de moyens materiels. L'aide aux intellectuels 
refugies, et particuliPrement aux Espagnols, est une question qui nous 
depasse. Comme vous le suggerez vous-meme, l'affaire est du ressort du 
Departement; je m'en suis d'ailleurs dejä entretenu avec le Quai d'Orsay et 
votre intervention personnelle serait sans aucun doute tres utile. 17 
13 Minutes of 24/4/1937, AJ16/4757, Archives Nationales. 
14 The Oxford Magazine. 19/11/36, p. 173. 
15 Minutes of 24/4/1937, AJ16/4757, Archives Nationales. 
16 Letter of 5/4/1937, AJ16/6969, Archives Nationales. 
17 "We wish we had the capacity (I speak of the University of Paris) to properly ameliorate 
the fate of our colleagues for whom we clearly have sympathy. But you understand how 
many obstacles hamper our efforts, and for reasons which do not only depend on the search 
for material means. The aid to refugee intellectuals, and particularly to the Spanish, is a 
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Perhaps more significant than organisational efforts for refugees were the 
informal aid provided by British and French academics to their Spanish colleagues. 
In Britain these most often involved hispanists, such as J. B. Trend at Cambridge, 
whose professional connections to Spain had extended into close friendships. 
During the war, two refugee Spanish academics and three families found 
accommodation in Cambridge, including Alberto Jimenez who stayed with 
Trend. 18 
French Refugee Relief 1936 -1937 
The civil war, far more than its rather stationary 1914-18 predecessor, was a 
conflict where the military front and civilian front frequently overlapped. The 
experience of bombardment, siege or street-fighting, as well as fears of the reprisals 
of the victors, consequently produced massive flows of refugees firstly within 
Spain, and increasingly into France. After Franco's quick march to Madrid in mid- 
1936, the capital had become the magnet for a huge displaced population. Initial 
international humanitarian aid efforts had been directed towards proving medical 
services at the front, but increasingly they focused on the provisioning, housing and 
sanitation problems of these refugees within Republican Spain. During October 
1936, the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief (NJCSR) and the Comite 
Francais de Secours aux Enfants were both involved in seeking to move children 
from Madrid, as the city itself became part of the front, to safer areas in Valencia 
and Catalonia. 19 
One of the first international efforts to provide refugee relief in the war was 
the Comit6 d'Accueil des Enfants d'Espagne (CAEE) founded by the CGT with 
assistance by Ligue des Droits de l'Homme 20 Its two patrons were Leon Jouhaux 
and Victor Basch. The new Comite d'Accueil after negotiations with the Spanish 
Republican government produced a plan to evacuate from Spain refugee children 
between the ages of 6 to 13 years old and to provide them with temporary 
accommodation in France. 21 After one month in a camp de triage near the Catalan 
questions which is beyond me. As you suggest yourself, the matter is the responsibility of 
the Department; I am moreover already in contact with the Quai d'Orsay and your personal 
intervention has been without doubt very useful" - Letter of 27/4/1937, AJ16/ 6969, 
Archives Nationales. 
18 Letters of 21/10/1936 & 9/12/ 1936, Ms SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
19 Pierre Marques, Les Enfants Espagnols Refugies en France (1936-1939) AutoEdition, 
Paris, 1993, p. 22. 
20 La Voix du Peuple July 1937, p. 456. 21 La Voix du Peuple. Dec 1936, p. 792. 
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frontier for the children to readjust to a new climate and language, they were then 
to be placed amongst families from the labour movement. Relying on the support of 
local union militants, the CAEE established fund-raising committees and hostels 
throughout France, These included hostels in the university towns of Aix, 
Bordeaux, Lille, Grenoble, Marseille and Montpellier. 22 
TABLE 7.1: NUMBER OF COLONIES FOR SPANISH REFUGEE CHILDREN 
FORMED ANNUALLY IN FRANCE23 
1936 1937 1938 1938 
Colonies 15 83 13 38 
TABLE 7.2: LOCATION AND SPONSORS OF COLONIES FOR SPANISH REFUGEE 
CHILDREN IN FRANCE24 
Location No. 
Paris region 35 
Midi / Pyrenees 20 
Vendee / Limousin 16 
Centre 9 
Brittany / Normandy 8 
Nord 6 





Spanish Republican Gov. 13 
Basque Gov. 10 
British Gov. 1 
French Gov. 22 
Municipal Authorities 9 
CAEE 54 
Trade Union 11 
Secours Populaire 2 
Rassemblement Populaire 1 
SFIO 1 
CNC 6 
The above tables reveals how refugee relief in France was concentrated at 
particular times, regions and groups. The formation of colonies for refugee children 
shows that 1937 and 1939 were the peak years for refugees, though as will be 
discussed in the final chapter, the character of these two waves was fundamentally 
distinct. Regionally, colonies were concentrated in Paris and close to the frontier, 
partly because of the accessibility of both by rail. The efforts of the CAEE were later 
parallelled by other groups with different motives, like the Comite National 
Catholique de Secours aux Refugies d'Espagne (CNC) which was formed in mid- 
1937 with the new influx of refugees from the Basque region. Despite these political 
22 Marques, Les Enfants Espagnols Refugies en France p. 37. 23 Hid. p. 120. 
24 Ibid., pp. 121-123. 
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differences, conditions within the colonies were remarkably similar. 25 Like 
humanitarian relief to Spain, the care of refugees in France remained divided 
between different political organisations. 26 
The sheer numbers of refugees fleeing to France during the Spanish civil war 
encouraged a highly distinctive, pro-active role by the French State. Though Blum's 
government was accused by many of betraying the Spanish Republic with its policy 
of non-intervention, it provided sympathetic treatment for Spanish refugees?? 
Departmental Prefects and municipal authorities were often leading local figures in 
the organisation of relief. 28 This high level of involvement in refugee relief by the 
French State had the effect of depoliticising the refugees themselves, though often 
tolerating highly political campaigns for their support. Participation in French 
politics was explicitly banned for Spanish refugees by State authorities, and their 
absence from political meetings, platforms and newspapers is striking, especially in 
contrast to their prominence in Britain. 
Basque Refugees to Britain 
In contrast to France, the National Government in Britain only briefly 
involved itself directly with the refugee crisis in Spain when at the end of April 1937 
it agreed to lend naval assistance for the evacuation of civilians from the coast of 
Northern Spain. 29 The evacuation itself, and more importantly the support of 
refugees after they had arrived in Britain, was organised by the National Joint 
Committee for Spanish Relief. With fears of the civilian casualties if the bombing of 
Guernica or the massacres of Badajoz were repeated in Bilbao, the NJCSR 
successfully lobbied a reluctant government to accept the evacuation of almost 4,000 
child refugees 30 These arrived in Southampton on 20 May 1937, and almost from 
25Ibid., p. 138. 
26 Symbolic of this politicisation of French refugee relief efforts is the disappearance of CGT 
records during the Occupation which has left few sources for the activities of the Comite 
d'Accueil des Enfants d'Espagne - Ibid., p. 105. 27 Iid., p. 44. 
28 In Toulouse aid efforts were led by the SFIO mayor, normalien Ellen Prevot, who strongly 
supported the Spanish Republic - Bulletin Municipal: Ville de Toulouse, April 1938, p. 247. 29 Marques, Les Enfants Espagnols Refugies en France (1936-1939) p. 53. 30 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 109-110; 
An estimated 15,000 refugee Basque children were sent to France - Dorothy Legarreta, The Guernica Generation: Basque Refugee Children of the Spanish Civil War University of 
Nevada Press, Reno, 1984, pp. 52 & 106. 
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the outset British academics and students were heavily involved in relief efforts for 
the Basque children 31 
The first public appeal for the Basque refugees in Cambridge was made on 
18 May 1937 by Canon Raven and Dr Plumb for the local branch of the NJCSR. 32 
They were seeking funds and a large empty house to establish a hostel for 50 to 100 
Basque children. They wrote, 
Cambridge has already responded very generously to the appeal made for 
Medical Aid, but we hope that this appeal on behalf of the Basque children, 
whose suffering have been so great, will meet with an even more generous 
response 
Even though this appeal directly followed three months of intensive campaigning 
by the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal, an initial meeting at the Guildhall, 
chaired by the Mayor of Cambridge, successfully raised 70 pounds for the refugees. 
On 17 June 1937,29 refugee children and 3 Spanish women arrived in Cambridge, 
greeted by a crowd of several hundred Republican supporters 34 
In Cambridge, there was a strong continuity between the new efforts to 
establish a Basque Hostel and other humanitarian campaigns for Spain. Inez 
MacDonald, a Research Fellow at Newnham College on sixteenth century Spain, 
served as secretary for the new refugee committee after having filled a similar post 
for the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal since February 1937. In the same year 
MacDonald had also visited the hospital established in Murcia by George Young's 
University Ambulance unit. Another figure linking the Cornford-Maclaurin 
Memorial Appeal and the local efforts for the Basque refugees was Professor 
Francis Cornford, who became treasurer of the new committee partly in tribute to 
his son's memory. 36 
Cambridge academics were not just the patrons of fundraising for the 
refugee children, but also personally involved in their care. Francis Cornford 
31 At a meeting of the AUT executive, Dr W. J. Lucas of Southampton led a collection of £7 
for the Basque refugees - Minutes of 28/5/ 1937, Mss 27/ 1/ 1/6, Modern Records Centre; 
Several LSE students worked as volunteers in the camp at Southampton when the refugees 
first arrived - Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 694. 32 Jessie Stewart, ed., 'Recuerdos': The Basque Hostel at Cambridge, Cambridge Daily News, 
Cambridge, c1939, p. 2; 
The Granta. 26/5/1937, p. 437; 
The Cambridge Review. 21 / 5/ 1937, p. 414. 
33The Granta. 26/5/1937, p. 437. 
34 Stewart, 'Recuerdos'. p. 4. 
Newnham College Register 1871-1971. Vol 1, Newnham College, Cambridge, 1979, p. 20. 
36 Interview with Allison Duke, Cambridge, March 1996. 
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invited the children to his windmill on the Norfolk Coast for a month over the 
following summer. 37 Trend took the children to performances by the Cambridge 
University Spanish Society and to the ballet 38 Dr Stewart, the Dean of Trinity 
College also offered hospitality to the Basque refugees 39 In mid-January 1938, 
when the refugees faced losing their temporary accommodation at the Pampisford 
Vicarage, they moved into a small villa offered by Jesus College. 40 
The evacuation from Bilbao not only gave British communities direct contact 
with the civil war in human terms, but for some it was also an encounter with the 
complex politics of the divided Republic. The refugee children who were sent to 
Cambridge were all from the same hostel in Bilbao which had been run by the 
Spanish Socialist Party for the orphans of its militiamen. 41 They were therefore a 
homogenous and highly politicised group, with a very different view of Basque 
Nationalism from the adults who were their hosts. Though the children were from 
Bilbao, they were not ethnic Basques and did not recognise the Basque anthem 
which greeted them on their arrival to Cambridge. 42 As one Cambridge aid worker 
would later write, 
The deep cleavage between the Basque Nationalists and the Socialists was 
scarcely realised here, and it was a dangerous pitfall to well-meaning friends 
with a little knowledge of politics. 43 
The little touches which had been intended to make these 'Basque' refugees feel 
more at ease, such as a welcome cake with the words "Gora Euzkadi" and a large 
picture of Basque President Jose Aguirre at the hostel, only aroused the children's 
political hostility. 44 As Republicans, rather than Basque nationalists, they asked for 
the portrait of Aguirre to be removed. This differences in perspectives, between the 
37 Stewart, 'Recuerdosp. 24. 
38 Ibid. 
Academics were also patrons for the national Basque Children's Committee, including its 
mass meeting on "Spain and Culture" held at the Royal Albert Hall on 24 June 1937. 
Speakers included the painters Picasso and Constable, writer Heinrich Mann, and French 
academic Langevin, while the meeting was sponsored by Abercrombie, Blackett, Le Gros 
Clark, Haldane, MacMurray, Singer, and Trend - flyer, LP/ SCW/ 14/ 6, National Museum of 
Labour History. 
39 NJCSR press release - WG/ SPA/ 594, National Museum of Labour History. 40 Stewart, 'Recuerdos', pp. 23-24. 
41 Eid. p. 8. 
42 Transcript of recorded interview with Tony McLean, pp. 69-70 in 838/5, Imperial War 
Museum. 
Legarreta notes the political tension amongst the children at the camp in Southampton, and 
she writes that half of them supported the main Basque Nationalist Party (Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco). Her own sympathies for Basque nationalism mean that she does not 
examine to what extent the situation in Cambridge was exceptional. - Legarreta, The Guernica Generation. pp. 111 & 253-254. 
43 Stewart, 'Recuerdos'. p. 9. 
44 Ibid. 
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children and their British hosts, reveals the tension that was possible between the 
'hard' politics of the front in Spain and the 'soft' politics of British relief work. 
Another issue faced by the Cambridge Committee was the extent to which 
the children should become involved in fundraising for their own maintenance. The 
London-based national Basque Children's Committee had from an early stage of its 
existence used performances by the refugee children of traditional Basque dances as 
a profitable source of fundraising 45 The Cambridge committee were initially 
opposed to such concerts as they did not want to exploit children, yet eventually the 
local committee yielded to the children's own desire to make a contribution to the 
Republican cause. Muting their socialist objections to Basque nationalism, both the 
boys and girls learned traditional Basque dances, though they adopted blue 
costumes rather than the traditional red. `s' Their tours to surrounding towns and 
by other refugee groups became a prevalent focus for relief efforts. These "endless 
Basque concerts" reinforced the distance between humanitarian efforts for 
Republican Spain and party politics in Britain 47 The performances combined the 
powerful images of the Republic as defending the 'true' Spain of traditional Basque 
culture and that of the suffering of innocent non-combatants, which meant that 
refugees were far more prominent in public meetings in Britain than in France 48 As 
in Cambridge, these de-politicised images of the children could be quite different 
from their experiences in Spain. 
As part of their performance tour, the Cambridge Basque children visited 
Oxford where they drew an estimated audience of 800 people 49 There was no 
hostel for refugees within Oxford, but academics and students were involved with 
several located nearby 50 One attempt to channel this concern was a concerted 
campaign amongst Oxford College students to sponsor the support of an individual 
Basque children. During January 1938, the JCR's of the Colleges were circularised 
about 'adopting' a Basque child, and by the time the JCR of Corpus Christi College 
debated the issue two other JCRs had already accepted 51 At Corpus it was 
45 Ibid., pp. 17-18 & 24. 
46 Ibid., p. 19. 
47 Transcript of recorded interview with Tony McLean, p. 71. 
48 The prominence of the Basque children was important at a time where British 
immigration authorities were keen to restrict the propaganda activities of Spanish or French 
political activists in Britain. 
9( Arthur Excell, "Spanish Civil War & Oxford", p. 14 in Mss 12 Arthur Excell Papers, 
Ruskin College Archives. 
50 Mrs Carritt, wife of don E. F. Carritt, took supplies of vegetables to the Basque camp at 
Labourne - The Oxford Magazine, 17/6/ 1937, p. 757. 51 Minutes of 23/ 1/ 1938, JCR Minutes Book 1933-1944, Corpus Christi College Archives, 
Oxford. 
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proposed that to maintain a Basque refugee for six months would cost each JCR 
member 2 shillings. The JCR minutes record that, 
It was at this point that Mr Urmsen began a running accompaniment of 
remarks to the effect that he didn't want to support a communist; that some 
had been known to clench fists and sing the internationale; and in any case 
they looked revolting 52 
However, this resistance was effectively side-stepped as the President of the JCR 
offered that Corpus would adopt a comely and reactionary child, after which the 
motion was carried by 35 votes to 9 against. The 'undergraduate' tone of the debate 
was reinforced by the discussion which immediately followed the motion over 
which sex the refugee was to be, with only one of the all-male JCR not wanting to 
adopt a female. Though such a debate would have appalled those students who 
were committed to 'serious politics', by accepting the 'undergraduate' tone of the 
forum, the debate had been successful in mobilising the JCR for a cause that was 
also highly political. 53 
Amongst other Oxford colleges, students from Lincoln College pledged 13 
pounds for two Basques refugees over three months, while those at Oriel College 
agreed to sponsor one child for three months . 
54 Aside from this fundraising, the 
members of the Labour Club from Oriel and St. Hildä s arranged an afternoon play 
group for the Basques 55 A similar visit by Basque refugees was organised at 
Somerville College for afternoon tea and games, though it was noted that the 
language barrier had presented a problem for the guest and the hosts .% As Michael 
Alpert argues, "the children personalised the issues for wide sections of the 
population especially when they were distributed all over the country in small 
groups" 57 Like humanitarian aid, these efforts for refugee Basque children mixed 
and clouded over any simple polarisation of political concern or humanitarian 
motives. What is clear is the real commitment to the children which many British 
52 paid. 
53 Though JCR discussion was largely marked by a lack of seriousness, political agendas 
could be pushed if they adapted to such a forum. At Corpus Christi, the JCR agreed to 
subscribe to the CPGB's Daily Worker on the grounds that it provided the most 
comprehensive coverage of Scottish lower division football results, rather than as the 
tribune of world revolution - Minutes of 28/11/1937, JCR Minutes Book 1933-1944, Corpus 
Christi College Archives; 
contra Brian Harrison, "College Life 1918-1939" in Brian Harrison, ed., The History of the 
University of Oxford, Vol 8: The Twentieth Century, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 95- 
96. 
54 The Oxford Magazine . 17/2/1938, p. 418&419. Ibid., p. 430. 
The Oxford Magazine, 10/3/1938, p. 517. 
57 Alpert, "Humanitarianism and Politics in the British Response to the Spanish Civil War", 
1936-9", p. 232. 
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students and academics felt. The female students of St Hilda's College JCR were still 
supporting their 'adopted' Basque child during the 1939-40 academic year. 58 
Catholic Refugee Relief and the Debate over Repatriation 
Though the relief efforts for the refugees from Northern Spain in mid-1937 
drew strongly from those who were already engaged in humanitarian aid 
campaigns for Spain, they also marked the involvement of new groups in the war. 
The difficulties of the Catholic relief efforts which were created to care for Basque 
Catholic refugees represented a new stage in debates over the position of religion in 
the civil war. From the opening of the war British and French Catholics had often 
been involved in debates over the legitimacy of the Spanish Republic, sometimes 
unwillingly. The outbreak of the war had been accompanied by a wave of 
spontaneous anti-dericalism which became key for defenders and opponents of the 
revolt. The image of an anticlerical fury in which nearly 7,000 Spanish clerics were 
killed, provided a powerful symbol for those who attacked the Republic's moral, 
civil and political disorder? 9 For the Republic's supporters, the atrocities had been a 
short-lived reaction by the repressed provoked by the military revolt which 
demonstrated how unpopular, anachronistic, unrepresentative and illegitimate the 
Catholic Church was in Spain. Despite the testimonies of liberal Spanish Catholic 
intellectuals and international delegations to the Republic's respect for freedom of 
religion, and of Nationalist propagandists to portray their war as a crusade of faith, 
attempts to claim religious sanction by either side were riddled with ambivalence 
and ambiguity as reflected in the relief efforts for the Basque refugees. 
The massive sea-borne evacuation of Northern Spain was initially directed 
towards the Atlantic ports of South-Western France. During the months of May, 
June and July 1937, an estimated 90,000 refugees left Bilbao, Santander and finally 
the Asturias 60 In mid-1937 the Comite d'Accueil des Enfants d'Espagne recorded 
that it was caring for 8,000 children from Bilbao and Santander, as well as another 
1,500 children from Toledo, Madrid, and Malaga who had been placed in hostels in 
France. 61Arising out of the relief efforts of local clergy in the Gironde a Comite 
National Catholique de Secours aux Refugies d'Espagne (CNC) was formed during 
58 St Hilda's Chronicle. 39,1939-1940, p. 10 59 Jose M. Sanchez, The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy, University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1987, p. 9 60 Legarreta, The Guernica Generation pp. 50 & 341. 61 La Voix du Peuple, July 1937, p. 466. 
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August 1937 62 The Comite National Catholique was endorsed by the Archbishops 
of Paris and Bordeaux, Cardinal Verdier and Monsignor Feltin, who served as its 
Honorary Presidents. 
The formation of the Basque Children's Committee in Britain had allowed 
the NJCSR to secured the support of the TUC and Catholic hierarchy during the 
May crisis of 1937.63 However, after several months, the British Catholic press and 
hierarchy began publicly supporting calls for the repatriation of the children. Three 
factors motivated this reversal by the British Catholic Church, partly because it had 
always seen the evacuation as only a temporary measure, partly because of the 
financial strain of supporting the refugees, and partly because of the combined 
pressure of the total endorsement of Nationalist cause by the Spanish Church 64 
Underlying the debate over repatriation was whether military events or 
political conditions should be responsible for determining when the refugees were 
returned to their families. Nationalist supporters in Britain lobbied for the return of 
the children to Spain, while Republican supporters saw such an action as absolutely 
unacceptable. Both sides accused the other of putting politics above the real 
interests of the children. The Committee of the Cambridge Home for Basque 
Children publicly defended its opposition to repatriation stating that, 
Certain persons in the press and elsewhere... have seen fit to turn a work of 
common kindness into a political bear-garden and make these unhappy 
infants the pawns of party-feeling. Bringing the children to England has at 
least spared them the horrors of the last battles and air raids in Bilbao; it has 
saved some, undoubtedly, from mutilation or death 65 
The letter stressed that children would be returned to Spain if their parents made a 
bona fide request for them. The deep commitment of the Cambridge committee, and 
political nature of refugees in its care, meant that during the civil war's final 
months, when even the national leadership of the Basque Children's Committee 
was calling for repatriation if possible, all 29 children in Cambridge were fostered 
by local familiesffi Even as late as November 1938, the Oxford University Spanish 
62 Marques, Les Enfants Espagnols Refugien en France, p. 114. 63 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 111. 64 Ibid., pp. 114-115. 
65 The Cambridge Review, 12/ 11/ 1937, p. 90 
Gilbert Murray declined to write a similar letter to The Times for the Basque Children s 
Committee, though he was indignant at the attacks calling for repatriation - Letter of 17/ 9/ 1937, No. 82, Mss Gilbert Murray, Modem Manuscripts, Oxford. 
66 Stewart, 'Recuerdos', p. 25. 
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Democrats Defence Committee were able to secure 3,000 signatures for a petition 
that the Basque children be allowed to stay in Britain 67 
Dorothy Legaretta's comprehensive survey of the relief efforts for Basque 
refugees argues that the Catholic Church was one of the central promoters of 
Nationalist attempts to force the repatriation of the refugees 68 However, Catholic 
opinion was far more divided that Legaretta allows, as the Church hierarchy 
contained many conceptions of politics and its relationship to faith. While there was 
a striking demographic different between the Catholic populations of Britain and 
Prance, it is interesting to note that the heated debate over Basque repatriation 
between British religious and political groups, was largely absent in France. This 
was partly because French trade unions and Catholic groups maintained their own 
very separate refugee efforts. There was no central body such as the Basque 
Children's Committee in Britain in which the different conceptions of relief could 
clash. By the end of 1937, the Comite d'Accueil des Enfants d'Espagne estimated 
that there were 35,000 Spanish refugees in France, 10,000 of whom were children 
placed with families 69 Legarreta estimates that there was relatively little immediate 
repatriation of Basque children in France, though her estimates seem unusually low 
given the high numbers of refugees from Northern Spain. Probably, the effect of 
placing children with individual families and the reluctance of State authorities to 
create a potential issue by moving refugees in groups, meant that Basque refugees 
in France trickled back to Spain without the public debates that occurred in Britain. 
Another key reason explaining the different reactions in Britain and France 
to Basque repatriation was the ambivalent relationship between Catholic faith and 
politics. Those who have focused on the religion's impact on the Spanish civil war 
have stressed how religion divided and polarised support for the Republic and the 
Nationalists 70 Far less studied is the degree to which religion fuelled a 
disengagement from political debate, despite the efforts of both left and right to 
claim its support. In France, the large corporate students groups for Catholics, the 
Jeunesse Etudiante Chretienne and the Jeunesse Etudiante Chretienne Feminine, 
both deliberately distanced themselves from the political clashes of their peers. 71 
Significantly, French Catholic students only officially became involved in Catholic 
67 Excell, "Spanish Civil War & Oxford", p. 12. 
68, Legarreta, The Guernica Generation, p. 202. 
69 Marques, Les Enfants Espagnols Refugie s en France, p. 151. 
70 Sanchez, The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy, p. xiii. 71 P. Drujon, IEC: 15 ans d'Histoire (1929-1944), JEC, Paris, 1944, p. 32; 
Les Amis de la JCEF, Paris, 1981, p. 122. 
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relief efforts at the end of the war, when refugee relief was a much less controversial 
issue. While the Basque exodus involved Catholics in both Britain and France in the 
established humanitarian campaigns of the left of both countries, there was no 
single Catholic position on the war and often their conception of aid and politics 
was considerably different from those of Nationalist and Republican supporters. 
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Chapter 8 
Humanitarian Aid (April 1937 - April 1938) 
From the outset of the civil war, there had been a contrast between the broad 
coalitions which organised Spanish relief in Britain and the party-focused aid efforts 
in France. These differences between the campaigns were intensified over the 
course of the war due to the changing events in Spain, international currents and 
the domestic politics of Britain and France. The Nationalist offensive in Northern 
Spain, which opened on 31 March 1937, marked a new phase in the war, and 
generated new international concerns for the besieged civilian population of that 
area. For academics and students in Britain, relief for the encircled Basque country 
reinforced existing coalitions amongst political and non-political groups, while 
French campaigns for the same cause were marked by increasing inter-party 
tension. These contrasts were further accentuated by the other issues and debates 
which humanitarian aid to Spain was linked to in each country. Within British 
universities, aid campaigns for Spain ran together with those for academic refugees 
in China and Austria. In France, it was domestic politics rather than international 
events which most profoundly shaped the new relief efforts that developed after 
Blum's return to power in March 1938. Academics and students faced different 
opportunities for action over Spain, depending on how humanitarian aid was 
organised, the relationships between domestic political parties and the other events 
to which the civil war was linked in their respective countries. 
The Changing Face of the War. The Northern Front 
After the failure of attacks around Madrid, which culminated with the 
Republic's successful defence of Guadalajara in mid-March 1937, the Nationalist 
army opened their offensive in the Basque country confident of a quick campaign. 1 
With their overwhelming air superiority, the new Nationalist offensive was marked 
by concentrated and well coordinated air and artillery bombardment. The aerial 
attacks on civilians and the Nationalist naval blockade of Northern ports generated 
increasing international concern for the civilian population of the Basque country. 
Like the battle for Madrid, this new phase of the war mixed humanitarian 
assistance for the besieged civilians, efforts at relief for refugees and political attacks 
1 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 612-616. 
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on non-intervention? Central to these concerns was the dramatic role played in 
Nationalist military operations by the aircraft and personnel supplied by Germany 
and Italy .3 The destruction of Durango on the opening day of the offensive, was to 
be repeated on other Basque towns behind the front throughout the following 
months as the Condor Legion consciously experimented with different approaches 
to aerial attacks on military and civilian targets. These attacks culminated on 26 
April 1937 with the bombing of Guernica. As Raymond Carr writes, "Guernica 
made such an impression on the European imagination because it was the first 
example of the horrors of modern war" .4 Though reactions to Guernica were very 
different in the French press compared to their British peers, in both countries the 
bombing campaign was a powerful spur to humanitarian aid and refugee relief 
efforts in the Basque country. 5 
Foodships for Bilbao 
Coalitions within British campuses had developed amongst left-wing and 
religious student societies during anti-war campaigns between 1933 and 1936. From 
the beginning of the civil war, these coalitions had sometimes been extended to 
include Conservative students through fundraising for humanitarian aid for non- 
combatants in Spain. These coalitions had developed differently within the separate 
campuses, and there were few efforts which matched the broad alliance in 
Cambridge which sponsored the Cornford-Maclaurin Memorial Appeal. One of the 
subjects of the Appeal had been a Foodship to Spain organised by the British Youth 
Peace Assembly (BYPA) which was intended to represent these local student 
coalitions at a national level. By early 1937, the student committee of the British 
Youth Peace Assembly included representatives of University Conservatives, 
University Liberals, University Labour Federation, British University League of 
2 Headline "Le massacre de Guernica est le resultant de la 'non-intervention'! " - L'Humanite, 
30/4/1937, p. 1. 
3Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 614. 
4 Raymond Carr, The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective. 2nd ed, Weidenfeld, 
London, 1988, p. 187. 
5 The different press coverage that Guernica recieved in Britain and France is detailed in the 
works of Southworth and Pike. This contrast was partly due to the location of journalists in 
the Basque campaign, for while Philip Steer of The Times was with Republican forces near 
Guernica, the first French reporters to arrive at the town were travelling with the 
Nationalists and followed their version that the Basques had destroyed the town 
themselves. This difference was reinforced by France's more politicised press which gave 
two polarised visions of the war throughout the conflict - Herbert Rutledge Southworth, 
Guernica! Guernica!: A Study of Journalism Diplomacy Propaganda and History 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, pp. 137-138; 
Pike, La Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne, pp. 217-225. 
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Nations Society, and the Student Christian Movement. The corporate National 
Union of Students (NUS) supported the BYPA as an associate member .6 This broad- 
reaching national coalition was formed around the provision of humanitarian aid to 
Spain, and the BYPA was affiliated to the National Joint Committee for Spanish 
Relief. The NUS described the BYPA's operations in 1937 as, 
concerned almost entirely with the issues arising from the war in Spain. 
Food, clothing and money were collected in the universities and colleges in a 
great campaign which reached its climax in the autumn.? 
In early 1937, the BYPA launched two appeals for Foodships to Spain, the second of 
which was directed to the besieged Basques as the Nationalists' Northern offensive 
intensified. 
The development of the Foodship appeals within University College 
London, reveal the extent to which coalitions for humanitarian relief in Spain were 
increasingly successful. The Union sponsored a Spanish Foodship Sub-Committee, 
which included representatives from the SCM, ISS, Peace, Socialist and Jewish 
students' societies. 8 During the first fortnight of March there were collections of 
"food (coffee, sugar, condensed milk), clothes, and money" .9 Collection tables were 
set up in the Union Lounges, and most of the fund raising was done during 
lunchtime. The organisers of the appeal "hoped to show the new Ivor Montague 
[sic] film, if it is realised in time, and to get the Cambridge Spanish exhibition" 10 At 
the end of the fortnight, three packing cases of tinned food, six parcels of warm 
clothing, and 5 pounds in cash had been collected for the first Youth Foodship. 11 
A special appeal for the Bilbao Youth Foodship was launched within UCL at 
the end of April 1937. The campaign was again organised through a Youth 
Foodship Committee, but was also supported by the International Society and 
individual members of the Catholic Society 12 The sponsors of the appeal asked 
their fellow students to, 
See report of the British delegation on the terrible shortage of food in the 
6 NUS 1922-1943, p. 9, in Mss 280/144/8/4,, Modern Records Centre. 
7Ibid. 
8 Preceding the first aid campaign in UCL was a talk on 22 February 1937 by the Liberal 
MP, Wilfrid Roberts, on 'The International Significance of Spain" in which he gave an 
account of existing relief work. Roberts had visited Spain in November 1936 as part of an all- 
party delegation of British MPs, and on his return had become one of the leaders of pro- 
Republican aid efforts - Phineas. 2/ 2/ 1937, p. 3; 9Phineas. 2/3/1937, p. 2. 
10 mid. 
Montagu released two films on Spain during 1937. 
11 Phineas. 18/3/1937, p. 4. 
12 University College Magazine, June 1937, p. 339. 
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Basque country. This is no political question but one of common 
humanitarian principles. 13 
Instead of lunch-time collections, the second appeal was organised differently from 
its predecessor, 
It was decided that collecting cards should be distributed to individual 
members of the societies, in the hope that this method of collection would be 
more successful than the more general method adopted last term. 
The campaign began with a meeting on May 3rd, at which Monica Whately, 
a member of the Church Delegation to Spain, gave a most moving account of 
some of her recent experiences in the Basque country. On May 13th a sound 
film, 'News from Spain, " was shown. Hugh Gosschalk, a member of the 
Student Delegation to Spain, made a brief appeal for help; the need of which 
was most adequately illustrated by the film. 14 
The importance of the testimony of Whately and Gosschalk on conditions inside 
Spain reveals the large role that the first-hand experiences of visiting delegations, 
like those of the International Brigades, had in pro-Republican fundraising. 
Before the campaign's second week, the Foodship Committee had been 
seeking to raise 20 pounds, a total it in fact doubled. 15 This success was partly a 
reflection of the improved organisation of fundraising and perhaps more 
importantly reflected the increased humanitarian concern for suffering in Bilbao. 
This coalition within UCL would be reinforced after the Nationalist conquest of the 
Basque country by the efforts of the same student societies to financially 'adopt' one 
of the young Basque refugees in June 1937.16 Humanitarian aid and refugee relief 
overlapped, but both appealed to student groups other than those on the political 
left. Given the success of the Youth Foodship appeal, it is surprising in a way, that 
student efforts had remained almost completely confined to campus. Fund-raising 
for aid and refugees was conducted through the Union and the student societies, 
but not by students groups on the streets of London. This campus focus in Britain 
made possible broad-ranging coalitions for humanitarian aid which in France were 
increasingly militated against by the tensions of party politics. 
13 Phineas, 27/4/1937, p. 3. 
14 University College Magazine, June 1937, p. 339; 
The film "News from Spain" was also shown at LSE as part of fundraising for Spanish relief - 
Union Annual Report, 1937, p. 5, LSE 67-J, LSE Archives. 
15 Phineas. 11 / 5/ 1937, p. 1; 
Early donations had been almost equally divided between staff and students, so that given 
the large student meeting of 13 May 1937 it seems more probable that their proportion of 
contributions would have increased. - Phineas, 25/ 5/ 1937, p. 3. 16 Phineas, 8/6/1937, p. 1. 
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French Reactions to the Basque Offensive 
Relations between the SFIO and PCF had been strained by the debate over 
the Front Populaire's non-intervention policy, and were further aggravated in 
March 1937 by the government's 'pause' in economic reform and the dramatic 
shooting of anti-fascist protesters in Clichy. The tensions between the two parties 
made both keen to maintain their own separate relief efforts for Republican Spain 
within the loose framework of the Rassemblement Populaire. 17 On 3 May 1937, a 
few days after the Nationalists had begun their offensive in the Basque country, the 
PCF secretariat launched a new appeal to organise Foodships to the besieged 
North. 18 Carlos Serrano described the motives behind the Comite Bilbao as, "cette 
acfivite a une dimension humanitaire; eile est politique avant tout". 19 The committee was 
led by prominent Communists politicians (Cachin, Duclos and Peri), Party 
intellectuals (Valliant-Couturier and Aragon) and independents (Malraux, Rolland, 
and Bayet). While earlier aid efforts by all parties had been coordinated under the 
Rassemblement Popular, the Comite Bilbao represented a distinct campaign 
organised and patronised by the PCF. In response, members of the SFIO launched 
their own aid campaign so that throughout May 1937 Le Populaire and L'Humanite 
carried competing national appeals for food and medical supplies for the besieged 
Basques 2° 
The SFIO Foodship appeal for Bilbao originated around the same time as the 
PCF, from the opponents of non-intervention within the party (the Comite d'Action 
Socialiste pour 1'Espagne supported by the Seine Federation of the SFIO)? 1 On 7 
May 1937, the party leadership took over the appeal, creating a Comite Socialiste de 
Secours pour Bilbao which appealed directly to the secretaries of the Party's 
Federations 22 The committee's aims were to raise funds within the party that 
would feed the civilian population, provide medical aid to the wounded and help 
to evacuate women, children and the elderly. 
17 The Jeunesses Socialistes refused to participate in the national days to collect for Spain 
organised by the Jeunesses Communists on 5-6/ 2/ 1937 and 17-18/ 9/ 1937 - Serrano, L'Enjeu Espagnol, p. 137. 
18 Ibid. pp. 113-114. 
19 Ibid., p. 114. 
20 L'Humanite, 6/5/ 1937, p. 1; 
Le Populaire, 6/ 5/ 1937, p. 1. 
21 Le Populaire, 4/5/1937, p. 6; 
Le Populaire, 6/ 5/ 1937, p. 1. 
22 Le Populaire, 8/5/ 1937, p. 3; 
Le Populaire, 11/5/1937, p. 4. 
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Collecting for the same purpose far more successfully was the PCFs Comite 
Bilbao, which within ten days of its formation had sent two Foodships to Spain 
carrying a claimed 100,000 francs worth of supplies. 23 The speed of this aid may 
partly be attributable to the Comite Bilbao 's decision to organise its national 
collections through the train station at Bordeaux and the PCF stronghold of 
Montreuil in Paris"red belt' of Communist suburbs. 24 Amongst the published 
donors to the Comite Bilbao were academics Langevin, Bayet and Wallon who each 
gave symbolic sums 25 By 25 May 1937, the Comit6 Bilbao claimed 565,613 francs 
had been raised across France. 26 Twenty five trucks were to leave Paris with 60,000 
kilos of food and material, which would be sent on three more Foodships to 
Bilbao 27 In comparison, the appeal of the Comite Socialiste de Secours had only 
reached 89,107 francs by the end of May 1937.28 In the first week of June 1937, as the 
defences around Bilbao collapsed, the Comite Socialiste de Secours appeal for aid 
also became an appeal for families to billet the refugee children from the town. 29 
Part of the PCF's success in organising Foodships for Bilbao was through the 
formation of local fundraising committees by party militants and other supporters 
across France. In Bordeaux, a Comite Girondin pour Bilbao was created, which 
claimed support from local numerous groups 30 The Bordeaux committee was 
chaired by Professor Daudin who also presided at a mass fundraising meeting for 
Republican Spain in the town on 28 May 1937. At the same time as these efforts, the 
Union Federale des Etudiants in Bordeaux were finishing an appeal for an 
ambulance for Republican Spain which had been launched before the Easter 
holidays 31 Nationally, the appeal had raised 13,092 francs, which was collected by 
nearly 100 students 32 In mid-May 1937 the UFE students of Bordeaux were 
23 L'Humanite, 13/ 5/ 1937, p. 1. 
24 L'Humanite, 15/ 5/ 1937, p. 1; 
Later collection depots were established in Tours, Orleans, Limoges, Bourges, Poitiers and 
Lyon - L'Humanite. 19/ 5/ 1937, p. 3; 
L'Humanite. 23/5/1937, p. 3. 
25 L'Humanite, 9/ 5/ 1937, p. 1; 
L'Humanite, 13/5/1937, p. 3. 
26 L'Humanite, 25/ 5/ 1937, p. 3. 
27 L'Humanit6,24/ 5/ 1937, p. 3; 
L'Humanite. 27/ 5/ 1937, p. 3. 
28 Le Populaire. 31/5/1937, p. 7; 
In the second week of July 1937, the Comite Bilbao dAide au Peuple Basque claimed a total 
of 1,655,000 francs raised, while the Comite Socialiste de Secours ä l'Espagne Republicaine 
reported 229,208 francs raised - report of 9/ 7/ 1937, BA 1665, APPP. 29 Le Populaire, 6/6/1937, p. 1. 30 Le Gironde Populaire. 21/5/1937, p. 1; 
The Comit6 Girondin pour Bilbao had first been announced the week before - Le Gironde Populaire, 16/ 5/1937, p. 1. 
31 Report of 8/5/1937,1 M 605, AD Gironde. 
32 Report of 10/5/1937,1 M 605, AD Gironde. 
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extending their appeal to local unions in the Gironde and the local deputies of the 
Front Populaire. It is likely, given the massive influx of Basque refugees by sea and 
by rail into Bordeaux that the local UFE students also became involved in Daudin's 
aid and relief efforts. 
By January 1938 the Comite pour Bilbao claimed to have raised 3,500,000 
francs 33 However, despite this national success, these efforts were still shaped by 
local debates over Basque relief which reveal the politicised nature of French 
humanitarian aid and the significant tensions between the parties of 
Rassemblement Populaire. 
The Comite pour Bilbao in Toulouse 
In Toulouse, from early August 1936 humanitarian aid for Republican Spain 
had been organised by a Comite d'Aide au Peuple Espagnol, which had included 
representatives from the SFIO, CGT, PCF, Secours Rouge, Ligue des Droits de 
l'Homme and other groups. 34 In early March 1937 the committee was re-organised 
into a Commission de Solidarit6 d'Aide au Peuple Espagnol with the same parties 
represented, although the new organisation was headed by a Secretary-General 35 
This post was occupied by the local secretary of the SFIO who also emerged as the 
directing hand of the Commission. The Commission relaunched the appeal for aid 
(of which a third was to go to the families of local volunteers in the International 
Brigades), and in March 1937 collected 22,521 francs, including a contribution of 
1,000 francs from a Comite d'Aide des Etudiants 3 Though the Commission 
formally represented a broad coalition of local parties, it was far more centralised 
than its predecessor, and was closer to the SFIO, which were key elements in a 
confrontation which occurred two months later. 
On 9 May 1937, the newspaper Le Midi Socialiste announced the formation of 
a new aid campaign with the establishment of a provisional Comite pour Bilbao in 
Toulouse 37 The new committee claimed the patronage of eminent local 
personalities, including academics from the University of Toulouse. Donations were 
to be sent to the pro-Communist Secours Populaire and the Amis de 1'URSS or to 
the left-wing Catholic group the Jeune Republique. 
33 CICIAER letter of 15/1/1938, p. 8, in F7/ 14741, Archives Nationales. 
34 Le Midi Social iste. 3/8/1937, p. 3. 
35 Le Midi Social iste. 4/3/1937, p. 4. 
36 Le Midi Socialiste. 6/5/1937, p. 4. 
37 Le Midi Socialiste. 9/5/1937, p. 5. 
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The response from the Commission de Solidarite was immediate and 
absolute. The following day, the Commission published a resolution in Le Midi 
Socialiste that it was the only nationally recognised body in Toulouse mandated to 
collect for humanitarian relief in Spain 38 Only the Commission was qualified to 
organise relief for Bilbao and it therefore launched its own appeal. The 
Commission's response was signed by its office holders, the local leaders of the 
Socialist party, trade unions and the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme. The 
Communists though represented on the Commission did not hold office, nor would 
they have been willing to censure the Comite pour Bilbao of which they were the 
anonymous initiators. The confrontation reveals the very real strength of the SFIO 
in Toulouse local politics, as well as the strong tensions between the parties of the 
French left on a national level. 
The Comite pour Bilbao was killed at birth in Toulouse. Its unnamed 
supporters from the university remained unnamed, although it is reasonable to 
suspect that they were the same academics who had supported a petition creating a 
Comite Universitaire des Amis de l'Espagne Republicaine in mid-November 1936. 
The petition praising the Spanish Republic's fight against fascism had been signed 
by Professors Solua, Ducuing, Faucher, Bugnard, Guilhem, Valois as well as 38 
school teachers, including 24 women 39 In late January 1937 the Comite 
Universitaire had organised a week-long exhibition of pro-Republican posters and 
photographs, and after their unsuccessful support for the Comite pour Bilbao, the 
leading figures of the Comite Universitaire would reappear the following year in a 
more university-centred medical aid committee. ` 0 Significantly, the success of this 
later campaign, like the demise of the local Comite pour Bilbao, was largely 
influenced by the support it received from the local SFIO. The SFIO's political 
hegemony in Toulouse was a crucial factor in shaping the opportunities available 
for students and academics in their humanitarian relief efforts for Spain. 
Interestingly it was not the political events in Barcelona during May 1937 which 
separated the SFIO and PCF, but rather their campaigns for relief for Bilbao. Both 
parties sought to maintain their own memberships by organising party-based aid 
campaigns, and the tensions between them were felt both nationally and locally. 
38Le Midi Socialiste. 10/5/1937, p. 5. 39 LaDepeche, 18/11/1936, p. 6; 
Le Midi Socialiste. 18/11/1936, p. 4. 
40 La Depeche. 22/ 1/ 1937, p. 6. 
La Depeche. 25/1/1937, p. 6. 
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May 1937: Bilbao and Barcelona 
The divisions between the PCF and SFIO over fundraising for humanitarian 
relief to Bilbao occurred at exactly the same time as the antagonism between 
Spanish Communists, anarchists and the POUM resulted in five days of street 
fighting amongst Republican forces in Barcelona. The clashes of the first week of 
May 1937 were followed a month later by the outlawing of the POUM and in 
August 1937 by the forcible dissolution of the anarchist Council of Aragon. Like the 
impact of non-intervention, this civil war within the civil war has been blamed by 
many historians as the decisive factor in the Republic's military collapse 41 Unlike 
the vigorous public debates which surrounded non-intervention in Britain and 
France, the split within the Republican camp symbolised by the May Days clashes 
in Barcelona, drew little comment during the war. 
Though some groups on the far left in both Britain and France made the 
causes of the POUM and the anarchists their own, these were rarely echoed within 
the political mainstream in both countries. 42 For the vast majority of academics and 
students in both countries, the mid-1937 change in the Spanish Republic's internal 
politics had little effect on their perceptions of the civil war. The unique sensitivity 
of the Etudiants Socialistes in Paris to the political divisions within the Spanish 
republic, as reflected in their arguments against non-intervention, were largely 
because they linked such conflicts to the "lutte des tendances" within their own 
party. 43 The absence of any major international debate over the May Days in Britain 
and France was due to two key factors; the image of the Republic as a symbol of 
political unity, and the politics of humanitarian aid. 
From the election of the Frente Popular in February 1936 and the unification 
of the Spanish Socialist and Communist Youth organisations, Spain had been seen 
internationally as a symbol for unity on the left. With the outbreak of civil war, the 
Republic was heralded as the embodiment of a progressive, liberal, socialist, 
communist and anarchist union against fascism. This image of the united Republic 
underpinned the first humanitarian and political campaigns over the civil war in 
both Britain and France. The French Rassemblement Populaire saw itself as 
parallelling the left's political coalition in Spain, while British activists sought to 
create such a Popular Front through campaigns to aid Republican Spain. The 
41 Tim Rees, "Visions of the Vanquished: Recent Work on the Spanish Civil War", European 
History Quarterly. 23,1993, pp. 571-582. 
42 Serrano, L'Enjeu Espagnol, p. 123. 43 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
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foremost champions in both Britain and France of the Republic were the 
Communists who saw Spain as embodying united resistance to fascism. It was this 
international image which made the May Days eruption seem to be such an 
aberration. The image of the Spanish Republic as embodying a broad antifascist 
coalition, rather than the Communist attacks on the POUM as Trotskyist and fascist, 
represented what Raymond Carr has described as the power of the communist 
voice in preventing any debate. 44 Amidst the growing antagonism within the 
Republican camp, L'Humanite hailed Negrin's new government in mid-May 1937 
as the true embodiment of the antifascist Popular Front 45 
Few historians have connected the political debate over the May Days with 
the 'soft' politics of humanitarian relief for the Basque front. For those outside 
Spain, the focus in May 1937 was not Barcelona but Bilbao, where civilian relief and 
medical aid were most acutely needed as the Basque defences became more 
desperate. Even with the fall of Bilbao on 19 June 1937, the care of refugees and the 
Nationalists' continued offensive in the North made the military situation there the 
primary front of the war. Just as humanitarian aid for the besieged civilian 
populations of Madrid and Bilbao had provided a rallying point for opponents of 
non-intervention, so humanitarian campaigns for the Basque country made the May 
Days clashes in Catalonia seem of secondary concern. It was not merely perceptions 
of the Republic, or the politics of its overseas supporters which muted the debate 
over the Republic's divisions during the civil war, it was also the commitment and 
energy of relief efforts for the Basque country at the time when the Republic's own 
civil war was most visible. 
October 1937: British Relief for Chinese Universities 
The opening of the new British academic year in October 1937 was also 
marked by interest in a new war, following the summer invasion of China by Japan. 
Japanese conquest had dramatic consequences for Chinese society, particularly its 
universities which were physically targeted during the fighting and then vigorously 
repressed. ` Like the 1933 attacks in Germany on academic freedom, broad'non- 
political' campaigns were established in British universities to send humanitarian 
aid to their Chinese peers. These not only intertwined professional and political 
concern, but reinforced existing campaigns for academic refugees and for Spain. At 
44 Carr, The Spanish Tragedy, p. 176. 
45 L'Humanite, 18/ 5/1937, p. 1. 
46 The Gryphon, May 1938, p. 320. 
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the forefront of these appeals was the International Student Service (ISS) which had 
earlier organised 'non-political' aid for German student refugees in parallel to the 
work of the Academic Assistance Council. In October 1937 the ISS launched a 
national appeal at universities across Britain, though the form these campaigns took 
was influenced by existing campus coalitions between local students. Perhaps more 
significantly, the humanitarian campaigns which developed for Chinese 
universities reinforced and were often explicitly linked with relief efforts for 
Republican Spain. 
In mid-October 1937, the group For Intellectual Liberty organised a telegram 
to the Chinese Minster of Education which was signed by 115 academics from 22 
British universities and university colleges 47 The telegram read, 
Horrified by bombing of Chinese cities and destruction of schools and 
colleges we wish to convey to you our deepest sympathy and to assure you 
that we shall do everything in our power to urge our government to take 
effective measures to check Japanese aggression. 48 
The petition deliberately sought to draw support from as many universities as 
possible, with Edinburgh providing the leading number of signatories (19), 
followed by London (12). The petition was headed by Professors Ernest Barker 
(Cambridge), Gilbert Murray (Oxford) and R. H. Tawney (LSE, London). Included 
amongst the signatories were university figures who had been prominent in 
Spanish relief campaigns including Bernal, Needham, Sir Daniel Stevenson, 
Haldane, Blackett, Laski and the Principal of Somerville College, Helen Darbishire. 
The petition was paralleled by student debates over China. A motion of 
condemnation of Japan was passed by the LSE Union in October 1937, while the 
Cambridge Union later voted support for sanctions against Japan by 172 to 93.49 
The academic year of 1937-1938 opened at University College London with 
the ISS appeal for Chinese Universities, which was supported by the Student 
Christian Movement and the British University League of Nations branch 50 The 
campaign within UCL opened with a meeting on the "Plight of the Chinese 
Universities" which was addressed by a Chinese academic and Professor Tawney. 51 
Significantly, Provost Mawer, who had tried to constrain student political activity 
outside and within University College during the early 1930s, chaired the meeting. 
47 The Cambridge Review. 29/10/1937, p. 43; 
48 Telegram, A3/ 22, Add 9369, University Library, Cambridge. 
49 Minutes of 27/ 10/ 1937, Coll Misc 649 2/5, LSE Archives; 
The Granta. 1/12/1937, p. 178. 
50 Phineas. 4/ 10/ 1937, p. 5. 
51 Phineas. 19/ 10/ 1937, p. 4. 
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Mawer s support was probably because he accepted its proclaimed "non-political" 
nature due to the mixing of his own professional and humanitarian concern. The 
appeal for China was organised by the Union for the first fortnight of November 
1937.52 The coalitions for Spain and then China probably facilitated the formation of 
the University College Peace Council, which comprised representatives from the 
SCM, Jewish Students Society, Peace Society, Socialist Society and the Association 
of Scientific Workers 53 
At Oxford and Cambridge it was the existing student Peace Councils which 
collected for the ISS appeal through the broad coalition of student societies they 
represented. M The Cambridge University Peace Council sent a collective letter 
denouncing Japanese aggression to All-China Students Union and the Japanese 
Ambassador to Britain. It was signed by office-holders of the Conservative 
Association, Socialist Club, League of Nations Union, Liberal Club, Democratic 
Front, Anglo-American Society, and CSAWG55 On 19 October 1937, the ISS appeal 
in Cambridge was opened by Professor Chang Peng-Chun of Nankai University 
who addressed a meeting of academics in Trinity College, and then a mass meeting 
of students at St Andrew's Hall organised by the Peace Council and the ISS. 56 
Between October and December 1937 the ISS China Appeal was the focus of 
fundraising at universities across Britain. Amongst these were the University of 
Leeds where it was supported by the Vice-Chancellor, academic staff and students' 
Union 57 
52 Phineas, 2/11 / 1937, p. 1. 
53 University College Magazine, Autumn 1937, p. 88. 
M In Oxford "methods of collecting included a self-denial lunch and a collection realising 
£15; collections at public meetings brought in £20; punts on the river collecting small sums 
fared successfully too" - The CherwelL 28/ 5/ 1938, p. 89; 
At Cambridge a Badminton Tournament was held with proceeds to aid China - The Granta, 
2/3/ 1938, p. 303. 
55 The Cambridge Review, 29/ 10/ 1937, p. 49. 
56 Ibid., p. 44; 
The Cambridge Review. 15/10/1937, p. 5. 
57 The Gryphon, Dec. 1937, p. 161. 
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TABLE 8.1: ISS CHINESE UNIVERSITIES RELIEF APPEAL58 
Total Staff Students 
University of Liverpool 470 
University of Oxford 460 
University of Cambridge 350 222 128 
University of Leeds 160, 60, 
More pro-actively, in both Cambridge and Oxford, students called for a 
boycott in their towns of Japanese goods in response to the attacks on China 59 The 
Oxford University Peace Council wrote to Gilbert Murray and other academics 
asking for their support, as "we feel that an appeal signed by prominent senior 
members and published in the press would help a great deal in calling attention to 
our effort" 60 Following this letter, an appeal to the citizens of Oxford to back the 
boycott was published in The Cherwell, signed by Murray, W. E. Le Gros Clark, J. L. 
Brierly, E. R. Dodds, A. Zimmern, L. Abercrombie, G. F. Carritt, J. E. Meade, M. 
Holroyd and A. Headlam-Morley. 61 In Cambridge the following term a similar 
letter was signed by Professors Ernest Barker, F. L. Bartlett, F. M. Cornford, R. H. 
Fowler, G. H. Hardy, F. Gowland Hopkins, J. D. Bernal, F. L. Lucas, and M. M. 
Postan. 62 
Significantly, the new concern for China was not separated from the existing 
campaigns for Spain. At the University of Leeds, the ISS described itself as 
providing relief to students "regardless of consideration of race, creed, or political 
viewpoint, for there have been many cries in the student world since the war. Spain, 
of course offers the latest example" 63 At UCL, the ISS also expressed its willingness 
to provide aid to students in Spain, though like the AAC's search for Spanish 
academic refugees there were relatively few opportunities for specifically 
university-focused relief during the civil war. 64 Campaigns for China and Spain 
frequently overlapped, so that during the Peace Week in Cambridge in mid- 
November 1937, speakers included relief-worker Leah Manning on Spain and a 
58The Granta, 19/10/1938, p. 193; 
The Granta, 23/2/1938, p. 292; 
The Cambridge Review, 21/ 2/ 1938, p. 189; 
The Gryphon, Feb. 1938, pp. 170 & 183. 
59The Cambridge Review. 21/1/1938, p. 186. 
60 Lettter of 7/ 11/ 1937, Mss Gilbert Murray 83, Bodleian Library. 
61 The Cherwell, 20/ 11/ 37, p. 139. 
62The Cambridge Review, 18/2/1938, p. 268; 
This had been preceed by a letter supporting the boycott signed by a dozen prominent 
political students -The Cambridge Review, 21/1/1938, p. 194. 63 The Gryphon, Oct. 1937, p. 47. 
64Phineas, 4/10/1937, p. 5. 
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Chinese Professor 65 In Oxford, fundraising for Spain and China blurred together as 
it was reported that ; 'the collection for the victims of aggression in Spain and China, 
organised by the OU Peace Council, amounted to E170". 66 Humanitarian relief for 
Chinese universities reinforced the fundraising campaigns and coalitions over 
Spain which had developed within British campuses. In France, there was a striking 
absence of any parallel campaigns over China, rather the coalitions of French 
students and academics were largely shaped by domestic politics and the changing 
face of the war in Spain 67 
The Comite Sanitaire d'Aide au Peuple Espagnol in Toulouse 
In late April 1938, a Comite Sanitaire d'Aide au Peuple Espagnol (Section 
Toulouse) was formed, which was striking for its depth of support within the 
University of Toulouse's Faculty of Medicine 68 The committee's two presidents 
were Professors Ducuing and Soula, who since the beginning of the civil war had 
participated together in the Comite Universitaire des Amis de l'Espagne 
Republicaine and in pro-Republican meetings 69. The Comite Sanitaire included 
seven other academics from the Faculty of Medicine, as well as ten local doctors, 
two dentists and two pharmacists 7° Most studies of French universities have 
stressed that their politics followed the division between the professional Faculties 
of Law and Medicine which were seen as favouring the right, and those of Science 
and Letters which were more prominently on the left. While this was frequently 
true, the Comite Sanitaire is one of many exceptions to that polarisation. 
The Comite Sanitaire listed its four aims as: 
(i) visiting and tending to wounded International Brigade and militia 
members hospitalised in the region; 
(ii) providing medical assistance to the colony of refugee children in Toulouse; 
(iii) organising medical collections to be sent to Republican Spain; 
(iv) arranging propaganda such as meetings, posters and flyers. 71 
65 The Cambridge Review, 5/11/1937, p. 63. 
66 The Cherwell. 28/5/1938, p. 89. 
67 The ISS in Britain collected 3,000 pounds for Chinese relief while that in France collected 
28,810 francs, which was a fifteenth of the British total - EUI Annual Report 1937/ 1938, 
AJ61 / 101, Archives Nationales. 
68 Le Midi Socialiste, 22/4/1938, p. 4. 
69 Le Midi Socialiste 28/3/1938, p. 4. 
70 Le Midi Socialiste, 22/4/1938, p. 4. 
71 Ibid. 
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The first two aims reveal the extent to which Toulouse's proximity to the Spanish 
frontier meant that it was directly touched by the war, especially by civilian and 
military refugees 72 
The Comite Sanitaire publicly disclaimed any partisan position, rather it 
proclaimed its motivation to be humanitarian concern. 73 It would be wrong to 
translate non-partisan, as the equivalent to the non-political label so frequently 
invoked in Britain. Support for the Comite Sanitaire did cut across party lines, as it 
included Professor Brustier from the Faculty of Medicine, who although a supporter 
of the Radicals, was also sympathetic to the local group of Socialist students74 Party 
politics remained important in shaping the medical collections organised by Comite 
Sanitaire, which revealed the extent to which it drew a large amount of support for 
the local SFIO. When Professor Soula, who was both a member of the SFIO and co- 
president of the Comite Sanitaire, accompanied a shipment of medicine to 
Barcelona, he seemed to be wearing both these hats at once. 75 The close relationship 
between the committee and the SFIO extended to the local group of Socialist 
students who collected 2,000 francs for medical aid during the Easter vacation76 
The predominance of SFIO militants within the Comite Sanitaire d'Aide au 
Peuple Espagnol (Section Toulouse), contrasts with the political character of the 
Centrale Sanitarie International to which it was affiliated. The Centrale Samtarie 
International (CSI) was created in January 1937 by the Comite International de 
Coordination et d'Information pour l'Aide ä 1'Espagne Republicaine led by Victor 
Basch and Paul Langevin. 77 The Centrale Sanitaire Internationale was largely a 
French initiative, which claimed a special role to co-ordinate and liaise with other 
international medical aid efforts due to France's geographic proximity to the war. 78 
Though the SMAC was identified as the English section of the CSI, and Professor 
72 In June 1938, Toulouse was uniquely affected by the isolated resistance in the Pyrenees of 
the Spanish Republic's 43rd Division, which triggered a local appeal to provide aid to the 
encirled soldiers and then for the wounded when they retreated across the border - Le Midi 
Socialiste, 7/6/1936, p. 5; 
Le Midi Socialiste, 12/6/1938, p. 1; 
Le Midi Socialiste, 15/ 6/ 1938, p. 5; 
Le Midi Socialist. 17/6/ 1938, p. 1; 
Le Midi Socialiste, 18/ 6/ 1938, p. 1. 
73 Le Midi Socialiste, 22/4/1938, p. 4. 
74 Brustier supported efforts to establish a group for Radical students in 1939 and was also 
patron of the Union Syndical des Etudiants in 1934 led by socialist students- Clipping of 
15/3/1939,1303 W 13, AD Haute-Garonne. 
75 Le Midi Socialiste, 7/11/1938, p. 4. 
76 Le Midi Socialiste, 15/6/1938, p. 5. 
77 Conference International d'Aide Sanitaire a 1'Espagne Republicaine: Compte-Rendu et 
Resolutions, Centrale Sanitaire Internationale, Paris, 1937, p. S. 78 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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Marrack attended the CSI's international conference as a recognised delegate, the 
British refused to fund the new body79 Between March and July 1937 an appeal by 
the CSI for medical aid, sponsored by Professors Wallon and Roussy, raised more 
than one million francs. 80 Wallon's patronage of the Centrale Sanitaire International 
reveals the extent to which as a national organisation it was closely related to the 
PCF's efforts, even if it was not directly linked S1 Like many other pro-Republican 
aid campaigns, the political character of French medical aid differed regionally, 
from its pro-Communist patrons in Paris, to its success in the Socialist stronghold of 
Toulouse. 
Paris Student Efforts for Spanish Aid and Refugee Relief 
Originating at the same time as the Comite Sanitaire d'Aide au Peuple 
Espagnol (Section Toulouse), April 1938, were the first sustained humanitarian 
campaigns over the civil war to be established within the University of Paris. On the 
first day of April 1938, Mademoiselle Schneider, a student, wrote to the Rector of 
the university, announcing the formation of a Rassemblement des Etudiants pour 
l'Aide ä 1'Enfance Espagnole by a group of Paris students with the encouragement 
of some of their teachers 82 The new group sought recognition from the Rector. 
However, while he was personally sympathetic to the initiative, and had given 
money to similar causes, he felt unable to officially commit himself. 83 
The Rassemblement des $tudiants pour 1'Aide ä l'Enfance Espagnole quickly 
claimed several hundred members 84 The political affiliation of the group is harder 
to determine than its numbers. One of its leaders was a Communist, but whether it 
also included Socialist students is unknown 85 The participation of Socialist and 
Communist students together was unlikely given that at the same time the 
committee was being formed, Paris Socialist students had split in half over the 
79 Ibid. pp. 12,88 & 89; 
Though Marrack attended the second of the CSI's Conferences in early July 1937, the 
SMAC's distance from the French body was reflected by its original attitude to the invitation 
to attend, when "it was decided that no useful purpose would be served by sending 
delegates to either of these conferences" - Minutes, Ms Addison 323, Bodleian Library. 80 Conference International d'Aide Sanitaire a l'Espagne Republicaine, p. 10. 81 The Centrale Samtarie International section in Marsailles which was formed in mid 
December 1938 was largely led by Communist students and activists - Report of 30/8/1939, 1M 1726, AD Bouches-du-Rhone. 
82 Letter of 1/4/ 1938, AJ16/6968, Archives Nationales. 
83 Letter of 5/ 4/ 1938, AJ16/6968, Archives Nationales. 
84 Report of 23/ 10/ 1938, No 14, Rassemblement Mondial des Etudiants, International 
Institute of Social History. 
85 Ibid. 
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SFIO's deregistration of them for their extreme left and anti-communist orientation. 
Given that the re-organised student section that remained within the SFIO claimed 
300 members after the split, and the dissidents claimed a similar number, it seems 
unlikely that either group threw its full weight behind the humanitarian campaign 
as support from either would have doubled the Union's size. The deeply-felt clashes 
of French party politics which will be considered in the following two chapters, 
made it unlikely that the students could form a broad coalition similar to their 
British peers. 
What brought the Communist students of the Rassemblement des Etudiants 
pour l'Aide ä l'Enfance Espagnole and the Socialist academics and students of the 
Comite Sanitaire d'Aide au Peuple Espagnol (Section Toulouse) together was their 
common birth in April 1938. Mid March 1938 inaugurated a new Front Populaire 
government led by Blum which seemed to promise more opportunities for the 
French left, just as the German Anschluss with Austria made the international scene 
more threatening. This conjunction of French and European events reinforced the 
concern of the Republic's supporters as a new Nationalist offensive in Aragon and 
the Levante seemed to threaten both Barcelona and Valencia. By 14 April 1938 
Franco 's forces had reached the Mediterranean coast above Valencia, dividing the 
Republican territory in two. This military collapse not only generated international 
fears that the Republic itself would soon fall, but inspired frenetic relief efforts in 
France. Blum's second government unofficially relaxed its restrictions on the 
border, marking the high point of covert military aid from France. Equally, the PCF 
and SFIO sought to channel their militants' energies into humanitarian relief for 
Republican Spain. This convergence of domestic politics and the events of the war 
meant that in April 1938 academics and students for the first time established large- 
scale aid efforts based around the universities of Toulouse and Paris. While the 
Republican army was able to stabilise the front and delay defeat, Blum was quickly 
replaced by Daladier who was far less sympathetic to the Republic's demands for 
arms and to Spanish refugees in France. 
Fragmenting Coalitions, Consolidating Coalitions 
The Republic's military defeats also intensified humanitarian campaigning 
in Britain during May 1938; however unlike in France, it was not party politics 
232 
which were the determining force in university relief efforts. 86 The aid campaigns 
of British students for Spain were increasingly organised through broad-reaching 
coalitions which extended across political and non-political divisions. These 
political and humanitarian alliances were reinforced by reactions to the attacks on 
Chinese universities and the Austrian crisis of early 1938.87 While these later events 
caused increasing political divisions which will be considered in the following 
chapter, they also reinforced the humanitarian campaigning within British 
universities. After the Anschluss, relief campaigns for Austrian refugees were 
quickly incorporated into those already running for German refugees, Chinese 
universities and the Spanish Republic. That the same coalitions and campaigns 
remained active through each of these events, though with increasing support, 
reveals the extent to which fascism was seen in British universities as an 
international and interlinked phenomenon. Humanitarian campaigns drew on and 
reinforced this broadly defined anti-fascism. Significantly, Spanish aid was always 
placed alongside the new efforts, and the civil war remained the central concern 
which transcended other developments in international politics. 
In France, the tensions between the parties of the Front Populaire were 
reflected in their commitment to distinctive humanitarian relief campaigns for 
Republican Spain, even where these were in response to the same crisis such as the 
siege of Bilbao. Party politics powerfully shaped the few aid campaigns which did 
develop in French universities during 1938. The antagonism between the SFIO and 
the PCF and the divisions within the SFIO itself affected the political space in which 
French academics and students could organise humanitarian relief. It was therefore 
domestic political events, rather than events in Asia or Central Europe, which were 
primary in shaping French political perceptions and activity over the war in Spain. 
Aid campaigns for Republican Spain reflected the increasing fragmentation of the 
Front Populaire, at the same time that British activists were seeking to use it to 
create an all-party coalition in Britain. 
In both countries, political propaganda and humanitarian relief for the 
Spanish Republic focused on the image of the Republic as representing the united 
forces of the left - stretching from progressives and liberals to socialists, communists 
8' During the second week of May 1938 a "Spain Week" of concerted fundraising was 
organised in Cambridge, with a Spanish Shop and frequent performances by the refugee 
Basque children - The Cambridge Review, 6/ 5/ 1938, p. 367. 87 In Cambridge, the student Peace Council held a meeting on Austria at Trinity College 
which was supported by the League of Nations Union, Socialist Club, Liberal Club, 
Conservative Association, Democratic Front, Jewish Society, Anglo-American Society, 
CSWAG and the Majlis -The Grants, 23/2/1938, p. 287. 
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and anarchists. For Republican Spain's international supporters this image of unity 
overshadowed the increasing conflicts within the Republic itself, which was best 
encapsulated by the humanitarian focus on Bilbao during the Barcelona May Days 
in 1937. While the image of left unity underpinned humanitarian campaigns for the 
Republic in both countries, they had contrasting national characters due to the way 
in which aid was organised and whether Spain was seen as part of international or 
domestic political struggles. The increasing success of coalition-politics in British 
universities, and its increasing failure in France were further reinforced during 1938 
and 1939 by the currents of party politics in both countries. 
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Chapter 9 
Debates and Divisions within the Left 
Nineteen thirty-eight was a critical year of change in the political climates of 
both Britain and France. Germany's military expansion in first Austria and then 
Czechoslovakia redefined political perceptions, coalitions and campaigns 
throughout Western Europe. Just as the bombing of Guernica and the Barcelona 
May Days embodied the failure of non-intervention and the political conflict within 
Republican Spain, so the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938 was seen as 
marking a definitive division between those who were committed to opposing 
fascism and those committed to avoiding a European war. While most historians 
have focused on reactions to the Czech crisis itself, far less studied is how these 
reactions were shaped by earlier changes in the domestic political landscape. 
This chapter seeks to relate the coalitions and divisions which had been 
developing over the civil war in Spain during 1937 and early 1938, to the changes in 
party politics in Britain and France. Mirroring their parliamentary parties, the 
French student left was increasingly divided by domestic politics and the fear of 
European war, debates in which Spain became a significant symbol. Unlike their 
French peers, British students on the left were able to maintain campus-based 
coalitions despite the divisions of party politics. However, the increasing 
proliferation of pacifist groups encouraged by the diplomatic tensions of 1938 did 
represent one potential fissure within the British left. Drawing on the same fear of 
imminent war as the pacifists, an attack on the Government's Air Raid Protection 
policy was championed by the anti-fascist left, which focused on experiences in 
Spain. 
Perceptions of the Spanish conflict remained central to the political concerns 
of many academics and students, and strongly shaped how later developments in 
Central Europe were seen. Even in September 1938 when a European war seemed 
possible, Spain remained a powerful symbol, if not of political allegiance, then of 
the actual human devastation which would occur. Reactions to the civil war 
influenced what coalitions and campaigns were created in response to the Munich 
Pact, be they anti-appeasement coalitions in Britain or renewed political 
polarisation in France. 
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Dissent on the Left: Divisions over Spain 
The tensions between French Socialist and Communist students had been 
felt even during the formation of the successful antifascist coalition of 1934. At the 
Oxford Congress of Socialist students in July 1936, the French delegation had been 
leading opponents to the international merger of Socialist and Communist student 
organisations .1 This position was reinforced at the April 1937 National Congress of 
the Federation Nationale des $udiants Socialistes. The Congress was addressed by a 
Communist representative urging the merger of students groups on the left, but this 
appeal was rejected? Instead the FNES adopted, by 51 votes to 5 (with 17 
abstentions), a motion which deferred any merger until it had been effected by the 
PCF and SFIO themselves. Although the resolution called for unity of the working 
class, it also carried a strong attack on Communist policy. Unity on the left in 
France, argued the Socialist students, could not resemble that which had already 
been achieved in Belgium, Britain, Spain (and explicitly Barcelona), where the 
absorption of Socialist groups by the Communists had deprived them of their 
fundamental collective and revolutionary character. 3 The increasing anti- 
communism of the FNES was reflected in its direct criticism of the show trials in 
Moscow, and most strikingly, by the importance it gave to the May Days in 
Barcelona the following month. 4 
During the first half of 1937, elements of the FNES in their opposition to non- 
intervention had already been increasingly critical of Spanish Communist attacks 
on the POUM 5 They therefore reacted to the clashes in Barcelona during the first 
week of May 1937 with a heightened sensitivity. The June 1937 issue of Essais et 
Combats was largely devoted to the Spanish Republic's internal conflict, and it 
carried a 31 page account of the confrontation by Marcel Olliver titled "Les Joumees 
Sanglantes de Barcelone (3 au 8 Mai 1937)',. 6 The unfolding repression of the 
POUM, its outlawing and eventually the trials of some of its leaders, became the 
central focus of the frequent articles on Spain in Essais et Combats.? 
1 Essais et Combats, Nov. 1937, p. 9. 
2Essais et Combats, April 1937, p. 19-21. 
3 Essais et Combats. May 1937, p. 19. 
4Though affirming solidarity with the October Revolution, the FNES reserved the right to 
criticise the current Russian regime as a personal dictatorship. 
5 Essais et Combats, Feb. 1937, pp. 10-11. 
6 Essais et Combats. June 1937. 
7 Jean Lauriet in "Le Proces du POUM" accused the Republican authorities of assinating Nin 
in a private prison before his trial and of falsifying evidence against the POUM, - Essais et Combats, Nov 1937, p. 9; 
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Just as the International Brigades had brought the impact of the war back to 
their home communities in Britain and France, so did foreign volunteers for the 
POUM dramatise for the FNES the issues at stake. Essais et Combats noted that, 
Un ES de France, Ladmiral, un ancien membre de la Section frontiste 
universitaire, Gaston Parrot, qui etaient partis se battre pour la revolution 
espagnole, des centaines d'autres militants sont victimes des sbires et des 
bourreaux de l'Internationale Communiste, devenue une enterprise 
d'agitation xenophobe, une police contre-revolutionnaire, un gangsterisme 
conscient et organise... une Campagne active, que nous avons contribue ä 
animer, a permis de sauver Ladmiral. Mais il reste tous les autres.... 
The sensitivity of the FNES to the repression of the POUM was in part 
because Spain had become a symbol for their own opposition to Communist 
politics. This was exemplified at the mid July 1937 Congress of Unification in Paris 
held by the Socialist and Communist students' Internationals. Forbidden to 
participate by their own party, the students of the FNES criticised proceedings from 
sidelines, focusing particularly on Spain. During the Congress, the son of the 
Spanish Republic's first President Alcalä Zamora spoke for the united Spanish 
Socialist and Communist student group. He was criticised by the correspondent of 
Essais et Combats for speaking of saving Spanish democracy rather than of the 
realities of Communist suppression Y The accusation that the Communists were 
absorbing and repressing other parties on the left under the cover of a union sacree, 
had a strong resonance in French domestic politics, particularly in early 1938. The 
correspondent concluded by accusing the Communists of falsifying the Congresses 
final resolution which "justiflant les assassinats des revolutionaires en Espagne". 10 
An editorial celebrating the Republican capture of Teruel also called for the release of 
POUM activists, noting that the military victory might also strengthen the revolution in 
Barcelona - Essais et Combats, Jan 1938, p. 2; 
Essais et Combats carried articles on the repression of the POUM by journalist Yves Levy, 
who also gave a talk on the same subject to Paris students - Essais et Combats, Feb. 1938, p. 
7; 
Essais et Combats. April 1938, p. 9& 16. 
8 "An ES from France, Ladmiral, a former member of the Section frontiste universitaire, 
Gaston Parrot, who left to fight for the Spanish revolution, is one of the hundreds of activists 
who are the victims of the henchmen and torturers of the Communist International, which 
has become an operation of xenophobic agitation, a counter-revolutionary police, a 
deliberate and organised gangsterism... an active campaign, that we have helped to 
stimulate, has saved Ladmiral. But all the others remain... " - Essais et Combats, Nov 1937, p. 
3. 
9Ibid. 
, p. 10. 10 lb d., p. 11 
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This active championing of the POUM not only distanced the FNES from the 
Communists but from other groups on the French left, including its own party. A 
review of the LAURS's new journal, L' ui e noted that neither it nor its parent 
body, the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme had taken a strong position on the POUM 
or Moscow purges 11 The constant support for the POUM also exacerbated the 
differences between the socialist students and the SFIO leadership. Jean Lauriet 
questioned the latter's inaction in the face of unjust trials, falsified evidence, 
arbitrary assassination and private prisons in Republican Spain. He wrote in 
November 1937 that, 
La direction de notre parti et la redaction du 'Populaire' vont-elles enfin se 
decider ä faire connaitre ä Ia classe ouvriere francaise tout ce qu'elles savent 
sur ce qui passe en Espagne, et cesser d'aider par leur silence ä la 
colonisation de 1'Espagne et du mouvement ouvrier international par le 
stalinisme. 12 
Party Politics and the Etudiants Socialistes 
Spanish events served as a symbol for the growing tensions between the 
students of the FNES and the leadership of the SFIO, but they were not the cause of 
the conflict. Following the Clichy tragedy in March 1937, the Gauche 
Revolutionnaire had been officially dissolved by the SFIO after its youth section in 
Paris had strongly attacked SFIO Minister of the Interior, Marx Dormoy. 13 
However, this action neither prevented the members of the Gauche Revolutionnaire 
from acting as a party within the party, or from taking control of the Seine 
Federation of the SFIO which had previously been controlled by Zyromski's Bataille 
Socialiste. 14 With its Paris leadership strongly supporting the dissolved tendance, 
there was increasing strain between the FNES and the SFIO leadership. 15 Finally on 
16 February 1938, the SFIO's Comit6 Administratif Permanent voted by 18 votes to 6 
to dissolve the student Federation. Only Zyromski and the representatives of the 
Gauche Revolutionnaire defended the existing FNES. As Essais et Combats 
11 The FNES refused to co-operate with LAURS's L'Eguipe as the latter had criticised the 
Gauche Revolutionnaire - Essais et Combats, Jan 1938, pp 18. 12 "Are the leadership of our party and the editors of 'Populaire' ever going to decide to 
make known to the French working class all that they know about what has happened in 
Spain, and stopped aiding by their silence the colonisation of Spain and the international 
worker's movement by Stalinism" - Essais et Combats, Nov 1937, p. 9. 13 B. D. Graham, Choice & Democratic Order. The French Socialist Party 1937-1950 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 15. 14 Ibid., pp. 52,102 &104. 
1,5 Essais et Combats, April 1938, p. 2. 
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complained, the dissolution was due to the FNES's energetic support of the Gauche 
Revolutionnaire; "C'etait un proces de tendance: on ne tolerait pas que les ES passent 
defendre des idees, qui sont pourtant celles d'une fraction du PartP. 16 The leaders of the 
tendance itself soon found themselves facing expulsion from the party as their own 
commitment to dissent fuelled increasing clashes with the SFIO leadership. 
With dissolution, the FNES divided into two student groups. Those who 
supported Pivert's dissent formed the Federation des $tudiants Revolutionnaires, 
which also maintained control of Essais et Combats. The new Federation declared 
itself as anti-reformist, anti-stalinist and anti-militarist. 17 It claimed support from 
existing groups at the Paris Cite Universitaire and of female students at the Ecole 
Normale Superteure in Sevres. For those students who remained within the SFIO, a 
Congress was held in late March 1938 to reconstitute the FNES. 18 It was attended 
by 12 delegates from Paris, 8 from Toulouse and 5 from other universities. The new 
General Secretary of the FNES was jean Morin, who had previously been the 
Secretary of Paris ES section. The quick reorganisation of the FNES suggests that the 
radical line of Essais et Combats was in some ways unrepresentative of the 
Federation as a whole. Certainly the lutte de tendances in Paris seems to have had 
little effect on the strong section of socialist students in Toulouse, as was reflected in 
their successful fundraising efforts for the newly established Comite Sanitaire 19 As 
B. D. Graham argues the Departmental Federations of the party were largely self- 
sufficient, with their own individual characters, which meant that the Gauche 
Revolutionnaire was largely unsuccessful in seeking national support for its clash 
with the party's leadership 2° It seems that in Paris both the dissident students and 
those who remained in the party ended up with similar numbers of supporters. 
While the Federation des Etudiants Revolutionnaires claimed that 400 copies of 
Essais et Combats were sold throughout Paris, the FNES claimed its membership in 
the capital numbered 300 students. 21 
Pivert's group had opposed SFIO support for the second Front Populaire 
government of Camille Chautemps which had lasted from 18 January 1938 to 10 
16 "Ibis was the trial of a tendance.: they could not tolerate that the ES goes on defending the 
ideas, which are those of a section of the Party" -Ibid. 17 Ibid. p. 3. 
18 Pivert made a brief appearance at the Congress where he called for the maximum of 
independence for the Socialist students - bI id... p. 7 19 Police reported in mid June 1938 that at a meetimg of 50 USE members in Toulouse there 
was a threat of a split over participation in Daladier's government following the Royan 
Congress of SFIO - report of 20/6/1938,1303 W 13, AD Haute-Garonne. 20 Graham, Choice & Democratic Order. p. 130. 
21 Essais et Combats. May 1938, p. 20; 
L'Etudiant Socialiste. Jan-Feb 1939, p. 16. 
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March 1938. As Blum returned to power, Germany's Anschluss with Austria 
encouraged him to seek to broaden the left's Front Populaire into a Front National, 
including representatives of the right, to resist Nazi expansionism. Such a coalition 
was vigorously attacked by Pivert as a union sacree which was a fundamental 
betrayal of the Socialists' commitment to pacifism. 22 When Blum s second 
government again faced having its legislation blocked by a hostile Senate, Pivert's 
supporters demonstrated in the Luxembourg Gardens demanding more radical 
measures. 23 The demonstration had taken place despite being prohibited by Marx 
Dormoy, and four days later, after Blum s government had resigned, Pivert and the 
other leaders of the Gauche Revolutionnaire were suspended from the party. 24 
After supporting the dissidents, the Seine Federation itself was dissolved in mid 
April 1938, prompting militant Daniel Guerin to write an article "Aux etudiants" in 
Essais et Combats which stated that the dissolutions had ended revolutionary 
activity within the SFIO, and now he and the other leaders of Gauche 
Revolutionnaire would join the side of students in the avant-garde. 25 
At the SFIO's National Congress in Royan during the first week of June 1938, 
the suspensions of Pivert and his followers were confirmed by vote. Significantly, in 
the Congress debate Pivert tried to make the conflict between the tendance and the 
SFIO leadership one of policy rather than party discipline. 26 Looking back, Guerin 
also argued that it was the tendance's opposition to a union sacree, its loyalty to a 
traditional socialist pacifism, which was responsible for the split 27 However, this 
focus on the union sacree ignores the extent to which the gap between the Gauche 
Revolutionnaire and the party had developed over the 'pause' in the Front 
Populaire economic reforms, the tragic Clichy protests, and the disappointments of 
Blum's repeated resignations from office. It was the tendance's commitment to 
dissent - to the revolutionary hopes of June 1936 when French politics and labour 
relations had seemed transformed - which caused the split, not the specific issue at 
stake. The radicalism which defined its identity impelled it into a confrontation 
with the party leadership? 8 Just as the repression of the POUM had been the focus 
22 Graham, Choice & Democratic Order, pp. 124 & 134. 
23 Guerin, Front Populaire Revolution Manqu&e, pp. 187-188; 
Police identified students of the Federation des Etudiants Revolutionnaire as amongst the 
first of the demonstrators who gathered outside the Senate - report of 7/4/ 1938, BA 1867, 
Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
24 Guerin, Front Populaire Revolution Manquee. p. 193. 
Graham, Choice & Democratic Order. pp. 143-145. 
25 Essais et Combats. May 1938, p. 3. 
26 Graham, Choice & Democratic Order, p. 165. 
27 Guerin, Front Populaire Revolution Manquee pp. 190 & 201. 28 Graham, Choice & Democratic Order, p. 143; 
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for the radicals of the FNES, so the union sacree served as symbol for Pivert's break 
with the SFIO, though in both cases the split had far deeper ideological and 
organisational roots. 29 
Campus Coalitions and Party Politics in Britain 
The tensions between the tendances of the SFIO were parallelled by the 
internal divisions of the British Labour Party. While several studies have examined 
the radical left within the Labour party during the 1930s as a single dissenting body, 
it was in fact divided amongst several organisations 30 Two of these bodies were the 
Home Counties Labour Association which advocated a larger role in party decision- 
making for constituency groups and the Socialist League which had initially been a 
propaganda group but increasing advocated a more radical line for the party. Both 
these groups had opposed the party's concerted resistance to united action with 
other parties on the left. Equally, both were highly critical of Labour's initial 
support for non-intervention and of its leadership's failure to organise more pro- 
active propaganda or relief campaigns for the Spanish Republic. As Tom Buchanan 
has argued, the Labour party responded slowly to such criticisms, with its primary 
concern being to keep pro-Republican propaganda and aid efforts within the party's 
established institutions 31 The absolute opposition to joint activity with other parties 
was such that Labour's leadership deliberately distanced itself from first the 
Spanish Medical Aid Committee and then the National Joint Committee for Spanish 
Relief because of the prominence of Communist activists in both organisations 32 
Significantly Zyromski kept his dissent within the party, though his support for united 
action with the PCF contrasted to the party's growing anti-communism. 
29 The significance of the union sacree for Pivert's new Parti Socialiste Ouvrier et Paysan was 
reinforced by later events, particular the fear of European war during the Czech crisis of 
September 1938. During the crisis the Federation des Etudiants Revolutionnaires drafted a 
telegram to Daladier, in the name of students who could be called up for military service, 
opposing mobilisation as increasing the prospect of war. The Munich Agreement 
encouraged the Etudiants Revolutionnaires to join the pacifism of the CVIA and the Centre 
Syndical d'Action contre la Guerre - Essais et Combats, Oct. 1938, pp. 5& 20. 30 James Jupp treats the left as a whole, whereas Ben Pimlott contrasts the pragmatic 
reformism of the Home Counties Labour Association with what he sees as the ineffectual 
radicalism of the Socialist League - James Jupp, The Radical Left in Britain 1931-1941. Frank 
Cass, London, 1982; 
Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s , passim. 31 Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement, passim. 32 Buchanan, "The Role of the British Labour Movement in the Origins and Work of the 
Basque Children's Committee, 1937-9", European history Quarterly, 18,2, April 1988, pp. 
158-159. 
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In January 1937, the Socialist League directly challenged this policy by 
agreeing to cooperate with the Communist Party and ILP's campaign for unity 
amongst parties on the left. The campaign publicly opened with a mass meeting in 
Manchester on 24 January 1937, and within three days the Socialist League had 
been disaffiliated by the Labour Party. 33 Two months later, Labour's National 
Executive Committee held that party members could not also belong to the League, 
by which point the League had already lost half of its membership 34 For those such 
as Joseph Needham who had hoped that the Socialist League would help to 
radicalise the party, the commitment to Labour remained despite the failure of the 
Socialist League. 35 In the Cambridge City Labour Party, Needham and H. L. Elvin 
were unsuccessful in seeking a motion disapproving the disaffiliation of the 
League. 36 As David Howell writes of the 1930s, 
The enthusiasm of British intellectuals for progressive politics, was stronger 
than ever before. Yet the moderates' domination of the Labour Party 
remained unbroken. In the end all the enthusiasm shattered against the 
unwillingness of Labour leaders to support any radical agitation outside the 
institutions of the party 37 
Significantly, this commitment to Labour's institutions was shared by many 
academics within the Party, who called for a more radical foreign policy but also 
saw themselves as loyal party members working within its organisation. 
Labour academics such as Cole, Laski and Tawney did join their Communist 
and Liberal peers such as Bernal, Cornford, Haldane, Levy and Murray, in 
supporting the call for an all-party National Conference on Spain in early April 
1938, as the Nationalist offensive in Aragon and the Levante seemed to spell the end 
for the Spanish Republic 38 On 23 April 1938, a National Emergency Conference on 
Spain was held at Queen's Hall, London. It was attended by 1806 delegates drawn 
from trade unions (25.5% of delegates), the Labour Party (19.1%), the Co-operative 
movement (6.2%), the Communist Party (10.8%), the Liberal Party (1.9 %), Youth 
33 Pimlott, Labour & the Left in the 1930s, p. 98; 
Howell, British Social Democracy, p. 90. 
34 Pimlott, Labour & the Left in the 1930s, p. 104. 
35 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 167. 
36 Minutes of 3/ 2/ 1937, p. 13 & Minutes of 3/ 3/ 1937, p. 16,634/ 08 "Executive Minutes, 
Nov. 1936-May 1941", Cambridgeshire Trades Council and Divisional Labour Party, 
Cambridge County Record Office. 
37 Howell, British Social Democracy, pp. 89-90. 
38 Appeal of 6/4/1938, LP/SCW/4, National Museum of Labour History; 
An Emergency Conference was organised by Home Counties Labour Association, the 
Provisional Committee of London Constituency Labour Parties and the Labour Spain 
Committee on 9 April 1938 was attended by 300 delegates representating of 78 divisional 
and local Labour Parties and 15 trade unions - Report, LP/ SCW/4, National Museum of 
Labour History. 
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Groups (4.3%) and various other bodies including local Aid Spain Committees. The 
gathering had been supported by a petition signed by MPs of all parties and 
supported by academics Cole, Cornford, Haldane, Laski, Murray, Tawney. 39 The 
Conference was addressed by a volunteer from the International Brigades, 
Communist leader Harry Pollitt who had just returned from Spain, and the leader 
of the Labour left Stafford Cripps. The Conference's twin themes were the necessity 
to reverse non-intervention and for energetic humanitarian relief for Republican 
Spain. Significantly, though all of the Labour academics who supported the 
Conference were opposed to the Labour leadership's avoidance of collaborative 
campaigns, all of them also chose to remain in the Labour Party while channelling 
their energies into aid and propaganda efforts outside it. 
At the same time as the Labour Party leadership had asserted its authority 
against the Socialist League, it also sought to quieten other dissenting groups within 
the party which advocated united action on the left. The Labour League of Youth 
was reorganised while the University Labour Federation was threatened with 
disaffiliation in April 1937. ULF President, Bill Shebbeare, claimed to be surprised 
by the measures as there was no ban on Communist membership of the Federation 
since it was formed in 1921, ignoring that from 1925 there had been such a ban on 
CP membership in the Labour Party4° Shebbeare argued that to be successful a 
socialist group in Britain's universities need to be a broadly-based forum. The ULF 
executive rejected the proposition that its members should individually join the 
Labour Party (thus formally excluding Communists), arguing instead that its mixed 
membership should "contract in" to the Party, like the trade unions 41 
The students had probably drawn the ire of the party for the proceedings of 
their Annual Conference in Manchester during the previous month. ` At the 
Conference the ULF celebrated doubling its membership to 3,000 students in 28 
groups. The Conference's motions vigorously condemning non-intervention and 
opposing rearmament in Britain, may have been tolerable to the Labour leadership, 
but the ULF's slogan of "Unity works" was a direct negation of the Labour Party's 
official policy. The threat of disaffiliation had surprising little effect on the ULFs 
politics, or that of its Socialist Societies as was revealed by the May Day 
39 Report of National Emergency Conference on Spain, LP/SCW/4, National Museum of 
Labour History. 
40 Student Forum May 1937, p. 5- Rassemblement Mondial des ); tudiants, International 
Institute of Social History. 
Pimlott, Labour & the Left in the 1930s, p. 80. 
41 Student Forum, May 1937, p. 5. 
42 The Clare Market Review. March 1937, p. 19. 
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demonstrations of 1937. The Labour Party held its official march on 2 May 1937, in 
which ULF members participated in Oxford, Cambridge and London. 43 However, 
the day before, 750 ULF students from these universities had marched in London, 
calling for "Unity against Fascism and War" 44 The student marchers had carried a 
banner of Cornford and another which outlined the growth of the ULF after the 
merger of Socialist and Communist students. It called for the workers to press for 
the same. 
The distance of the ULF from Labour Party policy was reflected not only in 
the maintenance of politically mixed membership but also their commitment to the 
political alliances which Labour's leaders viewed with abhorrence. These campus- 
based coalitions were formed largely in reaction to international events. In Oxford, 
The Liberal Club and the Labour Club have agreed on a programme for joint 
anti-government action. The programme includes arms for Spain and a 
guarantee of Czech independence. 45 
Both Clubs also agreed on the nationalisation of coal, the repeal of the Trades 
Disputes Act, state control of the Bank of England, and the establishment of a 
Constituent Assembly for India. Together they addressed a letter to the Press calling 
for similar joint action by the parties themselves. 
Pacifism and Anti-Fascism 
From the mid 1930s, the first broad coalitions of students political groups 
had formed around the Peace Councils established within various British 
universities. Given the success of these alliances in campus-based campaigning over 
issues such as humanitarian relief for Spain and China, it is interesting that in 1938 
there was increasing debate within the left over pacifism. Drawing on the fears 
aroused by the Abyssinia crisis and then Spain, pacifism in Britain had been 
successfully organised in the Peace Pledge Union, which grew rapidly in 1936 and 
early 1937.46 The Peace Pledge Union was supported by those whose pacifism was 
motivated by practical political considerations or religious faith 47 Amongst its 
leading sponsors were Cambridge academics Alex Wood and Charles Raven; the 
43 Student Forum May 1937, p. 7. 
4120 CUSC students went to London for the march -The Granta, 5/5/1937, p. 380. 45 The Cherwell. 4/6/ 1938, p. 126. 
46 Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1980, p. 212. 
47 Did. p. 267. 
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former was the Chairman of the University Labour Party and the latter was heavily 
committed to humanitarian relief for Republican Spain 48 
The strength of support for the Peace Pledge Union within British 
universities was shown when pacifist students at the University of Glasgow 
nominated their own candidate for their Rectorial Election in October 1937. Winston 
Churchill had been put forward as the Rectorial candidate for Conservative 
students, while UCL's J. B. S. Haldane had been nominated as representing a "United 
Front against War and Fascism". Haldane's supporters stressed "the need for unity 
among all progressive groups", both political and non-political, against the threats 
of war and fascism 49 The committee which publicly sponsored Haldane's Rectorial 
campaign included office-holders of the Student Christian Movement, the Students 
Representative Council, the Glasgow University Magazine, League of Nations 
Union, and the ISS (though significantly the strongest supporter of the campaign, 
the Socialist Club, was not named in the first appeal). 510 The appeal drew a pointed 
rejoinder published in the Glasgow University Magazine pointing out that the 
eleven signatories of the "United Front against War and Fascism" were more 
representative of a social clique of student politicians than the societies they claimed 
to represent but which in fact did not endorse Haldane 51 Haldane's Rectorial 
Campaign was launched by a supper and dance organised by the Socialist Club 
which was addressed by Cambridge's Bernard Knox who had served in the 
International Brigades 52 Significantly, Spain was also a central reference point for 
the pacifist students who supported the Rectorial campaign of Reverend Dr H. R. L. 
Sheppard, leader of the Peace Pledge Union. Their election flyers carried graphic 
picture of the bombing in Spain, asking "What are you doing to prevent this? ' . 53 
Sheppard provided a very different answer to that question than did Haldane or 
Churchill, and he was ultimately elected Glasgow's Lord Rector. M Sheppard's 
electoral victory in Glasgow in late 1937 reflected the vitality of pacifist politics, and 
their successful appeal to students over a year after war had broken out in Spain 
48 Ibid., pp. 135,135,204 & 321. 
49 Glasgow University Magazine, 21 / 411937, p. 320. 
50 mid. 
Haldane was also supported by fellow academics Bernal, Needham, Gowland Hopkins, 
Hogben and Laski - The Student Front. 14/10/1937, p. 3 in File: "Glasgow University 
Rectoral Election 1937", Mitchell Library. 
51 Glasgow University Magazine, 5/ 5/ 1937, pp. 332-333. 
52 Ibid. 
533 he Student Pacifist, 18/10/1937, p. 3 in File: "Glasgow University Rectoral Election 
1937", Mitchell Library; 
The Student Pacifist. 22/ 10/ 1937, p. S. 
54 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945. p. 266. 
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Nationally, the Peace Pledge Union enjoyed growing support in the summer 
of 1938 with the increasing tensions over Central European diplomacy 55 
Immediately preceding these events there were attacks on pacifism by the left in 
London and Oxford, which though isolated are also revealing. On 25 February 1938 
the Students' Union of University College London, debated "That collective security 
rather than pacifism is the best way of obtaining peace", with guest speakers John 
Strachey and Lord Ponsonby. 56 The motion for collective security received 88 votes 
against 56 votes for pacifism. The debate had arisen with the formation of a pacifist 
student society within UCL in the previous month. The Pacifist Society had been 
established as a separate body from the existing Peace Society, though the latter 
supported its registration by UCL's Provost 57 The Pacifist Society aimed "to 
promote and encourage active peace policy based on the pacifist decision of 
individual abstention from war and the threat of war as an instrument of policy". 58 
Rebutting charges of sectarianism against the pacifists, the treasurer of the Peace 
Council publicly defended their separatism since they continued to work on the 
counci159 
Though small, the flurry of activity which gave birth to the society quickly 
aroused the hostility of some of the committed left 60 Contributions by pacifists to 
Phineas drew the complaint from a Communist student Brian Pearce, that, "it is 
clearly apparent by several items in this term's first number that the College 
Pacifists have acquired an influence on Phineas quite out of proportion to their 
relative strength". 61 Pearce was particularly aggrieved that a student manifesto 
calling for collective security with the USSR and arms sales to Spain, had been 
relegated to the student weekly's back page, while its editorial had been strongly 
pacifist 62 He called on the pacifists to "cease disrupting the struggle against 
Fascism", stating that, 
Four students of UC went to Spain to help defend Democracy against 
International Fascism. Two have already given their lives. One wonders 
what the other two, working every day in danger of death for our sakes, will 
think of us if they read articles like your editorial, which are nothing but 
55 Ibid., p. 212. 
56 Phineas. 1/3/1938, p. 1. 
57 Phineas. 9/ 12/ 1937, p. 1. 
58 Students' Handbook 1938-1939. University College London, p. 186, 59 Phineas. 15/2/ 1938, p. 1. 
60 The Society attracted 30 students to hear Kingsley Martin speak - Phineas. 6/12/1938, p. 4. 
61 Phineas. 10/ 5/ 1938, p. 1. 
62 Phineas. 3/5/ 1938, p. 1 & 4. 
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sabotage of their struggle 63 
Pearce continued this attack two issues latter, criticising the continued publicity 
given to the Pacifist Society. Clearly worried that the new society might change the 
direction of progressive efforts, he condemned it as "making a pro-Fascist policy 
with 'Left' phrases [which] has, by the way, an ugly name among Socialists - 
Trotskyism' 64 
These attacks on absolute pacifism were parallelled in Oxford at the time 
UCL's Pacifist Society was being formed. The Liberal students newspaper Oxford 
Comment celebrated a recent pamphlet, Would I Fight? which it argued proved 
that few current Oxford students would have supported the Union's resolution not 
to fight for'King and Country' in 1933.65 The Oxford Comment conducted its own 
survey of 269 students asking them what they were willing to defend by arms. Only 
23% of the survey were willing to fight for the League of Nations, 37% for 
Democracy, 53% for the British Empire and 64% for King and Country' When 
Union President Raymond Walton stated that the pacifist vote of 1933 would be the 
same in 1938, the Oxford Comment threatened that there were plans afoot to debag 
him 67 The Oxford University Pacifist Association had been established for several 
years, yet around the same time it also came under attack. The Association's 
decision to send a Christmas pudding to General Franco the previous term as a 
token of "their sincere wishes that Spain's troubles may speedily be ended in a spirit 
fitting to the season", was attacked by the left-leaning student newspaper The 
Cherwell as a pathetic betrayal 68 The President of the Pacifist Association, Richard 
Symonds replied that a pudding had been sent to Negrin as well as Franco 69 It was 
not intended as serious political action but to make the point that "war leaves no 
63Phineas, 10/5/1938, p. 1. 
64 Phineas, 24/5/1938, p. 1; 
Perhaps the most directly effected by the new society, was the Peace Society which seems to 
have lost some of its direction, leading to it contemplating changing, "in favour of forming 
an International Affairs Society rather than a League of Nations Society" - Phineas, 
6/ 12/ 1938, p. 4. 
65 Oxford Comment, 23/2/ 1938, p. 1; 
Oxford Comment,, 2/3/1938, p. 1. 
66 Though the survey was intended to show that the majority of Oxford students opposed 
pacifism, it also revealed that a large minority were opposed to war - Oxford Comment, 9/3/ 1938, p. 1. 
67 'Oxford Comment. 9/ 3/1938, p. 6; 
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68 The Cherwell. 2211/1938, p. 3; 
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chance for the small joys of life" 70 These isolated exchanges in Oxford and London 
during the first half of 1938, reveal the extent to which the left's "United Front 
against War and Fascism" could cause conflict with those groups which were not 
prepared to give priority to the politics of anti-fascism. 
The civil war in Spain has been described as curing the British left of its 
pacifism, of marking the shift from anti-war campaigns of the early 1930s to the 
committed anti-fascism of the end of the decade. It is equally important to recognise 
that for some in British universities, Spain positively encouraged pacifist belief 
rather than undermined it. As Martin Ceadel has argued, pacifists were divided by 
their religious and political perspectives and this affected their reactions to the civil 
war. Those whose pacifism was rooted in a religious apoliticism were "more 
inclined therefore, to see the suffering of the Spanish people in their civil war as 
confirming pacifist predictions about the nature of war, rather than to see the 
political issues involved as upsetting all previous assumptions"71 Humanitarian 
aid for Republican Spain or the war's tragic victims could combine these multiple 
motives. During 1937, UCL Arts student J. Goodfellow was a leading organiser of 
the appeal for a Basque child refugee and responsible for collection for the BYPA 
'Milk for Spain' Appeal in 193772 The following year he was also one of the 
founders of the UCL Pacifist Society. Equally in Oxford, Richard Symonds who was 
active in the Labour Club as well as the Pacifist Association joined an all-party 
BYPA student delegation which travelled through Republican Spain in August 
1938. Pacifism was not merely a form of defeatism, as it was sometimes portrayed 
by the political left. It could also be a source of activism in relief efforts for Spain 
which were so centred on the war's tragic impact on the civilian population. 
The Debate over Air Raid Precautions 
Emerging from the same climate of impending war which fuelled the 
development of distinctive pacifist student groups within British universities was a 
national debate over Air Raid Precautions (ARP) led by left-wing academics. While 
invoking many of the same images which the pacifists used in their appeals to 
action, the protagonists of the ARP debate were supporting a very different political 
position. A central reference point for both pacifists and ARP campaigners was the 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ceadel Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945, p. 204. 
72 Phineas, 8/6/ 1937, p. 2; 
Phineas. 12/10/1937, p. 2; 
hineas 9/12/37, p. 4. 
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conflict in Spain, particularly the aerial bombing of civilians in major towns. Air 
raids emerged as a dominant image of the war because they symbolised both the 
Republic's need for humanitarian aid and the one sidedness of non-intervention, 
which allowed the Nationalists aeroplanes and pilots from Germany and Italy, 
while denying the Republic the anti-aircraft armaments needed for its defence. 
Following the almost daily bombing of Madrid during the Nationalists' siege 
during the last months of 1936, the air war had reached a new peak in April and 
May 1937 with the Basque offensive? 3 While the destruction of Guernica was seen 
by many as embodying the new face of war, the air raids on Republican towns 
greatly intensified during the first half of 193874 Many of these raids were focused 
on Barcelona, which coincided with the increasing fears of a European war in 
Britain and France stirred by the crisis in first Austria and then Czechoslovakia. 
Before the outbreak of the war in Spain, the memory of the First World War 
was so strong in Britain that the primary threat to civilian populations was feared to 
be poisonous gas. 75 The first British debates over Air Raid Precautions were 
therefore over the defence measures for civilians from gas between left-wing critics 
of the government and the Home Office which sought to treat the matter as one of 
individual responsibility. Left-wing groups such as the Socialist Medical 
Association and the Cambridge Scientists Anti-war Group rejected this premise, 
arguing that the only effective protection from gas could come from active 
government efforts. After experiments in late 1936, the CSWAG published The 
Protection of the Public from Aerial Attack in February 1937 which argued that the 
government's ARP scheme for gas masks, and the gas-proofing of domestic housing 
were largely technically ineffective, and also politically discriminatory against the 
working class. 76 The Cambridge academics who comprised the CSWAG, led by 
Bernal, Needham, Pirie, Waddington, and Wooster, cited their technical expertise 
and "scientific fact" to justify their attack on the government?? 
After debate in Parliament and the press, the government produced its own 
scientific study which argued that the CSWAG had overestimated the effects of gas 
bombardment on residential housing. 78 Significantly, the reply to these counter- 
73 Bombardements et Agressions en Espagne (Tuillet 1936-luillet 1938) Comite Mondial 
Contre la Guerre et le Fascisme, Paris, 1938, pp. 9-11 & 16-19. 
74 Ibid., p. 6. 
75 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 226-227. 
76 Ibid., pp. 228-230. 
77Nature, 1/5/1937, p. 760 in Box 36, Add 8287, University Library, Cambridge. 
78 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 230. 
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criticisms in The Times by the scientists of the CSWAG revealed that the debate 
over ARP had entered a second stage by mid February 1938. They wrote, 
If the Government experiments on the relative ineffectiveness of gas are to 
be accepted it is more than ever difficult to see why, if the safety of the 
public is the prime interest, they are to be left for the most part without any 
protection whatever against high explosives. The experience of Spain has 
shown that it is perfectly possible, even in a poor country in the midst of 
war, to build effective shelters for the civil population. With the resources 
and time at our disposal we should be able to do far better. 79 
After a year and a half, the conflict in Spain had become the touchstone for modem 
war. For the left, the civil war bore testimony not only to the Conservatives' failure 
in foreign policy, but also in their domestic provision of ARP. 
On the same page of The Times which carried the CSAWG reply was 
another letter to the editor from Cambridge signed by 13 academics. The letter was 
no doubt motivated by the intensifying air attacks on Barcelona in January and 
February 1938 for it stated that, 
In view of the growing horror of air raid in the Spanish conflict, and in view 
of the recent proposal of the Spanish Government to General Franco that 
both sides in Spain should refrain from bombing the non-combatant 
population, we urge the British Government to bring all possible diplomatic 
pressure to bear on General Franco to take back his refusal of the proposal 80 
Amongst the signatories were F. M. Comford, H. L. Elvin, F. L. Lucas, C. E. Raven and 
J. B. Trend who had each supported humanitarian relief efforts for the Republic. The 
two letters from Cambridge encapsulate the two positions which academics 
adopted in the political debates over ARP, either as scientific experts or as 
independent intellectuals. While the latter position was common in the moral 
criticism of the Nationalist air raids in both Britain and France, the linking of 
scientific argument and national politics over ARP in Britain was unique. 
J. B. S. Haldane & the ARP Debate in UCL 
The academic who probably most epitomised this mixing of scientific 
expertise and political commitment was University College London scientist J. B. S. 
Haldane. Haldane described his own political development in these terms, 
Till 1933 I tried to keep out of politics, but the support given by the British 
79 The Times. 11/2/1938, p. 10 in Box 36, Add 8287, University Library, Cambridge. 80 Ibid. 
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Government to Hitler and Mussolini forced me to enter the political field. In 
1936-1938 I spent three months in Republican Spain, first as an adviser on 
gas protection, and then as an observer of air raid precautions. I was in the 
front line during fighting, and in several air raids behind the line. Since then 
I have tried with complete lack of success, to induce the British Government 
to adopt air raid protection measures which had proved their efficacy in 
Spain. 
Mr Chamberlain's policy, and recent developments in physics and biology, 
combined to convince me of the truth of the Marxist philosophy. Though I 
am a member of no political party, I have of late years supported the 
communist party on a number of issues 81 
Haldane's strong support for the CPGB during the late 1930s mirrored in many 
ways that of Paul Langevin for the PCF; both were well-known scientists who as 
prominent independents in public life acted as consistent advocates for the 
Communist cause. 
In September 1938, during the height of the Czech crisis, Haldane was the 
central figure in a national propaganda campaign over ARP launched by the Left 
Book Club 82 Importantly, this campaign against aerial bombardment by high 
explosive and incendiary bombs rather than gas had been begun developing within 
British universities over a year earlier. It was especially within University College 
London and Cambridge, that scientists of the left gradually elaborated on the 
lessons of Spain. Within UCL, on 20 May 1937 the Peace Society organised a talk on 
ARP by Dr Hughes of the Cambridge Scientists Anti-War Group, and chaired by 
Haldane 83 The advertising notices for the talk asked, "You remember Guernica? ", 
while in the same issue Phineas carried appeals for the BYPA Foodship to Bilbao . 
84 
Almost a year later, an anonymous article "ARP Criticised", was published 
in the University College Magazine which censured the UCL authorities for their 
"makeshift and half-hearted" attempts at ARP. 85 It argued that the civil war in Spain 
had proved that the primary need for civilian protection was not ineffective gas 
masks or gas-proof rooms, but shelters from high explosive bombs. As its author 
tated, 
81 "Autobiographical Notes', p. 2, Box 7, JBS Haldane Collection, University College 
Archives; 
cf Werskey, The Visible College, p. 159. 
82 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 232. 
83 Phineas. 27/4/ 1937, p. 3. 
84 Phineas11 / 5/ 1937, pp. 1 & 2. 
85 University College Magazine, Summer 1938, p. 224. 
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In Spain the chief aerial weapon has been the high explosive bomb, and a 
raid on Barcelona lasting 30 seconds produced nearly a thousand casualties. 
No other form of attack is likely to produce more devastating results than 
this. Well-constructed bomb-proof shelters are the only protection against 
such carnage... This protection we are not getting, and will not get unless 
the Government is forced by agitation to provide us with it. &' 
The imminence of war over Czechoslovakia fuelled the Air Raid Precautions 
debate to fever-pitch during September 1938, as Haldane gave talks across the 
country for the Left Book Club 87 The publication by the latter of Haldane's study 
ARP, established him as one of the government's foremost and most authoritative 
critics. Haldane relied on his experiences in Spain extensively to justify his own 
arguments over the deficiencies of the British National Government's policy on 
ARP 88 For him, Spain proved that effective air raid protection was possible for 
civilians, it merely required scientific organisation. The government's anti-gas 
measures would only increase the casualties from bombardment by high 
explosives, and Haldane argued that the Conservatives were deliberately ignoring 
the practical lessons which could be learnt from Spain. 89 Reflecting the aims of 
CPGB strategy at the time, Haldane called for a broad non-party movement to 
lobby the government into providing effective civilian defences. 90 He argued that 
real civilian protection would prevent war and offer a solution to unemployment 
and rearmament 91 
Haldane's ARP directly cited University College as an example of the 
inadequacy of civilian protection in London. He described the basements of the 
college which were to be used as shelters as potential "death traps" 92 High 
explosive bombs with delayed fuses would render the majority of these basements 
as unsafe as the rest of the building. Haldane noted that while some basements 
were adequate, these should be supplemented by a system of trenches and the use 
of the first floor of steel frame buildings as shelters. 
&' Ibid.. p. 226. 
87 Werskey, The Visible College, p. 232. 
88 J. B. S. Haldane, ARP, Victor Gollancz, London, 1938, p. 9. 
89 p. 138. 
90 id., p. 10; 
Werskey, The Visible College, p. 232. 91 Draft, "Can we get one hundred percent safety in air raids! ", Box 7, JBS Haldane 
Collection, University College Archives. 
92 Haldane, ARP, p. 149. 
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Following the Munich Agreement, Haldane reproduced these arguments for 
student consumption in an article for Phineas which stressed that the blame for the 
existing inadequacies lay with the Government's policies, and not the UCL 
authorities 93 A week later Phineas published the reply by the College 
administration. College Secretary P. O. G. Douie cited his own personal experience of 
bombing in France during World War Ito explain that he was taking the threat 
seriously 94 The College had drawn up a detailed ARP scheme, even going so far as 
to purchase 113 respirators and 16 decontamination suits after it had been refused 
government supplies 95 
Conclusion 
While the debate over Air Raid Precautions at UCL broke after the crisis of 
September 1938, it had been developing within the College for some time. In May 
1938 it was possible for a UCL student to write that "Our President said that we live 
in times of war and rumours of war: that was last term; now we live in times of war 
and ARP" 96 The repeated air raids on Madrid, the Basque country and then 
Barcelona became the central reference points both for those attacking the politics of 
Chamberlain's government such as Haldane, and for newly organised pacifists at 
UCL envisaging the next war. 
Following the Second World War, the pacifism which marked movements of 
both the left and right (especially in France) has largely been described as a form of 
defeatism. Pacifism was actually a source of activism which could fuel both the 
left's humanitarian concern for the victim's of the war and the French extreme 
right's absolute opposition to being drawn into a war between Fascism and 
93 phineas. 18/10/1938, p. 1. 
94 Phineas. 25/ 10/ 1938, p. 1. 
95 Minutes of 1/ 11 / 1938, p. 5, "Minutes of College Committee, 1938", University College 
Archives; 
Minutes of 29/11/1938, p. 3, "Minutes of College Committee, 1938", University College 
Archives; 
Minutes of 7/2/1939, p. 4, "Minutes of College Committee, 1938", University College 
Archives. 
`X' Phineas 3/5/1938, p. 2; 
Another perspective, articulated after the Munich Agreement was very different: "Now that 
the crisis is over, and life has resumed its usual routine; re-armament in the Times, and 
scandals in the Mirror. Now that we no longer look up every time an aeroplane passes by; 
surely we can leave the managing of the college's affairs to competent authorities. Must we 
and you drag up ARP from its damp trenches once again, must the Conservatives and the 
Socialists keep on giving Chamberlain advice. Sit back and relax, dear Phineas" - Phineas. 25/ 10/ 1938, p. 1. 
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Communism. It could therefore work both ways, to encourage campaigns for the 




The Right and the 'Spanish Obsession' 
In France the year of 1938 was marked by the Radical Party's shift to the 
right which effectively ended the Front Populaire coalition. This was parallelled by 
the revival of the French extreme right after the disaster of legal dissolution in 1936. 
A pro-Franco journal, Occident, was established as a direct rebuttal to the 
intellectuals of the left. Some nationalist students had been successfully reorganised 
by the Parti Social Francais and its Centre Universitaire, while others were still 
willing to rely on the old repertoire of Action Francaise. In Britain, Conservative 
students faced the divisions of their seniors over foreign policy, with opposition to 
the Government's foreign policy being encouraged by the existing campus 
coalitions for Spain and humanitarian relief. 
Occident 
The week after the Nationalist army completed its occupation of Northern 
Spain in late October 1937, a new pro-Nationalist journal, Occident, was published 
in France. The title of the new journal was significant, as it echoed the October 1935 
petition by right-wing intellectuals opposing League of Nations sanctions against 
Italy, "Manifeste pour la Defense de 1'Occident". As in 1935, the French right saw the 
Spanish Nationalists as defending a common Western civilisation, a shared Latin 
solidarity, against communism. The first issue of Occident carried addresses from 
Franco and Bernard Fay of the College de France on its opening page .1 The journal 
was established as a reaction against the Spanish Republic's claimed support from 
French and Spanish 'intellectuals'. Directly contesting this claim Occident concluded 
its first issue with a text from renowned Spanish intellectual Miguel de Unamuno 
attacking the Republic? As well as Unamuno, the journal cited guitarist Andres 
Segovia, and composers Maurice Ravel and Igor Stravinsky as intellectual 
supporters of the Nationalist cause .3 
1 Occident, 25/ 10/ 1937, p. 1. 
2Ibid., p. 8; 
See also article "Unamuno et le mouvement national", Occident. 10/2/1938, p. 8; 
For the attempts by both the French right and left to claim Unamuno see Francoise 
Peyregne, "Les Derniers Mois de la Vie d'Unamuno d'apres la Presse Francaise", Autour de 
]a Guerre d'Espagne 1936-39: Actes du Colloque Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, 
1993, pp. 137-148. 
3 Occident, 10/1/1938, p. 8. 
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Occident's following issues contained a "Manifeste aux Intellectuels 
Espagnols" with 40 signatories and another petition supporting the Nationalists 
signed by 32 others 4 The latter petition included the signatures of thirteen 
academics, including 8 from Paris and 3 from Bordeaux. Significantly, not only did 
the petition lack the numerical support of pro-Republican French efforts, but as 5 of 
the signatories were honorary professors, pro-Nationalist supporters were also 
older than their opponents .5 Amongst the signatories of the petitions were two 
Paris academics, Louis Le Fur and Bernard Fay, who emerged as the Nationalist 
counterparts to pro-Republican quartet of Albert Bayet, Victor Basch, Paul Langevin 
and Henri Wallon. Occident carried an article on Le Fur's legal justification for the 
Franco regime in La Guerre d'Espagne et le Droit. 6 Bernard Fay published his own 
pro-Nationalist book which recorded his travels from San Sebastian, Burgos, 
Salamanca and symbolically concluding in the Catholic stronghold of Navarre.? 
As well as contesting the allegiance of intellectuals, Occident sought to 
establish humanitarian campaigns similar to those which had rallied support for the 
Republic. Fay was named President of a French committee to restore Catholic 
churches destroyed by the 'reds' in Spain, which secured the patronage of General 
Joffre and Cardinal Verdier. 8 Other aid efforts were organised through Solidarite 
d'Occident and Amis de l'Espagne Nationale, though like the pro-Nationalist 
petitions these were never strong enough to rival those organised for the Republic .9 
The assumption of much of the historiography from the left is that the lack of pro- 
Nationalist aid campaigns and petitions relative to those supporting the Republic 
indicates the strength of the latter's cause. Rather, the contrast between the two 
sides was that different political ideologies sought different forums for expression. 
Occident also championed the recognition of Nationalist Spain by the French 
government. 10 Diplomatic recognition of the Nationalists had first become an issue 
in late 1936, when it seemed likely that they would capture the Spanish capital. 
4Occident. 10/12/1937, p. 4; 
Occident. 10/ 1/ 1938, p. 4. 
5 At least half of the academic signatories were drawn from the Faculties of Letters and 
Sciences, questioning once again the accepted political geography of the Quartier Latin. 
6Occident. 25/2/1938, p. 4.; 
The Paris publishers of La Guerre d'Espagne et le Droit. shared the same street and 
nationalist sympathies as the students of Action Francaise, rue St Andre des Arts. 7Bernard Fay, Les Forces de 1'Espagne: Voyage ä Salamanque Les Amis de 1'Espagne 
Nouvelle, Paris, 1937. 
8Occident, 10/6/1938, p. 1. 
9Occident. 25/6/1938, p-7; 
Occident 10/ 1/ 1939, p. 7. 
10 Occident. 10/ 5/ 1938, p. 1. 
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With the failure of the Nationalist offensive on Madrid, there was an increasing 
propaganda campaign by the right-wing press, led by Le Figaro in February 1937 to 
recognise the Nationalists as a belligerent power, and later the following year to 
exchange ambassadors with Nationalist Spain? 1 In the fifth issue of Occident, Le 
Fur called for the French government to recognise Franco 's government as he 
already held two thirds of Spanish territory. 12 This press campaign for the 
recognition of Nationalist Spain increased dramatically during the final year of the 
civil war as the military situation of the Republic became more precarious. 13 The 
growth in pro-Nationalist propaganda was also encouraged by the resurgence of 
the extreme right in France in 1938 with the weakening of the coalition of the Front 
Populaire. 
The Parti Social Francais and its Centre Universitaire 
Before 1936, French politics had been marked by physical confrontation, 
with clashes on the streets, in public meetings, around newspaper sellers, at 
marches. The violence of 6 February 1934 had intensified this "atmosphere of battle" 
in political activity across the country. 14 After the dissolution of the leagues, the 
connection between nationalist politics and student corporate groups became 
increasingly nebulous. For the former league members, corporate groups offered 
one forum to re-organise their efforts in the wake of dissolution. 15 Perhaps the most 
successful league to adapt to the new situation was the Croix de Feu, which had 
been the fastest growing body on the right after the riots of 6 February 1934.16 Just 
as the league re-organised itself into a political party, the Parti Social Francais (PSF), 
11 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 387; 
Pike, Les Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne p. 200. 
12 Occident, 25/ 12/ 1937, p. 3. 
13 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 387. 
14 Kevin Passmore, "Boyscouting for grown-ups?: Paramilitarism in the Croix de Feu and 
the Parti Social Francais", French Historical Studies, 19, Fall 1995, pp. 529-530. 
15 In March 1937, police reported that a newly-formed Syndicat Corporatif des ftudiants de 
Paris, was not the 'non-political' corporate group it was registered as, but was exclusively 
composed of nationalist students. Its committee was led by members of the Parti Franciste - 
Report of Aug. 1937,304, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris; 
In Bordeaux, police recorded the formation of an Association des Amis du Salon des 
Etudiants which claimed to be inspired by Italian culture (though it was probably more 
inspired by Italian politics). It claimed 150 members and was led by students who had 
formerly been members of the Action Francaise - Reports of 24/4/1937 & 30/4/1937,1 
M605, AD Gironde. 
16 For the debate over whether Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais were Fascist see 
Soucy, French Fascism, pp. 17 & 136; 
Kevin Passmore, From Liberalism to Fascism: The Fight in a French Province 1928-1939, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 250. 
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to continue its legal existence, so its student section re-organised itself into a 
corporate group. From mid-1936, the paramilitary sorties which had characterised 
the league's old activities were phased out by the PSF as it sought other forms to 
maintain its public presence. 17 Equally the students of the PSF's Centre 
Universitaire rarely engaged in their former repertoire of violent street politics. 
The first group of the Centre Universitaire was founded in Paris in mid 
January 1937.18 It occupied the third floor of 120 Boulevard St Germain, behind a 
door discreetly labelled "PSF". 19 The Centre Universitaire had its own library of 
newspapers, political propaganda and a restaurant which were regularly used by 
approximately 100 students 20 The Centre was intended as a corporate group for 
PSF members, assisting their activities as students and as militants within the party 
which directed the group's administration and leadership. 21 The students were 
largely drawn from the Faculties of Law, Medicine, Science and the Ecole Libre des 
Sciences Politiques. 22 The following academic year, a Foyer Universitaire de Paris, 
was also established for female students. It opened with at least 80 members, drawn 
from the Faculties of Law, Medicine, Letters and the $cole des Chartes23 
The leagues had justified their organisation by action on the streets, whereas 
the new student organisations of the PSF justified their separate organisation 
through social work. As the Centre Universitaire's founder, medical intern Pierre 
Suire stated, "le Social doit rester notre raison d'etre" 24 From the outset, medical 
students were encouraged to visit elderly and sick PSF members in Paris25 Other 
students were encouraged to lead workers study circles or contribute to the PSF's 
youth groups26 This social work had a political character, for it drew on the image 
17 Passmore writes that in September and October 1936 the PSF's paramilitary mobilisation 
was briely revived, but that it was far les important to the organisation than before 
dissolution - Passmore, From Liberalism to Fascism, pp. 236,251 & 263. 18 John Rymell, "Militants & Militancy in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais: 
Patterns of Political Experience on the French Far Right (1933-39)", PhD, University of East 
Anglia, 1990, p. 37. 
19 L'Etudiant Social, May 1938, p. 27. 
20 Reception - Ibid., p. 24; 
Dinner - L'Etudiant Social, June 1938, p. 43; 
Courses - L'14tudiant Social, Oct. 1938, p. 94. 21 L'Etudiant Social. 1, Apr 1938, p. 4; 
Rymell, "Militants & Militancy in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais", p. 46. 
22 based on regular courses - L'Etudiant Social, May 1938, p. 27; 
L'Etudiant Social, Dec. 1938, p. 124. 
23 Le Flambeau du Sud-Ouest, Nov. 1938, p. 113. 
24 L'Etudiant Social, Aug/ Sept 1938, p. 69. 
25 L'Etudiant Social, April 1938, p. 5. 
26 L')4tudiant Social, May 1938, p. 22; 
L'Etudiant Social, Aug/Sept 1938, p. 84; 
L'Etudiant Social, Nov 38, p. 113. 
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of serving the nation which had been central to the politics of the ancien combattants 
of the Croix de Feu 27 As was recognised by its members, the political repertoire for 
students had changed dramatically between the Croix de Feu 's Volontaires 
Nationaux and their new student organisation, 
Sous la direction de Pierre Suire, le Centre universitaire a fait penetrer les 
idees Croix de Feu au Quartier Latin. Au 'Politque d'abord', nous avons 
substitue le 'social d'abord'. 28 
Significantly, for the bourgeois students of the Centre Universitaire social work 
offered the opportunity for cross-class contact which was central to PSF's rejection 
of marxist class conflict. Just as academics and students on the left had sought 
contact with the working class as the embodiment of socialist revolution, so 
students of the right sought the same contact to embody their'national' rather than 
class-based politics. 29 
Despite this emphasis on social work for the party, the possibility of 
humanitarian aid for Spanish Nationalists does not seem to have been considered 
by PSF students 30 The Centre Universitaire journal, L'Etudiant Social, gave a far 
greater public prominence to the group's corporate, rather than political, face. There 
is an almost complete absence of material on international events in L'Etudiant 
Social and it must be assumed that for political reading the students turned to the 
party's main newspaper 31 Rather than formulating their own distinctive political 
positions like the Socialist students of the SFIO, the PSF students seem to have taken 
their own position firmly within the party line. 
The leader of the PSF's parliamentary wing was Jean Ybarnegaray who was 
the second most popular speaker to the students of the Centre Universitaire after 
27 "Etudiants, pour cela aidez-vous. Donnez au Centre Universitaire vos Neures de liberte, vos 
aptitudes. Vous ne serez pas inutilises. Vous servirez" - L'Etudiant Social, Aug/ Sept 1938, p. 83; 
Rymell, "Militants & Militancy in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais", pp. 13-16. 
28 "Under the leadership of Pierre Suire, the Centre universtaire has caused the ideas of the 
Croix de Feu to penetrate into the Latin Quarter. For'Politics first', we have substituted 
'social [work] first"' - L'$tudiant Social, Oct 1938, p. 94. 29 This aspect of the PSF's nationalism was particularly pronounced at a mass meeting in 
Paris on 11 May 1938 where La Rocque's speech stressed the importance that the audience 
mixed students and workers of the PSF. As L'Vtudiant Social wrote of the meeting "cette 
fraternisation cordiale de deux classes qu'on a voulu jusu'alors opposer arbitrairement prenait une 
valeur eminemment symbolique et constituait le fait important de cette memorable soiree" - 
L'Etudiant Social, June 1938, p. 40. 
30 In February 1938, the PSFs newspaper in the Gironde carried an appeal by an ex-naval 
officer in Bordeaux for impartial aid to Spain in which he stressed the solidarity of latin 
people - Le Flambeau du Sud-Ouest. 5/2/1938, p. 3. 1 L')Studiant Francais, the journal of the Etudiants d'Action Francaise, emerged with a 
similar focus on the univeristy rather than national politics after dissolution in February 
1936. 
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the party's leader Colonel de La Rocque. Ybarnegaray was also the PSF's 
spokesman on foreign affairs and his view of the war in Spain seems to have been 
highly influential on the students. As deputy for the Basses-Pyrenees on the Spanish 
border and of Basque descent, Ybarnegaray had strong personal as well as political 
reasons for committing himself to supporting the Nationalists. At the PSF's first 
National Congress in Paris in late 1936, Ybarnegaray hailed Franco as a friend of 
France who tomorrow would be the victor and master of Spain 32 He then attacked 
Blum for supporting the communists and anarchists of the Frente Popular. 
Ybarnegaray recognised that both Germany and Russia had supplied large amounts 
of military material to the two sides in Spain, yet unlike the left critics of non- 
intervention, he saw this aid as the very reason France should remain neutral in 
conflict, lest it be drawn into the "duel a mort" of Nazism and Communism. 33 This 
position changed little during the war, as the PSF attacked the Front Populaire for 
alienating Nationalist Spain whose anti-communism and Catholicism made it the 
true embodiment of the country. 
At the Second National Congress of PSF students in mid February 1939, 
Ybarnegaray argued that the recent fall of Catalonia to the Nationalists was a 
triumph of the realism of his own policy 34 He saw the victory of Franco as not the 
victory of a particular party but the triumph of order and authority in Spain over 
tyranny and bolshevism. The day before Ybarnegaray's speech, Bordeaux student 
Louis Audet addressed the Congress on "L'Etudiant et la France de 1939". Though 
Audet explicitly deferred to Ybarnegaray on foreign affairs, he did join the party's 
leaders in supporting the Munich Pact and welcoming the imminent victory of 
Franco 35 
The PSF's consistent support for the Spanish Nationalists does not seem to 
have extended beyond denouncing the Front Populaire's support for Republican 
Spain and calling for the diplomatic recognition of Franco 's government 36 On 3 
October 1936, the PSF staged a massive counter-demonstration to disrupt a PCF 
mass meeting in support of the Spanish Republic. The clash was a return to the pre- 
July 1936 confrontations over political space, as the meeting at the Parc des Princes 
32 Le Partis Social Francais Devant les Problemes de l'Heure: Rapports Presentes au Premier 
Congres Nationa du PSF. Paris, 1936, p. 366 in 68 J 216, AD Nord. 
33 Ibid., p. 368. 
34 Jean Ybarnegaray, "La Paix ou la Guerre" 19/ 2/ 1939, p. 6 in 68 J 216, AD Nord. 
35 Louis Audet, "L'ttudiant et la France de 1939", pp. 8-13 in 68 J 216, AD Nord. 
36 In early 1938, a Paris police report noted that the PSF were supporting a propaganda 
campaign in France by one element of the Francoist coalition, the juntas de Ofensiva 
Nacional-Sindicalista, however such a campaign seems to have gained little publicity - 
Report of 8/3/ 1938, BA 1663, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
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in the 16th arrondissement, represented a challenge to the PSF's claimed hegemony 
of Western Paris. Despite the Front Populaire's decision to ban the counter- 
demonstration, 15,000 to 20,000 PSF supporters gathered to challenge the 40,000 to 
50,000 who attended the meeting?? In the ensuing scuffles 1,200 were arrested by 
police 38 The violence of the counter-demonstration was exceptional as in France 
the heated press polemics by the extreme right and left over the Spanish civil war 
rarely found physical form. 
The Revival of the Extreme-Right 
The establishment of Occident and the successful reorganisation of the PSF 
were parallelled by the increasing public activities of other former leagues in 1938 
and 1939. Just as the election of the Front Populaire had forced the leagues out of 
public life, so the hostility of Daladier's government's to their former Popular Front 
allies in mid 1938 encouraged the right's belief that there was more political space to 
manoeuvre. The absolute opposition of the PCF to the Munich Agreement marked 
not only the definitive end of the Front Populaire coalition, but also the increasing 
marginalisation of the party in October 1938. As the Radicals increasingly adopted 
the anti-communism of the right, so the followers of Action Francaise even began to 
hope that the potential dissolution of the PCF would allow for the leagues' re- 
formation through royalist clubs 39 
Despite this increasing confidence on the right in the late 1930s, the 
followers of Action Francaise were far less successful than the PSF in organising a 
new repertoire of action after dissolution. 40 The March 1939 banquet for 600 
members of the medical profession organised by the Medecins et Pharmaciens 
Amis de 1'Action Francaise, was addressed by 25 year old student and activist 
Roger Ballade. According to police, Ballade stated to his audience that, 
Voici quatre annees, dit-il que les etudiants en medecine ne se sont pas 
37 A PSF poster for the counter-demonstration had deliberately mimicked the left's rallying 
calls, "A bas lefascisme! Unite d'Action! Discipline! Vive la Liberte! Vive la France! " - Report of 
3/10/36, BA 1863, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris; 
Rymell decribed this parodying as contrived, unconvincing and overstated, however there 
were several occasions where the French right attacked the 'fascism' fo the left - Rymell, 
"Militants & Militancy in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais", pp. 171-172. 38 Report of 9/ 10/ 1936, BA 1863, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
39 Report of 19/ 12/ 1938, BA 1896, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
40 This failure is significant given that Catherine Breen argues that the Nationalist cause 
excited far more support in the pages of Action Francaise than from the ranks of the PSF - 
Catherine Breen, "La Droite Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne 1936-1937", These, Universite de 
Geneve, 1973, p. 68 
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trouves reunis aupres de leurs aines. Durant cette longue periode, nous 
avons assiste ä pas mal d'evdnements entre autres la dissolution des ligues 
par le juif Blum (hudes) mais croyait-il qu'il suffisait de nous dissoudre pour 
tuer notre mouvement; il a dissous les groupements d'Action Francaise mais 
la doctrine, eile nest pas dissoute (applaudissements). 41 
Ballade, who was 25, had already been detained five times by the police during 
league demonstrations before the election of the Front Populaire 42 However, after 
dissolution, there were fewer avenues for this commitment and it was certainly 
clear that the public activities of Action Francaise had been largely muted since 
1936. Still there remained sporadic scuffles for the leagues' supporters to express 
their frustration, either in ambushes on left militants or, perhaps as frequently, with 
other groups on the right 43 
On 15 December 1938, the Rassemblement des Etudiants pour l'Aide ä 
l'Enfance Espagnole held a film screening in the Latin Quarter as part of its 
intensified fundraising campaign that term. 44 Approximately 150 people attended 
the movie which was shown at the Foyer International des $tudiantes. After half an 
hour of a pro-Republican film, the screening was interrupted by a barrage of tear 
gas from nationalist students. Police identified the two leaders of the demonstration 
as jean Dufour and Pierre Boutang, both aged 22 and studying medicine and 
philosophy respectively: 45 Both men were linked to Action Francaise, and Boutang, 
who had given the signal for the chahut with the cry "Montrez-nous les Carmelites! ", 
was a normalien who had already been cautioned by the Rector of the University of 
Paris for his political activities. 46 Dufour was identified by the police as deputy 
chief of $tudiants d'Action Francaise who had already been detained twice in 1938 
for a demonstration against the Minister of National Education, Jean Zay, at the 
official opening of the academic year and for an attack on another student 47 
41 "It was four years, he said, since the students in medicine had met together with their 
elders. During this long period, we have witnessed quite a few events including the 
dissolution of the leagues by the Jew Blum (boos) but does he believe that it is sufficient to 
'disolve' us to kill our movement; he had dissolved the groups of Action Francaise but the 
doctrine is not dissolved (applause)" - Report of 20/ 3/ 1939, BA 1895, Archives de la 
Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
42 Report of 26/3/ 1936, BA 1896, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
43 One of the leaders of the Gauche Revolutionnaire tendance , Daniel Guerin, was roughed 
up by nationalist students as he passed through the Latin Quarter following the SFIO's 
march protesting against the Senate's opposition to Blum's second government on 7 April 
1938 - Guerin, Front Populaire Revolution Manqu&e, p. 188; 
Rymell, "Militants & Militancy in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Francais", p. 123. 
44 Report of 16/12/1938, BA 1665, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Letter of 23/ 2/ 1938, AJ16-2895, Archives Nationales. 
47 Report of 23/11/1938, BA 1896, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris; 
Report of 16/12/1938, BA 1665, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
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Even though the public face of the leagues had gone, their members and 
their influence remained. Far more importantly than the sporadic violence of their 
most committed followers, the threat of confrontation remained. This threat was a 
powerful factor in excluding political activity from within university space, which 
partly explains why there was so little political and humanitarian activity within 
French universities, compared to their British counterparts. Open campaigning over 
Spain within the university, such as that by the Rassemblement des Etudiants pour 
l'Aide a l'Enfance Espagnole, could provoke reprisals. Even humanitarian aid was 
stifled by the polarisation of French politics and the absolute division between the 
extreme right and the left. It was not until the end of the decade as France's 
domestic political climate changed, that the students of Action Francaise were able 
to challenge the campaigns of the left. In February 1939, L'Action Francaise 
intensified its campaign for the appointment of a French ambassador to Nationalist 
Spain, and its followers planned demonstrations over the residence of the President 
Azana of the Spanish Republic in Paris following the fall of Barcelona. 48 
The Right's Corporate Presence 
While the extreme right had lost their physical dominance of public space 
during the second half of the 1930s, they maintained strong links with the 
established corporate students groups. The united efforts of the student left were 
spectacularly unsuccessful in elections for student delegates to the university's 
Council of Discipline. In the elections of December 1937 in Paris, the left could only 
manage a quarter of the votes compared to what it labelled "les lister 'nationales 
corporatives "' 49 Such results were replicated across the country. Even in Toulouse 
the strength of the Union Syndicale des $tudiants was not enough to prevent the 
list of the Association Generale gaining three quarters of the vote. 
48 Reports of 7/ 2/ 1939 & 15/ 2/ 1939, BA 1664, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
49 Essais et Combats. 8, / 1/ 1938, p. 19. 
263 
TABLE 10.1: COUNCIL OF DISCIPLINE ELECTIONS IN PARIS, DECEMBER 193750 
Faculty Association Generale Left 
Faculty of Letters 560 votes 240 votes 
Faculty of Sciences 521 votes 203 votes 
Faculty of Medicine 724 votes 244 votes 
Faculty of Pharmacy 389 votes 75 votes 
Faculty of Law 727 votes 125 votes 
TABLE 10.1: COUNCIL OF DISCIPLINE ELECTIONS IN TOULOUSE, JANUARY 
193851 
Faculty Association Generale USE 
Faculty of Letters 165 votes 68 votes 
Faculty of Sciences 138 votes - 
Faculty of Medicine & 
Pharmacy 338 votes 125 votes 
Faculty of Law 209 votes 48 votes 
The strength of the right amongst corporate groups, and its reviving 
confidence during the year was marked by the student protests at the end of 1938. 
The fact that the Munich Agreement did not represent a permanent settlement of 
claims in Europe, was strongly felt by the French government which was 
increasingly attacked in the Italian press after October 1938. These attacks 
culminated on 30 November 1938, when the deputies of the Italian Chamber 
interrupted its sessions with the chant "Nice, Corsica, Tunis" to herald a new phase 
of Italian expansionism. 52 Such territorial claims on its sovereign territory were 
absolutely opposed by the French. In Italy, the propaganda campaign for expansion 
was reinforced on 6 December 1938 by large demonstrations of university students 
in Rome for Corsica and Tunisia53 This immediately triggered massive marches at 
universities across France, some of which numbered several thousand students. 54 
While no group was publicly identified as sponsoring the marches, it seems they 
were largely organised by the main corporate groups such as the Association 
Generale in Lille 55 With widespread public sympathy (including that of the police), 
50 Essais et Combats, 8, / 1/ 1938, p. 19. 
51 : Express du Midi/28/1/1938, p. 4; 
Le Midi Socialiste. 3/2/1938, p. 5. 
52 Anthony Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936-1939 
Frank Cass, London, 1977, pp. 256-257. 
53 L'Express du Midi, 7/ 12/ 1938, p. 2. 
54 Student protests on 7-8 December 1938 were estimated as numbering 5,000 in Paris and 
1,500 in Toulouse - L'Express du Midi, 9/ 12/ 1938, p. 4. 55 Lille Universite. Jan 1939, p. 13. 
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students marched singing the nationalist standard of the Marseillaise and 
parodying the Italian claims with their own, "Naples ä la France". 
Both Socialists and Communists sought to channel the nationalist protests 
against Italy into support for Republican Spain however their efforts merely 
symbolised the strength of political divisions within France. Students of the left 
marched through Paris in late January 1939, chanting "Les Italiens en Italie! L'Espagne 
aux Espagnols! des armes pour 1'Espagne! " . 57 It was unlikely that their chants found 
much response amongst the students of the extreme right. While members of the 
PSF and the readers of Action Francaise or Occident might agree with the slogan 
"L'Espagne aux Espagnols", to them the true Spain was that of the Nationalists rather 
than the Republicans. 
Conservative Students and International Politics 
Despite the overwhelming prominence of left-wing politics in Oxford and 
Cambridge after the mid-1930s, the majority of students and academics at both 
universities were actually much loser to the right 58 Despite their numerical 
superiority, Conservative politics for most of its followers had little need of the 
public activism which defined the left. During the late 1930s, in reaction to the left's 
repeated campaigning, some Conservative students sought to adopt the same forms 
of activist politics while others deliberately distanced themselves from such 
engagement. These two different approaches to politics shaped the differing 
perspectives with which Conservatives viewed the civil war in Spain. As embodied 
by the leaders of the student Conservative Associations of Oxford and Cambridge, 
both approaches to politics affected not only their participation in collective action 
with the student left but also their relationship to the Chamberlain Government's 
foreign policy. 
Nationalist groups or parties were not mentioned in police reports of the demonstration 
which is significant given police success in identifying such groups in other proclaimed 
'non-political' campaigns and organisations. 
56 Report of 28/1/1939,1 M 605, AD Gironde; 
Report of 15/12/1938 M6 10980, AD Bouches-du-Rhone. 
57 L'Humanite. 26/ 1/ 1939, p. 5; 
L'$tudiant Socialiste. Jan. -Feb. 1939, p. 2. 58 Philip Toynbee, "Journal of a Naive Revolutionary" in Philip Toynbee, ed., The Distant 
Drum: Reflections on the Spanish Civil War, Sidwick & Jackson, London, 1976, p. 146. 
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The gap between the Cambridge University Socialist Club and their 
Conservative peers was not merely ideology, but as the left itself recognised, one of 
activity; 
The merits of the Cambridge University Conservative Association are 
definitely negative merits. Indeed the chief virtues of the Conservatives are 
the things they do not do. Conservative propaganda tracts are never pressed 
into unwilling hands outside Mill Lane. Conservatives do not embarrass 
Petty Cury pedestrians by wandering unconcernedly by in sandwich boards 
and single file. The Conservatives do not hire buses, and singing the sixty 
miles to Westminster, they do not lobby MP's. The Conservatives do not 
send eighty-word telegrams to Franco. The Conservatives do not have 'bottle 
parties for Spain and they do not sell six penny soup-and-cheese lunches, lie 
down in the roadway, or cook sausages on the footwalk. Thank God for 
small mercies 59 
Michael MacRobert served as Secretary for the Cambridge University 
Conservative Associations during 1938-1939, and for him the left's political activism 
was fundamentally misguided 60 MacRobert wrote that, 
The idea of an Organised Student Community playing an active and 
decisive role in National Politics is primarily humorous, but, widely and 
seriously held as it is, it repays investigation. The general case against it is 
that Democracy cannot work if the elements within it challenge the 
supremacy of the elected representatives of the people... The particular case 
against it is that, with the exception of mental defectives, and middle-aged 
women from Bloomsbury, Students as a whole are probably less fitted to 
influence the conduct of affairs than any other element in the country. What 
threads of respect remain for Undergraduate Politics are being swiftly 
dissipated by the bi-weekly demonstration, which appear to abrogate any 
claim of the demonstrators to serious political attention. 61 
Of course, the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty was particularly appealing for 
Conservatives at a time when the National Government claimed 432 seats in the 
House of Commons to 154 seats for the Labour Party. However, in the same term in 
which MacRobert penned his attack on the left, his own college had established the 
Queens' College Conservative Club which was arranging dances and other 
activities for its 60 members. These seem to be partly an imitation of the CUSC's 
success in building up a social as well as political organisation. 
59 The Granta, 15/2/1939, p. 249. 
6OThe Granta, 12/10/1938, p. 12. 
61 The Grants, 26/4/ 1939, p. 343. 
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What is perhaps most striking about MacRobert's antipathy to student 
activism was that his statements were made in 1939, at a time when he was 
personally opposed to Chamberlain's government. MacRobert was a prolific and 
respected speaker in the Cambridge Union, and its debates help to map out his 
changing politics during the late 1930s. In February 1937, MacRobert spoke in the 
Union supporting non-intervention in the civil war 62 By November 1938, he no 
longer defended the government's foreign policy, and was instead a committed 
opponent of Franco, Germany and Italy 63 The following term, he proposed the 
motion which opened the Union debate of no confidence in the government's 
foreign policy of appeasement, which was won by 216 votes to 99 votes 64 
MacRobert focused his attack on the prime minister, and ended his address by 
criticising the Labour Party for refusing to participate in an anti-appeasement 
coalition. His frequent speeches at the Union, college life at Queens' and support for 
the Japanese boycott in early 1938 mark out MacRobert as a highly active 
Conservative, yet his perception of political activity was different from those on the 
left whom he might work with in the Union or humanitarian relief. 65 Significantly, 
his increasing opposition to the Government's foreign policy did not affect his 
loyalty to the party itself or alter his views on the political activism of the CUSC. 
In contrast to MacRobert's antipathy for student activism, for Edward Heath 
who was a leading figure amongst Conservative students at Oxford dissent within 
the Tory Party and activism were closely linked 66 Heath was elected president of 
the Oxford University Conservative Association in June 1937 and had later become 
president of Federation of University Conservative Associations 67 He was also 
extremely active in the Oxford Union being elected Secretary in late 1937 and 
President in late 1938.68 Like many students on the left whose political activism had 
also encouraged European travel, Heath's visited Germany on his 1937 summer 
holiday, which confirmed his anti-fascist politics 69 Over foreign policy, Heath 
supported Eden's opposition to Chamberlain's pursuit of rapproachment with 
Germany and Italy. Whilst Eden's resignation in February 1938 was a shock to 
62The Cambridge Review, 12/2/1937, p. 261. 
63 The Granta, 23/11/1938, p. 122. 
64The Granta, 25/ 1/ 1939, p. 192. 
65 The Granta, 19/1/1938, p. 195-1%. 
66 John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography, Jonathan Cape, London, 1993, p. 37. 
67 Heath won the presidency as as anti-fascist, defeating a Conservative who supported 
Franco - Ibid., p. 31. 68 At the time members of two colleges dominated the Oxford Union's elections, Balliol and 
Christ Church. Heath belonged to the former. 
69 Campbell, Edward Heath, pp. 30-31; 
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Heath, he remained committed to the party rather than a Popular Front alliance 
with the left . 
70 
It was Heath's activist approach to politics which led him to join a BYPA 
student delegation to Republican Spain in early July 1938. The delegation of four 
Oxford students and one other from Liverpool, represented the Labour Club, 
Liberal Club, Pacifist Association, League of Nations Union, and NUS. Heath was 
described as joining the delegation in a "private capacity"71 The students were 
forced to travel by plane from Barcelona, to Valencia and Madrid as republican 
territory had been cut in two by the Nationalists a few months earlier. 72 The 
students were treated very well by their hosts and enjoyed interviews with Prime 
Minister Juan Negrfn, Alvarez del Vayo and Spanish academics. 73 They also visited 
the British Battalion of the International Brigades on the Ebro Front a fortnight 
before the Republic launched what would become its last offensive. Though Heath 
eventually broke with Conservative foreign policy over Central Europe, his 
energetic anti-fascism brought him close to the coalition of the left defending the 
Spanish Republic. 
The Oxford By-Election: 'Balliol v Fascism' 
The national - or international question of an age is being fought out at 
Oxford at the present moment. 74 
In British national politics, Munich provided a rallying point for dissidents 
within both the Conservative and Labour Parties to seek a common coalition with 
Liberals and Communists, though such an alliance was never formalised. Like the 
debates over non-intervention, the Munich crisis ambivalently affected pro- 
Republican and Nationalist supporters, for opponents and supporters of the 
agreement could be found in both camps. Either fragmenting or creating new 
political alliances, the crisis in Central Europe intensified the international 
campaigns around Spain. 
70 plod., p. 32; 
The Cherwell 11/6/1938, p. 148. 
71 Interview with Richard Symonds, Oxford, October 1997. 
72 During one of these flights their plane was shot at by Republican anti-aircraft - Richard 
Symonds in Brian Harrison, ed., Corpuscles, p. 119. 
73 Symonds felt that the students were "taken more seriously in Spain than [they] would be 
in Britain" - Interview with Richard Symonds. 74 The Cherwell, 22/10/1938, p. 23. 
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The threat of war before Munich not only delayed the opening of a new 
academic year but left scattered physical scars within several British universities. 75 
Amongst students throughout the country it seemed, "that the events at the end of 
the vacation had awakened more than the usual interest in politics". 76 This was 
particularly the case in Oxford, where the local by-election pushed academics and 
students into the national debate over Munich. The Master of Balliol, A. D. Lindsay, 
agreed to stand as an independent candidate on the single issue of Chamberlain's 
foreign policy. Significantly this Popular Front over the single issue of 
Chamberlain's foreign policy directly drew on a coalition two years earlier which 
had supported Sir Arthur Salter's independent campaign for one of the university's 
constituency seats.? It was therefore not merely the shock of Munich which gave 
birth to the all-party alliance supporting Lindsay against the Conservative Party's 
official candidate, but the existing close contacts within the university between its 
most politically active academics. 
It was Oxford academics Roy Harrod, Richard Crossman and G. D. H. Cole 
who played a significant role in converting the town's Liberal Party and Labour 
Party to supporting a coalition candidate78 However, for Lindsay, Cole and many 
other academics who were members of the Labour Party, an independent cross- 
party coalition over the election only became possible when it became clear that it 
would neither split the local party nor result in its disaffiliation by Transport 
House79 Even in forming an unofficial coalition with Liberals, Communists and 
dissident Tories, which was viewed with suspicion by Labour's national leadership, 
Oxford academics retained their fundamental commitment to the party. Lindsay 
focused his own election speeches on the particular crisis which had arisen out of 
Munich, rather than issuing a general call for a Popular Front 80 
75 In Oxford and Cambridge ARP trenches were dug at several colleges and Newnham 
College received a contingent of London children who had been evacuated in case the 
capital was bombed. 
76 Said in reference to a Freshers Tea at UCL addressed by Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson - 
Phineas. 18/10/1938, p. 4. 
77 Salter's campaign was sponsored by Cole, Murray and Crutwell representing the Labour, 
Liberal and Conservative Parties - Letter of 11 / 8/1936,78, Mss Gilbert Murray, Bodleian 
Library; 
Preceding Lindsay's independent candidature, Rowse wrote to Murray seeking to avert the 
disaster of a Liberal candidate standing against Labour's candidate, who was then Gordon 
Walker. He sought some reciprocity after Labour's efforts in Salter's election in 1935 - Letter 
of 8/9/1938,85, Mss Gilbert Murray, Bodleian Library. 
78 Roger Eatwell, "Munich, Public Opinion and Popular Front", journal of Contemporary 
History. 6,4,1971, pp. 125-127. 
79 Letter of 7/ 11 / 38 to New Statesmen, p. 1, A1/57, Cole Papers, Nuffield College Archives. 
80 Drusilla Scott, A. D. Lindsay: A Biography, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971. 
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The by-election created a political frenzy in Oxford during the first weeks of 
the 1938-39 academic year. From its inception, Lindsay's electoral campaign relied 
heavily on the enthusiasm of its student supporters. As one first year member of 
Corpus Christi College remembered, "For many of us it was our initiation into 
politics on the ground as we cheerfully delivered leaflets on behalf of Lindsay". 81 
Denis Healey, who whilst a student in the Labour Club also joined the CPGB, 
remembered that, 
... undergraduate Communists flooded the meeting of the 
Oxford City 
Labour Party and helped to produce the majority which compelled Gordon 
Walker to stand down so that Lindsay could fight without a rival from the 
Left, much against his own will and that of the Labour Party's National 
Agent... 
We fought the campaign with enormous enthusiasm. Almost all the 
undergraduates who took part supported Lindsay S2 
Healey studied philosophy under Lindsay, and was also a member of Balliol, the 
college Lindsay headed. His enthusiasm for Lindsay's electoral campaign was 
therefore partly encouraged by personal contact which could develop between 
academics and students in Oxford's system of one-on-one tutorials and residential 
colleges. 
Sharing these personal contacts with Lindsay, but of a very different political 
position, was Edward Heath. Heath also was a resident of Balliol and had been a 
frequent social guest of the Lindsays. Along with his position in the Conservative 
Association and the Union, he was president of the Balliol JCR at the time of the 
election. Heath's support for Lindsay against the Conservative candidate was seen 
by many as representing a students' Popular Front against appeasement. The 
Conservative Association was split by the election between support for Lindsay and 
the party's official candidate, 
The two sides maintained friendly relations throughout, lunching each day 
at the Carlton Club opposite Balliol, Lindsay's supporters on one side of the 
room, Hogg's on the other, exchanging good-humoured abuse across the 
gap P 
Still, as one of Heath's biographers notes, "despite his rebellion over Munich, he 
dearly still saw himself as a leader of university Conservatism and was determined 
to use his position to advance his personal vision of a modern, progressive, self- 
81 Alastair Hetherington in Brian Harrison, ed., Corpuscles, p. 131; 
Throughout the campaign, Lindsay "always looked like the Master of Balliol" - Interview 
with Richard Symonds. 
82 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 37. 
83 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 34. 
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consciously young Toryism : 84 Heath's commitment to the Conservative Party was 
as strong as his anti-fascism, though he remained an outspoken critic of 
Chamberlain's foreign policy 85 
The by-election campaign was marked by "ten days of crowded meetings, 
hasty organisation, touring the city with loud-speaker vans and canvassing; and 
then it was polling day" 86 However university enthusiasm was not enough to 
reverse a safe Tory seat and while Lindsay halved the Conservative majority, he lost 
by 17,797 votes to 12,363 votes. Following the elections, Lindsay's campaign was 
publicly criticised by Gordon Walker, the Labour candidate who had been forced to 
stand down, as a betrayal of the party and especially for not dealing with Spain in 
the election 87 G. D. H. Cole replied to these accusations by stating that Lindsay's 
election address, which focused on foreign policy, had stressed there should be no 
Anglo-Italian agreement without the withdrawal of Italian troops from Spain. Cole 
also argued that, "I both made, and heard made by others, plenty of strong 
references to the Spanish question in the course of the election campaign" 88 
Interestingly, despite the ambivalence of Labour leaders such as Walter Citrine over 
Spain, the exchange between Gordon Walker and Cole treated commitment to 
Republican Spain as a symbol for commitment to the party's interests. 
Conclusion: Party Politics, Foreign Policy and the Universities 
In reaction to the public activism of the left during the mid-1930s, students 
of the right in both Britain and France became increasingly prominent in political 
activity during 1938. For the former members of the leagues in France this reflected 
the increased opportunities brought about by a change in the national political 
climate as the Front Populaire fragmented and Daladier's government increasingly 
looked to the right. In British universities, the increasing prominence of the right 
84 Campbell, Edward Heath, p. 37. 
85 Heath at the Union's Presidential debate moved the motion of no confidence in the 
National government's foreign policy. Interestingly he was supported by Mayhew who was 
also in a sense a dissident of the left as he was opposed to the Communist influence within 
the Oxford Labour Club - The Cherwell, 26111/1938, p. 36. 8' Scott, A. D. Lindsay, p. 254. 
87 Letter of 7/ 11 / 38 to New Statesmen, p. 3, Al / 57, Cole Papers, Nuffield College Archives; 
This criticism was picked up by Eatwell and perhaps overstated in his analysis of Lindsay's 
campaign: "his deeply held religious and democratic beliefs led him to a more equivocal 
position on the Spanish civil war" which ignores Lindsay's other activities in support of 
Republican Spain - Eatwell, "Munich, Public Opinion and Popular Front", p. 129. 88 Letter of 7/ 11 / 38 to New Statesmen, p. 3, A1/57, Cole Papers, Nuffield College 
Archives. 
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had less to do with national party politics than with the increased willingness of 
student Conservatives to adopt the militant forms and organisation of their socialist 
counterparts 89 Though some British Conservatives such as Michael MacRobert at 
Cambridge saw student activism as a form of leftist self-aggrandisement, others 
such as Edward Heath at Oxford became heavily involved in the left's campaigns, 
delegations and appeals. 
Participation in the left's campaigns for China, Spain and Central Europe 
encouraged Conservative students such as Heath to increasingly find themselves 
opposed to the Chamberlain Government's foreign policy of rapprochement with 
Italy and Germany. That this dissent only became widespread after the Munich 
Agreement was most clearly symbolised by the Annual Congress of the Federation 
of University Conservative and Unionist Associations in early January 1939. 
Significantly, the first motion before the Congress was on foreign policy, which, 
gave rise to a great deal of discussion. The motion urging support of the 
policy, especially with regard to renewed friendship with Italy, was defeated 
by 14 votes to 10... Mr Ilsley of UC said that our foreign policy could best be 
judged by its results, to wit - an increase in the German Navy and Italy's 
demands to France. ` 
UCL Conservative students joined their Cambridge and Oxford counterparts, who 
whether adopting or opposing the political forms of the left found themselves 
unable to accept the government's foreign policy as war began to look increasingly 
likely. 
Though these debates amongst British conservatives were shaped by events 
in Central Europe, the civil war in Spain remained a significant symbol for their 
changing approach to politics. The 1937 Annual Congress of the Federation of 
University Conservative and Unionist Associations, held in Glasgow, had passed a 
resolution holding that the conflict in Spain was not a concern of England 91 This 
position was the one which united Conservative MPs in Parliament (rather than the 
89 With the opening of March 1938, a Conservative Club was formed at UCL. Its letter to 
Phineas noted that, "the Socialist have held long enough the monopoly of political activities 
here. It is high time that they were reminded that, in this country at least, they are in the 
minority" - Phineas. 1 / 3/ 1938, p. 3; 
The UCL Conservative Society's intention to hold fortnightly meetings and debates 
expressed a new level of activism and organisation, which was derived from the left it was 
counter-attacking - University College Magazine, 15,3, Summer 1938, p. 268. `O Phineas. 10/1/1939, p. 2. 
91 The Congress did agree to co-operate with left wing organisation in campus Peace 
Councils - The Clare Market Review. March 1937, p. 19. 
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pro-Franco sentiments of which they were accused by the left) 92 Yet the all-party 
coalitions which developed around humanitarian aid for Spain meant that it 
became of both humanitarian and political concern to many Conservative students 
such as Heath. Significantly despite their growing opposition to Chamberlain's 
official policy the students remained committed to the Conservative Party, neither 
breaking away to join the left, nor supporting any of the extremely marginal 
attempts to establish groups on the extreme right 93 
In contrast to the multitude of aid and relief activities of the left, the French 
right were "far more concerned with using what was happening in Spain as a rod 
for the crumbling back of the Popular Front" 94 Strikingly, despite the efforts of 
Occident in France to rebut the hegemony of left intellectuals in supporting the 
Republic, it was not events in Spain which provoked the strongest reactions from 
the students of the extreme right. Rather, the revival of the extreme right in French 
universities was marked by its counter-protests to Italian territorial claims against 
France at the end of 1938. The demonstrations were well-suited to the French right's 
nationalist approach to politics and encouraged by the gradual right-ward shift in 
the national political climate. 
92 Thompson stresses that the dissent of Tory MPs over foreign policy was aroused by 
events in Central Europe and not the civil war in Spain - Neville Thompson, The Anti- 
Appeasers: Conservative Opposition to Appeasement in the 1930s, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1971, pp. 116 & 165. 
93 At UCL, the attempt to found a Nationalist Society at University College was opposed by 
the College authorities, the Socialist Society and the Conservative Society. The Conservative 
Society saw the proposition as damaging to the government and representing another alien 
'ism', and even sought the authority of cental office to endorse its position- Phinea 
7/2/1939, p. 4; 
Phineas, 28/2/1939, p2. 
941.. Iilary Footitt, "Intellectuals of the French Right and the Spanish Civil War", M. Phil, 
University of Reading, 1972, p. 70. 
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Chapter 11 
The Final Campaigns for the Spanish Republic 
The end of summer 1938 was marked by the bloody attrition of the Spanish 
Republic's offensive across the Ebro river, and the increasing pressures of refugees 
and food shortages within its divided territory. As its military position became 
increasingly critical, elements within the Republican government appealed for 
humanitarian assistance from overseas as a means of increasing political pressure 
for either a mediated settlement of the war or the reversal of non-intervention. In 
contrast to the first relief efforts which had mixed appeals for combatants and non- 
combatants, the concerted campaigns of the civil war's final months were 
overwhelming focused on the food shortages faced by the Republic's civilian 
population, especially in Barcelona. Between October 1938 and March 1939,29 
Foodships were sent to Republican Spain from Britain. 1 The British Youth Peace 
Assembly organised fundraising for its own Foodship in British universities, while 
students and academics also contributed to the campaigns organised in Yorkshire, 
Manchester, Cambridgeshire, and Glasgow? In France, the worsening position of 
the Republic intensified both aid and opposition to non-intervention, culminating in 
the campaign call of "ouvrez la frontiere" in January 1939. By the end of the month, 
the military collapse of the Republic in Catalonia had reversed the meaning of 
"ouvrez la frontiere' as refugees flooded across the French border from Spain. 
In both Britain and France, appeals for humanitarian aid and then refugee 
relief during late 1938 and early 1939 were a culmination of the campaigns which 
had developed during the previous two years of fighting. However, there was a 
strong contrast between the perspective from which the civil war was seen in the 
two countries, as reflected in the other issues to which these final efforts were 
closely linked. Ever since the outbreak of the civil war, there was a strong concern 
within British universities to connect the civil war in Spain to other international 
events, and this was particularly the case in late 1938, as the new concern for 
refugees from freshly-partitioned Czechoslovakia both fuelled and limited existing 
relief efforts for Spain at the end of the civil war. The academic year of 1938-39 
1 NJCSR Report, p. 3 in Mss SPSL 118/8, Bodleian Library. 
In contrast to these general appeals, J. B. S. Haldane was contacted by the North American 
Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy to secure Spanish PM Negrin's approval for a scheme 
to focus on medical tratment of malnutrition rather than foodships - Letter of 30/ 12/38, Box 
15, Haldane Collection, UCL Archives. 
2Letter of Dec. 1938, WG/ SPA/ 552, National Museum of Labour History; 
Spanish Relief, Dec. 1938, p. 5, Box: Aid for Spain, National Working Class Library. 
274 
opened with appeals for Czech refugees, and by March 1939 it was again Central 
European events which were the focus of public concern in Britain. In France, the 
Czech crisis had intensified the shift in national politics from left to right, which had 
led to the birth of a new intellectual group, the Union des Intellectuels Francais, to 
support the embattled PCF. Domestic politics, rather than other international 
events, remained the central concern of French aid for Spain until the refugee crisis 
of late January 1939. When the Spanish Republic collapsed, France became the 
country most directly touched by the war, and this forced the French state into a 
central role in organising refugee relief on a national and local level. State 
involvement was fundamental in encouraging university-based campaigns which 
parallelled those which had developed in Britain during the war. 
UCL and the Crisis in Europe 
The delayed opening of the academic year at University College London in 
October 1938 was not only marked by debates over Air Raid Precautions, but also 
by fresh relief campaigns for those most affected by the crisis. On 31 October 1938, a 
meeting at University College London was chaired by economics lecturer Hugh 
Gaitskell to launch a Czech Refugee Fund. Gaitskell had previously helped to 
organise funds for the evacuation of Austrian dissidents after the repression of the 
left in 1934, when he had been in Austria on a research fellowship. 3 The meeting for 
Czech refugees was addressed by Professor Robert Seton-Watson who argued that 
the National Government had betrayed its moral responsibility to the Czechs by 
forcing the Munich Agreement on them .4 The meeting was also addressed by the 
Deputy Mayor of Brno (Czechoslovakia) who claimed that the summer crisis had 
been caused by German imperialism and not the ethnic divisions of 
Czechoslovakia. For those committed to anti-appeasement politics, refugee relief 
was a moral response to the betrayal' of the Czechs by the British government. 
During the first week of November 1938, a collection on the UCL campus was 
undertaken for both the Lord Mayor's Fund for Czech refugees and the ISS appeal 
for Czech, Austrian and Chinese students. 5 
At the same time as these relief efforts for refugees from Central Europe, 
there was also a renewed focus on anti-semitic persecution within Germany. The 
3 Durbin, New Jerusalems. p. 111. 
4 Phineas, 8/11/1938, p. 3; 
Seton-Watson was a specialist in Central European History at Kings College, London. 5Phineas. 1/11/1938, p. 1. 
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destruction of the Kristallnacht stirred at UCL a Union meeting on anti-semitism. 
Professor Haldane was one of the meeting's speakers, and a resolution was passed 
by 400 votes to 3 to protest "the barbaric persecution of sections of the German 
people by the group in control" 6 It was also moved that the Prime Minister should 
be encouraged to facilitate refugee immigration. As a result of this meeting, a 
Jewish Refugees Committee was established through the Union drawing the widest 
support of any political alliance amongst UCL students during the 1930s. It 
sponsors included political groups (the Socialist Society, Pacifist Society, 
Conservative Society and the Peace Council), religious groups (the SCM), academic 
groups (the German Society, English Society and Medicine Society), as well as the 
Soccer club .7 While some of these dubs were newly-formed themselves, the 
increasing number of student societies willing to support refugee relief reflected an 
expansion of concern over events in Central Europe. This coalition was inter-linked 
with the renewed humanitarian efforts for Republican Spain in late 1938. 
The final aid campaign for Spain within UCL occurred during the same term 
as the appeals for Czech and Jewish refugees, commencing in the first week of 
December 1938. With the sanction of the UCL Provost, the appeal for humanitarian 
aid for Spain was organised by a sub-committee of UCL Peace Council, and 
supported by the Socialist Society, SCM, Jewish Students Society, Conservative 
Society, Historical Society, Pacifist Society, and Association of Scientific Workers. 8 
While the first three groups had played a large role in organising Spanish 
humanitarian aid campaigns in 1937, the inclusion of four newly formed students 
societies signalled the broadening of interest in the civil war in Spain and in 
humanitarian relief generally. 
In response to attacks on the pro-Republican aid for Spain campaign within 
the university as political fronts, 9 the widening alliance of student groups stressed 
the non-political nature of their appeal. Though the precarious position of the 
Republic's divided territory had considerably intensified its food shortages and 
refugee problems, with Franco's military success the Republic's claim to represent 
Spain had at least been geographically weakened. The appeal therefore stressed 
that, 
We feel it important that your readers should realise that the campaign is 
6 Phineas, 22/ 11/ 1938, p. 1 
7 Phineas, 29/ 11 / 938, p. 4. 
8 Phineas, 29/11/1938, p. 3. 
9Third year UCL medical student, Charles Dent y Colsa, argued that the Nationalists also 
lacked medical supplies, but were denied these by the unilateral philanthropy of the left - 
Phineas, 22/11/1938, p. 2. 
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based solely on humanitarian principles... Should any student still feel that 
the appeal is raising political issues, he is welcome to earmark his 
contribution for the 'Friends Food Council' which sends food to the civilian 
population of the whole of Spain 10 
just as in earlier appeals, the non-partisan nature of Quaker relief was cited to rebut 
accusations of political bias against the relief appeal as a whole, although it is 
significant that one had to opt into 'non-partisan' aid. 
Within a week, just over 28 pounds was raised in UCL, which was not only 
probably higher than the student contributions to the Bilbao Foodship campaign, 
but also achieved in half the time. 11 The subscriptions were divided between almost 
13 pounds for the Government, 5 shillings for the Nationalists and 15 pounds 
earmarked for the side with the greatest need. Like the Cornford-Maclaurin 
Memorial Fund in Cambridge in early 1937, the choices made by UCL students in 
their donations embodied the ambivalence between the 'political' and 'non-political' 
distinction which was continually invoked in humanitarian campaigns. Prima facie, 
over half the contributions were given without regard to political situation in Spain. 
The Nationalist offensive through Catalonia in early 1939 did not dull 
Republican support at University College. The Socialist Society held several self- 
denial lunches for Spain of bread and cheese in late January and February 1939.12 
At the same time as these, there was also an appeal from member of UCL's 
Department of Chemistry for volunteers to help a "group blowing ampoules to use 
as containers for procaine which is being sent to Spain by the Voluntary Industrial 
Aid Committee"13 Part of the explanation for this strengthening of support for the 
Spanish Republic at a time when it was collapsing, was because both UCL students 
and academics saw the civil war as linked to other international events. 
In late January 1939, parallelling the continuing aid efforts for Spain and 
refugees from Central Europe, over fifty UCL academics jointly published a 
"Statement from the Staff"which embodied the connection of the Spanish civil war 
to a wider crisis 14 The statement began by observing "with misgivings the recent 
indications of a general abandonment in public affairs of the elementary principles 
10 phineas, 29/ 11 / 1938, p. 3. 
11 Phineas, 24/1 / 1939, p 4. 
12 Ibid. p 6; 
Phineas, 21/2/1939, p3. 
13 Phineas. 7/2/1939, p4. 
14 Phineas, 4/ 1/ 1939, p. 4. 
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on which our civilisation and culture depend". 15 It saw the "same spirit" extending 
from Nazi anti-semitic persecution, Japanese atrocities in China and the war in 
Spain. It attacked the National Government's foreign policy for failing to support 
the League of Nations or collective security "with the democratic and non- 
aggressive powers", and called upon it to support refugees from persecution. The 
perception of international events as a continuum, was expressed as it noted Fascist 
aggression in different countries; 
in Spain where the democratically elected Government is facing a foreign 
invasion, whilst deprived by international agreement of the means of self- 
defence, and where in consequence the people are enduring ruthless aerial 
bombardment and the threat of slow starvation. 
We regard the abandonment of Czechoslovakia to Germany by the Munich 
agreement as a betrayal of democracy, a grave injustice entirely inconsistent 
with the principles of the League of Nations and a step which has seriously 
jeopardised the safety of this country... 
In face of the threat to intellectual freedom and to cultural and human values 
arising from the growth of Fascism, we believe that intellectual workers can 
no longer be indifferent to political affairs; for it was in the political field that 
freedom was won and it is in this field that it must once again be 
defended. 16 
The statement was signed by 6 professors, including Haldane, 45 university 
teachers and 37 research workers (the latter left unnamed in the printed copy in 
Phineas . These signatories represented 16% of UCL's professoriate, and 33% of its 
other teaching staff. 17 Such a campus-focused petition amongst academics was 
unusual; much more frequently petitions were for national appeals by prominent 
teachers. Perhaps this is why it drew such a strong response from within the college 
itself. 
The "Statement from the Staff"provoked a strong student debate in the 
pages of Phineas, initiated by a letter from J. Edward Murphy which attacked the 
support for the Spanish Republic given the record of atrocities against Catholics 
which had been committed within its territory. Murphy asked, 
All the world knows of the persecution of the Jews, which is an indefensible 
barbarity, but how many know the truth of the even greater and more 
ruthless persecution of the Catholics in Spain, under the democratically 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Based on records of College staffing for June 1938 - Minutes of 6 June 1939, Appendix XII 
- Academic Staff Appointments, Minutes of College Committee. 1938, UCL Archives. 
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elected government?... if these members of the Staff know, they are also 
being dishonest, and if honest can only be misguided. 18 
The following week Murphy's letter drew support from another student, Charles 
Dent y Colsa, who attacked, 
The fairy stories of general religious tolerance in Red Spain... The cold fact of 
the murders, without trial, of 15,000 priests in government Spain. The only 
public Mass my own friends in Madrid have ever witnessed was the one 
they faked up for the Dean of Canterbury. 19 
Dent y Colsa closed with an open challenge to the students of the left to a public 
debate on Spain. 
Printed alongside these criticisms of the "Statement from the Staff', which 
significantly all focused on Spain, there was also a collective letter supporting the 
staff signed by five students. They wrote to 
voice the gratitude of the ordinary student to those who have signed the 
manifesto for their lucid description of the present trend of western 
'civilisation'. We may well be grateful for the fact that while our politicians 
continue to muddle the issues to suit their own purposes our professors can 
still give a clear account of world events in terms of their ideals and 
standards for which the common people have fought and suffered for 2,000 
yew 20 
Focused on more specific issues, H. Rosen of the Socialist Society wrote to Phineas 
in response to Murphy's attacks on the Spanish Republic. Rosen argued that, 
... since 
he is concerned for the Spanish people let him ask himself if one 
defends culture by bombing schools and universities, if the best way to 
announce oneself as a Christian saviour is to machine-gun refugees, and if 
the word 'civilisation' can be discerned among the shambles of Guernica... 
The Statement of the Staff was in keeping with the best traditions of the 
College 21 
As encapsulated in the focus of the students' debate over the 'Statement of the Staff, 
part of the Spanish civil war's importance was due to the events it was placed next 
to, particularly whether it was seen in the context of the spread of international 
fascism. 
18 Phineas 24/1 / 1939, p 2. 




The Last Campaigns for Spain in Oxford and Cambridge 
Like UCL, the first term of the 1938-1939 academic year in Oxford and 
Cambridge was marked by intensified fundraising for the Foodships to Spain and 
relief efforts for refugees from Central Europe. In early November 1938 the student 
Peace Councils of both Oxford and Cambridge launched humanitarian appeals for 
civilian population of Government Spain. 22 The Oxford campaign was sponsored 
by the Principals of Somerville College and Lady Margaret Hall, as well as the 
Provost of Oriel College, the Rector of Lincoln College, the Master of Balliol and 
Professors Brierly, Harrod and Cole. The appeal estimated that there were four 
million refugees in Government Spain, and aimed to raise 1,000 pounds for 
humanitarian relief. As part of the campaign 68 studies for Picasso 's Guernica were 
exhibited at Oriel College during the last week of November 1938? 3 In contrast to 
their restrictions of the mid-1930s, Oxford Proctors raised no objection to afternoon 
house to house collections of food by students for the Oxford Spanish Aid 
Committee? 4 
In Cambridge the University Peace Council, which comprised 46 student 
societies, established a Spanish Relief Committee. 25 The new committee also aimed 
to raise 1,000 pounds by the end of winter, and through its affiliated societies to 
contact every academic and student in the university. Three thousand jam jars were 
to be distributed across the campus to collect coins. The Peace Council also 
sponsored a Spain Week during mid-November 1938 for the collection of food, 
money and clothes. 26 A mass meeting was held at the Corn Exchange with Attlee as 
a keynote speaker which attracted an estimated audience of 1,500 people? 7 This 
meeting was disrupted by fireworks set off by some members of Conservative 
Association, who were criticised by the left for depriving the collection for Spain of 
an estimated 50 pounds of clothes and goods. Unlike the continual confrontations of 
student politics in France, this was an isolated incident as Conservative students 
generally either supported or ignored (rather than opposed) the left's humanitarian 
appeals. 
The Oxford Magazine, 17/11/1938, p. 169. 
23 The Oxford Magazine, 24/11/1938, p. 205. 
24 Letter of 31 /1/ 39, PR 3/ 2/339, Proctors' Records, Bodleian Library. 
25 Spanish Relief. Dec 1938, p. 5, Box: Aid for Spain, National Working Class Library. 
The Cambridge Review, 4/11/1938. p. 62. 
26 The Grants, 9/11/1938, p. 87. 
27 The Granta, 2/11/1938, pp. 59 & 67. 
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After almost three weeks of fundraising, the Cambridge University Peace 
Council announced that over 400 pounds had been raised for Spain, not counting 
collections made in the Colleges 28 However, at the same time, the Peace Council's 
concern had now shifted to the pressing refugee exodus from Germany following 
Kristallnacht. For these refugees the Peace Council launched another fundraising 
appeal which was supported by all of the University's religious societies29 
Significantly, there had been no separate appeal for aid or coalition established for 
Czech refugees in Cambridge during October 1938; however the term was full of 
fundraising appeals, such as dances for China and Central Europe30 
Despite these new overlapping efforts in November 1938, Spain remained an 
important issue around campus, as four Newnham College students were able to 
attract a crowd of contributors for Spanish aid by cooking sausages over an open 
fire outside the Marshall Library. 31 After four months, the target of 1,000 pounds 
was claimed to have been achieved at Cambridge through voluntary collections and 
fundraising auctions 32 One supporter of the Peace Council stated that "the most 
ingenious methods of extortion have been employed, from Art Exhibitions to 
sausages, and from bottle-parties to poetry". 33 The fundraising campaigns of late 
1938 in Cambridge and Oxford were probably the most successful of those 
organised by students during the 1930s, as they drew on coalitions of support and 
fundraising methods which had been gradually developed over the decade in 
reaction to events in Germany, China, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Spain. 
Student efforts were parallelled by their seniors, as The Cambridge Review 
carried a humanitarian appeal which revealed the deteriorating living conditions in 
Republican Spain, 
The Cambridge Joint Committee for Spanish Relief draws attention to the 
much worsened plight of the Spanish People. The food situation in Eastern 
Spain is critical; the children in particular are feeling the effects of an acutely 
deficient diet . 
34 
The appeal then noted the prevalence of skin diseases and tuberculosis amongst the 
children in Republican territory. To meet this need, a concerted effort to send 
28 The Granta, 23/ 11/ 1938, p. 127. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The Cambridge Review, 21/10/1938, pp. 22 & 30. 
31 The Granta, 30/11/1938, p. 148. 
Apart from sausages the Peace Council had also used art exhibitions, bottle-parties and 
punts for fund-raising - The Grantor 30/11/1938, p. 160. 32The Granta, 1/3/1939, p. 283. 
33 The Granta, 30/ 11 / 1938, p. 160. 
The Cambridge Review, 21/10/1938, p. 24. 
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Foodships from Britain to Spain was launched during the war's final months, 
including an Eastern Counties Foodship sponsored by the Bishop of Ely, the Bishop 
of Chelsmford, two local members of Parliament and Professor Ryle from the 
University of Cambridge 35 The Eastern Counties Foodship appeal estimated that 
100,000 children were starving in Eastern Spain due to the acute food shortage. The 
appeal called for money or goods which were to be distributed by the NJCSR in co- 
operation with the Society of Friends 36 
For some British academics the intensifying humanitarian appeals for Spain 
and a commitment to anti-appeasement politics reinforced each other. Oxford 
classicist E. R. Dodds wrote to the left-wing intellectual group For Intellectual 
Liberty at the end of October 1938 that, 
It seems to me that at the moment the most urgent thing for FIL to 
concentrate on is Spain. I think we ought to ask our members now to get 
busy in their own districts on 2 jobs: 
(a) organising local public meetings (where possible, through existing Spain 
Committees) to protest before it is too late against bringing [the] Anglo- 
Italian pact into force before the condition of proportionate withdrawal is 
fulfilled. 
(b) raising money locally for sending food - on American ships, since ours 
get bombed - before the blockade is complete 37 
Chamberlain's negotiations with Italy in February 1938 had triggered Eden's 
resignation as Foreign Secretary as well as a petition signed by 170 academics from 
FIL 38 Implicit in Dodds' blurring of aid and politics was his recognition that the 
events of summer 1938 (the failure of the Ebro offensive and the Munich 
Agreement) had given both elements a renewed urgency. Concurrent with the 
strengthening of humanitarian efforts for Spain was a renewed political campaign 
for the beleaguered Republic. 39 
35 The Granta, 25/ 1/ 1939, p. 193. 
36 In Cambridge, the two hundred members of the university constituency Labour Party 
raised 343 pounds for a Spanish Foodship during Michaelmas Term 1939. However, the 
appeal was disappointing as 236 pound had been donated by one member - Minutes of 
9/6/ 1939, Add 8881/ 1, University Library, Cambridge; 
Accounts of 28/ 10/ 1938, Add 8881 / 2, University Library, Cambridge. 
37 Letter of 30/ 10/ 1938, B1, Add 9369, University Library, Cambridge. 
38 The petition had read "Profoundly deplore rapproachement Mussolini before his troops 
leave Spain". It was signed by 65 academics from Cambridge, who represented 40% of the 
total signatories, though nine other British universities were also represented - Petition of 
23/2/1938, A4, Add 9369, University Library, Cambridge. 
39 F1L had also publicised a letter by French academic Albert Bayet against the closing of the 
French border to Spain to rebut statements by Chamberlain - Minutes of 20/ 7/ 1938 & 
13/10/1938, Al, Add 9369. 
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Leeds and London: Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Relief 
At the University of Leeds, it was not until the final stages of the civil war 
that Spanish relief was able to successfully mobilise substantial support from the 
student body. The Students' Union had previously held aloof from political and 
humanitarian campaigns organised outside the university. In early May 1937 the 
Union committee had declined to affiliate to the local Leeds committee of the 
National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief, "the object being outside the scope of 
its activities' 40 Neither did the Union support the University Committee for 
Spanish Relief which was established in early October 1937, as "a branch of the 
Leeds Joint Committee and is a non-political organisation engaged in the relief of 
Spanish war victims" 41 The University Committee was sponsored by Professor 
Smith and Professor Harvey, who had visited Spain during the summers of 1936 
and 1937 as part of Quaker relief efforts. From its foundation, the University 
Committee sought student support for its efforts though these met with ambivalent 
results 42 
The University Committee for Spanish Relief in Leeds organised appeals for 
humanitarian aid in late November 1937 and early February 1938.43 While these 
found support amongst academics and the local population, few students seem to 
have played an active role in them. As the Secretary of the University Committee 
noted, 
Our second collection week started on February 9th and although the money 
has not yet been checked, it appears that there has been little response from 
4() Minutes of 6/ 5/ 1937, Union Committee Minute Books: April 1936 to Tune 1939, p. 69, 
University of Leeds Archives; 
The Gryphon did publish an appeal by the local NJCSR committee which described itself as 
part of a non-partisan national effort headed by representatives from all major parties- The 
Grypihon. May 1937, p. 288 
41 The Gryphon, Nov. 1937, p. 80. 
42 The Leeds NJCSR committee appealed to students that, 
'They can help as either through Societies, or as individuals: - 
(a) By forming groups in order to 'adopt' a Spanish child 
(b) By accepting collecting boxes and cards 
(c) By supporting our meetings and general appeals" - Ibid. 43 The Gryphon, Dec. 1937, p. 110; 
On 8 February 1938, the University Committee for Spanish Relief held a concert in the 
University of Leeds' Great Hall, featuring a Spanish pianist, singer and dancer. It was 
reported that, "in the interval Prof. Smith, our Chairman, introduced Mrs EW Black, who 
made an appeal and stressed the urgent need for food, medical supplies and warm clothing 
for the women and children. A silver collection was then taken and most people contributed 
liberally... [the collection raised 25 pounds]... The hall was crowded, although it is notable 
that a very small percentage of the audience were students" -The Gryphon. March 1938, p. 278; 
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the students. There were very few collections, in spite of appeals for them. 44 
Perhaps, this lack of enthusiasm for fundraising was due to the different conception 
of student politics (as well as opportunities) in Leeds compared to Oxbridge. Even 
the socialist students of Leeds had rejected the activism which characterised their 
southern peers during their lone dissent in the debates over Communist 
involvement in the University Labour Federation. Spain was not the only cause 
which failed to mobilise student support in Leeds during the mid-1930s, as the 
organisers of the ISS appeal for China and the students' "rag" for local charities also 
complained of student apathy. 45 
The decision of the Students' Union to support a "milk for Spain" appeal 
during the final months of 1938 was therefore vital in rallying support from the 
student body in Leeds. The Union's minutes recorded that, 
The Spanish Relief Appeal which was organised towards the end of last term 
received very good support from the students. One thousand tins of milk 
were sold 46 
For its efforts, the Union was publicly thanked by the local Spanish Foodship 
Committee. 47 In the same issue of The Gryphon it was noted that one of the Hostels 
for women students at the University was proposing "that Dinner should be missed 
one evening in order to send the consequent saving to the help of the Spanish 
people"48 While there had been aid activity within the University of Leeds 
throughout the Spanish civil war, particularly championed by Professor Harvey, it 
was only in the war's final months that with the sponsorship of the Union it 
achieved mass student support. 
Parallelling the growing success of appeals for humanitarian aid in Leeds, a 
campaign for refugee relief developed, in which the war in Spain was firmly linked 
to other international events. At the close of 1938, a Refugee Relief Committee was 
established within the University of Leeds as a sub-committee of the students' Peace 
Council 49 The new sub-committee was primarily intended to raise funds for 
refugee students from Central Europe in the wake of events in Austria, 
Czechoslovakia and Germany. The Refugee Relief Committee initially succeeded in 
raising over E60, which included a 10 pound grant from the Chancellor, over 24 
pounds from Department collections, almost 17 pounds from a concert in the Great 
44 The Gryphon, March 1938, p. 278. 
45 Ibid., p. 241. 
46 The Gryphon. Feb. 1939, p. 167. 
47Ibid. 
48 p, id., p. 170. 
49 The Gty_phon, May 1939, p. 305. 
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Hall and general contributions totalling nineteen pounds. 50 Shortly before the end 
of the 1938-39 academic year the Refugee Relief Committee was able to grant 30 
pounds towards sponsoring four refugee students from Central Europe. 
Despite the success of its campaign refugee relief, the Peace Council's pro- 
Republican position in humanitarian efforts was far more controversial. A letter to 
The Gryphon pointed out the political hostility which could be stirred by mixing 
aid appeals for Central Europe with those for Spain, when it stated, 
The posters in the JCR and other parts of the University certainly show up 
the Peace Council in its true colours. Bearing, in bold red letters, the caption: 
We Can Save Spain', these surely give the lie to the supposedly non-partisan 
nature of the organisation. 
It is notable that, although the Council was formed as a result of the protest 
meeting against the persecution of Jews in Germany, and had, as first task, 
the organisation of some effort to assist Jewish refugees, no sign of any work 
in this direction has yet appeared 51 
The posters, which were probably for the "milk for Spain" appeal, encapsulated the 
extent to which relief efforts for 'Spain' were implicitly for Republican Spain. As at 
UCL a few months earlier, the non-partisan image of relief was questioned in Leeds 
during the civil war's closing stages when it was no longer for civilian victims of 
continued fighting, but for refugees on a losing side. The editor of The Gryphon 
replied caustically that the Refugee Relief Committee had raised 25 pounds for 
Jewish Refugees and "that Spanish women and children have a right to live, 
whatever the colour of their politics' 52 The exchange in The Gryphon seems to 
suggest that humanitarian aid for Spain was for some a far more politicised issue 
than that for Central Europe. 
Like in Leeds and other British universities, refugee relief campaigns for 
Spain and Central Europe ran together at the LSE. The character of the LSE Students 
Union, which had been in the forefront of clashes with the university's authorities 
over student political action, contrasted to the determined apoliticisim of the Union 
in Leeds. At the LSE it had been university regulations rather than student apathy 
which had limited university-based aid efforts in the civil war's early stages. In mid 
November 1938, the LSE Union had voted to adopt two Spanish refugee babies. 53 
The following term, the Union's Executive Committee noted that, 
50 ibid. 
51 The Gryphon, March 1939, p. 217. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Given that 120 students were estimated as present, and the motion had been carried by 70 
votes to one dissent, the vote reveals what a large role apathy had in the unanimous 
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It was reported that plans for weekly and monthly collections for Spanish 
babies were proceeding well and that collections from a certain number of 
societies and faculties had guaranteed to raise some money. 54 
The following day after this report, on 18 January 1939, it was announced at a 
general meeting of the Student Union that over five pounds had been raised for 
Spanish babies. 
At the same meeting, a motion calling for the Union to establish a sub- 
committee at the LSE to campaign for refugees was also carried which read, 
That in view of the urgencies of the situation in Government Spain where 
many thousands of children are faced with death by starvation unless food 
supplies arrive immediately and in view of the fact that the Liberal, Jewish, 
Student Christian Movement, Socialist and Indian societies would wish to 
raise money and food for Spain and that other societies wish to raise money 
for other humanitarian purposes, the Union Exec be requested to set up a 
sub-committee to co-ordinate the efforts of these societies 55 
Underlying the motion was the blurring of Spain with other international events 
such as the new wave of refugees from Czechoslovakia and Germany which gave 
common cause to diverse students groups. While it occurred at the same time as the 
Society for the Protection of Science and Learning's appeal for academic refugees 
from Central Europe, the first collection made by the LSE Refugee Committee took 
Spain as its immediate focus. Within a fortnight of its establishment, the committee 
had doubled the total collected for the Spanish refugee babies to over 12 pounds, as 
well as collecting and knitting warm clothes to be sent to Spain 56 
The connection drawn between humanitarian relief for Spain and refugees 
from other countries, both broadened the level of sympathy for Republican Spain 
while at the same time diffusing its appeal alongside a number of other competing 
causes. This was encapsulated in the Relief Committee's report on the first terms of 
its existence; 
During the Michaelmas term the Union and the International Student 
Service Committee at the School collected about £60 for refugees from China, 
Spain, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. The Union adopted two Spanish Babies 
motions passed in British universities over Spain - Minutes of 19/ 10/ 1938 & 16/ 11/ 1938, 
Coll Misc 649 2/5, LSE Archives. 
54 Minutes of 17/1/1939, Coll Misc 649 3/5, LSE Archives; 
On 11 January 1939 it was reported at a general meeting of the Union that the collection for 
Spanish babies was not wholly sufficient - Minutes of 11 / 1/ 1938, Coll Misc 649 2/ 5, LSE 
Archives. 
5518/1/1939, Coll Misc 649 2/5, LSE Archives. 
31/1/1939, Coll Misc 649 3/5, LSE Archives. 
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and operated a scheme for the regular collection of money to support them. 
In face of the constant appeals for assistance for refugees the Union set up a 
Relief Committee to plan collections in the School. The committee has 
worked well so far and has received considerable help from the Staff. The 
total amount collected for Spanish relief through the Union is about £25 and 
a large amount of clothing has been collected and sent to Spain 57 
Though Spain was always a central concern, the Union's Refugee Committee 
achieved its greatest success with its later efforts in mid-1939 when it raised 100 
pounds and organised personal assistance for 40 German and Czech refugees 58 
This connection between events in Spain and Central Europe which had 
partly fuelled and been reinforced by refugee relief, was also expressed in ISE 
debates over the National Government's foreign policy. On 25 January 1939, a week 
after the Refugee Relief Committee had been formed, the LSE Union debated and 
passed the following motion, 
That in the opinion of this meeting of the Student's Union the defeat of the 
Spanish Republic by the combined forces of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler 
would be one of the severest blows yet received by democracy and progress 
throughout the world 59 
The motion called for end to the policy of non-intervention and the restoration of 
the Spanish Republic's legal right to purchase arms. Of the 70 students present, 
there was only one recorded dissent. Three weeks later another motion was passed 
by the LSE Union condemning belligerent rights for Franco as the recognition of 
Fascism 60 The rejection of Nationalist Spain and non-intervention were assimilated 
into a general condemnation of the British government's foreign policy of 
appeasement in Central Europe. 
National Contrasts in Student Relief Campaigns 
The contrast between the campaigns of British and French students for 
humanitarian aid for Spain during late 1938, was reflected at the Executive meeting 
of the Rassemblement Mondial des Etudiants on 23 October 1938.61 The 
Rassemblement Mondial des $tudiants drew heavily on the international contacts 
57 Annual Report 1938/9, p. 6., 67-K, LSE Archives. 
58 Letter of 12/ 7/ 1939,67-K, LSE Archives. 
59 Minutes of 25/ 1/ 1939, Coll Misc 649 2/5, LSE Archives. 
60 Minutes of 15/ 2/ 1939 Coll Misc 649 2/5 LSE Archives. 
61 Minutes of 23/10/1938,14, Rassemblement Mondial des Etudiants, International Institute 
of Social History. 
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of Communist students and it was probably these connections which encouraged 
the announcement of a fundraising competition for Spanish relief during November 
and December 1938 between the universities of North America and Western 
Europe 62 Former Cambridge student James Klugmann spoke on the British 
university appeals which were aiming to raise 5,000 pounds before Christmas 1938. 
He reported that students at Cambridge had already raised 750 pounds before the 
end of October 1938. 
In comparison to the successful fundraising coalitions of British campuses, 
the efforts of French students seemed more limited, both geographically and 
politically. Bicard addressed the Executive meeting for the Rassemblement des 
Etudiants pour l'Aide ä l'Enfance d'Espagne (REAEE). The REAEE was currently 
supporting dispensaries for Spanish refugee children in Valencia, and was hoping 
to increase its fundraising the following month through the exhibition of films, 
lectures, meetings and receptions. The films included "SOS Spain" and "The ABC of 
Liberty", and it was the screening of one of these which was broken up by followers 
of Action Francaise in mid December 1938. The campaign was to culminate on 15 
January 1939 with a bal163 Though the Rassemblement des Etudiants pour l'Aide ä 
l'Enfance d'Espagne claimed several hundred members in Paris, it seemed to have 
little contact with students outside the capital, as was reflected in its proposal to 
send an appeal to provincial universities. The REAEE was not only geographically 
limited, but few Socialist students seem to have supported its Communist 
leadership 64 
The Executive meeting of the Rassemblement Mondial des Etudiants also 
heard from a third pro-Communist student organisation, which embodied the 
differences between British and French student aid efforts. Following Bicard's 
report on the REAEE was Bordeaux lycee teacher, Jean Daudin, who discussed the 
Mouvement Liberte which had been formed at the end of 1937.65 Daudin was a 
Communist activist, whose father in Bordeaux, Henri Daudin, had been one of the 
leading public patrons of the PCF's aid efforts for Republican Spain. 66 The 
Mouvement Liberte had campaigned for the right to free discussion, including 
politics, within French universities which it held as necessary for academic work. 67 
62 Les Cahiers de la ieunesse. 15/11/1938, p. 31. 
63 Les Cahiers de la Jeunesse. 15/12/1938, p. 29. 
64 See Chapter 8. 
65 Minutes of 23/10/1938,14, Rassemblement Mondial des Etudiants, International Institute 
of Social History. 
66 Dictionnaire Biograp ue du Mouvement Ouvrier Francais Vol 24, pp. 91-92. 67 Les Cahiers de la Ieunesse. 15/12/1938, p. 11. 
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It was sponsored in October 1938 by a petition signed by 80 Paris Professors which 
read, 
Etranger ä toute doctrine et ä tout interet de parti, il defend ce qui nous est 
commun ä tous, non pas une opinion politique ou philosophique, mais le 
droit de nous en faire une. 68 
The Paris committee of Movement Liberte, which mixed professors and students, 
sought to organise debates in the Faculties and Cite Universitaire. Despite the 
obvious left-wing bias of the Mouvement Liberte's sponsors, it was calling for 
conditions which already existed in British universities, in which students Unions 
had formalised debates amongst students and different students' groups cooperated 
to put forward common platforms. Mouvement Liberte represented the realisation 
that the decades of intense politicisation and polarisation surrounding French 
universities, had in fact constrained the development of campus-based 
organisations and repertoires of activity due to regulations based on the authorities' 
fears of confrontation. 
Significantly, Jean Daudin in addressing the Executive meeting called for a 
focus on aid campaigns for Republican Spain as a means to establish an inclusive 
coalition of the left inside French universities, 
He stressed the necessity for any broad student movement in France to hold 
aloof from political strife, which had divided students very much in the past. 
The movement should boldly pursue the path it traced out for itself and 
develop humanitarian aid for the victims of the war in Spain. 69 
Such a campaign was possible in Britain, but not France. The historical 
development of politics within French universities had been based on the 
confrontations of party politics in public spaces. The campus-based 
interconnections which had fuelled coalitions amongst political and 'non-political' 
students groups in Britain did not exist on the other side of the Channel. The 
divisions of left and right, and within the left itself, powerfully shaped how 
humanitarian aid had developed, whereas in Britain aid had been seen as a non- 
partisan issue which could appeal above and beyond the divisions of party politics. 
68 "Foreign to all doctrines and all party interests, it defends that which is common to all, 
not one political opinion or philosophy, but the right of us to make one" - Ibid., p. 14 69 Minutes of 23/10/1938,14, Rassemblement Mondial des Etudiants, International Institute 
of Social History. 
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Ouvrez la Frontiere: French Humanitarian Aid for Spain 
Throughout the war, the call to "ouvrez lafrontiere" had been put forward by 
French opponents of non-intervention, especially following the tightening of border 
controls by Daladier's government after 13 June 1938.7° At a time when the 
Republic's survival seemed increasingly precarious, its French supporters were 
facing a much less sympathetic government after Blum 's second resignation from 
office. As the front in Catalonia collapsed and the Republic's military position 
became increasingly precarious, the slogan acquired a new intensity. "Ouvrez la 
frontiere" could refer not merely to military supplies for the Spanish Republic, but 
also humanitarian aid, and increasingly through January 1939, to refugee asylum in 
France. Another factor which fuelled the magnification of the campaign against 
non-intervention in France during late 1938, was the definitive rupture of the Front 
Populaire after the Munich Agreement and the rightward drift of Daladier's 
government. Perhaps most importantly, the slogan "ouvrez la frontiere" symbolised 
the extent to which the Spanish civil war was seen as part of French domestic 
politics, rather than linked to other international events as it had been in Britain. 
A survey of the complex changes in the French political landscape caused by 
the Czech crisis of September 1938 is beyond the scope of this study, but as 
discussed in the preceding chapters the crisis did aggravate existing divisions 
within the French left while increasing the confidence of the right. Most 
significantly, the Munich Agreement marked the definitive rupture of the Front 
Populaire coalition. The coalition had been under increasing strain following the fall 
of Blum s second government, and revealingly its fourth anniversary was 
commemorated on 14 July 1938 by marches, but no speeches, by mutual agreement 
of the parties 71 In the post-Munich climate of relief at a European war so barely 
avoided, the PCF stood out by its absolute opposition to Daladier's policy 72 The 
growing anti-communism within the Radical Party finally was able to express itself 
to the full, so that the Party's Annual Congress in late October 1938 was described 
as an "orgy of anti-communism' at which academic Albert Bayet stood out in 
70 Timothy P. Maga, "Closing the Door: The French Government and Refugee Policy 1933- 
1939", French Historical Studies, 12,3, Spring 1982, p. 435; 
Louis Stein, Beyond Death and Exile: The Spanish Republicans in France 1939-1955. Havard 
University Press, 1979, p. 11 
71 Colton, Leon Blum p. 313. 
72 On 4 October 1938, the Chamber of Deputies voted confidence in Daladier's government 
(and its foreign policy) by an overwhelming 537 to 75 votes. Of the dissenters, 73 were PCF 
deputies - Jean-Pierre Azema, From Munich to the Liberation 1938-1944, trans. Janet Lloyd, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p 7. 
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continuing his support of the PCF. 73 On 10 November 1938 the Radicals formally 
broke with the Rassemblement Populaire. 
Just as during Blum's first government when the PCF had sought to mobilise 
an independent critique of non-intervention through the CICIAER, so in the wake 
of Munich did the Party seek to focus intellectuals' opposition to Daladier's foreign 
policy. On the final day of September 1938, the day that Daladier was mobbed by 
enthusiastic Paris crowds on returning from Munich, L'Humanite published a 
"Manifeste pour la Paix" which argued that in preserving Czechoslovakia, France 
would preserve Peace and therefore called for the end of capitulation to Fascist 
expansionism. 74 Over the first three days of October 1938, L'Humanite printed the 
names of several intellectuals close to the PCF (such as the familiar figures of 
Langevin, Wallon, and Bayet), academics who were party members (including 
Marcel Prenant and Jacques Solomon) and a number of students in support of the 
appeal. 75 This petition for "Paix et Democratie" became more impressive over the 
following two days as it garnered the signatures of over a dozen Professors of the 
College de France and Sorbonne 76 These included physicist Frdddric Joliot, 
psychologist Henri Pieron, sociologist Marcel Mauss, and economic historian Henri 
Hauser; the last three of whom had been dreyfusards in their youth. While most of 
these signatories were already politically prominent, the Czech crisis had stirred a 
considerable amount of concern amongst Paris academics during September and 
October 1938, particularly those in Slavonic studies 7 
Sixteen out of the twenty senior academics who first signed the petition 
opposing appeasement in L'Humanite had been public supporters of CVIA in 1934. 
They included two female academics, Irene Joliot-Curie and Genevieve Bianquis. 
Significantly five of these former CVIA members had publicly split from that 
organisation in June 1936.78 Together they provided a core for new organisation, the 
Union des Intellectuels Francais (UIF), which sought to rally support an active anti- 
fascist foreign policy, particularly over Spain. The leading role of academics in the 
Union des Intellectuels Francais was particularly important because it was formed 
73 Lamour, The French Radical Party, p. 245. 
74 L'Humanite, 30/ 9/1938, p. 2. 
75 L'Humanit6,2/ 10/ 1938, p. 2; 
L'Humanite, 3/ 10/ 1938, p. 2. 
76 L'Humanite, 4/ 10/ 1938, p. 2; 
L'Humanite, 5/ 10/ 1938, p. 1. 
77 Yvon Lacaze, L'Opinion Publique Francaise et la Crise de Munich, Peter Lang, Berne, 
1991, pp. 80-87. 
78 Two more of CVIA's founders, Rivet and Gerome left the organisation in October 1938 
over its endorsement of absolute pacifism and the Munich Agreement - Ibid., p. 449. 
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at a time when anti-communism was unifying the Radicals and the right into 
common cause, much as anti-fascism had done for the left after 6 February 1934. 
Jean-Jacques Becker has argued that at the same time as the PCF were increasing 
their opposition to Daladier's government over Munich, by the general strike of 30 
November 1938 and then in supporting Republican Spain in the new year, they 
remained committed to the idea of the Front Populaire. 79 They maintained the same 
broad appeals in their mass meetings and propaganda, yet these forms of politics 
were largely a shell of earlier years. Given the party's increasing marginalisation in 
party politics, it needed more than ever the public support of intellectuals. 80 
These changes in the PCF's position were reflected in the humanitarian aid 
campaign for Republican Spain, which the party launched with the opening of 
January 1939 and the rapid progress of the Nationalists offensive in Catalonia. 
Under the title "Lait - Pain - Sante", the appeal was launched in L'Humanite on 5 
January 1939 by donations from the PCF's deputies. 81 In contrast to its broad appeal 
for Bilbao in mid 1937, this campaign was heavily party-focused, parallelling the 
SFIO's own efforts to mobilise support from early 1938. Victor Basch was one of the 
first supporters of the appeal and gave 500 francs S2 At the end of January 1939, a 
group of Communist students were listed as donating 150 francs, while the appeal 
itself now totalled 142,381 francs 83 While this amount was more than doubled the 
following month it was still significantly less than the almost 600,000 francs which 
had been raised during the first month of the Comite pour Bilbao's campaign 84 
The comparison of the Comite pour Bilbao and the PCF's appeal for "Lait - 
Pain - Sante" would seem to support Richard Gordon's general contention that 
material aid to Spain became increasingly sporadic in France after 1937.5 However, 
as had been highlighted in Chapter 8, there had actually been an intensification of 
French humanitarian aid for Republican Spain during April 1938, as revealed by the 
79 Jean-Jacques Becker, "Le Parti Communiste" in Rene Remond & Janine Bourdin, eds., La 
France et la Francaise 1938 en 1939, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1978, 
230-231. 8At 
the PCF's National Congress in late December 1938, Langevin publicly declared to its 
members his support for "votre part: " - Langevin, Paul Langevin, Mon Pere, p. 103; 
Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, Langevin: Science et Vigilance, Belin, Paris, 1987, p. 148. 
81 L'Humanite, 5/ 1/ 1939, p. 3; 
During mid October 1938, a "Semaine des Intellectuels' en faveur de 1'Espagne Republicaine' was 
held sponsored by Langevin, Wallon, Rolland, Bloch - Report of 12/10/1938, BA 1664, 
Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
82 L'Humanite, 10/ 1/ 1939, p. 3. 
83 L'Humanite, 29/ 1/ 1939, p. 3. 
L'Humanite, 30/ 1// 1939, p. 4. 
84 L'Humanite, 25/ 5/ 1937, p. 3. 
85 Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 379. 
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first large university-based appeals in Toulouse and Paris. In Toulouse, the local 
group of $tudiants Socialistes collected 8,000 francs for medical aid to the Republic, 
and held fundraising meetings in mid November 1938 and early January 1939.86 
Equally, despite the dramatic shifts of national politics during 1938 there does not 
seem to have been a significant change in general collections for Spanish aid in 
Toulouse. 87 Therefore the contrast between the PCF's appeals of May 1937 and 
January 1939, reflected the changing base of general support for the PCF itself, 
rather than any broad decline in support for Republican Spain within France. 
On the same pages of L'Humanite that announced the daily total of 
donations for the "Lait - Pain - Sante", a manifesto appeared in mid-January 1939 by 
the Union des Intellectuels Francais, which reflected both the increased activism of 
Paris academics after the Czech crisis and their present concern with Spain. 88 The 
petition demanded that with the repatriation of the International Brigades, the 
Spanish Republic should be allowed to participate in international commerce free of 
restriction, especially given the famine menacing its civilian population. It declared 
itself against the granting of belligerent rights to Franco, or to any new abdication to 
international fascism. It was headed by the signatures of Langevin and Wallon, who 
were joined by ten other members of the College de France, five professeurs 
honoraires of the Sorbonne, eleven professors from the Sorbonne, as well as a wide 
variety of other intellectuals and teachers. 
Parallelling this petition by the academics of the Union des Intellectuels 
Francais, was another signed by 80 students of the Ecole Normale Superieure. The 
students informed the Director of the School, Celestin Bougie, that they intended to 
join a delegation of academics and laboratory workers, led by Jean Perrin and Joliot- 
Curie which would present the petition to Daladier. Bougle wrote to the Rector of 
the University of Paris that, 
Je n'ai cru devoir m opposer ä cette demarche: les signatoires ayant respecte 
I'article de notre reglement qui veut que les declarations et petitions soient 
connues d'abord de l'administration de 1'Ecole 89 
Interestingly, Bougle described the signatories as "d'opinions d'ailleurs assez diverses", 
which seems a correct evaluation given the number of students involved. The 
8' Le Midi Socialiste, 3/11/1938, p. 4; 
Le Midi Socialiste, 6/ 1/ 1939, p. 5. 
87 See Le Midi Socialiste, 1936-1939. 
88 L'Humanite. 12/ 1/1939, p. 3; 
Report of 17/ 1/ 1939, BA 1664, Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
89 "I did not have to oppose this declaration: the signatories have respected the article of our 
regulations which requires that declarations and petitions are first made known to the 
administration of the School" - Letter of 18/l/ 1939, AJ16/ 2895, Archives Nationales 
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closeness of normaliens to the activities of academics is in stark contrast to other 
French university students. Their petition read as follows, 
Les eleves de 1'Ecole Normale Superteure de la rue d'Ulm soussignes emus 
par les violations incessantes et unilaterales du principe de non-intervention, 
demandent l'ouverture immediate de la frontiPre espagnole et le maintien de 
cette ouverture jusqu'ä cessation de toute intervention etrangere en 
Espagne 90 
The primacy given to foreign involvement in the wording of the petition revealed 
that its focus was for military relief for the beleaguered Spanish Republic. However, 
when it was published the following month, events in Spain had perhaps given its 
demands a different meaning. By February 1939, the Republic was obviously 
collapsing militarily, but the border remained a central political issue, no longer as a 
supply route but as a passage for the massive exodus of Spanish refugees. 
Ouvrez la Frontiere: Spanish Refugees in France 
The petition from the Ecole Normale Superteure became part of a much 
wider campaign to open the French-Spanish border which had both political and 
humanitarian objectives. In the same issue of Cahiers de Teunesse which published 
the ENS petition with 90 signatories, there was a copy of a telegram from the Jeunes 
Laiques et Republicains to the Chamber asking for the opening of the border to 
prevent the deaths of children and the innocent 91 At the same time, a delegation 
from the Etudiants du Front Populaire also met at the Palais-Bourbon as part of 
several university demonstrations about the border. It was also during mid January 
1939 that Blum, Thorez and Jouhaux renewed their collaboration of the mid-1930s, 
in issuing a joint call for the opening of the French border 92 In the following weeks, 
the PCF organised a massive campaign of repeated demonstrations around Paris 
and throughout France focused on the slogan "ouvrez la frontiere". 93 The intensity of 
these demonstrations was partly motivated by the dramatic advance of the 
Nationalist army towards Barcelona, but also by the PCF's own isolated position 
following the shift to the right by Daladier's government. 
90'The undersigned students of the Ecole Normale Superteure moved by the incessant and 
unilateral violations of the principle of non-intervention, demand the immediate opening of 
the Spanish border and the maintaining of it as open up until the cessation of all foreign 
intervention in Spain" - Ibid. 91 Les Cahiers de la ieunesse. 15/2/ 1939, p. 32. 
92 Greene, Crisis and Decline. p. 251. 
93 Reports of 25/l/1939,26/l/1939,27/l/1939,29/l/1939 &1/ 2/ 1939, BA 1867, Archives 
de la Prefecture de Police, Paris. 
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In the midst of these campaigns "ouvrez la frontiere" gained a new meaning as 
a flood of refugees from Republican Spain sought to enter France during the final 
week of January 1939. Emmanuelle Salgas identifies three phases of this exodus 
during which an estimated 450,000 Spanish refugees crossed into the French 
Department of Pyr6n6es-Orientales in the space of a fortnight 94 The first large 
wave of the exodus occurred during the last four days of January 1939, when 
114,000 refugees crossed the border. During the next four days, these were followed 
by another 126,000 refugees. Despite French government attempts to limit the flow 
of refugees to civilians and wounded, a new phase of the influx began on 5 
February 1939 as some 250,000 soldiers of the Republican army crossed into France. 
For the extreme right, this new wave of refugees was the least desirable; "Ia France 
envahie! " is how L'Express du Midi described the retreating soldiers. 95 The PSF 
argued that at least 40,000 of the refugees should be sent back to Spain at once, as 
there were "parmi les Espagnols refugies, un tres grand nombre d'indesirables, de bandits, 
de criminels, de bourreaux". 96 Unlike the extravagant estimates of left and right over 
the number of foreign troops in Spain, the PSF's figures for the total number of 
refugees were remarkably precise, reflecting the extent of State involvement in 
organising relief for the refugees. 
The University of Paris Appeal for Spanish Refugees 
Coinciding with the heightened political activity over refugees, the 
University of Paris became the focus for a large humanitarian campaign. The Rector 
of the University, in his capacity as head of state education in the capital, appealed 
to others throughout France; 
L'Universite de Paris, comme vous le savez, a accepte de recueillir des fonds 
pour les enfants espagnols recemment refugies en France. Apres entente 
avec M. Le Ministre de 1'Education Nationale et avec M. le Ministre de 
l'Interieur, il a ete decide que les sommes verwes seraient reparties par 
priorite entre les colonies d'enfants espagnols qui ont ete constituees dans 
94 Emmanuelle Salgas, "L'Opinion Publique et les Representations des Refugies Espagnols 
dans les Pyrenees-Orientales" in Jean Sagnes & Sylvie Caucanas, eds., Les Francais et la 
Guerre d'Espagne: Actes du Colloque de Perpignan. Universite de Perpignan, Perpignan, 
1990, p. 186-188. 
95 L'Express du Midi, 7/ 2/ 1939, p. 1. 
96 Le Flambeau du Sud-Ouest, 25/ 3/ 1939, p. 1. 
The author argued that the true danger of the Spanish refugees was that they would spread 
Marxism in France. 
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certain departements 97 
Certainly, such an official campaign would have been inconceivable without the 
deep involvement of the French state in organising refugee relief. It was not until 
the French government itself became committed in support of refugees that a 
humanitarian aid campaign could develop within the university. This campaign 
was undoubtedly aided by the strong sympathy for the Spanish Republic of Jean 
Zay, the Minister of Education 98 
The wording of the appeal to Paris students was significant for it located the 
operation of the appeal firmly within France; "1'Universite de Paris agissant 
officiellement, decide d'organiser une souscription au profit des femmes et des enfants 
refugies sur notre territoire". 99 It is striking that a university-based humanitarian aid 
effort similar to the ones which had developed in Britain could only occur in France 
when the war in Spain was ending and the problems of refugees were on "notre 
territoire". Posters around the university appealed to "des etudiants de toutes nuances 
politiques et religieuses". 10°The appeal was supported by Catholic students' groups in 
Paris, as well as the left. The national Catholic relief efforts for refugees in early 1939 
led by the CNC, probably facilitated support of Catholic students for the Rector's 
appeal. 
Still this alliance between religious and political groups was merely a 
temporary expedient rather than a deeply-grounded coalition. In Les Cahiers de la 
eunesse the two sections made separate appeals. British and French socialist and 
communist students appealed, 
Aux Etudiants Francais et Anglais: 
Aujourd'hui la paix du monde est menacee plus que jamais. 
Mussolini redame des colonies 
Sauvez 1'Espagne, sauvez la France, la Paix et la Democratie 
Les Universites doivent etre sur Ie front de combat pour 1'unite des 
democraties franco-britannique pour demander: 
97 "The University of Paris, as you know, has accepted the collection of funds for the 
Spanish children recently seeking refuge in France. After consulting with the Minster of 
National Education and with the Minister of the Interior, it has been decided that the 
amounts paid be distributed by priority between the camps of Spanish children that have 
been set up in certain Departments" - Letter of 3/3/ 1939, AJ16/6969, Archives Nationales. 98 Zay had been one of the few in the Radical Party to oppose non-intervention. He had also 
been involved during the war in a confrontation with Jacques Chevalier, Dean of the Faculty 
of Letters in Grenoble who had been invited by Franco to tour Nationalist Spain to provide 
advice on education - Jean Zay, Souvernirs et Solitude. Talus d'Approche, Le Roeulx, 1987, 
46-47. 99Poster, 
AJ16/6969, Archives Nationales. 
100 Ibid. 
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Des armes, des canons et des munitions; 
Des vivres, du lait pour le peuple d'Espagne. 101 
For the Catholic students, the tone was quite different, 
Resolument ä 1'ecart de toute opinion et organisation politiques, uniquement 
pousses par un sentiment d'elementaire humanite et par les imperieuses 
exigences de notre charite chretienne, 
Nous, etudiants catholiques, nous avons resolu d'aider ä recueillir [pour] des 
femmes et des enfants qui viennent chercher refuge sur notre sol. 
Aucun d'entre vous ne peut rester indifferent ä notre geste. C'est pourquoi 
nous sollicitons votre collaboration et nous vous disons: Aidez-nous! 
Nos differentes organisations se sont unies afin de secourir cette navrante 
misbre. 
Au nom du Christ, nous vous le demandons. 102 
Within two months the University of Paris appeal had raised 360,000 
francs for Spanish refugees in France. 103 However, this total was inflated by the 
inter-connected structure of French education. 290,000 francs came from Seine 
primary and secondary schools. As these figures suggest, the appeal seems to have 
remained Paris-focused. On 26 March 1939, the Rassemblement des Etudiants pour 
1'Aide ä l'Enfance Espagnole intended to send the first lorry of books from the 
Sorbonne to various refugee camps in the Eure and the Eure-et-Loire. 104 
The following month the Rector of the University of Paris was invited by a 
group of Spanish students in the refugee camp at Agde to support their Comite 
Provisoire d'Accueil aux Refugies d'Espagne. The Rector replied, 
je dois vous dire tout de suite que, quelle que soit ma sympathie pour votre 
initiative, il est difficile au Recteur de vous donner un patronage officiel... je 
suis par ailleurs heureux de pouvoir vous envoyer ma contribution 
101 "To French and British students: Today the peace of the world is menaced more than 
ever, Mussolini demands colonies. Save Spain, save France, Peace and democracy. The 
universities have to be on the battle-front for the unity of French and British democracies to 
demand: The arms, cannons and ammunition; Food supplies and milk for the people of 
Spain" - Les Cahiers de la Jeunesse, 15/ 2/ 1939, p. 6. 102 "Resolutely clear of all political opinions and organisations, uniquely driven by a 
sentiment of elementary humanity and by the pressing demands on our Christain charity, 
We, Catholic Students, have resolved to help in taking in the women and children who 
come to search for refuge on our soil. Some among us remain indifferent to our gesture. This 
is why we solict your collaboration and we say to you: Aid us! Our different organisations 
are united to help to relieve this upseting misery. In the name of Christ, we ask of you" - 
Ibid. 
103 Letter of 24/2/3199, AJ16/6969, Archives Nationales. 
104 Ibid. 
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personnelle 4 votre oeuvre. 105 
Refugee Relief for Spanish Academics 
While the Rector of Paris' official appeal for refugees was unprecedented in 
French universities, in Britain refugee relief largely developed within existing 
organisations. The prominence of Spanish intellectuals amongst the Republic's 
supporters fuelled concerns outside Spain about the extent to which they would 
suffer under Nationalist occupation. Given the international publicity surrounding 
the executions of the poet Garcia Lorca in August 1936 and of the Rector of the 
University of Ovideo in April 1937, these fears seemed to have some grounding. For 
academics, these fears reflected not merely political concern but also their personal 
and professional connections with Spanish colleagues. 
In April 1938 Isobel Henderson, a Spanish tutor at Somerville College, 
Oxford, and daughter of the Rector of Lincoln College, wrote to the secretary of the 
Society for Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL) over conditions in Spain. 106 
She was particularly concerned about the fate of academics in Republican Spain at a 
time when the Nationalist army was driving towards the Mediterranean. She wrote 
that, 
Prof J. B. Trend and I have been thinking that we might a) make a list of a 
few of the best Spanish University men who might find jobs here; b) canvass 
Oxford & Cambridge people willing to give them temporary hospitality; c) 
ask Azcärate [the Spanish Republic's Ambassador in London] to get in touch 
with them, so that they can give an English address to the Immigration 
Officers if they come over; and d) appeal to the colleges in their later 
support. 
My idea was to be prepared in case of a sudden military debacle. Many of 
the best Spanish intellectuals are, of course, very much in politics and could 
not stay if Franco won. 107 
Henderson faced the difficulty that British immigration authorities required 
guarantees of housing and maintenance for refugees before they would grant 
1051 have to tell you straight away that, whatever my sympathy for your initative, it is 
difficult as Rector to give you an official patronage... I am otherwise happy to be able to 
send to you my personal contribution to your work'- Letter of 19/4/1939, AJ16/6969, 
Archives Nationales. 
106 Letter of 12/411938, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
107 Ibid. 
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admission. She felt that, "Colleges will not directly invite people from Spain, but I 
think several would give Spaniards hospitality for a period, once they were in 
England". 108 Thus she was seeking SPSL backing to sponsor their entry into Britain. 
Henderson sent to the SPSL a "Purely Provisional List of Potential Refugee 
Scholars" including the names of Bosch Gimperä, Manuel Azafta, Juan Negrfn and 
seven others. The list was of largely prominent public figures such as Gimperä who 
was Rector at Barcelona and Catalan Minister of Justice. Henderson admitted to 
Adams that though she would like to invite Negrfn and Azana they would 
probably be considered too political as well as unlikely to need aid 109 She doubted 
that the SPSL appeal for academics refugees from Austria could be synchronised 
with an appeal for those from Spain. 
The SPSL was sympathetic to Henderson's plan, and was willing to 
approach the Home Office to seek entry permission for ten eminent scholars. 110 
However, the Society was more reticent about any general canvassing in Oxford 
and Cambridge for hospitality. Henderson was willing to agree with these 
reservations for she wrote in mid-May 1938 that, "I formed the plan when the end of 
the war seemed almost imminent: but at present it is clear that invitations to 
Republican intellectuals are neither necessary nor wise"111 As the Nationalist 
advance stalled, the impetus in Britain for academic aid soon dissipated. Henderson 
would write to Adams that, "I am glad Franco has got stuck, but it does make things 
harder to arrange". 112 
In late June 1938, Henderson was still seeking to invite four Spanish 
academics to Britain. 113 She wrote that there were "several Oxford heads of house 
sympathetic about temporary hospitality for Spanish scholars" 114 These pre- 
emptive efforts reveal the deep concern amongst some British academics over the 
fate of their Spanish peers, but it was not until after the military position of the 
Republic totally collapsed in 1939 that Spanish refugees became a central concern 
within British universities. 
Despite Henderson's efforts to create a scheme to support academic refugees 
in Oxford in early 1938, she was overseas when the refugee crisis occurred in early 
108 Letter of 11 / 5/ 1938, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
109 List, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
110 Letter of 10/ 5/ 1938, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
111 Letter of 17/ 5/ 1938, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
112rad. 
113 Letter of 30/ 6/ 1938, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
114 Ibid. 
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1939. In her place, her mother Margaret Munro, as the wife of the Rector of Lincoln 
College, took the lead in organising a scheme to support refugee Spanish academics 
in Oxford 115 With assistance from Oxford's Professor of Spanish, Entwistle, Munro 
sought to offer places in the university to Gimperä, Thomas and Alonso partly 
funded by the SPSL. 116 In Cambridge, Trend continued his efforts to support 
Spanish academics, offering his college rooms to Aguilar while he was overseas and 
looking for a position for Xirau amongst others. 117 
Perhaps the contrast between the way the British and Paris academics 
reacted to the plight of their Spanish colleagues provides the most appropriate close 
to this thesis. Groups in Britain and France had initially come together in reaction to 
the 1933 exodus of academics from Germany. Six years later, they maintained their 
own distinct approaches to refugee relief, reflecting the constraints and concerns of 
their own universities, as well as the political climates of their countries. 
For the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, the end of the civil 
war finally included Spanish academics amongst its central concerns, yet at the 
same time it found its resources already strained by the influx of other academic 
refugees from Central Europe. The SPSL co-operated with the NJCSR in trying to 
establish the number of university teachers amongst the refugees in Perpignan. 118 
By mid-April 1939, the SPSL had a list of 77 refugee scholars from Spain. 119 Yet 
despite these efforts, and the willingness of British academics to contribute to 
specifically Spanish relief, the SPSL remained far more successful in dealing with 
refugees from Central Europe. 120 One of the key factors in shaping British efforts 
for academic refugees was the timing of the appeals. In February 1939, For 
Intellectual Liberty had launched its own appeal for Spanish intellectual refugees, 
however by the mid-March this had been subsumed by refugees from 
Czechoslovakia who were described as the "most urgent problem". 121 
The SPSL was in close contact with a group of French academics who sought 
to create a Paris-based sister organisation to organise relief for university refugees 
115 Letter of 26/ 1/ 1939, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
116 Letter of 2/2/1939, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
117 Letter of 7/3/1939, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
Letter of 7/ 3/ 1939, Add 8251 / VI, University Library, Cambridge. 
118 Letter of 25/ 4/ 1939, Mss SPSL 118/ 8 Bodleian Library; 
It was also contacted by Spanish committees for intellectual refugees based in Toulouse and 
later from Paris - Letters of 7/3/1939,4/9/1939, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 119 Letter 25/4/39, Mss SPSL 118, Bodleian Library. 
120 Letter of 23/ 2/ 1939, Mss SPSL 153, Bodleian Library. 
121 F1L Bulletins of 9/2/1939 & 18/3/1939, Add 9369, University Library, Cambridge. 
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in France. The groups' secretary was Canadian Louis Rapkine, who in a letter to the 
SPSL's Walter Adams revealed the limits upon what aid could be organised within 
the French universities. Despite the end of the war, refugees remained a politicised 
issue in France which imposed constraints on the relief that could be undertaken 
within the state education system. As Rapkin wrote to Adams in mid 1939, 
Am writing this two days after one of our committee meetings that we held 
for the special purpose of helping some Spanish scholars. The Ministry of 
National Education appointed our committee to examine all the applications 
and to choose the candidates which are to be helped. All this is of course by 
the way; it is just to tell you that our Council met, and besides examining the 
Spanish scholars' applications, we also examined a few new ones coming 
from Austria, Tchekoslovakia [sic] and Germany. Now, it seems that the 
Government is ready to contribute, through the French National Research 
Council, some funds, to help certain foreign scientists who have shown, in 
the past, some good feeling towards French institutions of learning and 
science. But, the French National Research Council is rather afraid of taking 
this responsibility, because it is afraid of criticism by some of the reactionary 
elements. 122 
The fear that the extreme right, especially its press, would use academic refugees as 
a pretext for a scandal, reveals the extent to which Spain remained a politicised and 
potentially controversial issue. 
Despite the formal constraints within the French university system, 
academics and students in southern France were heavily involved in aiding the 
large number of Spanish refugees arriving in their communities. In June 1938, a 
committee to aid Spanish intellectuals was established in Montpellier, which was 
headed by Jean Amade, a Professor in the Faculty of Letters 123 With the exodus of 
early February 1939, Montpellier academics successfully raised 1,000 francs for 
refugee relief and co-operated with the Prefect and Mayor in establishing a 
residence for refugee intellectuals. 124 In Toulouse, state officials, political activists 
and academics collaborated in seeking to provide relief to the new refugees. The 
Comite Universitaire launched a new appeal in late January 1939, calling on 
Western governments to establish a neutral zone in Catalonia for refugees to 
prevent new massacres like that of Badajoz125 At the same time, the committee 
122 Letter of 12/ 5/1939, Mss SPSL 145, Bodleian Library. 
123 piepe Grau, "L'Aide des Felibres aux Intellectuels Catalans", in Sagnes & Caucanas, eds., 
Les Francais et la Guerre d'Espagne, pp. 200-201. 
124Ibid. pp. 202 & 206. 
125 Le Midi Socialiste. 27/1/1939, p. 4. 
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also appealed for material and money to help Spanish teachers and students. 126 
Vice-President of the Comite Universitaire was Professor Daniel Faucher of the 
Faculty of Letters who also helped the local authorities to co-ordinate aid efforts . 
127 
Faucher was patron of a meeting held on 2 February 1939 to bring together all local 
groups in Toulouse involved with the refugees, and he was prominent in the 
Comite Universitaire's attempts to establish a canteen for refugee intellectuals. 
These local efforts reflected the dramatic impact of the refugees on towns across 
southern France, and how the sheer magnitude of the problem forced state 
authorities and pre-existing relief efforts to work together. 
The influx of refugees into France meant that she was touched by the civil 
war even after Franco claimed victory on the opening of April 1939. As late as 
August 1939, a confidential paper titled "Le Probleme des Universitaires Espagnols 
en Exil", was circulating amongst Paris academics 128 The paper proposed that 
institutes, scholarships, courses and reviews should be established within French 
universities to aid the academic refugees from Republican Spain. Circumstances 
were very much against such an initiative, for as the Rector noted, discretion had to 
be shown so as not to publicly act against Franco. 129 Nevertheless, he was willing to 
support the creation on an Institut des Hautes Etudes Hispaniques for the refugees 
from Republican Spain. Despite the constraints they faced within the state system, 
some French academics continued to search for ways to assist their Spanish 
colleagues. 
Conclusion 
The crisis in Central Europe in September 1938 not only profoundly 
impacted upon political alignments within the universities of Britain and France, 
but affected the Spanish relief campaigns which had developed in both countries 
during the civil war. The Munich Agreement had been signed just as Nationalist 
forces were reversing the Republic's final offensive at the Ebro. The hectic months 
from October 1938 to March 1939, merged aid efforts and refugees, and blurred 
events in Spain with those in Central Europe. This connection between Spain and 
126 Other appeals for aid were launched by the SFIO and by the local Comit6 Sanitaire - Le 
Midi Socialiste, 20/2/1939, p. 1; 
Le Midi Socialiste, 24/3/1939, p. 4. 
127 Florence Mila, "Les Toulousains Face a l'Exode des Republicains Espagnols (1939)", 
Memoire de Maltrise, Universite de Toulouse (Miral), 1995, pp. 92 & 95. 
128 Notes of Aug. 1939, AJ16/6969, Archives Nationales. 
129 Letter of 28/ 12/1939, AJ16/ 6969, Archives Nationales. 
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the expansionism of German and Italy, particularly for those in Britain encouraged 
a view of international events which stressed continuity across Europe. 
By January 1939, the Nationalist advance into Catalonia meant that the 
nature of British and French refugee relief was fundamentally changed. The scale of 
the human exodus towards France was unparalleled in the war. British and French 
academics and students were heavily engaged in relief campaigns to aid refugees, 
as well as separate efforts for their peers from Spanish universities. It was only 
when the war was effectively over and the French state had committed itself to 
caring for those refugees on its own territory, that university-based aid campaigns 
could emerge in France. Before that point, the civil war had been seen as too 
politicised, and the tensions between different political parties too pronounced for 
the campus coalitions which had proliferated in Britain to develop. 
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Conclusion 
Theodore Zeldin has written of the dual importance of intellectuals in 
French history as actors and recorders of political movements, 
For not only have intellectuals played a leading part in these conflicts, but 
they have also interpreted them and labelled them in such a way as to 
influence all thought about them. It was they who formulated the issues 
which they claimed divided the country and defined the principles which 
were at stake. Their generalisations became accepted truths, to the extent 
that they shaped events, for new controversies were fitted into the categories 
they had devised. They bequeathed to historians a framework into which the 
events of the past can be conveniently slotted, but this inherited framework 
is not necessarily the only one that can be used. The reasons why it was 
evolved need to be examined more closely, and there seems to be room, at 
any rate, for another perspective. 1 
This need for a critical examination of the experiences of Western intellectuals is 
particularly appropriate for the ways in which the Spanish civil war has been 
shaped in popular memory and academic history by their writings. The study of 
academics and students, rather than writers, poets and artists, has provided another 
perspective on the civil war which is more nuanced for its recognition of their 
shared social background and common forms of participation in national political 
currents. A comparison between Britain and France highlights the importance of 
these two elements in the identities of each country's intellectuals. The experiences 
of university intellectuals during the Spanish civil war contradict many of the 
existing works on the literary intellectuals of the 1930s which have argued that the 
politicisation of the decade was a limited phenomenon. University reactions to the 
war also point towards some of the nuances of national politics in the two countries. 
Intellectuals and the Spanish Civil War: Engagement and Disillusionment 
One of the dominant themes of histories of the 1930s is that while the 
Spanish civil war represented the highwater mark of political commitment for a 
British and French literary intelligentsia, the defeat of the Spanish Republic 
spawned a widespread disillusionment with that same engagement in politics? 
1 Zeldin, France 1848-1945, Vol. 1 Ambition, Love & Politics, p. 1. 2 Stansky & Abrahams, Tourney to the Frontier, p. xviii; 
Gordon, "France and the Spanish Civil War", p. 403. 
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Tom Buchanan argues that because many British intellectuals supported the 
Spanish Republic based on their assumptions of its liberal politics, its democratic 
government, and the threat of foreign 'fascism, the very perspective which 
motivated their political engagement fuelled their turning away from politics as the 
complex internal politics of the Spanish Republic became more evident over time. 3 
More specifically, the Communist Party, which had done so much to actively shape 
and politicise intellectuals' involvement in campaigns over Spain, was seen as 
corrupting or betraying the cause which it had promoted with so much energy. 4 
With the onset of the Cold War during the following decade, this rejection of 
Communist involvement in the civil war took on a heightened resonance. For 
writers such as Orwell, Borkenau and Koestler, "the Spanish Civil War represented 
a personal encounter with what they saw as 'totalitarian' practices and a watershed 
in their relationship to communism". 5 For these three, and for others such as W. H. 
Auden, Stephen Spender and Simone Weil, experiencing the war at close hand 
made them increasingly critical of the costs involved 6 This disillusionment with the 
civil war and turning away from political activity are seen as originating during the 
war itself. 
The experience within British and French universities was very different 
from that of the individual authors and poets who have emerged so prominently in 
the histories of the civil war. 7 Rather than withdrawing from politics, academics 
and students in both countries played a large role in the intensifying campaigns for 
humanitarian aid, Spanish refugees, and against non-intervention over the course of 
the war. These campaigns were shaped by the course of battle within Spain, by 
other international events such as impending war in Central Europe during 1938, 
and by the changes in domestic politics of Britain and France. Despite the gradual 
Stuart Samuels, "English Intellectuals and Politics in the 1930s", in Philip Rieff, ed., On 
Intellectuals: Theoretical Studies, Case Studies, Doubleday, New York, 1969, pp. 217 & 243. 
3 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 146 
4Ibid. 
, p. 147; Julian Symons' chapter on the Spanish civil war are subtitled 'The Deceived" and "The 
Deceivers" - Julian Symons, The Thirties: A Dream Revolved, Cressent Press, London, 1960, 
pp. 119 & 129. 
5 Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War, p. 168. 
6 "Disillusionment took many forms in Spain but hinged on the realisation that what had 
appeared from the safety of Britain as a just war - or even a crusade - was more complex, 
more squalid, and infinitely less heroic when seen at close quarters" - Ibid. p. 163. 7The paths of these two groups of intellectuals occasionally crosed, so that in early 1937 
Oxford tutor Helen Grant saw celebrity writers Hemingway and Dos Passos when she 
visited besiged Madrid - Diary "Spain: March 25-April 18 1937", p. 68 in Add 8251, 
University Library, Cambridge. 
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accumulation of territory by Nationalist forces over the three years of fighting, the 
outcome of the war was always uncertain. 8 
Most strikingly, the major international campaigns for Republican Spain 
occurred when its military position was the most threatened, during the major 
Nationalist offensives against Madrid in late 1936, the Basque country in April 1937, 
the Levant in April 1938 and finally on Catalonia in January 1939. Each of these 
offensives gave humanitarian aid appeals and refugee relief efforts a distinctive 
character, either for the besieged civilian populations of Madrid and Bilbao, for the 
worsening food shortage in the divided Republican territory during 1938, or finally 
for the massive exodus of refugees from Catalonia in 1939. Oxford student Denis 
Healey remembered that as the European crisis intensified in 1938 and 1939 with 
events in Czechoslovakia and Spain, these produced a greater commitment to work 
harder to turn the tide, rather than resignation or despair. 9 Within the universities 
of both Britain and France, the period between October 1938 to February 1939 
marked the high point of the overlapping campaigns for the Republic. 
As the Spanish Republic's military forces disintegrated, the commitment for 
aid and relief for its civilian population intensified. While the first appeals for 
international assistance had been for combatants and their families, during the 
war's first year humanitarian aid shifted to focus overwhelmingly on the civilian 
relief. Within British universities these humanitarian campaigns were able to 
mobilise a broad range of support, which extended to explicitly 'non-political' 
groups and individuals. In France, party politics militated against such open 
coalitions, but within the parties themselves were a wide variety of perceptions of 
the war. It was the range of motives which these campaigns drew on, from a 
general opposition to war to absolute pacifism, from religious charity to 
professional solidarity, that meant they were able to broaden their support 
throughout the decade, despite the changes of party politics. 
For besieged Republican Spain, the front-lines of the war ran through its 
major cities, and the Nationalist forces recognised no division between the military 
and civilian population. The civil war changed the image of modem warfare for the 
rest of Europe, as images of the trenches and gas attacks of the Western Front 
between 1914-1918 were replaced by that of air raids on civilian conurbations. 
Aerial bombardment, which symbolised for many pro-Republicans the hypocrisy of 
8 Stanley Payne, "Review: Paul Preston, Franco", European History Quarterly, 25, Jan 1995, 
p157. 
`ý Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 34. 
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non-intervention, was therefore linked to humanitarian campaigns for the suffering 
civilian population. 
This continuing commitment to the Republican cause was recognised by Eric 
Hobsbawm, who was a Communist student at Cambridge in the late 1930s. 
Hobsbawm wrote in his recent history of the twentieth century that, 
What Spain meant to liberals and those on the Left who lived through the 
1930s, is now difficult to remember, though for many of us the survivors, 
now all past the Biblical life-span, it remains the only political cause which, 
even in retrospect, appears as pure and compelling as it did in 1936. Yet at 
the time it seemed to those who fought fascism to be the central front of their 
battle, because the only one in which action never ceased for over two-and- 
a-half years, the only one where they could participate as individuals, if not 
in uniform, then by collecting money, by helping refugees, and by the never- 
ending campaigns to put pressure on our own chicken-hearted 
governments. And the gradual, but apparently irreversible advance of the 
nationalist side, the foreseeable defeat and death of the Republic, merely 
made the need to forge a union against world fascism more desperately 
urgent. 1o 
Hobsbawm's own continuing commitment to the Communist Party after the 
Spanish civil war provides an important counterpoint to those who have described 
student politics as merely an adolescent adventure. In later decades both 
commentators and some participants themselves have sought to argue that the 
growth of a student organisations on the left (particularly those of the Communists) 
were a momentary flirtation, an act of defiance and desperation. 11 
The sheer strength of the left's commitment to Republican Spain was a 
matter of neither intellectual deception nor delusion, for it often survived the 
recognition of the complex and tragic realities of the war. British academics Francis 
Cornford and Gilbert Murray both lost their sons in the war, and both remained 
prominent supporters of the Republic. 12 Cambridge Communist student Bernard 
Knox returned from Spain shaken by his experiences and the high casualties in the 
10 Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 160. 
11 Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, p. 73; 
Despite their political differences at the time, the autobiographies of Philip Toynbee and 
Christopher Mayhew also share this downplaying of student political commitment - 
Toynbee, Friends Apart p. 63. 
Christopher Mayhew, Party Games. Hutchinson, London, 1969, p. 26. 12 Basil Murray died in late April 1937 whilst visiting Republican Spain - Duncan Wilson, 
Gilbert Murray OM 1866-1957, Carendon Press, Oxford, 1987, pp. 343-344, 
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Republicans' front-line in late 1936.13 Still, he was soon participating in fundraising 
campaigns for the Republican cause, which he continued to defend in the late 1980s, 
despite recognising its shortcomings 14 Even in an editorial that denounced the 
Communist repression of the POUM, Rabaud of the Etudiants Socialistes in Paris 
called for the members of the SFIO to redouble their efforts of solidarity for their 
Spanish comrades 15 
The various campaigns for humanitarian aid, refugee relief and against non- 
intervention, were most tightly intertwined for Communists, while elements also 
appealed to the different motives of others. Taken together, these campaigns, which 
were often contradictory, infused with political tensions, and fuelled by very 
different perceptions of politics and the war in Spain, do embody a positive 
movement that points towards the need for a reconsideration, not only of the 
history of intellectuals during the 1930s, but of British and French society at the end 
of the decade. This confident culture of activism, which harnessed the energies of a 
mixed minority, has been overshadowed by the long shadow of the world war 
which followed the conflict in Spain. Histories of French society in the 1930s have 
stressed the bitter climate of psychological pessimism, political polarisation and 
social division, which are seen as underlying the Republic's military defeat of 
1940.16 Though these factors were significant, the late 1930s were also marked by 
the strong commitment of the French left to the collapsing Spanish Republic. Tony 
Judt's argument that the Third Republic died unloved amongst French intellectuals 
of the left and right ignores the experiences of academics and students of both 
groups. 17 Neither did the French extreme right merely collapse into pacifist 
defeatism following its dissolution in 1936, as the protests against Italian 
expansionism at the end of 1938 and the propaganda campaign for diplomatic 
recognition of Nationalist Spain reveal. The vitality of the PCF, SFIO, PSF and other 
groups maintained the divisions between their student members, whereas amongst 
British students increasing activism led to coalition across and outside political 
boundaries. 
13 Straight, After Long Silence, p. 99. 
14 Bernard Knox, New York Review of Books, 26/ 7/1987, pp. 25 & 28. 
15 Essais et Combats, Dec. 1937, p. 3. 
16 James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991 2nd ed., 
Edward Arnold, London, 1992, p. 103; 
Weber, The Hollow Years, passim. 
17 Judt, Past Imperfect, pp. 15 & 23-25. 
Judt's attack is focused on the commitments of French Communist intellectuals during the 
Cold War. 
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Party Politics and Party Commitment 
This continuing commitment was not only to the Republican cause, but also 
to the existing parties in both countries through which many of these intellectuals 
defined their identities. Whether as members inside the party or independent 
activists and patrons outside its organisation, party politics played a large role in 
determining the reactions of academics and students to the Spanish civil war. 
Given that so much of the historiography has stressed the timidity of the 
SFIO and Labour Party in their support for the Spanish Republic, it is significant 
that the civil war itself seemed to have little direct effect on their levels of 
membership and support. Despite the divisions caused amongst the Socialists of 
both countries by their parties' initial adoption of non-intervention, and by the 
Labour Party's rejection of united action in Britain, party activists and militants were 
unwilling to push their dissent over policy into a radical challenge to the 
institutions of the party. 18 This was partly because alongside these debates 
Socialists in both countries were fully committed to a variety of aid and relief 
efforts for Spain. 19 While the Labour Party and the TUC sought to create 
humanitarian appeals which kept their members away from Communist front 
organisations, the activities of British academics were largely expressed in local or 
campus-based coalitions outside the Labour Party. In late February 1937, the 
Cambridge branch of the Labour Party replied to an appeal for the TUC Fund for 
Spain, "that our energies at present were being given to the Cornford-Maclaurin 
Fund". 20 In France, Socialist academics and students directed their activities 
through the local structures of the SFIO. The success of the Comite Sanitaire d'Aide 
in Toulouse was precisely because it followed the boundaries of party politics 
which increasingly separated French aid efforts for Spain. This political difference 
between the two countries was reinforced by the lack of campus-focus in French 
university politics which meant that academics and students were shaped by the 
local politics of their surrounding community, especially outside of Paris. 
In both countries, the Communists made the Republican cause their own, 
through their consistent championing of aid, their absolute opposition to non- 
18 Howell, British Social Democracy, p. 90. 
19 Tom Buchanan argues that the British labour movement was divided over Spain by the 
hostility of working class Catholics to the Spanish Republic. This opposition seems highly 
regionalised, and was less of an issue in the French labour movement - Buchanan, The 
Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movemen pp. 167-195. 
2 Minutes of 22/ 2/1937, p. 14 in 634/08 Executive Minutes Nov 1936-May 1941, Cambridge 
City Labour Party, Cambridgeshire County Record Office. 
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intervention, their organisation of the International Brigades, and through the 
substantial material support which the USSR supplied to the Republic. While pro- 
Communist historians have stressed how campaigns over the Spanish civil war 
represented the culmination of the party's consistent activism against war and 
fascism from the early 1930s, this underestimates the extent to which a radical 
refashioning of party strategy had taken place across the decade? i British 
Communist students were able to take the lead in campus coalitions with other 
groups over Spain, either within existing Socialist Societies or through university 
Peace Councils and the national BYPA. In France, and to some extent in Britain, 
academics such as Langevin and Wallon were important public supporters of 
Communist initiatives as their independent identities broadened such campaigns 
"against war and fascism" outside the party ranks. 
This patron's role was not confined to Communist sympathisers, but was 
adopted by a wide variety of university figures. Public patrons of pro-Republican 
campaigns during the civil war ranged from veterans of the Ligue des Droits de 
1'Homme (Victor Basch in Paris and Daniel Faucher in Toulouse), supporters of the 
Liberal Party (Gilbert Murray in Oxford, Francis Cornford in Cambridge and Sir 
Daniel Stevenson in Glasgow), to Quakers and Christian Pacifists (John Harvey in 
Leeds and Charles Raven in Cambridge). Importantly, these senior figures divided 
their patronage amongst a multitude of other professional, humanitarian, 
educational, and civic causes before the outbreak of the war in Spain. George Weisz 
has argued that the image of the Third Republic as a 'Republic of Professors, "a 
period of unparalleled academic influence in social and political life" has been 
largely derived from the activities of an isolated, unrepresentative Parisian 
oligarchy22 While the small circle of politically engaged academics, such as 
Langevin, Wallon, Joliot-Curie in Paris or the scientists of CSWAG in Cambridge 
were unique in their commitment, academics enjoyed a widely recognised position 
as patrons in national and local politics in both countries. 23 
During the mid-1930s French academics had played an important role as the 
independent supporters of cross-party coalitions during the development of the 
Rassemblement Populaire. From the pronunciamiento in 1936, new campaigns 
developed out of these existing coalitions, symbolised by Basch's role as president 
21 Tony Judt has rightly warned of the "oddities of communist vocabularly" given that so 
many these histories have largely ignored the changing meaning and contexts of 
Communist slogans - Judt, Past Imperfect, p. 454. 22 George Weisz, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France 1863-1914 p. 338. 23 Nathanael Greene, "National and Local: Rural Politics 1932-1936", French Historical 
Studies, 1976,9, pp. 523 & 519. 
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of the Rassemblement Populaire's efforts to co-ordinate party-based aid appeals for 
Republican Spain. Alongside Basch, academics in both countries stood as sponsors 
for humanitarian aid appeals for Republican Spain, their independent support 
legitimising the claims that such appeals went beyond matters of party politics. 
Equally in the debates over non-intervention, the academics who were absolutely 
opposed to the policy emerged as important advocates in organisations such as the 
Comite International de Coordination et d'Information pour l'Aide ä l'Espagne 
Republicaine or Haldane's campaign of 1938 over Air Raid Precautions. As patrons 
in the changing campaigns over the civil war, academics were both heavily 
involved in party politics and constantly invoking their own distinctive political 
identity. 
Perceptions of Republican Spain: The Embodiment of Anti-Fascist Unity 
In both Britain and France, the independent political identity of intellectuals 
helped to legitimise calls for anti-fascist unity between the parties of the left, 
symbolised by the electoral campaigns of Paul Rivet in May 1935 and A. D. Lindsay 
in October 1938. At first sight the two elections were strikingly similar. In both, 
academics and students emerged at the forefront of heterogeneous coalitions which 
cut across pre-existing political formations and alignments. Despite their common 
character, the electoral campaigns led by Rivet and Lindsay developed at different 
times and in response to very different national dynamics. Both campaigns were 
largely focused on the same single-issue of anti-fascism, yet from two very different 
perspectives, one focused on domestic politics and the other concerned with 
international events. In France, the epithet 'fascist' had been commonly used since 
the 1920s by both left and right to label their opponents, whereas in Britain it was 
only after the rise of Nazism in 1933 that it was seen as a threatening international 
phenomenon. 
This contrast explains not only the coalitions which did develop in both 
countries, but also what other alternatives were ruled out or left unconsidered. The 
political coalitions that were formed in France during the mid 1930s as a reaction to 
domestic politics precluded any parallel to the mobilisation over international 
events which occurred in Britain at the end of the decade. At the Oxford Congress 
of Socialist students in 1936, it was the French students who had participated in the 
triumphant Front Populaire coalition who opposed any shift from "unity of action" 
to "unity of organisation" with the Communists. Importantly, Spanish students 
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enjoyed a prominent role at the Congress as the international embodiment of anti- 
fascist unity. 
In both Britain and France, the election of the Frente Popular in February 
1936 was commonly invoked as a symbol of successful unity on the left, before the 
military rebellion in Spain five months later dramatically intensified this 
identification. Throughout the civil war, Republican Spain was seen by its 
supporters as representing a broad ranging alliance against fascism of liberals and 
anarchists, Catholics and Communists, progressive Conservatives and Socialists. 
This image was most strongly promoted by the Communists, especially in Britain 
where their campaigns for united humanitarian aid for Spain also carried calls for 
domestic unity of the left. The promotion of broad-reaching coalitions focused on 
anti-fascist unity and Spain by both the PCF and the CPGB were partly successful 
attempts to strengthen their own following. This call for an alliance on the left was 
supported out of different motives by British academics such as Cole and Laski 
from within the Labour Party and by French socialists such as Basch and Rivet. 
Cole's desire for a "People's Front", was grounded as much in his desire to radically 
reform the institutions of the Labour Party as in his perceptions of a general 
European crisis. Anti-fascist unity had distinctive meanings in Britain and France, 
which powerfully shaped perceptions of the civil war in Spain on the left in both 
countries. After 1934, French politics had been transformed by a coalition of the left 
against the threat of domestic fascism, which looked to Spanish events as a fraternal 
parallel? 4 For the second half of the 1930s, the campaign for anti-fascist unity in 
Britain was overwhelmingly focused on international events and opposition to the 
Chamberlain government's foreign policy. 25 
Different Political Repertoires, Different Political Battles 
The different perspectives of anti-fascist unity and of the civil war in Spain, 
were worked out through nationally-distinct forms of political activity and 
organisation. This contrast between British and French reactions to Iberian events 
was best encapsulated in the differing campaigns for humanitarian aid in the two 
countries. Drawing on his personal experiences, aid campaigns in the two countries 
were compared by British hispanist, Raymond Carr, who remembered that, 
24 French activists spoke of the "lessons of Spain" and in the first days of the war called for 
the purging of reactionary elements in the civil service and army to prevent a similar revolt 
in France. 
25 Jupp, The Radical Left in Britain 1931-1941, p. 120. 
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I had a long debate with A. J. P. Taylor over the degree of support for an 
active policy to aid Spain, which he maintained was widespread and deep. I 
came to left-wing politics from France in 1936 and found that support tepid - 
perhaps if I had lived in Glasgow or South Wales I would have thought 
differently. 26 
As Carr realises, though there was a fundamental contrast between British and 
French aid campaigns, there were strong connections between British and French 
working class communities, embodied in the support for the International Brigades 
or the fundraising efforts of the trade unions and established parties. 
The civil war in Spain was felt as a far more direct and polarised issue in 
France, due to the intense political climate generated by the domestic crisis of 6 
February 1934. British humanitarian aid for Spain was organised not only through 
the established labour movement, but also through a broad ad hoc coalition of 
political and non-political groups which coalesced in the National Joint Committee 
for Spanish Relief. The French left's campaigns against the internal fascist menace 
between 1934 and 1936 militated against any parallel coalition in France, as the 
rivalry for increasing party membership was carried into the organisation of aid for 
Spain. Party-based humanitarian appeals in France had a far more politicised 
content than did the explicitly 'non-political' and 'non-partisan' campaigns in 
Britain? 7 This national contrast was heightened within the universities of Britain 
and France, where the campus-based independence and coalitions of British 
students and academics allowed them to participate in a proliferation of 
heterogeneous humanitarian appeals. In France, party politics shaped the activities 
of students and even those of 'independent' academics. It was not until the close of 
the war that a university-based humanitarian appeal was established in Paris to 
parallel those of Britain, and even this was distinctive in its recognition by the state. 
The forms of political organisation and activity accepted within the universities of 
each country reinforced the differing political content of their humanitarian aid 
campaigns. 
The success of humanitarian aid appeals for Spain within British universities 
was partly because these were so strongly linked with other relief appeals for 
refugees from Germany, Austria, China and Czechoslovakia. Concern in Britain for 
German academic refugees in 1933 was in many ways the forerunner of this mixing 
26 Raymond Carr, "Labour Pains", Times Literary Supplement, 4591,29/3/1991, p. 8. 
27 French campaigns were more politicised in the sense that they were more often explicitly 
pro-Republican (or in support of particular Spanish groups) and more consciously separate 
from other eforts of other parties. 
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of political activity with professional, humanitarian and personal concerns which 
explained the breadth of support for the Spanish Republic. The acceptance of 
humanitarian fundraising within British universities encouraged a feeling of 
continuity between overseas crises which were the subjects of the various appeals. 
While the content and organisation of humanitarian aid in Britain was less 
politicised, it did have a significant impact on the debates over non-intervention 
and the divisions within the Spanish Republic. In France, while these two issues 
evoked heated debate, the tensions between the aid efforts of the PCF and the SFIO 
revealed that the increasing hostility between the parties had been aggravated by a 
more fundamental antagonism as they competed for members and influence. A 
comparative approach to the campaigns of the two countries, and their various 
proclaimed political or non-political identities, firmly establishes not only a 
fundamental difference in the political climate of the two countries, but helps to 
map the differing political characters of such diversely organised and motivated 
campaigns. 
While humanitarian aid for Spain campaigns were not the same between 
Britain and France, it is equally misleading to assume that the Spanish civil war 
evoked the same reaction from the right or from Catholics as it did from the left. It 
has frequently been argued that the Spanish civil war powerfully reinforced 
existing political divisions within both Britain and France, with the right and 
Catholics supporting Franco and the left rallying to the Republic 28 However, far 
from there being a fundamental polarisation over the civil war in Britain or France, 
large elements of the right rejected rather than shared the Spanish obsession of the 
left. The emphasis on polarisation fails to account for groups such as the Cambridge 
University Spanish Society who consciously chose to distance themselves from the 
debate over Spain. The majority of those in universities in both countries remained, 
if not unconcerned by daily politics, then inactive. 29 
With a different conception of politics from their opponents on the left, 
Spain was not the same cause for the right. Few British Conservative students 
shared the activist vision of politics which so marked the Socialist Societies of their 
universities. In France, the legal dissolution of 1936 had officially denied the 
students of the extreme right their repertoire of public activism, and there were few 
direct confrontations with the forces of the Rassemblement Populaire. Differences in 
28 Watkins, Britain Divided, passim 
Robert Graves & Alan Hodge, The Long Week-end: A Social History of Great Britain 1918- 
1939.2nd ed., Faber & Faber, 1949, p. 337. 
29 Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries:, p. 257 
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political actions was reinforced by diverging political concerns. The war in Spain 
was on the periphery of Tory foreign policy which was focused on achieving a 
rapprochement in Central Europe. Equally, the leagues and later the PSF had a 
largely negative foreign policy, focused on the threat to France of foreign 
entanglements, particularly those initiated by the left. These initial reactions to the 
war changed over time, as some British conservative students became more 
involved in 'non-political' aid campaigns for Spain and more outspoken over the 
failures of non-intervention. By adopting the activist forms of the left, they often 
found themselves sharing its political positions, though their dissent on 
government foreign policy never ruptured their loyalty to the party. 
What mattered in determining reactions to the civil war was not so much 
existing political alignments, but approaches to politics. Eugen Weber has 
questioned the assumption of a rigid polarisation of left and right in French politics, 
arguing that these categories were often blurred and subjectively imposed. Instead 
of ideological polarisation, Weber suggests that, 
psychological categories, rough as they are, serve better than our present 
ones: optimist or pessimist, static or dynamic, tell us more, much more, 
about the character of a man or group, than right or left 30 
Weber's approach partly explains why the strongest pro-Nationalist campaigns in 
France occurred during 1938 when Franco 's military success had Occident and 
others arguing that support for the Nationalists was merely a recognition of the 
status quo in Spain. Republican and Nationalist supporters were separated by 
differing conceptions of politics as much as ideology, which explains why there 
were so few pro-Nationalist campaigns 31 If the Spanish civil war was a powerful 
symbol for anti-fascist unity in Britain and France, the war also reveals that anti- 
fascism exaggerated the international unity of the extreme right as there was no 
automatic identification by either the British or French right with the Nationalist 
cause. 
Conclusion 
Differences in political repertoires and party politics shaped the political 
climates of Britain and France which powerfully shaped the reactions of academics 
and students to the Spanish civil war. Contrasting the two countries highlights the 
30 Eugen Weber, My France: Politics, Culture. Myth, Havard University Press, Cambridge, 
1991, p. 54. 
31 Toynbee, "Journal of a Naive Revolutionary", pp. 148-149. 
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national contexts in which parties acted, aid and relief campaigns were organised 
and the war was debated. Though the slogans of these debates were remarkably 
similar on either side of the Channel, they were translated in particular 
circumstances. Theodore Zeldin has rightly warned the historian not to merely 
follow the political labels and slogans which French parties used to mass their 
troops, 
the purpose of these labels is partly to conceal differences, to make common 
action possible, to rally support... the labels perpetuate distinctions, feuds, 
enmities whose origin is almost forgotten and whose significance is largely 
historical 32 
Political programs and slogans were often compromises seeking to create unity by 
what they left silent as much as what they said 33 Slogans such as "Against War 
and Fascism", "Aidez 1'Espagne" or "Ouvrez la frontiere" were intended to appeal to a 
diverse spread of supporters and their meanings changed over time. 
These nuances of political language were perhaps best encapsulated in the 
debate over non-intervention which assumed different meanings in Britain and 
France. In the latter, the debate amongst the left focused on whether the policy was 
a betrayal of the Front Populaire and the possibility of direct military support for 
the Spanish Republic, while British arguments focused on the Republic's rights at 
international law to commercial liberty in purchasing arms. In both countries, the 
absolute opposition to the policy of Communist activists gradually overshadowed 
the political definitions of Socialists, pacifists and others. It is these other views 
which have been lost in a historiography which treats the civil war as a 
international ideological struggle par excellence. A recognition of the variety of 
religious, professional, humanitarian and personal motives provides an 
understanding of the depth of political commitments and the particular contexts in 
which they were formulated. As Marc Bloch has argued, history is the science of 
diversity and movement, and a conscious comparison of academics and students in 
Britain and France during the 1930s reminds us that reactions to the Spanish civil 
war were never as unitary, unchanging, or as certain, as the political slogans 
imply 34 
32 Zeldin, France 1848-1945, Vol. 1 Ambition, Love & Politics, p. 385. 
33 Eugen Weber, My France: Politics, Culture, Myth, p. 49. 
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